



GANADHARAVADA

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GAṆADHARAVĀDA

Translation and Explanation

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Under the terms of the donation made by the trustees of the Sheth Punamchand Karamchand Kotawala Charitable trust, this institution has been publishing works on the various aspects of Jainism.

The following works have already been published under the Research Series of this fund:—

1. Gujarat in the Jaina Āgama Literature (in Gujarati)
by Dr. B. J. Sandesara, 1952.
2. Three Old Gujarati Works (in Gujarati)
Edited by Dr. Charlotte Krause, 1951.
3. Uttarādhyayana Sūtra (Ch. 1-18) —
with translation (in Gujarati)
by Dr. B. J. Sandesara, 1952.
4. Gaṇadharaṇyāda by Ācārya Jinabhadra with translation
(in Gujarati) based on Maladhārī Hemacandra's commentary
and Introduction
by Shri Dalsukh Malavania, 1952.
5. Yogaśataka by Haribhadrasūri with translation and annotations
(in Gujarati)
by Dr. Miss I. H. Jhaveri, 1956.
6. Mahāmātya Vastupāla's Literary Circle and its Contribution
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by Dr. B. J. Sandesara, 1957.
7. Yogaśataka by Haribhadrasūri — with translation and
annotations by Dr. I. H. Jhaveri — rendered into Hindi
by Shri S. M. Jain, 1959.

In its meeting held on 30th June, 1958, the Trust Executive Committee of this Institution resolved to entrust the work of preparing an English translation of Gaṇadharaṇyāda with Intro-

duction and annotations to Dr. Miss E. A. Solomon, who accepted the work and completed it in 1961. The committee then resolved, in its meeting held on 16th December, 1961, to publish it under the P. K. Kotawala Trust.

Gaṇadharavāda forms one of the outstanding sections of Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya by Ācārya Jinabhadra, which is esteemed highly for the exposition of the Jaina Āgamas.

Dr. Miss E. A. Solomon, now a Reader in Sanskrit in the Language Department of the Gujarat University, has specialised herself in the various systems of Indian Philosophy. She has translated the gāthās of the Gaṇadharavāda in the Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya as well as their elucidation given in its commentary by Maladhārī Hemacandra, supplemented the translation with necessary annotations and given a studied Introduction on the subject.

We hope this publication will be useful to several readers interested in the Jaina system of philosophy.

R. C. Marg,
Ahmedabad-9.
28th February, 1966.

Hariprasad G. Shastri
Asstt. Director,
B. J. Institute of
Learning & Research.

PREFACE

The Gaṇadharavāda is an important Jaina text in Prakrit. It is a part of the Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya (gāthās 1549–2024) of Jinabhadra and describes the controversies between Lord Mahāvīra and Indrabhūti and other Brahmanical thinkers who after much intellectual discussion were convinced of the truth of Mahāvīra's teaching and joined him as his faithful and devoted disciples and preached his teachings and philosophical views. A number of philosophical topics come up for discussion here and different views and speculations about them are discussed; all other possible alternatives are explained and refuted, and the Jaina view is established. Thus the Gaṇadharavāda gives an insight into a number of problems of Indian philosophy from different points of view.

When I was working as Assistant Director and Professor of Sanskrit and Ancient Indian Culture in the B. J. Institute of Learning and Research, Ahmedabad, from 1958 to 1961, I was entrusted with the work of translating the Gaṇadharavāda into English and providing an explanation based on Maladhāri Hemacandra's Brhadvr̥tti on it. This work had already been done in Gujarati by Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malavania for the Gujarat Vidyā Sabhā (the parent body of the B. J. Institute of Learning and Research) and his book had been published in 1952. Prof. Rasiklal Parikh, Director of the B. J. Institute, and Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi and others felt that it was desirable that a similar work be prepared in English also for the wider public of English-knowing readers.

This work is, as said above, based entirely on Maladhāri Hemacandra's commentary on the Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya. I have also consulted Jinabhadra's svopajñā (auto-) commentary and Koṭyācārya's commentary. I have derived much help from Pt. Malavania's work in Gujarati which has been the main source of information as regards different topics — historical or otherwise.

Pt. Malavania has been kind enough to permit me to include herein the text of the Gaṇadhara-vāda as edited by him. I here acknowledge my indebtedness and sense of gratitude to him.

I have also got much help in the notes to this work from Dr. Nathmal Tatia's 'Studies in Jaina Philosophy'. I am indebted to him for the exposition of certain topics of Jaina philosophy as also for the renderings of certain technical terms. Dr. Glasenapp's 'Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy' has been helpful in the treatment of karman. I have acknowledged my indebtedness to these and other authors in the foot-notes.

Though I have derived much help from the works of the scholars mentioned above, I hold myself responsible for the treatment of the subject. Mine is an humble attempt to place this important Jaina work before the English-knowing readers. Owing to other preoccupations, I have not been able to work at this book at a stretch and this must have left many flaws for which I crave the indulgence of the scholarly world.

I am highly thankful to revered Muni Śrī Puṇyavijayajī for lending me a copy prepared from an old manuscript of the svopajña commentary of the Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya and also other books. I find no words to express my sense of gratitude to my guru Prof. Rasiklal C. Parikh, revered Pt. Sukhlalji and the authorities of the B. J. Institute of Learning and Research for the opportunity they gave me to study this aspect of Indian philosophy by entrusting me with this work.

I thank the proprietors of the Grafo Corporation, Ahmedabad, for taking a keen interest in the printing of this work and for their patience in the face of difficulties inherent in oriental typography.

33, Nehru Nagar,
Ahmedabad, 6
Gujarat,
India,
19-6-'66

E. A. Solomon

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INTRODUCTION

WHAT IS THIS GAṆADHARAVĀDA ?

Before we talk of the Gaṇadharavāda proper, let us take a bird's eye view of the Jaina Canon, so that the Gaṇadharavāda may be properly located in the sacred literature of the Jainas, and its relation to the Jaina Canon shown. Hitherto, we have a detailed knowledge only of the Canon (Siddhānta or Āgama) of the Śvetāmbaras, as the Digambaras constituting the other important Jaina schism, refuse to accept this as the genuine Canon, though they also agree in regarding the 12 Āngas ('limbs' of the body of religion) as the first and most important part of the Canon which, they believe, is lost for ever. The Jaina Canon as it is recognised by the Śvetāmbaras is classified as follows :—

I. The 12 Āngas : (i) Āyāra (Ācāra), (ii) Sūyagaḍa (Sūtrakṛta), (iii) Tḥāna (Sthāna), (iv) Samavāya, (v) Bhagavatī or Viyāhapannatti (Vyākhyā-prajñapti), (vi) Nāyādhammakahāo (Jñātadharmakathāḥ), (vii) Uvāsagadasāo (Upāsakadaśāḥ), (viii) Aṃtagaḍadasāo (Antakṛddaśāḥ), (ix) Anuttarovavāiyadasāo (Anuttaraupapātikadaśāḥ), (x) Paṇhavāgaraṇāim (Praśna-vyākaraṇāni), (xi) Vivāgasuyam (Viçāka-śrutam), (xii) Diṭṭhivāya (Drṣṭivāda).

The twelfth — Diṭṭhivāya — has been lost for ever. It is said to have originally consisted of 14 Puvvas (Pūrvas), the knowledge of which went on gradually decreasing till it ultimately disappeared. There is also a difference of opinion regarding the order of these Āngas* and such other points; but we are not concerned with these here.

* For a detailed discussion of the Jaina Canon, and especially for a discussion regarding the twelfth Ānga which is lost for ever, see Weber's Sacred Literature of the Jainas (Translated by Dr. Herbert Weir Smyth — Indian Antiquary — Volumes xvii–xxi), S. B. E. Vol. xxii, xlv, Jaina Sūtras (Jacobi's Introduction), and A History of the Canonical Literature of the Jainas — H. R. Kapadia. See also — A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II — Jaina Literature — Maurice Winternitz.

II. The 12 Uvaṅgas (Upāṅgas, secondary limbs) corresponding to the 12 Aṅgas—(i) Uvavāiya (Aupapātika), (ii) Rāyapaseṇaiya (always translated by Rājaprasāniya), (iii) Jīvābhigama, (iv) Pannavaṇā (Prajñāpanā), (v) Sūriyapannatti (Sūryaprajñāpti), (vi) Jambuddivapannatti (Jambudvīpa-prajñāpti), (vii) Caṃḍapannatti (Candra-prajñāpti), (viii) Nirayāvaliyāo (Nirayāvalikāḥ), (ix) Kappavaḍaṃsiyāo (Kalpāvataṃsikāḥ), (x) Pupphiyāo (Puṣṣikāḥ), (xi) Pupphacūliāo (Puṣṣacūlikāḥ), (xii) Vaṇḍidasāo (Vṛṣṇidaśāḥ).

III The 10 Painṇas (Prakīṇas, 'scattered pieces')—(i) Causaraṇa (Catuhśiraṇa), (ii) Āurapaccakkāṇa (Ātura-pratyākhyāna), (iii) Bhattaparinnā (Bhakta-pariññā), (iv) Saṃthāra (Saṃstāra), (v) Tamdula-veyāliya (Tandula-vaicārika), (vi) Caṃḍāvijjhaya (Candrāvedhyaka), (vii) Devindaṭṭhaya (Devendrastava), (viii) Gaṇivijjā (Gaṇi-vidyā), (ix) Mahāpaccakkāṇa (Mahāpratyākhyāna), (x) Viṇḍatthava (Virastava).

IV The 6 Cheya-Suttas (Cheda Sūtras)—so called perhaps because they lay down a punishment, in cases of transgression of rules of monkish life, consisting in 'shortening' (cheda) the defaulting monk's seniority and his consequent degrading—(i) Nisiha (Niśītha), (ii) Mahānisiha (Mahāniśītha), (iii) Vavahāra (Vyavabhāra), (iv) Āyāradasāo (Ācāradaśāḥ) or Daśāsuyakkhandha (Daśāsrutaskhandha), (v) Kappa (Bṛhat-kalpa), (vi) Pañca-kappa (Pañca-kalpa). Instead of the last-mentioned, Jiyakappa (Jītakalpa) of Jinabhadra is also mentioned.

V The 4 Mūla-suttas (Mūla-sūtras—Root-sūtras—Are they meant for those who are at the root i.e. beginning of their spiritual career?)—(i) Uttarajjhayana (Uttarādhyayana), (ii) Āvassaya (Āvaśyaka), (iii) Dasaveyāliya (Daśavaikālika), (iv) Piṇḍanijjutti (Piṇḍa-Niryukti). The third or fourth Mūla-suttas are also sometimes given as Ohanijjutti (Ogha-niryukti) and Pakkhiya-sutta (Pākṣika-sūtra), and sometimes Piṇḍanijjutti and Ohanijjutti are classified under the Cheya-suttas.

VI Individual texts (i) Nandī-sutta (Nandī-sūtra), (ii) Anuyogadāra (Anuyogadvāra).

It may be noted that with the exception of the Aṅgas, the lists and titles of the canonical texts are not always mentioned in the same way. The traditional number of books is mentioned in the Siddhānta, but the number varies in the enumeration at different places.

This śruta (scriptural literature) is classified in various ways, one way of classifying being that the canon is regarded as two-fold (i) Aṅga-paviṭṭha (contained in the Aṅgas) and (ii) Anaṅga-paviṭṭha (not belonging to the Aṅgas). The aṅga-paviṭṭha suya-nāna (śruta-jñāna) has 12 subdivisions, each of which is known as an Aṅga. Thus, it is identical with the dvādaśāṅgī which consists of 12 Aṅgas—Āyāra, etc, and which is often referred to as 'duvālasaṅga gaṇipīḍaga' (dvādaśāṅga gaṇipīṭaka) (Samavāya, 148). According to one definition, what is composed by the Gaṇadhara (leaders of groups, the best disciples, Indrabhūti and others) is Aṅgapaviṭṭha, and what is composed by śruta-sthavira (i.e. those well-versed in Tḥāṇa and Samavāya; cf. Tḥāṇa 3. 2. 159) is anaṅga-paviṭṭha. The Āvassaya though anaṅga-paviṭṭha is regarded as composed by a Gaṇadhara. We find such a view first in the Āvaśyaka Nirukti, and then it came to be recognised that even an anaṅga-paviṭṭha text might have been composed by a Gaṇadhara. This was later extended to other texts and even to the Purāṇas and such other literature which were also stated to have been handed down in substance by the Gaṇadharas. That the Āvaśyaka was the first to be regarded as one composed by a Gaṇadhara, can be accounted for by the repeated statement that the direct disciples of Lord Mahāvīra studied the Sāmāyika (Sāmāyika) and other eleven Aṅgas. Now the Sāmāyika is the first chapter of the Āvaśyaka sūtra, and if it was placed first in the order of the texts prescribed for study, and even put before the Aṅgas, there could be no opposition to its being claimed as composed by a Gaṇadhara. This also explains why it was the first anaṅgapaviṭṭha text to receive this honour. This Āvaśyaka sūtra has six chapters corresponding to the six Āvaśyakas i.e. six daily essential duties of a Jaina. The six sections are

known as (i) Sāmāyika (sāmāyika) desisting from all evil, and equanimity of mind), (ii) Cauvīsattbava (eulogy of the twenty-four Tirthankaras), (iii) Vandanāya (veneration of the teacher), (iv) paḍikkamaṇa (pratikramaṇa) (confession and expiation), (v) kāussagga (kāyotsarga), (asceticism, indifference to the body), (vi) paccakkhāṇa (renunciation of sensual pleasures, etc). According to Bhadrabāhu, the Sāmāyika stands at the head of all scriptural knowledge. Conduct or character is the very essence of scriptural knowledge, and emancipation that of conduct.* Thus the Sāmāyika is shown to be related to the ultimate good—emancipation (moksa). Bhadrabāhu has also pointed out that after Lord Mahāvīra attained omniscience, his first preaching was in essence the teaching of sāmāyika, and his Gaṇadharas, after their discussion with him, sat at his feet and received instruction first of all regarding the sāmāyika.† This explains why Jinabhadra thought it fit to compose his encyclopaedic Viśeṣāvaśyaka containing 3606 verses as a commentary on the first chapter, Sāmāyika of the Āvaśyaka-sūtra, along with its Niriyukti (commentary) by Bhadrabāhu.

Bhadrabāhu in his Niriyukti by way of introduction to the Sāmāyika chapter gives a detailed account of how Lord Mahāvīra attained omniscience (kevala-jñāna). He went to the Mahāsena-vana in Madhyamāpāvā where the gods had arranged a great assembly (samavasaraṇa) in honour of Lord Mahāvīra, the sovereign in the kingdom of religion (539-40). In the same city, a brahmin Somilārya was performing a sacrifice to participate in which learned men from far off regions had come. The gods were, however, rejoicing in the assembly in honour of Mahāvīra to the north of this sacrificial assembly, the people in which were under the impression that the gods being delighted at their performance were coming in the direction of the sacrifice. But they were surprised to find that the gods moved onwards towards the north. When they came to know of the honour done to Mahāvīra by the gods, Indrabhūti,

* See Āvaśyaka-niryukti, 93.

† See Āvaśyaka-niryukti 733-745.

an arrogant Brahmin scholar, came to the samavasaraṇa to challenge the omniscience of Mahāvīra, as he had full confidence that no one could be more learned than he. But seeing him come Mahāvīra addressed him by his name and family name (gotra) (598), and also told him of the doubt he harboured in his mind regarding the existence of the soul. Mahāvīra also explained that this was so because he did not know the true meaning of the Vedic texts which he promised to explain (600). When Indrabhūti's doubt was shattered and he was finally convinced, he along with his 500 pupils became a disciple of Mahāvīra (601). This very Indrabhūti became the chief disciple of Mahāvīra. Agnibhūti and ten other Brahmin pandits also one after the other came to Lord Mahāvīra, but when they were addressed by their name and gotra, and also told of their doubt, they also became disciples along with their followers, and they too attained the status of chief disciples (602-641).

There are thus 42 verses (600-641) dealing with the episode of the Gaṇadhara, from the point when Lord Mahāvīra disclosed Indrabhūti's doubt up to when the eleventh Prabhāsa became a follower of Mahāvīra. Jinabhadra, while commenting on these in his Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya has given us his invaluable Gaṇadharavāda (our present work), the number of verses (gātbās) for each Gaṇadhara in it being:—1-56; 2-35; 3-38; 4-79; 5-28; 6-58; 7-17; 8-16; 9-40; 10-19; 11-49. In the Āvaśyaka Nirukti we find mentioned the names of the Gaṇadharas, the number of their followers, their doubt, their ignorance of the meaning of Vedic statements, and the promise of Mahāvīra that he would instruct them correctly. Jinabhadra like a true commentator with a literary flair has pounced upon this opportunity which gave ample scope for a discussion of the doubt and the true meaning of the Vedic texts and presented this in a dialectical pattern where each Paṇḍita is given the chance to argue out his case or raise doubts, or these are anticipated by Mahāvīra. This makes the text all the more lively and interesting.

Jinabhadra has himself commented upon his own Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, but he could not complete his commentary on account of his death. He could comment only up to 1863 verses i. e. up to the account of the sixth gaṇadhara. This commentary has been recently discovered by Muni Śrī Puṇyavijayajī; Acārya Kottārya completed the commentary (See his comm. on Gāthā 1863). Another commentary on the Gaṇadharavāda is by Kotyācārya, and a third by Maladhārī Hemacandra. Of these the last is the most lucid and illuminating. Hence the incorporation of this commentary in the body of this text.

BHADRABĀHU

Before we come to the main subject, Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, of which Gaṇadharavāda is a part, and its author Jinabhadra, we may say a few words about Bhadrabāhu, the author of the Āvaśyaka-niryukti, an episode in which is used by Jinabhadra as a peg to hang his philosophical dissertation on, for the purpose of propounding the Jaina system of philosophy.

In India the misfortune is that there are a number of persons known by the same name (e. g. many Kālidāsas) and the events of the life of one man are mixed up with those of another. Kalidāsa may be represented as having died in the house of a courtesan in Ceylon and also be said to have been familiar with Kashmir, or to have lived in the times of Vikramāditya and to have been present at the court of king Bhoja! What a mockery of historical facts! The same is the case with Bhadrabāhu. Many Ācāryas bearing the name Bhadrabāhu existed, and still all the niryuktis (commentaries) were ascribed to Bhadrabāhu who according to tradition was the last ācārya to know all the 14 Pūrvas (old texts) but who, it is said, went to Nepal for yogic practice and so could impart the knowledge of only 10 Pūrvas to Sthūlabhadra who went to him. His date may roughly be fixed at 170 B. C. But Muni

Śrī Puṇyavijayajī has come to the conclusion that the Niryuktis on Āvaśyakasūtra and other sacred literature are not by the first Bhadrabāhu who knew the Pūrvas, but by another Bhadrabāhu of the 6th century of Vikrama samvat.* Still, as noted by Da'sukhbhai Malavania,† we find several gāthās from the Niryuktis of Bhadrabāhu in the works of Kunda kunda and others who were definitely earlier than the 6th century. It is quite likely that there was an old corpus around which was built the structure of the Niryuktis that we have at present.

The Cheda sūtras were definitely the composition of Bhadrabāhu. So the following Niryuktis can be assigned to Bhadrabāhu II — Āvaśyaka, Daśavaikālika, Uttarādhyayana, Ācārāṅga, Sūtrakṛtāṅga, Daśāśrutaskandha, Kalpa-Brhatkalpa, Vyavahāra, Sūryaprajñapti, Rṣibhāṣita. Bhadrabāhu has himself, in his Āvaśyaka Niryukti (84-85), mentioned his plan to compose these. The last two are not extant. Uvasaggahara, a Prakṛit Stotra also was composed by Bhadrabāhu. Many other works are assigned to him, but it is doubtful whether they were his.

JINABHADRA AND HIS VIŚEṢĀVAŚYAKA BHĀṢYA :-

Practically nothing is known of Jinabhadra though his writings occupy a place of importance in the development of thought, and in the history of Jainā literature. Still we can gather a few facts about him, though, of course, one must always accept that they cannot be regarded as absolutely certain.

* See Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Silver Jubilee Volume (p. 185).

† See Gaṇadhara Vāda (in Gujarati) Introduction, p. 13 footnote. We are highly indebted to this Introduction. In fact, it has been the main source of the information given here. Śrī Malavania being a well-versed and open-minded scholar of Jaina philosophy and literature, one can easily find a fund of information in his writings which one can only quote, but hardly improve upon.

A copy of the Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya was prepared in Śaka era 531 i. e. 609 A.D. and kept in a Jaina temple in Valabhī. This agrees with the popularity of Jainism in Western India in and after the 5th century, and also shows that Jinabhadra must have moved about in the vicinity of Valabhī. As said before, this Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya along with its commentary which remained incomplete, was the last work of Jinabhadra whose date, therefore, cannot be fixed as later than 590 A.D. This is supported by a traditional view that Haribhadra died in the year 1055 of the Vīra Nirvāṇa era (i. e. after Mahāvīra), and Jinabhadra is said to have been a prominent teacher for 65 years after that and died in 1120 of the Vīra Nirvāṇa era, that is to say, in Vikrama era 650 or 593 A.D. Muni Śrī Jinavijayajī holds on the ground of two gāthās found at the end of a copy of the Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya discovered in Jesalmer that the bhāṣya was composed in Vikrama era 666. But as Śrī Malavania has pointed out the gāthās can only mean that the copy was prepared in Śaka era 531 (or Vikrama 666), and placed in a temple. This again agrees with our date, Vikrama samvat 650, for the death of Jinabhadra.

The gāthās are :

Pañca satā igatisā saganivakālassa vaṭṭamāṇassa,
to cetta-punṇimāe budhadīṇa sātimmī naḅkhatte;
rajje ṇu pālaṇapare sī.[lāi] ccammi ṇarabarindammi,
balabhīnagarīe imam mahavi.....mi jinabhavaṇe.

According to tradition, Jinabhadra lived 104 years, so he can be said to have lived between Vikrama 546-650 i. e. 489-593 A.D. This also tallies with the fact that no writer later than 590 A.D. has been referred to in the works of Jinabhadra, while he has been quoted profusely in the Nandīcūrṇi of Jinadāsa which was composed in Vikrama 733, i. e. in 676 A.D.

As to his personality, we find his qualities described by the commentator of his Jītakalpasūtra. Muni Śrī Jinavijayajī has given us an extract of this in his Introduction to the Jītakalpasūtra. *The then eminent śrutadharas (knowers of the*

sacred lore) honoured him highly and he was a great scholar of other śāstras also. He was highly learned in Palaeography, Mathematics, Prosody and Grammar. He was also well-versed in the scriptures of other schools. He was very earnest about the practice of the code of conduct laid down for monks and was at the head of all the Jaina monks..... No further information is available except that he saved the Mahaniśītha sūtra which was eaten up by white ants.* Some Jaina icons were recently discovered in Akotā (earlier Añkoṭṭaka). Prof. Umakant Shah believes that these icons belong to about 550-600 A.D, and he has come to the conclusion that the Jinabhadra mentioned in the inscription found on two of these icons is no other than Jinabhadra, the author of the Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, who must have installed these icons. The inscriptions found are 'Aum devadharmo' yam nivṛtikule Jinabhadra-Vācanācāryasya' and 'Aum nivṛtikule Jinabhadra-Vācanācāryasya' from which it can be inferred that Jinabhadra belonged to the Nivṛti family and was called Vācanācārya.†

The following works are ascribed to Jinabhadra:—

- (i) Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya—Prakrit verse.
- (ii) Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya Vṛtti—author's own commentary (Sanskrit prose),
- (iii) Br̥hat-saṅgrahaṇī—Prakrit verse,
- (iv) Br̥hat-kṣetrasamāsa—Prakrit verse,
- (v) Viśeṣaṇavati—Prakrit verse, (vi) Jītakalpasūtra—Prakrit verse,
- (vii) Jītakalpasūtrabhāṣya—Prakrit verse, (viii) Dhyāna-śataka—Prakrit verse.

Br̥hatsaṅgrahaṇī deals with human beings and hellish beings and geography and astronomy. In fact it gives us at a glance the relevant views regarding soul and world. Br̥hat-kṣetra-samāsa is like a geography of the universe. In the

* See Vividha Tīrtha Kalpa (Mathurā-kalpa) (p 19) of Jinaprabha. This shows that Jinabhadra had also gone to Mathurā besides being associated with Valabhī.

† See Jaina Satyaprakāśa, No. 196.

Viśeṣanavati, Jinabhadra has attempted to resolve the inconsistencies or apparent contradictions found in the Āgamas.

Jitakaḷpa-sūtra along with its bhāṣya by the author himself gives a detailed account of expiations (prāyaścitta) of wrongs done. In fact, Jinabhadra has in his commentary given us the secret of the entire cheda-śāstra concerned with punishment of wrongs done and the cutting off of the seniority of the offending monks and such other relevant matters. Dhyānaśataka, though termed a century of verses, actually contains 105 Prakrit Gāthās. This śataka has been assigned to Jinabhadra, though many have doubts regarding its authorship.

Jinabhadra's own vṛtti (commentary) on the Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya is his only work in Sanskrit. This commentary is very concise and gives hardly any such exposition as would make the text easily accessible to the common reader. It was because of this that Koṭyācārya and Maladbārī Hemacandra thought it fit to write detailed commentaries on the Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya. As said before, Jinabhadra could write his commentary only up to Gā. 1863, when probably death intervened. Koṭṭārya commented on the remaining Gāthās—Nirmāpya ṣaṣṭha-gaṇadharavaktavyam kila divaṅgataḥ pūjyāḥ; anuyoga-mārya(rga-)deśika - Jinabhadraganikṣara-āśramaṇāḥ; tāneva praṇipatyātaḥ paramavi(va)śiṣṭa-vivaraṇam kriyate Koṭṭārya-vādigāṇinā mandadhiyā śaktim anapekṣya (Gā. 1863).

The Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya occupies a unique place in the history of Jaina literature, esp. philosophical literature. A noteworthy feature of the Jaina system of thought is that unlike the Brāhmanic thought or the Buddhist which have branched off into a number of schools, it has maintained its unity throughout its history; and whatever change we see is in the clarification and new orientation of its topics and problems which in essence remain what they were from the very beginning. We find them even in the earliest Āgama literature, though scattered here and there. The greatest contribution of Jinabhadra is that he has systematically treated these different philosophical concepts even while making the plea of giving an

easily accessible exposition of the Avaśyaka-Niryukti on which he was writing his Bhāṣya (commentary). Another achievement of his is that after the composition of this voluminous Bhāṣya, the terminology of the Jaina system of thought assumed a stable form and became current as such. It must also be noted that in all respects Jinabhadra has made efforts to restate the original Āgamic position, though true to the Jaina *anekāntavāda* he keeps an open mind and is always prepared to accommodate the other view. We may take but one example. According to the original Jaina position, knowledge is the very essence of the soul, for only that knowledge which the soul has directly without the help of any external instrument is *pratyakṣa* (direct), the rest is *parokṣa* (indirect). Thus *mati* (sensual) and *śruta* (scriptural) knowledge were put under *parokṣa* (indirect cognition) and the other three, *avadhi* (visual intuition), *manah-paryāya* (intuition of mental modes) and *kevala* (perfect knowledge) were classified under *pratyakṣa* (direct or immediate knowledge).^{*} But in order to bring their theory of knowledge in line with the theories of other systems of thought, the later Jaina thinkers regarded the knowledge produced by the sense-organs as *prakyakṣa*. § Jinabhadra, a great upholder of the original position, designates the knowledge produced by the sense-organs and the mind as *saṃvyavahāra-pratyakṣa* (empirically direct and immediate knowledge) *Indiyamaṇo-bhavaṃ jam taṃ saṃvyavahāra-paccakkham—Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bh. 95*).

A glance at the text of the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* shows us that Jinabhadra has treated a number of topics and given them such a satisfactory and critical treatment that the relevant portions can very well serve the purpose of independent treatises.

But what is still more striking is that while the ratiocination and dialectical discussions of Buddhist logicians and philosophers pressed as it were the button and spread a flood of light in the form of precise philosophical thought illuminating a number of topics and problems lying in a latent

^{*} See *Sthānāṅga sū. II 1.71; Tattvārtha sū, 1-9-12.*

§ *Anuyogadvāra, pp. 194-5; Nandī sū, 4.*

form among the Jainas, Jinabhadra was one and perhaps the most prominent, of the Jaina philosophers who plunged headlong into this current of systematic dialectical thought and gave a clear-cut analysis of problems calling for uncommon insight.

We find references to controversies and divergent views even in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads and the Jaina Āgamas and the Buddhist Piṭakas, and this sort of intelligent and thoughtful atmosphere persisted all along. But the period between the lifetime of Nāgārjuna (2nd cent A.D.) and that of Dharmakīrti (650 A.D.) is outstanding as the period of fervent debating and discussions, wherein the canon of debate was established and each philosopher tried to argue out his case systematically and faithfully, at the same time making every effort possible to appreciate and understand the opponent's view-point; what deserves all the more appreciation is the fact that they were prepared to bring about innovations in their own system of thought if this did not involve any gross contradiction of the basic tenets of their respective schools. Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Diñnāga, and Dharmakīrti were the principal Buddhist logicians of this period who did not hesitate to criticise, and try to improve upon, the definitions of their predecessors if this meant a greater clarification and better presentation of the Buddhist thought. It is needless to say that they attacked other schools severely, and these latter had in their turn to answer the objections raised against their view and thus had a chance to detect the weak points and loop-holes in their system; they could develop their system while interpreting the basic texts and the views of their predecessors in the light of the attacks of the rival party. Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara of the Nyāya school and Praśastapāda of the Vaiśeṣika school and Śābara and Kumārila amongst the Mīmāṃsakas were very actively busy trying to answer their opponents even while setting their house in order. A careful study of the philosophical works of the Brāhmanical, Buddhist and Jaina schools would be very interesting from the point of view of their mutual influence and the internal development of thought.

The Jaina philosophers were by no means quiet or inert in this period. It is quite likely that it was this atmosphere of controversy and debate that inspired Unāsvāti to give a systematic treatment of the Jaina system of thought in his *Tattvārthasūtra*. But he merely stated the tenets and did not enter into any controversy, which only his commentators, Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda and others indulged in. It was, again, in this period that the *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara, the first systematic though brief manual of Jaina logic, was written, as also *Sammati Tarka* by the same author, giving an exposition of the theory of *Nayas* (points of view or approach) which forms the very cornerstone of the Jaina system of thought with its catholicity of outlook accomodating the different approaches in the picture of the total reality. But we cannot say of Siddhasena or even of Samantabhadra that they have gone into the niceties of thought; they have stated the broad facts of the Jaina system of thought. They cannot be given the status of worthy opponents or rivals of Dinnāga or Kumārila or Uddyotakara. We find clear evidence of this spirit of rivalry only in the *Aṣṭasahasrī* of Vidyānanda which is a commentary on the *Aṣṭasatī* of Akalaṅka, a commentary on the *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra. But this is not true of Jinabhadra to whom we can accord the place of honour of being the first to have the grit to take up cudgels against the rival systems; as also against those of his own school who were apt in certain respects to hold views which did not represent the true spirit of the Āgamas. A study of the *Gaṇadhara-vāda* will illustrate this. He has given a thorough exposition in his *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* of the Jaina topics and also explained the Jaina position as regards logic and Non-absolutism. His reasoning is sound and appealing and we find later philosophers like Haribhadra (8th cent.) and Yaśovijaya (17th cent.) putting forth the same arguments — may be in a different garb.

It can be said of the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* that it gives us the very essence of the Jainā Āgamas, as the *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosa gives us the very sum and substance of the Buddhist Piṭakas. What is more, Jinabhadra has subjected the

Āgamic statements of philosophy to the test of reason and given us a philosophy based on reason, though he has always adhered to the spirit of the Āgamas and resolved any apparent contradictions that may be found therein. In short, the Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya is a wonderful compendium of the Jaina system of thought.

ĀCĀRYA MALADHĀRĪ HEMACANDRA, THE AUTHOR OF VIŚEṢĀVAŚYAKABHĀṢYA VIVARAṆA (OR—BHĀṢYA—BRHADVṚTTI)—

The time of the rule of Siddharāja Jayasimha and Kumārapāla was the golden period in the history of Gujarat—both politically and culturally. The contribution of Jaina monks is by no means small or negligible. Great Jaina teachers and preachers had associations with the political functionaries and thus had their say in the political and cultural framework of the kingdom. We see this at its highest in the influence Ācārya Hemacandra (Kalikālasarvajña—the omniscient of the Kali Age) wielded over Siddharāja and Kumārapāla in the 12th cent.. Before Kalikālasarvajña Hemacandra, Ācārya Devasūri Maladhārī and after him Hemacandra Maladhārī occupied a place of honour both in the kingdom and in the heart of King Siddharāja by virtue of their sincerity, morality and austerity. Kalikālasarvajña Hemacandra received the heritage of this prestige and honour and therefore could shine forth all the more easily in the period of the reign of Kumārapāla. It is noted by Padmadeva Sūri (in his Sadgurupaddhati) and by Rājaśekhara who belonged to the same line, in his Dvyaśrayavṛtti, that King Kaṇadeva conferred the title of 'Maladhārī' on Abhayadeva; this shows that Abhayadeva was respected even by Kaṇadeva who ruled before Siddharāja. Siddharāja was highly devoted to Abhayadeva and we have a vivid account of the latter's personality and the respect paid to him by Siddharāja as given by Śrīcandra the grand-pupil of Abhayadeva, who was an eye-witness to all this. Maladhārī Hemacandra maintained all this and was equally honoured. Of course, this was mainly on account of the personal

virtues of Maladhārī Hemacandra. But it may also partly have been due to the political connections of the early part of his life i. e. before his renunciation. As stated by Rājasekhara in his Dvyāśrayavṛtti in the praśasti (eulogy), he was a minister and had four wives. He gave up this life full of pomp and luxury, and was initiated under Maladhārī Abhayadeva. Grand details of the life of both the Maladhārīs are found in the praśasti of Muni Suvratacarita by Śricandrasūri.* Abhayasūri is described as tall and handsome and highly tolerant and patient. He observed strenuously the code of conduct laid down for monks. When he foresaw that death was not far off he gradually decreased the quantity of his diet and finally took to fasting. Even then for many days he followed his daily routine of preaching, etc. and even went on foot to a rich man called Śriyaka whose last wish was to see Abhayadevasūri. Abhayadeva died on the 47th day of his fasting. His funeral procession was a grand sight and people said, with eyes wide with astonishment, that one would certainly choose such a glorious death—however painful death might be. Even King Jayasimha watched the procession from his balcony.

Ācārya Maladhārī Hemacandra was a pupil of Abhayadevasūri. The account given by Hemacandra's pupil Śricandrasūri is illuminating. He was highly learned in many subjects and had about 50,000 books. His discourses in a sonorous voice were very popular and enlightened the people. Even King Jayasimha attended his discourses. Through this king, Hemacandra could achieve much for the uplift of the Jaina religion and community. Like his preceptor Abhayadeva, he also fasted for seven days before death came to him. King Siddharāja himself joined the funeral procession. He had three chief disciples (gaṇadhara)—Vijayasimha, Śricandra, Vibudhacandra—of whom Śricandra officially succeeded him as a sūri on his seat.

Śricandra wrote his Munisuvratacarita a few years after the death of Maladhārī Hemacandra and it was completed in

* See Catalogue of Works of the Pāṭana Jaina Bhaṇḍāra (Gaekwad Series, p. 314).

Vikram Samvat 1193. Vijayasimha wrote a Brhadvṛtti (voluminous commentary) on Dharmopadeśamāla, and it was completed in Vikram Samvat 1191. In its praśasti we find personal accounts of his preceptor Hemacandra and grand-preceptor Abhayadeva. From this it appears that some years had passed after the death of Hemacandra.* It can be said that after the death of his preceptor Abhayadeva in Samvat 1168, he succeeded him on his seat as Ācārya and occupied it till about 1180, for we do not find any reference to a date beyond 1177.

Works — (i) Āvaśyakaṭippaṇa or Āvaśyakavṛttipradeśa-vyākhyānaka, (ii) Bandhaśatakavṛtti, (iii) Anuyogadvāravṛtti, (iv) Upadeśamālā-sūtra, (v) Upadeśamālāvṛtti, (vi) Jīvasamāsa-vivarāṇa, (vii) Bhavabhāvanāsūtra, (viii) Bhavabhāvanā-vivarāṇa, (ix) Nandītippaṇa, (x) Viśeṣāvaśyaka-vivarāṇa (also called Viśeṣāśyakabhāṣya-brhadvṛtti).

Jīvasamāsa-vṛtti was written in his own hand in Samvat 1164, as the praśasti itself tells us. In Āvaśyakaṭippaṇa or Āvaśyakavṛttipradeśa-vyākhyānaka (because it is a commentary on parts of Haribhadra's Laghuvṛtti on Āvaśyakasūtra), the author first gives the meaning of hard words and then the substance of the relevant passage. Bandhaśatakavṛtti Vinayahitā is a commentary on a century of stanzas (—really they are 106) called Bandhaśataka, dealing with karma in its details composed by Śivaśarmasūri who himself says that the work is based on the Dṛṣṭivāda. Hemacandra's commentary is very lucid and easy and shows a thorough grasp of the subject. Anuyogadvāravṛtti is a very lucid commentary on the Anuyogadvārasūtra which helps us to appreciate the very core of the Āgamas. Though there was an earlier Prakrit commentary (cūrṇi) and also one in Sanskrit by Haribhadra (this being mostly by way of explanation of the Prakrit commentary), neither went far in

* Śri Hemacandra iti sūrirabhūd amuṣya,

śiṣyaḥ śiromaṇir aśesamuniśvarāṇām;

yasyādhunāpi caritāni śaracchaśāṅka-

cchāyojjvalāni vilasanti diśām mukheṣu. (13)

See Catalogue of Works of the Pāṭaṇa Bhaṇḍāra, p. 313

giving an easy interpretation of the original text. So Hemacandra's vṛtti was a welcome addition, especially in view of its simple charming style. Upadeśamālāsūtra in 505 Prakrit gāthas, also called Kusumamālā by the author himself, deals with charity, conduct (celebracy), etc and reveals the secret of religion to the curious reader. Upadeśamālāvivarana is a commentary in Sanskrit on the Upadeśamālā. It is interspersed profusely with tales in Prakrit prose and verse to illustrate the basic virtues. Jīvasamāsavivarana is a commentary on Jīvasamāsa by some early Acārya. In this work the fourteen guṇasthānas (stages of spiritual development) are discussed, and Hemacandra in his commentary besides clarifying a number of subtle points has given a thorough treatment of the jīva. Bhavabhāvanāsūtra in 531 Prakrit gāthās deals predominantly with bhavabhāvanā (contemplation on metempsychosis) of the twelve bhāvānas, though Hemacandra seizes the opportunity of referring briefly to the other bhāvānās also. Bhavabhāvanāvivarana is a lengthy commentary in Sanskrit on the above work by the author himself. It too like Upadeśamālāvivarana is full of tales, but the author has very wisely given tales other than those related in the Upadeśamālāvivarana. The two together provide a very good collection of tales, especially of those pertaining to the code of conduct in Jainism, though not without interest to others. This commentary was composed in Vikram Samvat 1170 as the author himself says at the end :

Saptatyadhikaikādaśavarṣasātair Vikramād atikrāntaiḥ;
niṣpannā vṛttir iyaṁ Śrāvāna-ravi-pañcamīdivase.

No copy of Nandītippana has been found, nor is it referred to anywhere. Like the Āvaśyaka-tippaṇa it must have been a commentary on the Nandīṭikā of Haribhadra, dealing with five kinds of knowledge. Hemacandra himself has referred to this work as one written by him at the end of the Viśeṣāvaśyaka-vivarana, his last work.

Viśeṣāvaśyaka-vivarana is a very popular commentary on the Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, which we have incorporated in the body of this work by way of interpretation of the gāthās of

Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya. It was completed in Vikram Saṁvat 1175, as the author himself says. We are, further, told that four monks—Abhayakumāragāṇi, Dhanadevagāṇi, Jinabhadragāṇi and Vibudhacandramuni—and two nuns, Śrīmahānandā and Śrīmahattarā Vīramatī gaṇinī, helped in the composition of this work. This commentary is the best and the most popular of all the commentaries on the Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, and can be said to have eclipsed the others. It has captured the very spirit of the original text and laid it bare before the reader in all its purity, bringing out the unmanifest aspects in their fullness.

Hemacandra has, at the end of the Viśeṣāvaśyaka-vivarāṇa, given us a brief sketch of his spiritual career as also an account of his works through an allegory. He says he was sunk deep in the ocean of life full of painful things like birth, old age, etc.; but a noble person placed him in a ship in the form of right intuition or faith, right knowledge and right conduct, so that he could reach without much difficulty the island of Auspicious Jewel (Śiva-ratna), Emancipation. The noble gentleman also gave him a jewel in the form of a good mind placed in a casket of good intention and told him that as long as he preserved this jewel, no harm would come to the ship which would reach its destination without any serious obstruction. But if he somehow parted with this jewel, the ship would be shattered. He also warned him that on account of this jewel, the soldier-pirates of King Delusion would pursue him, and they might even succeed in tearing off the sides of the casket of Good Intention. He also explained how, in the event of this calamity, the sides were to be replaced. Explaining all this the great soul sailed with him for some time and then disappeared. Coming to know of this, King Delusion, residing in the city of Imprudence (Pramāda), cautioned his soldiers that their enemy had shown a soul plunged in mundane life the way to the island of Śivaratna (Auspicious Jewel) and the latter was journeying in that direction taking other like souls with him. They must pursue him before the latter brought an end to the

drama of mundane life. King Delusion started sailing in his ship, Evil Intention, and his companions in his fleet of ships called Evil Disposition. They approached the ship our hero was sailing in and a battle followed between the Divine and the Demoniatic Tendencies, The sides of the casket of Good Intention became worn out, and our hero decided to replace them by new ones in accordance with the advice of the good man. Consequently he created one after the other the planks in the form of the ten works mentioned above in the same order.

The great man was probably Hemacandra's preceptor and Hemacandra's goal in writing these works was to maintain and strengthen his pious resolution to attain emancipation and to be of help to others in reaching their goal. Looking to his works, and the fascination they have over the readers we can say that this was no tall claim.

GAṆADHARAVĀDA—ITS LOCATION IN THE VIŚEṢĀVAŚYAKABHĀṢYA

Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya is, as said before, a commentary on the Āvaśyakaniryukti of Bhadrabāhu which in its turn is a commentary on the Āvaśyaka-sūtra. Like Yāska, Bhadrabāhu also has given the etymological explanations of the technical words of the scriptures, in his case the Jaina Agamas, in his Niryuktis which are brief and give mostly the general tenor of the scriptural work commented upon besides giving such etymological explanations. In order to arrive at the relevant meaning of a word in a particular context he gives all possible meanings by the nikṣepa (aspect specified, e. g. name, concrete shape, present state, etc.) method and by setting aside the others recommends the one that is relevant, and gives his own comment, if he has to make any. Jinabhadra commenting on the Āvaśyakaniryukti has seized the opportunity to dilate upon the points touched upon by Bhadrabāhu or emerging from the latter's comment. We give here a very rapid survey of the Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya so as to be able to point out the location of the Gaṇadharavāda in it.

Every good work requires some sort of benediction (maṅgala); accordingly we have at the outset the explanation of maṅgala

in the form of Nandī* i. e. five kinds of knowledge. Here we have a lengthy discussion on Jaina epistemology (1-1013).† A number of topics such as the significance of sūtra, saṁhitā, etc. are treated here. It is also shown that of the five kinds of knowledge (matī, śruta, avadhī, manah-parjāya, kevala), we are here concerned with śruta (scriptural knowledge), because it illuminates both itself and the rest.

Then after the exposition of a number of topics forming the base of the introduction, there is obeissance to all the Tīrthaṅkaras, and to Lord Mahāvīra in particular, as also to the Gaṇadharas who gave us the first text of the scriptures from the teachings of Mahāvīra and to others who were responsible for the continuity of the texts and the scriptural tradition (1014-1068). Then after a mention of the Niryuktis written (—according to the Niryukti, proposed to be written) by Bhadrabāhu, the meaning of niryukti is given, and the origin of śruta and its growth is explained on the basis of its comparison with a tree, and so also the contribution of the Gaṇadharas and others to it. Sāmāyika Adhyayana of the Āvaśyaka sūtra is put at the head of the scriptural texts composed by the Gaṇadharas and it is explained that conduct (cāritra) is the very essence of scriptural knowledge and emancipation that of conduct (Tassavi sāro caraṇaṁ sāro caraṇassa nivvāṇaṁ — Āv. Nir. gā. 93, Viśeṣāvaśyaka. 1126); the relative importance of knowledge and action or cāritra (conduct) (including tapas, austerity and saṁyama, restraint) is explained (1068-1346).

*Nandī=(Sanskrit) Nāndī. There used to be a Nāndī, benedictory stanza or stanzas at the beginning of every Sanskrit drama which served as a maṅgala. As plays became popular the meaning of Nāndī was extended to denote maṅgala, anything auspicious. It was so used even in Jaina works. Nandī also came to mean knowledge which is maṅgala for the spiritual pursuit, and the scriptural text treating knowledge was also styled Nandīsūtra.

† Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya — Āgamodaya Samiti publication, Bombay, 1924.

Then are given the synonyms of pravacana, sūtra and anuyoga (exposition) (1347-1387). After dealing with anuyoga and ananuyoga (non-anuyoga) along with their nikṣepas with illustrations, the difference between bhāṣā, vibhāṣā and vārttika, is explained and the qualifications of the teacher and the disciple are dealt with and illustrated. (1388-1483).

After this preliminary discussion, Jinabhadra following Bhadrabāhu raises and answers a number of questions one ought to grasp fully before one studies the Sāmāyika adhyayana. The points raised are worthy of forming the basis of the introduction of any modern work: (i) uddeśa — a general statement of what is to be expounded (ii) nirdēśa — a particular statement of what is to be treated, (iii) nirgama — origin of the Sāmāyika, (iv) kṣetra — place, (v) kāla — time, (vi) puruṣa — from whom it was obtained, (vii) kāraṇa — cause, (viii) pratyaya — conviction (ix) lakṣaṇa — definition, characteristic, (x) naya — modes, points of view, (xi) samavatāra — the application of nayas, (xii) anumati — recognition of the Sāmāyika by particular nayas and from the highest point of view, (xiii) kim — what is the Sāmāyika? (xiv) its types, (xv) whose is it? (xvi) where? (xvii) wherein? (xviii) how is it acquired? (xix) how long does it endure? (xx) how many acquire it at one time, (xxi) what is the period of its absence? (xxii) period of non-absence or continuity? (xxiii) for how many lives can it continue, (xxiv) how many times can it be accepted, (xxv) what place it (soul who has acquired Sāmāyika) affects, (xxvi) nirukti — explanation of Sāmāyika. (1484-2802).

Discussing the third point, nirgama, under the pretext of explaining how Mahāvīra could achieve the nirgama (coming out) from false belief, etc., the entire history of Jaina religion starting from before Rṣabhadeva, and the life of Mahāvīra is given in all its details, with special emphasis on the spiritual career, by Bhadrabāhu, but Jinabhadra has not commented upon this portion. Jinabhadra starts in all earnest when he comes to the episode of Gaṇadhara Vāda related above, which occurred

after Lord Mahāvīra had attained omniscience as a result of his spiritual pursuit (1549–2024).

Many problems are discussed in connection with the 26 topics mentioned above, e. g. the doctrine of *nayas*, the problem of transmigration or mundane life and the causes that can lead to emancipation and the different branches in Jainism itself which tried to conceal the teaching of Mahāvīra or to twist it to yield another meaning (—they are called *nihnavas* on account of this).* Then after explaining the twelfth point as to what *Sāmāyika* (conduct, code of life) is acceptable to the different *nayas*, Jinabhadra comes to the thirteenth point and gives us a detailed discussion of *Sāmāyika* (2633–2802). The remaining portion of the text of the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya* gives, like the *Āvaśyaka-Niryukti* of which it is a commentary, an exposition of all the six *adhyayanās* (chapters) of the *Āvaśyaka sūtra*.

This brief account will give some idea of the encyclopaedic nature of the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* which, as said before, can be regarded as a compendium of Jaina religion and philosophy. It can also be seen that as in the whole of the *Mahābhārata*, the place of the *Bhagavad Gītā* is unique, so also in the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, the *Gaṇadharavāda* occupies a peculiar position and deals with all the main topics of Jaina philosophy and as such can hold its own independently, like the *Gītā*, as a book worthy of being studied by all curious readers.

THE GAṆADHARAS

By way of an introduction to the philosophical questions of the *Gaṇadharas* we may give a brief account of their life, etc.

Very little information is obtained from the *Āgamas* in connection with the *Gaṇadharas*. We find scattered the names and life span of the *Gaṇadharas* in the *Samavāyāṅga-sūtra*. § The *Kalpasūtra* † states that Lord Mahāvīra had attached to him nine *gaṇas* (schools) and eleven *gaṇadharas* (chief disciples).

* The interested reader is referred to *Vi. Bhāṣya* 2296–2620.

§ *Samavāyāṅga*, 11, 74, 78, 92, etc.

† *Kalpasūtra* (*Kalpalatā*), p. 215.

In the exposition of this the names and gotras of the Gaṇadharas and also the following of each are given. It is stated that all the Gaṇadharas had knowledge of the twelve Aṅgas and the fourteen Pūrvas. All of them were emancipated. All except Indrabhūti and Sudharman attained nirvāṇa during the life-time of Lord Mahāvīra. The present host (saṅgha) of Śramaṇas is descended from the following of Sudharman. The line of the rest has been cut off. Ārya Jambū was a disciple of Sudharman and Prabhava that of Jambū and so on. § This is all the information that we obtain in the Agamas concerning the Gaṇadharas.

It is said of Indrabhūti Gautama, the foremost disciple of Mahāvīra, that on the very night on which Mahāvīra attained nirvāṇa his tie of affection binding him to Mahāvīra snapped off and he too attained nirvāṇa. † It is also found mentioned that Indrabhūti was the chief of the 14,000 disciples of Mahāvīra who had abandoned worldly life and become śramaṇas (monks). * From this it is easy to derive that Indrabhūti was highly attached to Lord Mahāvīra and that he did not attain the stage of omniscience during the life-time of Mahāvīra. Bhagavatī sūtra 14.7 corroborates this. In it, Lord Mahāvīra alludes to Indrabhūti's love and affection for himself and assures him that both would become alike (having the same end in view and residents of the same place) in all respects after becoming free from the human existence. The commentator Abhayadeva explains here that Indrabhūti was very much disappointed and sad that he had not achieved omniscience though his disciples had, and hence the assurance given by Mahāvīra.

From the questions posed by the Gaṇadharas it can be seen that they were very inquisitive by temperament and had a very powerful craving for knowledge. Not that they were ignorant or always doubting, but they kept on asking questions for more

§ Kalpasūtra, p. 217.

† Kalpasūtra, Sū. 127.

* Kalpasūtra, Sū. 134.

and more clarification of philosophical problems and were not satisfied till they had arrived at a full solution of their doubts. Indrabhūti was the most curious among them. Whenever he had an occasion to hear the views of thinkers of other schools or to see something unusual he would at once rush to Mahāvīra and inquire about it.† We find recorded certain episodes revealing Indrabhūti's ready-wittedness. Hearing from Mahāvīra that Skandaka, a heretic (belonging to another school) had come, he went to receive him and foretold the reason of his coming to Mahāvīra and the doubts he entertained. This inspired in Skandaka great respect for, and faith in, Lord Mahāvīra.§ The teaching of apramāda (spiritual alertness) in Uttarādhyayana, 10 was imparted to Indrabhūti Gotama and indirectly to all. We find Indrabhūti carrying messages of Mahāvīra to others, e. g. he conveys the Lord's message to Mahāsataka at the time of his confession on his death-bed, that he should expiate for the bitter though true words uttered by him to his wife Revatī.† We find descriptions of Indrabhūti's appearance and personality in several places. He is described as having a fair complexion, as bright, undergoing severe austerity, as a true celibate, as a knower of the fourteen Pūrvas, as capable of four kinds of knowledge (i. e. excluding kevala-jñāna, omniscience).* Most of the Āgamas may be said to owe their existence to the questions of Indrabhūti.

Next to Indrabhūti, comes Sudharman from the point of view of information that can be collected, though we do not find any allusion to his personal life. What we are told is that he explained the Āgama on being asked by Jambū. It is really surprising that though the present Jaina saṅgha is traced to Sudharman alone, and though the text of the Āgamas is traditionally obtained from Sudharman, and though it is believed that Sudharman himself gave the text of certain

† See Bhagavati 2.5, 9.33 etc.

§ Bhagavati Śataka 2.1.

† Upāsakadaśaṅga, 8.

* See Bhagavati, Śataka, 1.

Āgamas to Jambū, † we do not find any record in the Āgamas of Sudharma having asked Mahāvīra any question and of the latter's reply. Bhagavatī Sūtra notes a few questions asked by Agnihūti, Vāyubhūti ‡ and Maṇḍiyaputta.* Ārya Sudharman's description is exactly like that of Indrabhūti's.

But it may be noted that nowhere in the Āgamas do we find any reference to the doubts of the gaṇadharas and their questions as detailed in the Gaṇadharavāda. We find the first reference to these doubts of the respective gaṇadharas in a gāthā of the Āvaśyaka Niryukti :

Jive¹ kamme² tajjīva³ bhūya⁴ tārisaya⁵ bandhamokkhe⁶ ya;
devā⁷ neraie⁸ yā punne⁹ paraloya¹⁰ nevvāne¹¹. —

Āvaśyaka Niryukti, Gā 596 —

(1) Does the soul exist or not? (2) Is there anything like karma, (3) Is the body the same as soul or is it different? (4) Do the elements exist? (5) Is the soul in the next world similar to that in this world? (6) Are bondage and salvation real? (7) Are there gods? (8) Are there hellish beings? (9) Are there puṇya (good) and pāpa (sin)? (10) Is there the other-world? (11) Is there anything like emancipation?

The Āvaśyaka Niryukti gives us further details regarding the life, etc., of these gaṇadharas. They are given in the chart on the following four pages. §

We are told, as said above, in the Kalpa-sūtra that Lord Mahāvīra had eleven gaṇadharas, but the number of gaṇas (schools) was nine. This is accounted for by the fact that a school or gaṇa is constituted as a result of a difference in the wording of the text though in all cases the meaning of the text might remain unchanged. The gaṇadharas composed the Āgamas on the basis of the instruction given by Mahāvīra. On

† See introductory statements of Jñātādharma-kathāṅga, Anuttaropapātika, Vipāka, Nirayāvalikā

‡ Bhagavatī 3.1

* Bhagavatī 3.3

§ See Āvaśyaka Niryukti, gāthās 589-641.

THE GAṆADHARAS

No.	Name	Father	Mother	Caste	Gotra (Family) name	Profession	Place of birth	Nakṣatra at the time of birth	Period of life as a householder	Period of life as one still involved in worldly life
1	Indrabhūti	Vasubhūti	Pṛthvī	Brāhmaṇa	Gautama	Teacher	Magadha Gobbara	Jyeṣṭhā	50	30
2	Agnibhūti	"	"	"	"	"	"	Kṛttikā	46	12
3	Vāyubhūti	"	"	"	"	"	"	Svāti	42	10
4	Vyakta	Dhanamitra	Vāruṇī	"	Bhāradvāja	"	Kollāga Sanniveśa	Śravaṇa	50	12
5	Sudharmā	Dhammila (Dharmila)	Bhaddilā (Bhadrilā)	"	Agnivaiśyāyana	"	"	Hastottara	50	42
6	Mandika or Mandita	Dhana-deva	Vijaya-devā	"	Vāsiṣṭha	"	Moriya Sanniveśa	Maghā	53	14
7	Maurya-putra	Maurya	"	"	Kāśyapa	"	"	Rohiṇī	65	14

No.	Name	Period of emancipated life	Total life in years	Following of disciples	Line of disciples left behind	Place of nirvāṇa	Sams-thāna *	Samgha-yaṇa †	Time of nirvāṇa	Knowledge of scripture	Remarks
1	Indrabhūti	12	92	500	×	Rājagrha	Sama-catur-asra	Vajra-ṛṣabha-nārāca	After Mahāvīra	12Angas. 14 Pūrvas	These three were brothers
2	Agnibhūti	16	74	500	×	„	„	„	Before Mahāvīra	„	
3	Vāyubhūti	18	70	500	×	„	„	„	„	„	
4	Vyakta	18	80	500	×	„	„	„	„	„	
5	Sudharmā	8	100	500	Jambū and others	„	„	„	After Mahāvīra	„	Children of the same mother but of different fathers.
6	Mandika or Mandita	16	83	350	×	„	„	„	Before Mahāvīra	„	
7	Maurya-putra	16	95	350	×	„	„	„	„	„	

THE GAṆADHARAS

No.	Name	Father	Mother	Caste	Gotra (family) name	Professi- on	Place of birth	Nakṣatra at the time of birth	Period of life as a house- holder	Period of life as one still involved in worldly life
8	Akampita	Deva	Jayantī	„	Gautama	„	Mithilā	Uttarā ṣādhā	48	9
9	Acalabhrātā	Vasu	Nandā	„	Harita	„	Kosalā	Mṛga- śiras	46	12
10	Metārya	Datta	Varuṇa- devā	„	Kauṇḍinya	„	Vatsabhumi -Tungiya Sanniveśa	Aśvinī	36	10
11	Prabhāsa	Bala	Atibhadrā	„	„	„	Rājagrha	Puṣya	16	8

(Continued)

No.	Name	Period of emancipated life	Total life in years	Following of disciples	Line tion of disciples left behind	Place of nirvāna	Sams-thāna *	Saṅgha-yaṇa †	Time of nirvāna	Know-ledge of scrip-tures	Remarks
8	Akampita	21	78	300	×	Rāja-grha	Sama-catur-asra	Vajra-ṛṣabha-nārāca	Before 12 Mahāvira	12Aṅgas, 14 Pūrvas	
9	Acalabhrātā	14	72	300	×	„	„	„	„	„	
10	Metārya	16	62	300	×	„	„	„	„	„	
11	Prabhāsa	16	40	300	×	„	„	„	„	„	

* Sams-thāna - See on the reverse.

† Saṅgha-yaṇa - See on the reverse.

* Saṁsthāna (Prakrit—saṁthāna) — Saṁtiṣṭhate anenā rūpeṇa pudgalātmakam vastv itī saṁsthānam—Utt. 1. a; ākāra-viśeṣe, mukhavr̥ṭṭyā pudgalaracanākāre—Āva. 4 a; atyadbhute racanāviśeṣe—Ā. Ma. 1 a; Viśe., Sa; ākr̥tīviśeṣaḥ saṁsthānāni tāni ca jīvājīvasambandhitvena dvidhā bhavanti.

Saṁsthāna, figure, excellent figure (ākr̥tīviśeṣa).

Mānonmānapramānāni anyūnāny anātiriktāni aṅgopāṅgāni ca yasmin śarīrasaṁsthāne tat samacaturasra-saṁsthānam—Abhidhāna Rajendra Kośa.

Samacaturasra-saṁsthāna—well-built, uniform, well-proportioned figure.

† Saṁghayaṇa (Sanskrit—saṁhanana), dovetailing of the joints, or the bones.

Asthi-sañcaye, vajra-ṛṣabhādyupamāne upameye śakti-viśeṣe—Sthā. 6, Ṭhā. 3u; Tatra vajram kilikā ṛṣabhaḥ pariveṣṭana-paṭṭaḥ nārācaḥ ubhayato markatabandhaḥ, yatra dvayor asthnor ubhayato markatabandhena baddhayoḥ paṭṭākṛtīnā tṛtīyenāsthnā pariveṣṭitayor upari tadasthitritayabbedikilikākāram vajra-nāmakam asthi bhavati tad vajra-ṛṣabhanārācam prathamam.

Vajra-ṛṣabha-nārāca is the best of the six types of the dovetailing of joints or bones.

Samhanyante—dr̥ḍhīkriyante śarīrapudgalā yena tat saṁhananam tac cā'sthnicayaḥ kilikādirūpānām asthnām nicayo racanāviśeṣo 'sthnīcayaḥ. Idam asthi-nīcayātmakam saṁhananam audārikāṅge audārika-śarīra eva, nā'nyeṣu śarīreṣu, teṣāṁ asthirahitavāt—Abhidhāna Rajendra Kośa.

account of difference of wording there were nine different texts (vācanā) of the canon, though the gaṇadharas were eleven. Akampita and Acalabhrātā had altogether 600 disciples who followed one vācanā (text); so also Metārya and Prabhāsa had altogether 600 disciples who followed one vācanā (text). Hence the total number of gaṇas (schools) was nine though the number of gaṇadharas was eleven.

The Āvaśyaka Niryukti relates the circumstances in which Indrabhūti first met Lord Mahāvīra, and how he was converted to faith in Mahāvīra. He approached as a sceptic and scoffer and remained to worship. The other gaṇadharas did not come with a view to revile Mahāvīra, but out of inquisitiveness and a sense of awe. They also became the disciples of Mahāvīra. Though later commentators have written at length and with flourish about this episode, we do not get any new information from them. Jinabhadra, the author of the Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya has seized this opportunity to give a digest containing the essential principles of Jaina philosophy. Imitating him, other commentators of the Āvaśyaka Niryukti and the commentators of the Kalpa-sūtra have done the same and given an exposition of the Jaina philosophy.

Ācārya Hemacandra has in his Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritra given, on the basis of traditional accounts, further details regarding the life of Indrabhūti and even regarding his previous life. § Such episodes as are related here are based on the statement in the Bhagavati Sūtra where Mahāvīra says to Indrabhūti that their relation was nothing new, but continued from the previous life.

It is believed by all that Indrabhūti's intense attachment to Lord Mahāvīra came in the way of his omniscience. The moment that was removed by the physical death of Mahāvīra, he attained omniscience. Describing this incident Ācārya Hemacandra says that Mahāvīra realised that Indrabhūti was

§ See. Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritra 10.9.

not attaining omniscience on account of his intense attachment to him. Hence knowing that he was to attain nirvāṇa on that very night, Mahāvīra sent Indrabhūti to instruct Devaśarman residing in a village not far away from the place. By the time he returned Mahāvīra had given up his worldly life and had attained nirvāṇa. He was very sad and also intrigued as to why he was sent away when the end of Lord Mahāvīra was drawing near. But he at once realised that till then he was deep sunk in the mire of ignorance and attachment and that his love and attachment were coming in the way of his attaining omniscience. He immediately attained omniscience.*

All such narratives are based on the statement in the Bhagavatī Sūtra 14.7 that Indrabhūti Gautama was highly attached to Lord Mahāvīra and that their relationship persisted even from the previous birth, and that they would both be alike in the future.

STYLE :

The Bhagavadgītā has a unique place in the Mahābhārata inasmuch as though it is perfectly set in the chain of the original story, it can be severed from it and can serve as a text-book of Indian thought. The place of the Gaṇadharavāda in the Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya is a similar one. Set in the original at the stage when after attaining omniscience (kevala-jñāna), Mahāvīra is honoured at a samavasaraṇa and even the gods come to pay their respects to him and Indrabhūti out of jealousy, and other ten Brāhmaṇas out of curiosity and even a sense of admiration approach Mahāvīra, each with a query in his mind, the Gaṇadharavāda can serve as an independent manual of Jaina philosophy. Like the Gītā or even the Upaniṣads, the Buddhist Piṭakas and the Jaina Āgamas, it is framed as a dialogue—between Mahāvīra and the eleven gaṇadharas one after the other. This gives the writer a very good opportunity to pose questions and raise objections or anticipate objections from the opponent and thus make the whole affair very life-like

* Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritra 10.13.

and interesting. Philosophical instruction, especially for the mediocre, is best imparted in such a sugar-coated pill of philosophical controversy. Even in serious and difficult works on Indian philosophy we find that the author has always in view a rival thinker and he makes persistent efforts to drive his point home or clarify his view-point as against the objections the rival thinker could possibly raise or is likely to raise. This is the usual style of books on philosophy. This may be a reflection of the debates and controversies which must have been very common in the philosophical circles and in the social conditions of the past.

Unlike what we find in the Gītā, here in the Gaṇadharavāda, Mahāvīra knows the doubts of the sceptical Brāhmaṇas as also the reasoning which has led them to this doubt, so that these latter have actually nothing to relate. This is quite in agreement with the tenor of the incident wherein the omniscience (kevala-jñāna) of Mahāvīra is to be brought to the fore-ground. Nevertheless, it may be borne in mind, the discussion proceeds purely on the basis of reasoning and only when it has had full scope, does Mahāvīra appeal to Indrabhūti and others to accept his words as he is omniscient. Thus due importance is attached to reasoning and the disciples are, we may say, thereby taught and inspired to accept authoritative statements no doubt, but also to reason them out. We find a parallel to this in the Bhagavad Gītā where Kṛṣṇa after imparting instruction reveals his cosmic form. There is a curious but welcome combination of reason and faith.

Another point that claims our attention is that the doubts of the Brahmin doubters are based on the authority of the Veda which at times seems to present contradictory statements. This is as it ought to be even though the Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya is a Jaina work, because Indrabhūti and the other ten were originally Brāhmaṇas. But what is worth appreciating is that Mahāvīra is not made to brush aside the statements of the Veda as not acceptable to him. But with due respect to them he explains that the contradiction is only apparent. Thus

the Veda is explained through the Veda and there is no attempt to condemn or cavil at the scriptures of other schools. This is in the true spirit of the Anekāntavāda (philosophy of non-absolutism and synthesis) which is the very essence of the Jaina system of thought. The Jaina tenets are expounded independently and mostly no attempt is made to twist the original texts. Moreover, the prima-facie view (pūrva-pakṣa) is given at length and then it is refuted, and even later on objections are anticipated. This must be appreciated in such an early work as the Viśeṣāvāśyaka-bhāṣya of Jinabhadra. We find this method at its best in such works as the Nyāya-mañjarī of Jayanta, the Aṣṭasahasrī of Vidyānanda and the like but one feels fully satisfied and even astonished to see it so well illustrated in the Viśeṣāvāśyaka-bhāṣya a comparatively early work, though it is by no means the only work of its type.

Maladhārī Hemacandra's exposition of the Viśeṣāvāśyaka-bhāṣya is, one may say, an ideal commentary, explaining and clarifying all the difficult points in a lucid style.

The following brief exposition which may be called 'A Philosophical Essay on the Gaṇadharavāda' will give some idea of the of philosophical problems in the Gaṇadharavāda, as also of the method adopted by Maladhārī Hemacandra in their exposition.

A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON THE GAṆADHARAVĀDA

In the Gaṇadharavāda which is a section of the Viśeṣā-vaśyakabhāṣya of Acārya Jinabhadra, this latter being a commentary on the Āvaśyaka Niryukti, we find a number of philosophical and religious problems discussed by way of a dialogue between Lord Mahāvīra and the different gaṇadharas (leaders of groups) who came to him in a defiant mood or motivated by the craving for knowledge. The problems discussed are as follows :

- (i) Existence of the soul;
- (ii) Existence of karman;
- (iii) Identity or otherwise of the soul and the body;
- (iv) Existence of bhūtas (real entities);
- (v) Semblance between this life and the next one;
- (vi) Reality of bondage and salvation;
- (vii) Existence of gods;
- (viii) Existence of the denizens of hell;
- (ix) Puṇya (good) and Pāpa (evil);
- (x) Existence of the other-world (paraloka);
- (xi) Reality of Nirvāṇa (emancipation).

We may consider these problems succinctly here. In doing so we shall link up the allied problems so as to make the exposition precise and systematic. Jinabhadra has, as in most works on Indian philosophy, given us a very faithful account of the opponent's view along with references to the scriptures he relies upon and then refuted the arguments of the opponents, added some to support his own view and finally given a fresh interpretation of the scriptural text cited by the opponent. The full significance of philosophical problems is brought out if we take into consideration the views of the main systems with regard to them. Hence we shall, in the course of this brief exposition, discuss the view of the main opponent and also refer to other views.

The first problem taken up in the Gaṇadharavāda is that of the existence of the soul; connected with it is the third problem whether the soul has an independent reality or is identical with the body. It would be proper to take these two problems together.

The popular view-point is to believe in the existence of things that are perceptible to the senses and it is popularly accepted that there is no reason to believe in the existence of what is not perceptible to the senses. Inference can help only in those cases where a thing may not be perceived at the moment, but can be perceived if one wants to perceive it, e. g. fire on the mountain that is inferred from smoke. Again, inference is based on perception, for the *vyāpti* (rule of invariable concomitance) cannot be arrived at without it. The soul or its relation to any *liṅga* (mark) has never been perceived and so inference cannot help us in inferring the existence of the soul. The *Cārvāka* or *Lokāyata* system of thought which had a popular appeal is an upholder of this point of view. Only that much exists as can be perceived by the senses; even the very wise arrive at ridiculous conclusions when they resort to inference or means of knowledge other than perception. As the story goes, a man made certain marks in the dust on the road just to test the intelligence and rational approach of the so-called wise, who actually fell a prey to this trick and inferred from the marks that a wolf had frequented the place. It is but natural that the soul should be denied according to this line of thought. Again we do not find anyone who has had the direct perception of the soul and hence whose words could be accepted as verbal testimony. Even the scriptures make conflicting statements. In *Bṛh. Up.* 2.4.12 we are told that the mass of consciousness itself arises from these material elements and follows them in destruction, and there is no consciousness after death (*Vijñānaghana evaitebhyaḥ bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāny evānu vinaśyati, na ca pretya samjñā'sti*). This seems to corroborate the *Lokāyata* view that the soul or sentient-principle has no independent reality but is only an epiphenomenon of the material elements aggregating in a certain proportion. Hence the allied view-point that the soul has no independent identity but is identical with the body, for consciousness is an attribute of the aggregate of the material elements, i. e. the body and there is the relation of identity between the attribute and what possesses it. The Buddha too has said that

rūpa, etc. are not pudgala or the soul, implying thereby that no external object that is perceived is the soul or that there is nothing which can be regarded as the soul. But on the other hand we have innumerable scriptural passages which tell us of the existence of the soul. Hence the question as to its existence. We are also told to perform sacrifices, etc. for the attainment of heaven, etc. and charity, honesty, etc. are also popularly regarded as rewarding in future. These by no means yield the fruit during the existence of the body and are not even intended to do so. This means that there is some continuation of the personality even after the body perishes. Hence one cannot deny the soul outright.* What is the way out?

* It may be noted that even the materialist Cārvākas do not deny the soul altogether, but regard it as an epiphenomenon of the elements earth, etc.. Keeping this in view, Uddyotakara has rightly pointed out that it can be said generally that no system of philosophy has doubted the existence of the soul. The differences among the different systems are as regards the nature of the soul. Some regard the body as the soul, others the sense-organs, mind, intellect, or the aggregate and some regard the soul as an independent entity distinct from these (Nyāya-vārtika, p. 336). The story of Indra and Virocana is interesting wherein we are told that Virocana propounded the view that the soul is identical with the body [Chāndogya Up. 8.8; see also Taitt. Up. 2.1,2 wherein we are told that the puruṣa is constituted of anna (food)]. It is not possible to separate the soul from the body and show it as distinct from it, as one can draw the sword from the sheath; so the soul exists only so long as the body does and perishes along with it (See Sūtrakṛtāṅga, 2.1.9; 2.1.10. King Pāeṣī of the Dīgha Nikāya, after a number of experiments comes to the conclusion that whatever energy there is is all due to the body and perishes with it). This view is known as the Tajjīva-taccharira-vāda—the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body. Unfortunately the works of the Bhūta-caitanyavādins (those who regarded sentiency as emerging from material elements) have

The rejoinder to all such arguments is, according to the Jainas, that the apprehension of doubt and other knowledge is itself the *jīva* (soul). Knowledge is self-evident and *jīva* being of the nature of knowledge is also such and it is not necessary to resort to any means of valid knowledge. We have the 'I' notion with respect to all the three times (e. g. 'I did', 'I do', 'I shall do'), and it is self-evident to all, even to those who have no claim to rational investigation and knowledge of scriptures. This 'I' notion must refer to some real object and that is the soul. Moreover, there could be no questioning or doubting ('Do I exist or not?') if the doubter *jīva* did not exist. Doubt is an attribute and there must be something of which it is an attribute. The body cannot be this entity for it is corporeal and inanimate while knowledge is non-corporeal and of the nature of *bodha* (consciousness). Hence the soul must exist as a substrate of knowledge. If one were to doubt one's own existence, one would be sceptical about everything. The doubter cannot doubt at least his own existence. According to our practical experience the soul is known to all.

been lost; even the *Bṛhaspati-sūtra* in which the *Lokāyata* system was formulated has been irretrievably lost. But we find references to the materialistic view in the scriptures—*Brahmanical*, *Buddhist* and *Jaina* (See *Ch. Up.* 4.3; *Śvet. Up.* 1.2; *Sāmañña-phala-sutta*, *Dīgha-Nikāya*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 1.1.1.7-8, etc.). Even within the different currents of thought we find development regarding the concept of the soul from a material principle to a sentient entity. (Cf. the use of words like *bhūta*, *prāṇa*, *sattva*, etc. for the soul in the *Ācāraṅga Sūtra*).

The *Buddhists* are *Anātma-vādins* (believers in non-soul) only in the sense that they do not recognise an independent permanent entity called the soul, but what other systems call 'ātman' (self), they regard as an everchanging aggregate of *rūpa* (physical factors) and *nāma* (psychical factors) comprising *vedanā* (sensation), *saṃjñā* (conceptual understanding), *saṃskāra* (impression) and *vijñāna* (pure consciousness). The inclusion of *vijñāna* is significant. (See *Milinda Pañha* 2.4.298).

Even if no means of valid knowledge can acquaint us with a thing it does not follow that it does not exist; e. g. ghosts, etc. The means of knowledge may not be able to operate with regard to the soul and yet the soul can be an existent entity. But in fact *pramānas* with regard to the existence of the soul are available. The qualities of the soul, viz. memory, desire to go, do, know, etc. and doubt, etc.—which are all particular forms of cognition—are established through self-apprehension. Therefore, the substrate of these qualities must also be known by perception, just as a jar is cognised by perception because its qualities, colour, etc. are cognised thereby. It cannot be argued that the soul does not exist because it is not perceived, while the jar exists because it is perceived. The existence of the jar will have to be first established before this can be said. And by whatever argument the jar is established, that same will demonstrate the existence of the soul too. The soul must be existent as the substrate of the qualities, knowledge, etc.. Knowledge, etc. cannot reside in the body for the knower is different from the senses, because even when these latter do not operate there is the remembrance of what has been cognised by them.

We may at this stage discuss the point that consciousness cannot emerge from the body which is a conglomerate of material elements, though it will mean a slight digression from the present line of thought. Even if we take the opponent at his word that consciousness emerges from the conglomerate of the elements, earth, etc. it must be present to some extent, however slight in each of the elements severally, so as to become full and distinct on their coming together. But this is not true, for consciousness is not observed in the conglomerate. The conglomerate called body comprises not only the elements, but also the soul and if consciousness exists in this conglomerate it is not on account of the conglomeration of the elements but because it is an attribute of the soul. Consciousness is not found in a dead body and does not emerge even if any element thought to be missing in it is introduced into it. Green grass may be found when there is a conglomerate of earth and water, but this does not

mean that it is a product of this conglomerate; similarly consciousness cannot be said to emerge from the conglomerate of the material elements, but is an attribute of the soul.

To return to our point, the soul is directly and fully perceptible to one who is free from all passions and whose knowledge is unobscured. Thus the soul is perceptible to all, though partially. Its knowledge can also be arrived at by inference and this helps us to conclude that others' bodies too have a soul associated with them as our body has. It is not absolutely necessary that the *lingin* (signified) should have been cognised previously as concomitant with the *liṅga* (mark) in order that we might be able to utilise inference. A spirit is generally never observed as making all sorts of gestures, and yet from certain gestures like laughing, screaming, etc. we infer the existence of a spirit in the body. Similarly we can employ a number of inferences to demonstrate the existence of the soul. To take but two instances:— The maker of the body must exist because it has a definite shape which has a beginning, like the jar which has a maker; or, The manipulator of the senses exists, because they are instruments, as the potter is the manipulator of staff, wheel, etc.. The soul is this maker, manipulator and so on, for the concept of God, according to the Jainas, does not stand the test of reasoning. The soul too, like the potter, etc, is, in a way, corporeal so long as it is in the transmigratory condition, for it is enveloped in the aggregate of the eightfold material *karman*. A newly-born child's knowledge or desire, etc must be preceded by another knowledge or desire, etc. respectively, because it is of the nature of knowledge or desire, etc. These are attributes and so must have a substratum. The soul is this substratum and is thus distinct from the body and persists even when the previous body has perished.

Moreover the very fact that there is a doubt about the soul establishes its existence, for there can be no doubt with regard to what is utterly non-existent. For instance, we have the doubtful cognition, "Is it a man or a post?"; man and post are both real. Error with regard to a thing or negation of a thing is possible only if the thing is real. When we say the ass's horn

does not exist we only mean that the horn does not exist on the ass, but it does exist on a cow, etc.. We negate the jīva when we say non-jīva; therefore the counter-entity of non-jīva, viz. the jīva must be an existent entity. The rule is that if an entity denoted by an etymologically derived, uncompounded word is negated, this negation always implies the existence of the counter-entity. Jīva which can be etymologically derived and is uncompounded is negated by non-jīva; so there must be a real entity called the jīva. Not so Dittha (which cannot be etymologically explained) and khara-viṣāṇa (ass's horn, which is a compound). A word which is etymologically derivable and is uncompounded must refer to a real thing. 'Jīva' is one such word; so the entity 'jīva' (soul) denoted by it must be an existent one. 'Jīva' (soul) and 'deha' (body) have different sets of synonyms, and so must be distinct entities. Again, what is non-existent is not negated. If we negate the soul, it must be an existent entity. The soul cannot exist without a support; it is very easily seen that the body is this substratum, for we have marks of its residence in the body, viz. knowledge etc..

The Vedic passage 'Vijñānaghana evaitebhyah...' should not be interpreted to mean that sentiency perishes with the body. Vijñāna in this passage means particular knowledge which is a sum total of jñāna (determinate knowledge) and darśana (indeterminate intuition). The soul is non-different from this vijñāna and being permeated by it, is called vijñāna-ghana. 'Eva' stresses that this is the very nature of the soul, otherwise it would not be inherently sentient, as happens in the case of the soul in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Particular knowledge (vijñāna) arises from the bhūtas (objects like jar, cloth, etc. which have assumed the form of knowables). These vijñānas are different modes of the jīva (soul) and hence it can be said that the jīva arises out of the knowables. When these objects are no longer perceived (on account of their being covered by something or on account of absent-mindedness, etc.) this particular knowledge does not arise; or when we leaving one object concentrate on another, that particular knowledge can

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be said to have perished on the destruction of that object in its capacity as a knowable, and hence that particular mode too of the soul can be said to have perished. But this should not be understood to mean that the soul totally perishes. Such modes keep on arising and perishing, but there is a continuity of consciousness which should not be lost sight of, and in respect of which the jīva is imperishable. In the Jaina view, every entity has the three-fold nature of origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and persistence (dhrauvya). The soul persists in the midst of this sort of origination and destruction. The soul is self-luminous (Cf. Brh. Up. 4.3.6); this self-luminosity is the same as jñāna (sentience, knowledge) and this shows that this jñāna-nature of the soul is in no way dependent on the existence or non-existence of material objects; particular knowledge alone is thus dependent. Thus the existence of the soul as an inherently sentient, self-luminous entity persisting in the midst of change has been proved. The soul is doer and enjoyer and can experience pleasure-pain, bondage, transmigration, and emancipation.*

* The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system regards the soul as eternally unchanging and as the substrate of a number of qualities like knowledge, pleasure, etc. which are produced in it by its association with the body. Thus, the soul is not inherently conscious, but is capable of being conscious. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga regards the soul as pure sentience, qualityless, unaffected, absolutely unchanging, non-doer, non-enjoyer, merely a witness; all operations of knowledge, pleasure, pain, bondage, salvation, etc. are on account of its association with the buddhi (intellect). The Buddhist views will be discussed later; as also the Vedāntic. The Mīmāṃsā view seems to be very much like that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The Vedāntic view of the soul is similar to that of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, only the soul is not absolutely independent as in the latter.

In all these systems the soul is entirely distinct and virtually independent of God even if God is recognised. Only the Vedānta recognises God and regards the souls as illusory manifestations of God (Śaṅkara) or as real and in a way non-

As to the number of souls, the Vedāntins believe that there is but one Ultimate Entity, one sentient principle, Brahman, which is all-pervading. They claim to have the support of the scriptures. But the Jainas say that if the same soul were present in all bodies, it would have the same characteristics, which is not what we find. Every individual has his own pleasure, etc.. There are innumerable more miserable souls than there are happy ones in the universe. If they were all one, there would be nothing like happiness or pleasure for any one. But we do find one person happy as against others who are unhappy. This clearly shows that the souls are infinite in number. †

The souls are also not all-pervading (vibhu). The characteristics of the soul are found only within the expanse different manifestations or parts of God (Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Vallabha, Śrīkanṭha, and others) or as different from but as dependent on God (Madhva), or as inseparable from God (Vijñānabhikṣu). God though recognised in the Yoga system has no special significance in his relation with the souls. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika recognises God as the creator of the world, in accordance with the karman of souls. In Vedānta, excepting the philosophy of Śāṅkara, neither the souls nor God can be regarded as kṛtastha-nitya or absolutely changing. Of course, in all the systems except the Buddhist, the souls are eternal entities. Śāṅkara would agree from the point of view of lower knowledge, for from the esoteric point of view the souls are unreal and so there is no question of their being eternal or not.

† The Upaniṣads recognise Brahman as the Absolute Principle and regard the inanimate world and soul as manifestations or modifications of the ultimate which is both immanent and transcendent. All the Vedāntic philosophers are of this view, except Śāṅkara who interprets the Upaniṣads to mean that there is but one non-dual, absolute principle, and all else is unreal. All the systems of philosophy recognise an infinite number of souls. Even the Vijñānavādins recognise an infinite number of streams of consciousness.

of the body and so can exist only in the body and be of the same size as the body. It is capable of expansion or contraction in accordance with the body it occupies. ‡

Mahāvīra holds that there is a relation of *bhedābheda* (identity in difference) between the basic substance and its modes (*pariyāyas*) or attributes (*guṇas*) as against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who regards the substance and attributes as absolutely distinct but joined together by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). On account of this the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika can afford to hold that the soul is eternally unchanging (*kūṭastha-nitya*) even when qualities like knowledge, pleasure, pain, attachment, dislike, effort, merit, demerit are produced in it or are destroyed (dissociated). The Jainas, on the other hand, true to their belief in the three-fold nature, viz *utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya*, regard the soul as *pariṇāmi-nitya* (eternal in the midst of change). New *pariyāyas* of knowledge, pleasure, pain etc. are created in it, and they also perish; accordingly from the point of view of these *pariyāyas*, the soul can be said to be originated or destroyed, while from the point of view of the basic substance (*dravya*) it remains eternal. Thus there is a constant change in the soul and yet it remains eternal.

The Buddhist theory of the soul-principle invites comparison here. As said above, the Pāli Piṭakas say that what others regards as a soul is but an ever-changing aggregate of *nāma-rūpa*. It is beginningless and endless as a stream of changing point-instants, but is not a permanent entity. This view is known as *Pudgala-nairātmyavāda* (Doctrine of the essencelessness of the soul). The Buddhists were condemned as

‡ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, and Śāṅkara regard the soul as all-pervading. The Vedāntic teachers other than Śāṅkara, regard the soul as atomic (*anu*), their argument being that the soul is eternal and so can be either atomic or all-pervading. But it cannot be all-pervading as that would involve much confusion. The Buddhists have not said anything precisely as to the size of the *citta* (mind) or *vijñāna* (consciousness), but the *hadayavatthu* (heart) is said to be its locus in some Buddhist works (*Visuddhimagga*, 14. 60; 17. 163, etc).

non-believers in soul, so a section of them viz. the Sammitīyas or Vātsīputrīyas advanced the theory that there is an entity called the pudgala or soul. This view did not find favour, as it was regarded as being against the view of Buddha. The Sarvāstivādins, on the other hand, to hold their own against other currents of thought recognising a soul and thus justifying the doctrine of transmigration and bondage-salvation, gave the name of citta to nāma (vedanā, sañjñā, saṃskāra, and vijñāna) and gave an analysis of it as divided into a number of parts. Even while accepting it as momentary, they established it as existing in all the three times by recognising its potency in the past and the future. This was equivalent to accepting Eternalism (Śāsvatavāda) to which Buddha was very much opposed. The Sautrāntikas, therefore, came forward to established it as momentary and existing in the present instant alone. The Mādhyamikas realised that this was simply dialectics and this inspired them in the direction of Śūnyavāda or the doctrine of the essencelessness of things. Ultimately the Vijñānavādins established that streams of momentary consciousness, infinite in number, are the only reality, everything else being external projections of them. This gives us some idea as to how difficult it is to deny a persisting sentient entity. The Jainas as compared to others have a synthetic approach inasmuch as a harmony is established by them between both change and persistence. The Buddhists find it very difficult to explain bondage, transmigration, emancipation, memory, recognition, etc. on the basis of the theory that every point-instant is different from the preceding and the succeeding point-instants of nāma or citta or vijñāna, as no identity is recognised. It is also not possible to have the knowledge of the momentariness of all things in the some moment, for knowledge too is momentary. To avoid these difficulties, it would be more rational, according to the Jainas, to recognise a soul distinct from the body.

Knowledge is inherent in the soul, but does not shine because it is obscured by the veil of karman. Five kinds of knowledge can arise with the removal of the corresponding karma-veil, viz., mati (sensuous), śrūta (scriptural), avadhi (visual intuition),

manah-paryāya (intuition of mental modes) and kevala (pure and perfect knowledge). The soul in its pure state does not require any external help of the sense-organs, etc.; but these are helpful only in removing partially the karma-veil. Kevala-jñāna is perfect and eternal, has an infinite number of things as its objects and persists in a pure condition eternally.

The soul though a real entity is not perceived because it is non-corporeal. That it is not perceived is no evidence of its being unreal. Charity, sacrifices, austerity, pursuit of knowledge, etc. can yield their fruit only if the soul is a real, persisting entity.

Souls can be classified as saṃsārin (worldly, transmigrating) and mukta (emancipated). The saṃsārin souls can again be samanaska (possessed of mind) and amanaska (devoid of mind) or trasa (dynamic) and sthāvara (stationary). Earth, water, and vegetation are sthāvara, and fire, wind air, those with two sense-organs, three-senses organs, etc. are trasa. Trasa souls are so called because they are capable of movement from one place to another and capable of effort to bring about pleasure and avoid pain. Fire and air are called trasa not because they possess this nature, but only because they resemble souls with two sense-organs, etc. with regard to movement. That is to say, trasa souls are of two kinds—labdhi-trasa (souls with two senses, etc.) and gati-trasa (air, fire). These latter are in reality sthāvara but are known as such on account of their having movement. Souls are again bhavya (those that can be emancipated) and abhavya (those that will never be emancipated).

BONDAGE AND EMANCIPATION OF THE SOUL.

The question of bondage and emancipation, whether there is anything like bondage or emancipation is discussed in Gaṇadharavāda, 6 and the nature of emancipation in Gaṇadharavāda, 11.

There are conflicting statements in the scriptures which say: "Sa eṣa viṣṇo vibhūr na badhyate saṃsarati vā, na mucyate mocayati vā, na vā eṣa bāhyam abhyantaram vā veda" [This soul is all-pervading and qualityless. Neither is it bound nor does it transmigrate. It is not freed (from karman) nor does it free (karman); it knows neither the (external nor the internal); and also "Na ha vai saśarīrasya priyāpriyayor apahatir asti, aśarīram vā vasantam priyāpriye na spr̥ṣataḥ" (The embodied soul can never be free from pleasure and pain, while these do not affect the soul as it exists in an unembodied state). The former statement says that bondage and emancipation have no reality, whereas the latter statement implies their reality. Dialectical arguments also lead one to question them. If bondage means the union of the jīva (soul) with karman, has this union a beginning or is it beginningless? If it has a beginning, did the jīva exist first or karman? Or were they simultaneously produced? Bondage cannot be explained in the light of any of these. (i) Jīva cannot exist before karman, for like the ass's horn it would have no cause and so would be unproduced. What is produced without a cause should also perish without one. Even if jīva is beginningless, there cannot be its union with karman without a cause, for if this union were there without any cause, it would occur in the state of emancipation also. If the soul be thought to have no union with karman, it is ever emancipated; or in the absence of bondage, the question of emancipation does not arise at all.* (ii) Karman cannot be there before jīva which is regarded as its kartr̥ (doer, agent). If karma be produced without a cause, it would also perish without one.

* This is the Sāṃkhya and the Kevalādvaita view.

(iii) If Jiva and karman were simultaneous, the drawbacks of both the above cases would be present and again, one could not be regarded as the kartr and the other as the effect. If the union of jīva and karman be regarded as beginningless, it would also be endless, and the soul would never be emancipated. Thus one feels like questioning the fact of bondage and emancipation.

All accept that bondage is the union of jīva and karman, for mere union of soul and matter cannot bring about bondage. There must be some attachment, etc., primary or secondary, on the part of the soul, for karman and bondage to arise. This attachment, etc. is caused by Avidyā (Nescience)—ignorance of the true nature of things. One can, according to the Jainas, become free from this bondage by true knowledge (samyag-jñāna), faith (darśana) and conduct (cāritra); (Samyagdarśana-jñāna-cāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ—Tattvārtha-sū 1.1).† Avidyā leading to attachment, etc. inspires the soul to act with passion with respect to matter and this brings an unseen potency (adrṣaṭ, karman) in association with the soul, which yields the fruit of the past material physical act when it becomes ripe for fructification. The contact of soul and matter does not by itself bring about bondage, but when the soul on account of this

† The Upaniṣads regard knowledge as the direct means to the attainment of emancipation; and regard action, devotion worship etc. as secondary. We find this very view in the Buddhist schools, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Vedānta of Śaṅkara and so on. Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā holds that action can itself lead to mokṣa (emancipation) while the theistic thinkers holds that bhakti (devotion) is the most important and direct means leading to mokṣa, and regard knowledge and action as subsidiary. Some Vedāntic school and the Śaivaites believe in the samuccaya (combination) of knowledge and action as leading to mokṣa. The argument of Śaṅkara and others who believe that jñāna (knowledge) alone leads to mokṣa is that Vidyā alone can destroy Avidyā, being its opposite and thus bring an end to bondage.

karman takes a body unto itself, it is bound, and it is from this bondage that the soul has to free itself.†

Now we may refute the arguments of the thinkers who are sceptical about bondage and emancipation. The chain of karman—body—karman—body—...is beginningless, so it is ridiculous to ask which was first. It is like the chain of seed and sprout related to each other by the cause-effect relationship. A particular body is the cause of a future karman, while being itself the effect of a past karman and so on ad infinitum. Thus karman is beginningless. 'Karman' comes from the root 'kr', 'to do', and what is done is itself a bondage. If karman be beginningless, bondage too should be beginningless. Now we must prove that the union of jīva and karman is beginningless. The cause-effect relationship does exist between body and karman, but neither would be produced without an agent, a doer, viz. the jīva. The jīva creates the body through the karman, and also karman through the instrumentality of the body. Thus the jīva is beginningless and its bondage also is beginningless.

The continuity of the union of jīva and karman though beginningless need not be endless. The seed-sprout chain though beginningless can come to an end if any individual seed or sprout perishes without having produced its effect. Similarly the union of jīva and karman, though it may have been handed down in a beginningless time, can be cut off by austerity, restraint, etc.. Again, such beginningless unions can be of two types—of the type of the union of jīva and ākāśa, and of the type of that of gold and soil. The former is beginningless and also endless; the latter is beginningless, but can be ended by being successful in separating the two. The bhavya souls who are capable of being emancipated have this type of union with karman, while the abhavya

† The Idealist philosophers (Śāṅkara, Vijñānavādins) do not recognise any material principle as real, but even they have to accept Brahman's association with the indescribable Māyā (principle of Illusion) or Avidyā (Nescience) as leading to bondage.

souls who can never be emancipated and are doomed to eternal bondage, have the former type of union with karman. (See gāthās 1820 ff).

Emancipation though caused by means is endless exactly like pradhvaṃsābhāva (posterior negation) of jar, which, it may be noted, is not a non-entity, but is an assemblage of pudgala (matter) characterised by the destruction of jar. But, as a matter of fact, mokṣa is not something artificial or brought about. As the destruction of jar means the existence of space alone, and no change is effected thereby in space which remains unaffected and eternal, so in emancipation, destruction of karman signifies the jīva existing by itself in its pure state; no change is brought about in it. Thus emancipation is eternal. The Jainas have no objection if mokṣa is regarded as, in a way, non-eternal, for according to them every entity is eternal from the point of view of the basic substance and non-eternal from that of its modes. When we refer to a thing as destroyed, or as originated, or as eternal, we have only one particular aspect of the thing prominently in view. The emancipated soul can be said to have perished from the point of view of its mundane state, but to persist from the point of view of its 'soulness', its upayoga (conscious activity), etc; it can also be said to have perished from the point of view of the perfection of the first time-point and to have originated from the point of view of the perfection of the second time-point and to have persisted as substance.

The Buddhists believe that as the lamp is completely extinguished (nirvāṇa), so the soul totally perishes in the state of nirvāṇa or mokṣa. But they are mistaken; even the lamp does not absolutely perish, it merely undergoes a change; it gives up its pariṇāma (modification) as lamp and assumes that of darkness, as milk turns into curds. The lamp after extinction is not seen because it has undergone a transformation and become subtle. Things which are initially amenable to one sense-organ, after modification can be perceived by quite a different sense-organ or become imperceptible. Musk and camphor, to take an example, are substances perceivable by the sense of

sight, but if blown off elsewhere by the wind, can be perceived only by the sense of smell, and if the distance be very great, it may not be perceived by any sense-organ. Similarly, everything merely undergoes a modification, but does not perish outright. The lamp, originally perceivable by the eyes can be perceived by the sense of smell when it is extinguished, so one cannot say that the lamp perishes absolutely in its state of extinction (nirvāṇa). Similarly when the soul attains parinirvāṇa, it attains another transformation of the form of unobscured perfect happiness. Absence of duḥkha (pain) is not bliss, and if a soul is just free from pain (which includes worldly pleasures also) in the state of mokṣa (as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believes), it cannot be looked upon as experiencing happiness or bliss. The emancipated soul experiences natural perfect bliss free from a false sense of ego. The soul in the state of mokṣa has perfect knowledge, and is omniscient for all obstructions have been removed. In the absence of puṇya (merit) and pāpa (demerit), which lead to misery directly or eventually, the soul is perfectly happy. Body, sense-organs, etc. are not required for the attainment of the perfection of knowledge, happiness, etc. for these are the very nature of the soul; and body, etc are helpful only when these are obstructed by the karma-veil, but are otherwise themselves a hindrance.*

* All systems of thought agree in holding that ignorance of the true state of things or the misconception of soul in non-soul, is the cause of bondage. Removal of ignorance and realisation of the true nature of things brings about mokṣa (emancipation). Of course, the conception of reality is different in each system. This state of emancipation does not fall, as a matter of fact, within the scope of any of the empirical means of knowledge, it can only be directly realised. Yet worldly as we are, we have to resort to language to describe the indescribable. Though the descriptions and terminology may differ, the ultimate goal is the same in all the different systems, as Haribhadrasūri has pointed out. (Samsārātītātattvaṃ tu param nirvāṇasamjñitam; tad dhy ekameva niyamāt śabdabhede' pi tattvataḥ;—Yogaḍṛṣṭi-samuccaya, 129. Sadāśivaḥ param brahma

The vedic passage 'Na ha vai saśarīrasya...' refers to the embodied state or bondage and the unembodied state or emancipation; even when we are told: 'Sa eṣa viḡuṇo vibhur na badhyate', this is with reference to the emancipated soul which has no bondage, and should not be taken as referring to both the states. Hence there is no conflict so far as such scriptural statements are concerned. When the soul is referred to as siddhātmā tathateti ca; śabdais tad ucyate 'nvarthād ekam evaivamādibhiḡ —Ibid. 130, Ṣoḡaśaka, 16.1—4. So also Kundakunda, Bhāvaprābhṛta, 149).

Yet the descriptions of the state of mokṣa (emancipation) differ. The Buddhists have used the simile of the extinction of a lamp (dīpa-nirvāṇa) to give an idea of mokṣa and hence the impression that mokṣa is for the Buddhists a state of utter extinction. But going deeper into their writings, we find nirvāṇa classified with the asaṃskṛta (uncompounded) entities and is said to be dhruva (permanent), śubha (good), of the nature of happiness, uncaused, etc. (See Udāna, 73, 80; Visuddhimagga, 16.71,74,90).

So mokṣa as a state of eternity (though as a continuum), pure sentiency, bliss is recognised by the Buddhists also. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards substance and qualities as entirely distinct entities; qualities like knowledge, etc. are produced in the soul on account of its association with the body, etc.. When in the state of mokṣa, the soul is dissociated from the body, etc. it is also devoid of these qualities, and remains by itself. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika recognises omniscience, perfect bliss, etc. in God. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga system regards the puruṣa as pure sentiency, which is always qualityless, and it remains as such in the state of mokṣa, Ātman in the Vedānta is sat-cit-ānanda (existence-sentiency-bliss). It may be noted that according to Śāṅkara Vedānta alone the soul in its state of emancipation merges completely in the Absolute Brahman; in fact whatever individuality it had was due to Avidyā, was an unreality; it merely realises its true nature in the state of mokṣa. All the other schools and systems recognise the distinct individuality of the soul even in the state of mokṣa.

'embodied' or as 'unembodied', it can be easily seen that these epithets can refer to only an existent entity; hence the extinction of the soul cannot be thought of.

There is a scriptural statement:† "Jarāmaryaṁ vaiṭat sarvaṁ yaḍ agnihotraṁ"—One must perform agnihotra as long as one lives. The rite of agnihotra is the occasion for the slaughter of creatures, hence there is some fault in it also. If one has to perform the agnihotra as long as one lives, there is no scope for anything that brings about apavarga or emancipation. Can this mean that there is nothing like mokṣa (emancipation)? No; there is a 'vā' in the statement which indicates that man should perform the agnihotra as long as he lives and he should also perform activities leading to mokṣa.

Once a soul becomes emancipated, there is no question of its being bound again or leading a mundane life all over again. The karma-matter is for ever dissociated from the soul; even though the karma-matter may be existing where the soul exists, the free soul will not be bound again, for the causes of bondage—the activities of mind, speech, and body, and perverse attitude—are absent.

As soon as a soul becomes emancipated, it being light on account of the removal of karmic matter flies up to the farthest extremity of the loka (cosmos, inhabited universe) in a single time-point, even as the castor-seed shoots upwards when its outer covering or sheath breaks off. The emancipated soul does not go beyond this abode of the siddhas (perfect beings), for beyond it is aloka and the dharmāstikāya (the principle of motion which has spatial existence) that helps motion does not exist there.*

† The reading in the Śata. Br. (12.4.1.1) is:—"Etad vai jarāmaryaṁ sattvaṁ yaḍ agnihotraṁ, jarayā vā hy evā'smān mucyate mṛtyunā va."

* Those who regard the soul as all-pervading or ubiquitous have not to consider the question of the place of the soul's residence after emancipation, for the all-pervading soul has no place where to go. Among the theistic philosophers of the Vedānta, the Vaiṣṇavaites believe that the emancipated soul goes

There are a number of steps on ascending which the soul attains perfect emancipation. They are the different stages of spiritual development (gunasthānas). This is comparable to the krama-muktī (gradual emancipation) of the Vedic current of thought or to the stages of yogacaryā (yogic meditation) of the Buddhists. The soul may continue to be embodied even after it does not bind any new karman unto itself. This is what is known as jīvanmukti, as against videha-mukti (when it is free from the body).

[The Buddhists also have the concept of 'sopādisesa' and 'anupādisesa nirvāṇa',* upādi signifying the five skandhas].

(For a detailed discussion regarding Jīva, see Gaṇadhara. vāda 1, 3, 6, 11).

THE DOCTRINE OF KARMAN

"The doctrine of Karman is the central dogma of the Indian religions. It means: every action, every word, every thought produces, besides its visible, an invisible transcendental effect—the Karman: every action produces, if one may so express it, certain potential energies, which under given conditions, are changing themselves into actual energies, forces which, either as reward or punishment, enter sooner or later into appearance." † The Gaṇadharavāda thus rightly assigns a place of importance to the discussion of the doctrine of karman. We find in Gaṇadharavāda 2 a lengthy discussion establishing the existence of karman. It be pointed out that karman figures prominently in Gaṇadharavāda 5 dealing with the semblance between this world and the other world, and in Gaṇadharavāda 7,8 establishing the existence of gods and hellish beings, in Gaṇadharavāda, 9 to the world of Viṣṇu and enjoys the company of Viṣṇu. Nāgasena has said in the Milinda Pañha, that the pudgala (Buddhist word for soul) can realise nirvāṇa in whatever place it is existing in.

* The concept of jīvanmukti is acceptable to all systems of philosophy and individual philosophers except Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhva and Maṇḍana and the like among the Śāṅkaraites.

† 'The Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy'—Dr. H. Glasenapp (Preface to the German edition p, xi).

which concerns itself with the reality of punya (good) and pāpa (evil) and in Gaṇadhara-vāda 10 which deals with the reality of the other-world. It is also referred to in other places.

Before we come to a detailed discussion of karma it would be more convenient to briefly trace its history. We cannot definitely say that the Vedic people never inquired into the diversity of existence on the human earth; but from what evidence we have we can say that their thought centred round the sacrifice which they performed for the propitiation of gods who in turn were supposed to give them the things they desired. After death,* a person went, according to them, to the world of Yama or Viṣṇu or any other world of happiness if he was good and religious, and the irreligious people were said to be doomed to darkness, whatever that might have meant. Persons going to the world of happiness were supposed to be rejuvenated and to stay there eternally enjoying the fulness of life. In the Brāhmaṇas, we have the inquiry whether life in that other-world is perpetual, and we find Naciketas asking Yama, in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, how his actions could never be exhausted. This means that with the development of thought it struck the Vedic people, that if as a result of their good religious actions they could start a new happy life in heaven, that life could also come to an end, exactly as the things of this world are exhausted after they have been enjoyed. Again, they must have realised, especially as the science of sacrifice became more and more complicated and magic-like, that one does not always attain the fruit of sacrifice in this life and yet sacrifices could not have been performed in vain. This also could have led the Vedic people to speculations about other lives wherein the fruits of actions could be enjoyed. But the act perishes, so how could it yield its result when it is itself not existent? It must be leaving behind some invisible effect (adr̥ṣṭa) — some potentiality which materialises at a later stage in the form of reward (or punishment if the original act was sinful). The doctrine of karma can be clearly seen in the Upaniṣads, though we find in the Upaniṣads other theories referred to as

* See Religion and Philosophy of the Veda, vol xxxii—A. B. Keith (Harvard Oriental Series).

accounting for the world, viz. Kāla (time), Svabhāva (Nature), Niyati (Destiny), Yadrachā (Chance), Bhūta (Elements) or Puruṣa (Cosmic Man—sentient principle).* The absence of karma, here need not lead us to believe that it was not accepted at all. Karman refers to the individual directly while these attempt to explain the world as a whole.

A view gaining popularity and receiving more and more attention is that the doctrine of karma owes its existence to the indigenous people—the pre-Aryans. That the souls of the dead inhabit plants, etc. is not an idle speculation of primitive people. While the doctrine of karma is not traced in the Vedic religion in the earliest stages, it can be seen to be firmly rooted in other schools of thought, like the Jaina and the Buddhist, especially the former and it is now recognised almost by all that these flourished independently of the Vedic current of thought. Another factor that supports this view is that belief in rebirth is not found in any of the other countries inhabited by the Aryans, and it is not also found in the Vedas. This means that the concept of rebirth and of karman was borrowed by the Aryans from the indigenous people and incorporated into their own way of thought. Moreover, even the Upaniṣads speak of the origin of the world, while the Jainas and the Bauddhas hold that the world has no beginning, but is a beginningless and endless continuum. This also corroborates the view that these schools are not Aryan in origin. If we trace the history of the doctrine of karman we find that the Vedic school has not devoted as much thought to the concept of karman, as the Jainas or even the Buddhists. In a way it comes into conflict with the Vedic idea of the omnipotence of God and they have always to explain this away. We find that Yājñavalkya in the Brhad. Up. 3.2.13, takes Ārtabhāga to a quiet corner to discuss the problem of karma. Can this be a clue to the fact that the doctrine of karma was not yet so popular as to be discussed in the presence of all, who would find in it a revolution in ideas and even heresy?

* See Śvetāśvatara Up. 1.2.

Nature of Karma :

The term 'karma' is used both in colloquial language and in the śāstras. In popular usage it means 'work,' 'profession, vocation, etc.' In śāstric language it has a number of meanings—all action such as eating, drinking, trembling, shaking, jumping, moving, etc. whether it pertains to animate or to inanimate things. The ritualist Mīmāṃsists understand by the term the cult of Vedic rites—sacrifices, etc.; it also refers in the Smṛtis to the duties of the varṇas (castes) and āśramas (stages of life); and also to vratas (vows), etc. and such other religious practices. By the way, we may note that karma in Grammar means the object of the subject's activity—the most desired of the subject. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system has a principle called karma (action). The Jainas use the word in a two-fold sense—the modification of the form of rāga (love), dveṣa (hate), etc.—which is called kaṣāya (passion) or bhāva (psychic) karma. The other karma is the dravya-karma, its material counter-part; it consists of karmic matter which by virtue of the bhāva-karma clings to the soul. The action of the soul on account of such causes as perversity, passion, etc. is called karma. This definition applies to both spiritual or psychical (bhāva) and material (dravya) karma, inasmuch as bhāva-karma is an effect of which the soul is both the doer as well as the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa); and jīva functions as an agent with regard to dravya-karma which is a modification of subtle karmic matter. Again dravya-karma is instrumental in the accumulation of bhāva-karma, and bhāva-karma in the accumulation of dravya-karma.* Bhāva-karma

* All the systems of philosophy which recognise re-birth have also to recognise some potentiality of actions which yields its fruit at a later stage—whatever be the name they give to it—avidyā (—in Vedānta it almost corresponds to bhāva-karma, when avidyā means psychic obliqueness), vāsanā (predisposition in Buddhism and Yoga), āśaya (mental deposits— in Sāṃkhya-Yoga), apūrva (potency in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā), Adṛṣṭa (unseen), puṇya (merit), pāpa (sin), saṃskāra (latent traces), dharma

and dravya-karma are mutually related as cause and effect each of the other; and thus the stream of each is beginningless, though it may be possible to point out any one dravya-karma becoming the cause of a bhāva-karma and vice-versa; individually every karma has a beginning, but from the point of view of the continuum it is beginningless.

Cause of Karma bondage :

Mithyātva (perversity), avirati (intense attachment, non-abstinence). kaṣāya (passions) and yoga (vibrations) are regarded as the causes of karma. The two causes mentioned in works dealing with karma, are mostly kaṣāya and yoga, or kaṣāya is mentioned even alone. Kaṣāya can be of many kinds, but it has been regarded as two-fold—rāga (love, attachment) and dveṣa (hatred), which can be looked upon as including all the psychic variations. Ignorance by itself is not a bondage; it must be accompanied by rāga or dveṣa to have a binding effect. It is karma that is the essential bondage.

(merit), adharma (demerit) are found in the terminology of almost all the darśanas in the sense of karma. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards adṛṣṭa (dharma-adharma) as a quality produced in the soul by action of some kind—of body, speech or mind; it has a beginning. The Mīmāṃsakas hold a similar view. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Vedānta regard the soul as absolutely pure and unchanging, and regard karma as an attribute of the inanimate buddhi (intellect). The Jainas regard both spirit and matter as capable of modification, and hence recognise both spiritual as well as material karmas. It may be noted that no system other than the Jaina recognises karma as two-fold, though characteristics of both the kinds may be found in their concept of karma. But the parallel evolution of spirit and matter is a peculiarity of the Jaina system of philosophy. Buddhists recognise a constant flux in the soul, as their vāsanā or karma is spiritual.

Annihilation of Karma :

Karma can be annihilated and emancipation attained by (i) samyag-darśana, (true faith) (ii) samayag-jñāna (true knowledge), (iii) samyag-cāritra (true conduct), or to put it briefly by knowledge and action. In the other darśanas, jñāna alone is mostly regarded as the immediate cause of the annihilation of karma, and action etc. are regarded as causes indirectly as bringing about purity of the mind. Some regard knowledge and action as joint causes of the annihilation of karma. Bhakti (devotion), and yoga too are accorded this honour. On comparison, we find that samyak-cāritra comprehends restraint of the mind, conquest of the sense-organs, purity of the citta (mind and even soul with the Buddhists and the Jainas), etc. and so does the same work as action and yoga. Samyag-darśana means faith, which is allied to bhakti. Samyag-jñāna is the path of knowledge.

Classification of Karma :

The soul in its pure state possesses perfection of all sort; but its characteristic attributes are obscured in the defiled state of bondage. In the state of perfection, the soul has infinite knowledge, infinite intuition, and bliss and is free from delusion, delimited longevity, embodied existence, gradation of status and obstruction of energy. The karma matter obscures and obstructs these characteristics of the soul. The soul under the influence of kaṣāya (passion) and yoga (vibrations of body, vocal organ, mind) binds unto itself karmic matter; this is the state of bondage. A very fine simile is given for this: As a lamp by virtue of its heat draws up oil with its heat, and after doing so transforms it into its body (i. e. the glow or flame), so the soul-lamp with the qualities of attachment, etc. attracts, by the wick of its vibrations, material aggregates (skandha) and after having done so, transforms them into karman—

“Uṣmaguṇaḥ san dīpaḥ snehaṁ vartyā yathā samādatte,
 ādāya śārīratayā pariṇamayati cā'pi taṁ sneham;
 tadvad rāgādiguṇaḥ svayogavartyā “tmadīpa ādatte,
 skandhān ādāya tathā pariṇamyati tānś ca karmatayā.”

Karman is classified into eight fundamental types and these are sub-classified into as many as 148 sub-types* — The eight main types are as follows:—

- (i) jñānāvaraṇa karman, which obscures knowledge,
- (ii) darśanāvaraṇa karman, which obscures intuition,
- (iii) vedanīya-karman, which produces joy and grief,
- (iv) mohaniya-karman, which obstructs right belief (darśana) and conduct (cāritra), and is accordingly sub-classified into darśana-mohaniya and cāritra-mohaniya,
- (v) āyuṣka-karman, which determines the duration of life, and apparently obscures the immortality of the soul,
- (vi) nāma-karman, which gives the bodiless a body—of whatever kind it be,
- (vii) gotra-karman, which determines status—racial, social, etc.,
- (viii) antarāya-karman— which obscures and obstructs the infinite energy of the soul for resolution and enjoyment of wealth, power, etc..

Of these eight types of karman, four viz. jñānāvaraṇa, darśanāvaraṇa, mohaniya and antarāya are obscuring (ghātin), and the remaining four are non-obscuring (aghātin). Of the ghātin types again, some are 'completely obscuring' (sarva-ghātin) and others 'partially obscuring' (deśa-ghātin). †

Karmans are also classified as sinful (pāpa, aśubha) and virtuous or auspicious (puṇya, śubha). But whether puṇya or pāpa, karman is binding all the same, and has to be got rid of. ‡

* Cf. The Doctrine of Karman in Jaina philosophy—Dr. Glasenapp; also Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Ch IV—The Jaina Doctrine of Karma, pp. 220 ff.—Dr. Nathmal Tatia. Yoga recognises fruition of karman as three-fold—jāti (determining body), āyu (age) and bhoga (enjoyment, joy and grief and ignorance).

† See The Doctrine of Karman, p. 20.

‡ Yoga has divided karman into kṛṣṇa (black, inauspicious), śukla (white, auspicious), śukla-kṛṣṇa and aśukla-kṛṣṇa (which are not binding). Bauddhas accept kuśala karman. They have a somewhat detailed theory and classification of karma with reference to its fruition, etc.. See Milinda-pañha, 3.36; Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha 5.16-19.

Besides this, the Jainas have discussed at length the duration (sthiti) of the different karmans with their sub-types, their intensity (rasa or anubhāga), space (pradeśa) of the soul occupied by karman, which bondage is called pradeśa-bandha, as against prakṛti-bandha which is according to the nature and the type of the bondage, e. g. jñānāvaraṇīya, etc.. The space occupied by souls is densely filled up with karmic matter which pours from all sides into the souls which are engaged in activity (yoga). This pouring in is called āsrava (influx) and continues till the soul is free from all activity. This āsrava (influx) varies directly as the measure of the activity of the soul. The karma-particles absorbed by the soul develop into the eight types of karman.* Bandha (bondage) is the assimilation of karmic matter and its development into different types. This corresponds to kriyamāṇa karma of the other darśanas. Udaya (realisation) is the becoming manifest of the effects of the karmans in due time, their ripening and fruition (vipāka). This corresponds to prārabdha karman. Sattā is the existence in the state of potentiality of the karmans from the time of their assimilation till the time when they ripen or are annihilated. A detailed description is given of the bandha-udaya-sattā sthānas of the types of karman—as to which sub-type of a main type can exist side by side in bandha, or udaya or sattā. Udīraṇā is the pre-mature realisation of the effect of karmans. The time during which a karman works, and its intensity are definite, but every karman can increase or decrease its effect. Increased realisation is called udvartanā, and decreased realisation apavartanā. Under certain circumstances one karma-type can transform itself into another whether this latter is itself bound or not. This transformation of one karman into another is called saṅkrama. It can take place only between the sub-types of a main type, not between two main-types. Moreover, it is not possible between the four āyus—celestial, human, animal, infernal

* The Jaina works give very apt similes to explain thoroughly the nature, intensity, space-bondage, etc. of the soul. This would form an interesting study by itself.

—, between darśana-mohaniya and cāritra-mohaniya, nor between the different kinds of darśana-mohaniya karman.

Before we discuss further we may try to answer, as the author of the Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya has done, the question as to why karma should at all be accepted. Karman is not amenable to sense-perception; and further even in the Vedas we find conflicting statements. The Veda says that the Puruṣa alone exists, and also that one becomes meritorious by meritorious action, and sinful by sinful action. Then why recognise karman at all? Yet there is some justification for the recognition of karman. Those who have an all-penetrating vision, it is said, can certainly have a direct knowledge of it. Anyhow, all can infer its existence from the experience of its effects. A garland gives pleasure to a man, but a dog is irritated by it. This peculiarity cannot be explained unless some unseen determining factor is posited. A newly born child has a body, sense-organs, etc. which must be preceded by another body, etc., otherwise their existence could not be accounted for. The body of the previous life cannot be this cause for in the interval between death in the previous life and birth in this one, the previous body has already perished, and unless the soul is associated with some body, its movement in the direction of one particular womb for re-birth would not be determined. It is the karmic body that accompanies the soul even at this stage. Moreover, we find in the world that people perform acts of charity, etc., for which they get no fruit in this life; again, at times we find good persons experiencing numerous difficulties, while the wicked are many a time happy. Children of the same parents are unlike one another. We come across a thousand such anomalies—there are insects, birds, animals, men; a few are rich, many poor. Why should all these differences be there? To explain all this one has to recognise karma, an unseen potency brought about by actions of beings. Karman is the cause of corporeal body, etc. and therefore it too is corporeal (mūrta); pleasure, pain are non-corporeal, but in the Jaina view they are modifications of soul which is their material cause (samavāyi-kāraṇa), so this need not disturb the argument about the corporeality of karman

which is but an instrumental cause. Karman is super-sensuous, subtle and internal because it clings closely to the individual soul. Even the soul in the worldly state becomes in a way corporeal on account of its association with corporeal karma. There may be many factors which can be regarded as responsible for, and as causes of, the world—e. g. Time, Destiny, Chance, etc.. But it may be noted that even these cannot function without the aid of karman; without karman there would be chaos, and the motionless, inactive soul would not be able to take unto itself a body, or create one. Even God cannot be accepted as the creator of other beings, for God to be a creator must have a body, and karma alone could create this body of His, or another God would have to be posited for the creation of this body, and yet another God and so on. Jīva, along with karma, can alone create for itself body, etc..

The Vedic statements which teach the doctrine of non-duality are not meant to deny the existence of karma; they are only meant to make man humble and to get rid of his pride of caste, position, etc., for all souls are alike. On the other hand, there are positive statements in the Veda which recognise the existence of karman.

Karman has to be recognised as puṇya (meritorious) and pāpa (sinful) to explain the experience of pleasure and pain. Again, acts of charity, etc. on the one hand, and of murder, etc. on the other must have their effects and these effects are nothing else but the transformations of the soul in the form of bhāva-karma—puṇya and pāpa—on the one hand, and assimilation of corporeal puṇya and pāpa karma on the other. Good action leads to puṇya karma and wicked action to pāpa karma. The universe is full of pudgalas (matter-particles), but the soul attracts only such as are in accordance with its puṇya or pāpa and the type of bhāva-karma accumulated. Karmic matter is not by itself śubha (auspicious) or aśubha (inauspicious); but as soon as the soul attracts it, it is converted into śubha or aśubha; even as the same food turns into milk in the case of a cow and poison in the case of a serpent. Karma whether puṇya or pāpa is, as said above,

bondage and should be subsided (*upaśama*) and finally annihilated (*kṣaya*). The influx of fresh karma-particles can also be checked—this is termed *dravya-saṁvara*. This can be achieved by *bhāva-saṁvara*, viz. *gupti* (right regulation of the activity of body, speech, mind), *saṁti* (carefulness in the smallest activity of life to avoid injury to others however insignificant they might be), *anuprekṣā* or *bhāvanā* (reflection about the transitoriness of things and such other matters), *pariśaha* (patient endurance of all troubles), and *cāritra* (conduct). The annihilation of karma is called *nirjarā*.

The Vedic and the Buddhist thinkers hold that the fruit of karma can be transferred to another. The performance of *śrāddhas*, etc. in the case of the Vedic people is an evidence in point. The Buddhists believe that the fruit of *punya* karma alone can be transferred to a section of pretas called *paradattopajīvins*, those who maintain themselves with what is given by others. The fruit of *pāpa* karma cannot be transferred at all. This distinction is attempted to be justified on the ground that *pāpa* karmans are very few in number, and so cannot be transferred.* The Mahāyānists are prepared to give up even *nirvāna* if they can help the miserable people of the world by transferring to them the fruit of their auspicious actions. This idea proved infectious and was willingly accepted by other religions, especially Vaiṣṇavism. But the Jaina Āgamas do not give expression to any such view. Pretas are not recognised, and there is no question of transference of the fruit of *karman*, good or sinful; though we find certain *ācāryas* like Haribhadra expressing the wish that other souls get the fruit of the good actions performed by them.

We may now consider what is the range of the efficacy of *karman*. All the systems of philosophy excepting the Cārvāka regard *karman* as a responsible factor in the determination of creation. *Karman* is regarded as an instrumental cause (*nimitta-*

* See *Milindapañha* 4.8.30-35; *Kathāvatthu* 7.6.3; *Petavatthu* and 'Buddhist Conception of Spirits'—Bimalcaran Law.

kāraṇa) in the creation or evolution of the world.† The Jainas hold that karmans determine the state of existence of the soul, i. e. its birth as man, god, hellish being, or lower animal, its pleasure, etc. and that it can explain the kind of body the soul builds unto itself. But inanimate creation other than this has its own laws. For example, karma does not function at all with respect to earth-quakes, etc., the presence of mountains, the formation and shape of clouds, etc..

Though the soul, even in the Jaina view is essentially pure and undefiled, yet true to their non-absolutistic view (Anekāntavāda) the Jainas believe that the existence of karma affects in a way the soul. Karmans according to their moral value are believed to colour the soul. This is called leśyā (coloration). The different leśyās are distinguished according to the colour they give to the soul: * (i) kṛṣṇa, black, (ii) nīla, dark; (iii) kāpota, grey, (iv) tejas, fiery-red, (v) padma, lotus-pink; (vi) śukla, white. §

Again, from the state of complete dependence upon karman to the state of complete dissociation of the soul from it, fourteen stages called gunasthānas (states of virtue) are recognised showing the gradual deliverance of the soul from the binding effect of

† Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that karman determines rebirth of individual souls and also the creation of inanimate things as they subserve the purpose of sentient entities. So also the Sāṃkhya-Yoga where karman is a modification of the insentient buddhi and functions on account of its association with the sentient soul. Even where God is recognised, this does not in any way detract from His omnipotence; only it saves Him from the charge of being unjust or even partial. The Bauddhas believe that karma does not help in determining the inanimate creation; and they hold that karman is not the only factor determining all the vedanās (sensations) it is only one of the eight factors such as the three humours, etc.. The Buddha alone can say what particular vedanā is determined by any one of these factors. (See Milindapañha, 4.1.62).

* Compare Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra, VI. 42-43.

§ The nature of the leśyās is explained by tales.

karman. The guṇasthānas are named according to the souls that possess these states of virtue. They are :

(1) mithyā-dṛṣṭi, the unbeliever. (2) sāsvādāna-samyagdrṣṭi, the one who has only a taste of the true belief, (3) samyag-mithyādrṣṭi (or miśra), the one who has a mixed belief, (4) avirata-samyagdrṣṭi, the one who has true belief but has not yet self-control, (5) deśavirata, the one who has partial self-control, (6) pramatta-samyata, the one who has complete self-control, sometimes however brought into wavering through negligence, (7) apramatta-samyata, one who has self-control without negligence, (8) apūrva-karaṇa (or nivṛtti-bādara-samparāya), the one who practises the process called apūrva-karaṇa, in whom, however, the passions are still occurring in a gross form; (9) anivṛtti-bādara-samparāya, the one who practises the process called anivṛtti-karaṇa, in whom, however, the passions are still occurring in a gross form, (10) sūkṣma-samparāya, the one in whom the passions still occur, only in a subtle form, (11) upaśānta-kaṣāya-vītarāga-chadmastha (or upaśānta-moha), the one who has suppressed every passion, but who does not yet possess omniscience, (12) kṣīṇa-kaṣāya-vītarāga-chadmastha (or kṣīṇa-moha), the one who has annihilated every passion, but does not yet possess omniscience, (13) sayogi-kevalin, the omniscient one who still practises an activity (yoga), (14) ayogi-kevalin, the omniscient without yoga.*

The guṇasthānas are arranged in a logical order according as sinfulness or impurity decreases and purity increases. The order is by no means chronological, because the succession varies with each individual, because there is possibility of relapses and because in the very nature of things, a direct transition from the first to the second stage is impossible, and also because the eleventh stage cannot be passed before the twelfth to fourteenth.

In Gaṇadhara-vāda, 9, it is shown that puṇya (merit) and pāpa (sin) are both positive; one is not just the negation of the other, This can be seen from the fact that their fruits are different. The soul like all entities is of the nature of origination-destruction-duration (utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyā);

* The Doctrine of Karma : pp. 68-9 — Glasenapp.

so there is another world in which the soul persists after death and experiences the fruits of pāpa and puṇya which are in store. A person after death may be reborn as a denizen of hell, or of heaven, or as a human being or as a lower being. This means that hell and heaven exist and they are inhabited by beings. The existence of gods has to be believed in, though gods are not ordinarily seen by the human eye. They visit the earth on certain occasions, and bring prosperity to some human beings and ruin to others. It may be argued that we see men who are very happy and so can be looked upon as experiencing the fruit of puṇya, and so there is no reason to believe in a distinct world of happiness called heaven; so also in the case of hell. But, we find that on the earth, the highest happiness has a taint of pain—however slight it may be—associated with it and the darkest cloud of suffering has a silver lining of happiness, however meagre it may be. Hence we are compelled to recognise the existence of heaven and hell, where those beings who do not deserve to experience any suffering or any delight whatsoever can reside. The Jainas recognise four classes (nikāya) of gods—Bhavanapati, Vyantara, Jyotiṣka, and Vaimānikā according to the place of residence assigned to them.* Seven hells are recognised, one below the other—Ratnaprabhā, Śarkarāprabhā, Vālukāprabhā, Paṅkaprabhā, Dhūmaprabhā, Tamaḥprabhā, Mahātamaḥprabhā.†

All the schools of philosophy except the Cārvāka have discussed the problem of life after death, to explain why all the fruits of actions performed are not attained in this very life, or why a good man is found to suffer and a wicked man is at times found to be happy. In the Vedas, as said before, we have the concept of the world of Yama, or of Viṣṇu, or of Varuṇa meant for the good after their mundane life. The concept of hell is not found distinctly referred to in the Vedas, because, as scholars say, the Vedic people were very cheerful and optimistic by temperament, and did not entertain any dark thoughts. That even the gods

* For details see Tattvārthasūtra, 4.

† For details see Tattvārthasūtra, 3.

are not immortal, but have to come down to the mortal world is a thought very clearly reflected in the Brāhmanas. We find references to other worlds such as those of Pitṛs (Manes), Gandharvas, Prajāpati, Brahmā in the section dealing with progressively higher and higher bliss in different worlds (Ānandavallī—Brh. Up. 4.3.33). We have also mention of Pitṛyāna (Path of Fathers) and Devayāna (Path of Gods). Those who go along the Devayāna pass through the worlds of Agni, Vāyu, Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati before they reach the world of Brahmā, from which if one is admitted after a proper test, there is no return (See Kauṣītakī Up. 1; Brh. Up. 5.10.1; Chand. Up. 4.15.5-6; 5.10.1-6). Pitṛloka is the same as Candraloka (world of Moon) from which beings return and are born as birds, beasts, etc. according to their actions and attainment of knowledge. The Purānas recognise a number of gods and also semi-divine beings and give detailed descriptions of their place of residence. These enjoy a very long life, but have to be reborn after their karman is exhausted. With regard to hellish beings, it appears from the Vedas, that the enemies of the Aryans, the indigenous people or whoever they might have been—Dasyu, Dāsa, or Asuras—came gradually to be looked upon as Rākṣasas, demons, and the Vedic people constantly prayed for their destruction. In the Upaniṣads we have references to a world of darkness for sinners and the niggardly (cf. Īśā. 3,9; Kaṭha 1.1.3, etc). But there is no clarification as to the location, or as to whether any return is possible from them. We have as many as 7 or even 28 and even more hells referred to in works like the Bhāgavata, where beings endure the bitter fruits of their wicked actions for a very very long time, and then alone can they escape. Detailed descriptions are found of the tortures experienced in these hells, and such other points.

Buddha refused to enter into any discussion regarding life after death and such things beyond the reach of our vision and advised people instead to concern themselves with the removal of pain and the betterment of life on this earth. But as his teachings took the shape of a religion and of a philosophical

system, his followers had to tackle such problems concerning life after death, heaven, hell, etc; which gradually took the shape of the concepts of heaven, hell, and preta (dead, spirits, ghosts). The Bauddha Abhidhamma recognises three categories of being—belonging to the Kāmāvacarabhūmi, Rūpāvacarabhūmi and Arūpāvacara—bhūmi, of which there are many sub-divisions. Gods live in the Kāmasugati portion of the first bhūmi and in the other bhūmis with their subdivisions. Hellish beings, lower beings, pretas, etc. live in the Apāyabhūmi of Kāmāvacara. * As to hells, we have eight hells enumerated in the Jātaka stories and each hell is said to have 16 sub-hells (upanaraka), so in all there are 128 hells (See Mahāvastu, 1.4). The tortures of hell are described in the Majjhima-Nikāya. †

Besides the denizens of heaven and hell, a class of beings called pretas (spirits, ghosts) are recognised by the Buddhists and we find interesting stories pertaining to them in the Petavatthu. These beings are born as pretas to experience the fruits of certain faults of theirs or even wicked actions, such as lack of faith while giving charity, etc, backbiting, stealing and murder. By doing good deeds on this earth, people can help those pretas, who were their relatives in a previous life, by transferring their punya to them. These pretas manage to drag on existence by the food offered to them by their human relatives on the occasion of festivals, etc; and become very unhappy if they are not remembered on such occasions. Different classes of pretas are recognised. ‡ The Jainas do not believe, as said before, in the existence of pretas.

REALISM vs IDEALISM :

The Jainas are realists and pluralists. Their arguments against Nihilism are very succinctly given in Gaṇadhavāda, 4 which establishes the reality of the objective world. The arguments are all found together in that chapter and need not be dilated upon here.

* For details see Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, 5.

† See Bālapaṇḍita-suttanta, 129.

‡ See 'Buddhist Conception of Spirits—Law.'

Besides the soul, i. e. the *jīva* category, in the *ajīva* (non-soul) category are recognised *dharma* (principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest), *ākāśa* (space) and *puḍgala* (matter). *Puḍgala* is either atomic or of the nature of an aggregate (*skandha*). Some add *kāla* (time) to these substances (*dravyas*) as also *puṇya* and *pāpa*. Another classification is given from the point of view of the soul's binding of *karma* and its gradual removal and ultimately annihilation and the attainment of emancipation. The principles thus recognised are: *jīva*, *ajīva*, *āsrava* (influx of *karma*), *bandha* (bondage), *saṁvara* (check of *karma*), *nirjarā* (dissociation or purging off of *karma*), *mokṣa* (emancipation). We have discussed these in connection with *karma*.

We may briefly consider here the substances recognised by the Jainas. Of these *jīva*, *puṇya*, *pāpa* have been discussed earlier. The *ajīva* substances are called *astikāya* in the sense that they occupy space. *Puḍgala* is matter which consists of atoms without size and eternal. Matter may be gross or subtle (e. g. *karmic matter*). The atoms are eternal and have touch, taste, odour and colour; but are distinguished as those of earth, etc. owing to the predominant manifestation of one of these qualities. The conception of *dharma* and *adharma* is not the same as in the other systems of philosophy wherein they signify *puṇya* and *pāpa*. *Dharma*, in the Jaina system, is the principle of motion which cannot make the soul or matter move, and yet is indispensable for their movement, like water for swimming. Hence souls at the extremity of the *loka* (cosmos), up to where the liberated souls go, cannot go beyond, for there is no *dharma*. *Adharma* similarly is a pervasive entity helping souls and *puḍgalas* to keep themselves at rest, otherwise they would be always moving. *Ākāśa* is the subtle entity which pervades the *loka* as also the *aloka*. *Ākāśa* is not mere negation; but is a positive entity which helps things to interpenetrate it. *Kāla* (Time) is believed to consist of innumerable particles which never mix with one another. *Kāla* does not bring about change of qualities in things, but helps the action of transformation of qualities in them. Time viewed from the point of view of its divisions—moments, hours, etc. is called

samaya. The unit of samaya is the time required by an atom to traverse one pradeśa (unit of space) by a slow movement.

Unlike the Vedāntins who believe in an eternally unchanging (kūṭastha) entity, and the Buddhists who recognise only a flux, and regard the opposite as unreal, the Jainas hold that every substance has three aspects—utpāda (origination), vyaya (destruction) and dhrauvya (permanence). New qualities are being produced in it, some old ones perish, and yet certain aspects remain permanently in it. Thus if a lump of gold is transformed into a necklace, it perishes as a lump of gold, is born as a necklace, but persists as gold. Paryāyas (modes) change, but the dravya (basic substance) persists. Every substance again is existent in its own form, but non-existent in another (para-rūpa); exclusion or negation of other's form is an integral part of the nature of a thing. All this is in accordance with the Jaina doctrine of Anekāntavāda (Doctrine of Non-Absolutism) and its presentation by the Saptabhaṅgī (statement of seven alternatives) and the Theory of Nayas (stand-points) evolved by them to explain that there is some truth in all the systems of philosophy, but it is not the absolute or ultimate truth, which can be attained only by a full view of the different aspects of a thing.

SOUL IN DIFFERENT DARŚANAS

As pointed out by Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi,* we can broadly classify the different conceptions of the soul as follows:

- (i) Bhūtacaitanyavāda,
- (ii) jīva or sentient principle as an independent entity,
- (iii) independent jīva which is also in a way dependent, being identical with or a part of the absolute principle.

In the Gaṇadhara-vāda, the first Gaṇadhara Indrabhūti doubts the very existence of the soul and Mahāvīra convinces him that the soul does exist. The third Gaṇadhara Vāyubhūti's question is about the nature of the soul. Can the soul not be regarded as identical with the body?

Unfortunately the works of the Bhūtacaitanyavādins have been lost and all our knowledge of them is derived from their

* Bhāratīya Tattvavidyā, p. 50

view quoted as the pūrva-pakṣa (prima-facie view) in the works of the rival systems of philosophy. In the period of the formulation of systems, the system of Bhūtacaitanya was formulated in the Brhaspati-sūtra which also is lost. The view put forth by Indraabhūti is known among the systems of Indian philosophy as the Cārvāka or the Bhautika (Materialist) darśana (system). Even the materialist Cārvākas do not deny the soul altogether, but regard it is an epiphenomenon of the elements earth, etc.. Keeping this in view, Uddyotakara has rightly pointed out that it can be said generally that no system of philosophy has doubted the existence of the soul. The differences among the different systems are as regards the nature of the soul. Some regard the body as the soul, others the sense-organs, mind, intellect or the aggregate and some regard the soul as an independent entity distinct from these.† In the Upaniṣads we find recorded the views of thinkers who regarded water,‡ air*, etc. as the ultimate principles and the Śvet. Up. § inquiring into the cause of the world refers to the view which regards 'elements' as the cause. Those whose power of reasoning was even more developed regarded ākāśa (ether), asat (non-being) or sat (being) as the ultimate cause of the world. In the Jaina Āgamas we find the view noted that jīva arises out of the five material elements‡‡ and in the Bauddha Piṭakas we find cited the view of Ajita Kesakambalin that the puruṣa (self) arises out of the four elements. § This shows that there was a time when thinkers looked upon the sentient principle as an effect or as arising out of the elements. This materialistic view is known as Lokāyata (prevalent amongst the people).

When thinkers turned inward in search of the ultimate principle of existence or the motivating force of existence they

† See Nyāya-vārtika, p. 336.

‡ Brh Up. 5.5.1

* Chāndogya Up. 4.3.

§ Svet. Up. 1.2

‡‡ Sūtrakṛtāṅga 1.1.1.7-8.

alighted on the *prāṇa* (vital breath)* and then progressively arrived at the conception of the *ātman* (self) or even Brahman (Absolute). This development of the conception of the soul is corroborated by the use of words like *bhūta*, *prāṇa*, *sattva*, etc. for the soul† in the *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*. Thus, whereas on the one hand we have the Non-dualism of insentient principle (*anātmādvaita*), on the other hand we find the doctrine of Non-dualism of sentient principle (*ātmādvaita*). Along with these we find the currents of Dualism or even Pluralism. From the point of view of the division into sentient and insentient principles, the *Sāṅkhyas*, the followers of the *Yoga*, the *Jainas*, and the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* are dualists, but they recognise a plurality of souls as also of insentient principles and so are, as a matter of fact, pluralists. The *Buddhists* are regarded as *Anātmavādins* only in the sense that they do not recognise an independent permanent entity called the soul, but what the other systems term '*ātman*' (self) they regard as an ever-changing aggregate of *vedanā* (sensation), *saṃjñā* (conceptual understanding), *saṃskāra* (impression) and *viññāna* (pure consciousness)—or *nāma* (psychical factor) as they call this aggregate. The *Buddhists* are thus *Pluralists*.

The *Vijñānavādins* do not recognise any external object but only ideas or consciousness and thus they are *Vijñānādvaitins*. But even they hold that there are an infinite number of such streams of point-instants of consciousness (—to put it in the terminology of other *darśanas*, infinite souls) with their own bondage, and pursuit of the path leading to emancipation. The *Sāṅkhya* recognises an infinite number of independent souls which are of the nature of pure unchanging consciousness. The *Vedāntins* admit an infinite number of souls which they interrelate in one way or the other with God—the Supreme Self. The *Vedānta* of the *Śāṅkara* tradition alone recognises one ultimate, absolutely unchanging sentient principle, all else being unreal.

* *Sāmaññaphalasutta*, *Dīgha Nikāya*

† *Chāndogya Up.* 1.11.5; 4.3.3; 3.15.4.

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GAṆADHARAVĀDA —
TRANSLATION AND EXPLANATION

TRANSLATION

GAṆĀDHARA 1 — INDRABHŪTI

EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL

(1549) (Indrabhūti), you have a doubt as to (the existence of) the soul, because it is not directly perceived as the jar is and nothing that is utterly imperceptible exists in the world e.g. the sky-flower.

(1550) (Your argument is:) And it cannot be known by inference, because that too depends on perception. We can infer on the basis of the memory of the relationship of the mark (līnga, reason, probans) with that whose mark it is (līngin, probandum)- (the relation) which has been cognised earlier.

(1551) One has never cognised the relation between the soul and its mark, so that on seeing the mark again, one might remember it and thus have correct knowledge regarding the (existence of the) soul.

(1552) It cannot even be known through verbal testimony, for verbal testimony is not (in essence) different from inference. And the soul has not been perceived by any one so that his statement could be accepted as verbal testimony.

(1553) Moreover the scriptures make statements which conflict with one another. Hence too it is but proper that one should have a doubt. (Thus, O Indrabhūti), you believe that the soul is beyond the scope of all the means of knowledge.

(1554) Gautama! The soul is perceived. The cognition of the type of doubt, etc. (that you have), that itself is the soul (because it is of the nature of knowledge). And what is directly perceived does not need to be established (by any other means of knowledge), e.g., (sensations of) pleasure and pain in one's own body.

(1555) 'I did', 'I do', 'I shall do'. — From this notion of 'I' (it can be seen that) the soul is directly known as there is a reference to activity of all the three times (past, present, future).

(1556) (If the soul were non-existent) how could there be the notion of 'I', and (if 'I' refers to 'soul') how could there be the doubt 'Do I exist or not?' And if the doubt is there, to what could this notion of 'I' be regarded as properly referring? (If you do not accept the soul, you will have to point out the object of this notion of 'I', or the notion would not be there at all).

(1557) If the doubter (one who has the doubt) himself does not exist, who would have the doubt, "Do I exist or do I not exist?"? Or Gautama, if he doubts his own nature, what thing (in the world) will he not suspect (i.e. be sceptical about)? (He will doubt the existence of everything).

(1558) The attribute (doubt, memory, etc.) is directly known and hence the (soul) possessing the attribute is (i.e. should be regarded as) directly known like the jar; because the jar which possesses the attributes is known when the attributes (colour, etc.) are known.

(1559) Is the thing possessing the attributes different from or identical with them? If it is identical it follows verily that the substance (possessing the attributes) — the soul — is directly known when there is the knowledge of only the attributes (doubt, memory, etc.).

(1560) If it is different (from the attributes), then (all) substances possessing attributes e.g. jar, etc.) would not be perceptible when only the attributes are known, so why this inquiry about the soul (alone)?

(1561) Now you may argue : The thing possessing attributes does exist, and it is not something different from the body; knowledge, etc. are found in the body and therefore it is but

proper that the body should be the possessor of these attributes (and therefore capable of being known when the attributes are known).

(1562) (The reply is): (The attributes) knowledge, etc. cannot belong to the body as it is corporeal, etc., like the jar. Therefore that to which the attributes knowledge, etc. belong must be something over and above the body, viz. the soul.

(1563) Thus this soul is partially perceived by you (but) it is wholly perceived by me because my knowledge is unobscured. Accept this as you accept (the veracity of) my knowledge (of your doubt).

(1564) In the same way, by inference know that the soul exists in another's body (too). (The soul in another's body too) is of the nature of consciousness, because it is actuated towards something that it likes and is repelled from what it dislikes, as one's own soul is.

(1565) As to what you have argued (lit. what you hold) that the probandum (that which is signified by the mark) has not been cognised formerly along with the mark (linga, probans) as the horn is not cognised along with the hare, and hence it cannot be inferred from the mark,

(1566) This is not conclusive as the apparition though not perceived previously along with its marks is inferred (as existent) in the body on the perception of the marks (i.e. symptoms) of (possession by) the spirit (e. g. laughing, weeping, singing, etc.).

(1567) (Reasoning to prove the existence of the soul): The body has a maker because it has a certain specific shape, like the jar. There is a (controller) of the sense-organs, because they are instruments, just as a potter is of the staff, etc.

(1568) There is the relation of the instrument of grasping and the thing grasped between sense-organs and objects. Therefore there must verily be a grasper; just as in the world (i. e.

our ordinary experience) the blacksmith is the grasper of (i. e. one who handles) the pair of tongs and pieces of iron.

(1569) Body, etc. must have an enjoyer, since they are fit to be enjoyed as man is the enjoyer of food. Body, etc. must have a lord (owner) since they are of the nature of an aggregate and for such other reasons (e. g. since they are corporeal, visible, etc), just as there is a lord of the house.

(1570) This maker, (controller, grasper, and so forth) is the soul. If you argue that this is just the opposite of what was to be established or these *lingas* are of the type called *viruddha* (contradictory, proving just the opposite of what is to be proved) because there is the contingency (of the enjoyer-controller, etc) being corporeal, (visible, of the nature of an aggregate and so forth), then this is no defect in the transmigratory soul (—being enveloped in karma, it can be said to be corporeal).

(1571) O Gentle one ! (even) in your view the soul does exist, because you have a doubt regarding it, just as the post and the man exist. O Gautama, that concerning which there is a doubt must exist there or elsewhere (i. e. somewhere).

(1572) (*Indrabhūti*): If this is so it comes to this that the ass should have a horn. (Reply) It may not be on the ass itself, but it does exist elsewhere. This holds good of erroneous cognition too.

(1573) The counter-entity (*vipakṣa*) of non-soul exists because it (the soul) has been negated, as jar, the counter-entity of non-jar exists. As in the case of 'The jar does not exist', this statement 'does not exist' establishes the existence of the soul. (If a thing does not exist it cannot be negated).

(1574) It is established that what does not exist is not negated, for there is the denial of conjunction, etc. (inherence, universal, particular). But the quartet of conjunction etc. also is certainly present in other entities.

(1575-6) This word 'jīva' (soul) has a meaning, (i. e. denotes a real object) because it is pure (uncompounded) like the word 'ghaṭa' (jar). That denotation by which it is meaningful, is the soul. If it is argued that its denotation is 'body', (the reply is) that it is not so, because (the two sets) of synonyms (of jīva and deha) are different. (We do not find a synonym of one given as a synonym of the other). (Soul and body are different) also because the soul is said to have the attributes, knowledge, etc. but not the body.

(1577) The statement, 'The soul exists' is true, since it is my statement, like other statements (of mine); or because it is the statement of one who is omniscient, like the statement of persons recognised by you as omniscient.

(1578) (My statement is) true and unquestionable since there are not fear, likes, dislikes, delusion (i. e. because it is not actuated by any of these). My statement is definitely true like the statement of an arbiter who is in the know of facts.

(1579) If you argue, "How can you be regarded omniscient?" (the reply is:) Because I can tear all doubts (to pieces) (i. e. can dispel all doubts). Ask me whatever you do not know, so that you may be convinced (about my omniscience).

(1580) Thus accept, O Gautama, the soul which has conscious activity for its mark (characteristic) as established by all means of knowledge. It is of different types—sāmsārin, tara, sthāvara, trasa, etc.

(1581) Moreover, O Gautama, if the same soul were to be present in all bodies, like space, then it would have the same mark, characteristic) in (all) bodies, but the soul is not found to be such.

(1582) The souls in the world are many, like jar, etc., because of difference of characteristics, etc. And if there were but one soul there would be no pleasure, pain, bondage, emancipation (since one and the same soul cannot experience both pleasure and pain, bondage and emancipation at the same time).

(1583) Because the soul has conscious activity as its characteristic mark and since this conscious activity is different in each body according to its grades of higher and lower, therefore the souls are infinite in number.

(1584) If there be but one soul, there would be no emancipation, etc as in the case of ether, owing to its ubiquitous character. It would not be the doer (or agent), enjoyer, thinker and it would not be transmigratory, like ether.

(1585) If there be but one soul, it would not be happy, because to a very great extent it would be afflicted, like one who is healthy (or unburnt) in respect of (only a small) part of his body. And because it would be bound to a very great extent it would not be emancipated like one only a part of whose body is free (not fettered).

(1586) The soul is only of the size of the body, because it is here that its attributes are found, as is true of the jar; or because it is not cognised elsewhere, (it does not exist outside the body) as cloth does not exist in the jar which is different from it.

(1587) Therefore, (the attributes of being) doer, enjoyer, bound, emancipated, happy, miserable, and transmigratory can properly hold good of those that are many in number and limited in dimension.

(1588-90) And, Gautama, you do not know the (true) meaning of these words of the Veda, viz. 'The mass of consciousness itself rising from the elements', (so) (you believe) that as the wine-spirit rises from constituents of wine so the soul of the nature of consciousness only rises from the aggregate of elements and again perishes after them (i.e. when they perish). And there is no after-life consciousness that in the previous life one had a particular name, was of a particular class (deva, nāraka, or any such). The import is that the soul does not pass from one existence (life) to another.

(1591-2) Gautama, believing this to be the meaning of the words you regard the soul as non-existent; however, in other sentences the soul is said to be existent, and the fruit of rites such as Agnihotra, etc. is spoken of. Hence you have a doubt regarding the (existence of the) soul. But do not entertain (this doubt). This is not what the words mean. Listen to the (true) meaning of the words.

(1593) 'Mass of consciousness' (vijñāna-ghana) means that it is identical with (or non-different from) consciousness, is permeated all over by it. 'It rises from the elements' means it rises in its aspects of 'cognition of jar', etc (which are its different modes).

(1594) 'It perishes after these very elements as they perish' means when the conscious activity (of the soul) is fixed on another object, these gradually perish in their aspect as knowables (and as a consequence of this the modes of the soul in the form of 'cognition of jar' etc. also perish, and the soul can be said to have perished from this point of view).

(1595) From the point of view of the conscious activity in the form of the previous cognition and of the following cognition, the soul can be (said to be) characterised by destruction and origination respectively. From the point of view of the continuum of consciousness (in general) it is a mass of consciousness (and) imperishable.

(1596) And no awareness of the previous cognition exists because the conscious activity is fixed on the present object. This soul has been referred to by the Vedas by the expression 'mass of consciousness'.

(1597) Even thus one may have the notion that knowledge is an attribute of material elements, because it exists only when they exist. (But) it is not so, since even in their absence, there is knowledge (in general) as pointed out in the Vedic tradition.

(1598) "When the sun sets, when the moon sets, when fire and speech have faded away, with what is this Puruṣa (self) luminous?" It has (thus) been stated to be self-luminous.

(1599) (Knowledge is not the attribute of a (material object) because it exists in its absence and does not exist even when it exists, as cloth is different (from jar) because of its being the reverse when the jar is existent or not. (It does not necessarily exist when the jar is present; it may be absent too; and it may be present when the jar is not there).

(1600-1) You do not know the meaning of these words of the Veda or rather of all (Vedic statements). What could 'meaning' be!—Is it word or knowledge or difference of things (i.e. particular object) or universal or substance or action, or quality? This doubt of yours is not proper. That a thing has this attribute alone and not another—such a determination does not stand to reason.

(1602) There are two kinds of modes (paryāya) — sva (own) and para (alien). Everything is verily constituted of everything (according to sva-para-paryāya i.e. if we take a comprehensive view), or everything is different from everything else and exclusive in character according as what is meant to be expressed.

(1603) Therefore it stands to reason that according to the intent the meaning of a word can be general or particular (—it need not be exclusively one). From the point of view of the mode, a thing can be omniform (universal, general).

(1604) When the Śramaṇa's (Indrabhūti's) doubt was set at nought by the Jina, free from old age and death, he became a monk along with his 500 followers (pupils).

(1605) Henceforth, in the discussion of Karma. etc, what is common (to this and the other topics discussed) should be linked up there. I shall state only the distinctive points briefly.

GAṆADHARA 2 — AGNIBHŪTI

KARMA

(1606) Hearing that he (Indrabhūti) had become a monk, a second one came indignant. "I shall go, defeat that Śramaṇa and bring him (Indrabhūti).

(1607) I think he has been cheated by tricks of debate-chala (quibble) etc; or he (Mahāvīra) may be a magician. (sorcerer). Who knows what actually happened? Now his doings will be found out.

(1608) If he is able to go to the end of any of my theses (i. e. is able to answer any of my views-pakṣa-thoroughly) I shall become his pupil." Thus saying he approached the Jina.

(1609) The Jina free from birth, old age and death and omniscient and all-seeing, accosted him (Agnibhūti) by his name and gotra (family-name).

(1610) Are you thinking (i.e. is this your problem), 'Does karma exist or does it not?'? This is your doubt. You do not know the meaning of the words of the Veda (and hence your doubt). This is what they mean.

(1611) You have a doubt regarding karma. You believe that it is beyond the scope of knowledge. But you perceive the fruit (of karma) in the form of experience (or sensation-pleasure, pain). Hence inference can be the means of knowledge for you (for establishing karma).

(1612) The cause of pleasure, pain exists as they are effects, as seed is the cause of the sprout. It may be argued that a visible cause (can give rise to pleasure and pain). But this is not proper as there is incompatibility.

(1613) That difference (which we observe) in the fruit in two cases where the means are similar, that cannot be without a cause. This difference (or particularity of the fruits), O Gautama, is an effect as the jar is (and must have a cause). Karma is this cause.

(1614) The body of a child must be preceded by another body because it is possessed of sense-organs, etc; as the body of a youthful person is preceded by the child's body; karma is, in this case, that preceding (body) (karma-body, kārmaṇa-śarīra).

(1615-6) As every action must have a fruit, there must be the fruit of charity, etc., as there is of agriculture. If one were to think that mental serenity (manah-prasāda-mental tranquillity) etc. is the fruit of charity, etc; then (our reply is) that it too being as much an activity (must have a fruit), and karma is regarded as that fruit of its. (This can be known) because the fruit of the nature of pleasure and pain results from it again.

(1617) If some one thinks that only the act of charity, etc., is the fruit of mental operations, this is not true, because it (act of charity, etc.), should be known to be the cause (of the latter) as a lump of clay is (known to be the cause) of a jar.

(1618) (Agnibhūti —) Even according to your (argument and illustrations), action which has a visible fruit should not (be supposed) to have karma as its fruit. It (action) has a (visible thing) alone as its fruit as the slaughtering of a beast has meat as its fruit (result) (i. e. people slaughter a beast for its meat and not with any other invisible motive in view).

(1619) Mostly the world of beings is seen to undertake activities with a tangible fruit and not even an infinitesimal part of them is seen to be interested (in activities) with an unseen invisible fruit.

(1620) (Mahāvīra —) Gentle one! just because souls are mostly known to take up activities with tangible results, even so know these very activities to have an unseen fruit also.

(1621) Otherwise, being free from the unseen, all of them would be liberated without any effort (on their part). And it would be the performance of actions with an unseen in view which would be festered with afflictions.

(1622-3) Because there are very many beings experiencing the undesired fruit (i. e. one not intended by them) and because no one here performs knowingly or deliberately an activity which has an unseen, undesired fruit, therefore know that all activity has invariably an unseen fruit. That activity has a seen (i. e. tangible) fruit casually (not invariably) can also be explained on the basis of the unseen (karma).

(1624) Or, karma has already been established (-see 1613) on the basis of (the particularity of the fruit) being an effect and hence requiring a cause), just as atoms are the cause of a jar. It (karma) is the (unseen) fruit of activities and is different from them.

(1625) If one were to say that it would be thus corporeal, (the reply is that) it is certainly corporeal, because its effect (body, etc.) is corporeal; as (we find) here that the jar being corporeal, the atoms (of earth—the cause of the jar) are corporeal.

(1626) It is to be so regarded because in conjunction with it there is experience of pleasure, and rise of sensation (pain), and because it is made strong by an external agency and because it undergoes modification.

(1627) Like food, like fire, like the strengthening of a jar by oil, etc., like milk - these respectively are the illustrations that make us acquainted with the corporeal nature of karma.

(1628) If it is thought that 'because it undergoes modification' is an unproven (asiddha) reason (this is not so) because its modificatory character is established from that of its effect, as the modificatory nature of milk is from that of (its effect) curds.

(1629) (Objection) What objection is there if there be (a variety of conditions of pain, pleasure, etc.) in the case of transmigratory beings (without karma), just as there is a variety of modifications of clouds, etc. even without karma?

(1630) (Reply) Even then in what way is the case of karma different? Just as variety is established in external aggregates of matter, so there can be variety in karma-matter joined to the souls.

(1631) If the variety of external (aggregates of matter) be accepted, much more would it be true of karma joined to the souls; as is true of designs (or compositions, constructions) designed by artists.

(1632) (Objection) If the body itself (be regarded as assuming a variety of shapes), why should karma be imagined (at all)? (Reply) Karma too is verily body only — more subtle, internal; then why not (accept variety in karma)?

(1633) (Objection) What do we lose by not accepting it (karma-body)? (Reply) A person who is completely divested of his gross body, could not take up (another) body and thus there would be an end to transmigration (without karma).

(1634) There would be (thus) the contingency of the emancipation of all or the transmigration of all without any cause; Or those who have been freed from birth (transmigratory existence) would (have to) transmigrate again and no one would have, therefore, any faith (in the teachings regarding emancipation).

(1635) (Objection) How could there be (any) relation of the corporeal (karma) with the non-corporeal soul? (Reply) Gentle one, (it is possible) just like the (relation) of jar with the sky (ether), or of substance with action.

(1636) Or as the body is perceived to be in relation with the soul, so the karma-body remains associated with the soul (as it passes to) another existence (birth).

(1637) How can a corporeal thing influence favourably or unfavourably a non-corporeal one? (Reply) As consciousness etc. are influenced by the drinking of wine, (use of) herbs, etc.

(1638) Or, the transmigratory soul is not absolutely and utterly non-corporeal, because it has assumed the form of the transformation of the beginningless stream of karma.

(1639) O Gautama! The stream (of karma) is beginningless because body and karma are related to each other as cause and effect, as the seed and the sprout are.

(1640) If karma were not there, O Gautama, Agnihotra, etc. enjoined by the Veda on one who desires heaven would lose their purpose, as also the fruit of charity etc. that is (well known) to the world.

(1641) If not wanting (to accept) karma, you regard the pure soul, God, (or Avyakta, Kāla i.e. Time, Niyati i.e. Destiny, Chance, etc.) as the creator of the body, etc., that is not proper,

(1642) because that has no means (whereby to create) or is inactive or is non-corporeal and so on. (If it is argued that God can be regarded as having a body, the reply is —) there will be the same difficulty as regards the creation of God's body or there will be *regressus ad infinitum*.

(1643) Or if on the basis of the Vedic statements regarding 'mass of consciousness', etc. (you doubt karma and) regard Nature-svabhāva as the instrumental factor in creation) the situation would be fraught with difficulties. Moreover, Gautama, this is what the words (of the Veda) mean.

(1644) When the Jina (victor) free from old age and death, removed the Śramaṇa's doubt, he became a monk along with his five hundred disciples (followers).

GAṆADHARA 3 — VĀYUBHŪTI

(1645) Hearing that those two had become monks, a third (Vāyubhūti) approaches the Jina (victor) thinking, “I shall go, bow down and having bowed down wait upon him.

(1646) Indrabhūti and Agnibhūti have become his pupils. The three worlds pay their respects to him. That blessed one must be approached.

(1657) I shall have my sins removed by approaching him, bowing to him and waiting upon him. Or I shall go to the Jina, disclose my doubt (to him) and have it dispelled.

(1648) The Jina who was free from birth, old age, death, and was omniscient and all-seer accosted him (Vāyubhūti) by his name and gotra.

[Vāyubhūti was so overawed by the extraordinary knowledge and personality of Mahāvīra that he could not utter a word. Mahāvīra himself said:]

(1649) You have a doubt whether the soul and body are one (or are different) and yet you do not ask anything. You do not know the meaning of the words of the Veda. This is what they mean.

(1650) Your doubt is that consciousness emerges out of the aggregate of the elements, Earth, etc. Though not perceived in each severally, it is verily (perceived) in the aggregate like wine-spirit.

(1651) As (wine -) spirit though not perceived in the constituents of wine severally, emerges in the aggregate and with the passage of time is destroyed, such is the case with consciousness with respect to the aggregate of elements.

(1652) If consciousness is not existent in each (element) severally, it cannot originate in the aggregate as oil cannot originate in the aggregate of particles of sand. As regards the constituents of wine, it is not true that it is absolutely non-existent in them severally.

(1653) As the constituents of wine even severally can turn the mind (cause a reeling sensation) or satisfy the appetite or quench thirst and so on, so there could be consciousness in the aggregate of the elements (only) if it existed in the elements severally.

(1654) If it (wine-spirit) is utterly non-existent in all severally, why should there be the insistence regarding these (very) constituents or on the aggregate of these; it should then be found in (the aggregate of) others also.

(1655) Consciousness exists in each of the elements because it is perceived in the aggregate as wine-spirit (the power to intoxicate) is perceived in (each of) the constituents of wine. If one should have this reasoning (in view), (the reply is that) the hetu (probans — viz. because it is perceived in the aggregate) is not admissible (is unreal).

(1656) (Vāyubhūti—) This is verily contradictory to sense-perception (that even though consciousness is found to be existent in the aggregate of the elements, you say that it does not belong to it). (Mahāvīra—) Gautama, it is not so, for there is an inference (to set aside this perception). And you yourself contradict direct perception (by saying) that consciousness exists in each of the elements.

(1657) Consciousness belongs to something distinct from the elements and the sense-organs because there is remembrance later on of what has been cognised by them, as it belongs to a man who remembers what was cognised through the five windows.

(1658) Consciousness belongs to something different from the sense-organs, because there is remembrance even when they stop functioning and there is non-cognition even when they are functioning, as it belongs to one who cognises through the five windows.

(1659) He who perceiving an object by one organ, reacts to it by another, is certainly different (or distinct) from them, as the man who perceives an object through the window in the east and reacts (acts upon it) through another is different from them.

(1660) It must be regarded as being over and above (i. e. distinct from) organs, because it remembers what has been cognised by all the sense-organs; as a man cognising all the cognisables (colour, etc.) is different from the five who have knowledge severally of the cognisables.

(1661) The knowledge of a child (must be) preceded by another knowledge, because it is knowledge, as the knowledge of a youth is preceded by that of a child and that is over and above the body.

(1662) The first desire for breast-feeding must be preceded by another desire for nourishment because it is an experience, like a desire of the present and that is over and above the body.

(1663) The body of a child must be preceded by another body, because it has sense-organs, etc., as a youth's body is preceded by (that of) a child. He, to whom the body belongs, is the embodied one (Jīva, Ātman).

(1664) The pleasure, etc. of a child must be preceded by other pleasure, pain, etc., like the pleasure of the present, because it is of the nature of experience and the soul is the possessor of this experience.

(1665)* O Gautama, the stream is beginningless, because body and karma are related to each other as cause and effect, as the seed and the sprout are.

(1666) Hence, because of the relation of instrumental cause and effect between karma and body, accept a doer (agent) over and above these, like the potter with respect to stick and jar. (And that agent or doer is the Ātman or soul).

(1667,-8,-9,-70 same as Gāthās 1567-1570. In Gāthā 1567, the reading is 'dehassatthi vihāyā').

(1671) The one who remembers the (previous) birth (i.e. existence) could not have perished, because there is remembrance, as the one who remembers what happened in childhood, or as the man who remembers in a foreign country what happened in his own country (cannot be said to have perished).

(1672) If you believe that even though momentary it does remember by virtue of the stream of (point-instants of) consciousness, still the stream of (point-instants of) consciousness is established as other than the body.

(1673) And knowledge is not absolutely momentary because there is remembrance of what was previously cognised. What is momentary does not remember what happened in the past like one who dies immediately after birth.

(1674) For him who regards consciousness as one (i.e. without another to help it), as having one object and as momentary, the knowledge of all momentary objects (i.e. the momentariness of all objects) can never be possible.

(1675) How possibly will that which is confined to its own object and which perishes immediately after its origination, cognise momentariness, (essencelessness, painfulness), etc. which pertain to the objects of a great number of cognitions.

*Same as Gāthā 1639 and Gāthā 1813.

(1676) If it is argued that by the inference from oneself and one's own objects one can know the momentary nature of all things, that is not so, because inference can work only when the (very) existence, etc. of these (i.e. the subject—all things) is established.

(1677) If it is argued that) the impression can cognise it, this is verily possible (only) when the impressor and the impressed exist together, but not when that perishes immediately after origination.

(1678-9) If consciousness be accepted as momentary, there would be these and other difficulties — simultaneous origination of many cognitions, or one cognition having many objects or lasting character of consciousness, or setting aside of dependent origination. But (there is) no (such difficulty) with respect to the soul (accepted as) of the nature of consciousness (vijñānamaya), persisting (lasting), produced, and destroyed.

(1680) It has different kinds of perception — momentary as also persisting in other times (or moments), produced as a result of the destruction-cum-subsidence of its covering (obscuring karma) of different kinds.

(1681) The stream of these (cognitions) is eternal. That (knowledge) which arises on the complete destruction of all obscurations (karmans) is said to be perfect and pure (kevala). Being perfect and pure it is infinite and not admitting of difference.

(1682-3) (Vāyubhūti —) If it (soul) is other than the body, why is it not seen entering or leaving (the body)?

(Mahāvīra —) Non-perception is said to be two-fold — that of a non-existent thing, e.g. of ass's horn, and of even the existent on account of its being distant, etc.; there is non-perception of the soul to which karma is attached because of non-corporeality and subtlety.

(1684) Or if the soul be non-distinct from the body, the Agnihotra, etc. enjoined by the Veda on one desirous of heaven would be purposeless and the fruit of (acts of) charity, etc. (as known) to the world (would be repudiated).

(1685) You do not know the meaning of the expression of the Veda, viz 'Mass of consciousness', etc. and so you regard the soul as identical with the body. This is what the words mean.

(1686) When the Śramaṇa's doubt was dispelled by the Jina (victor) free from old age and death, he became a monk along with his 500 followers.

GAṆADHARA 4 — VYAKTA

(1687) Hearing that they had become monks, Vyakta came to the Jina. (He was thinking to himself), "I shall go, bow down to him and wait upon him".

(1688) The Jina — free from birth, old age, and death and omniscient and all-seeing, addressed him (Vyakta) (as Vyakta Bhāradvāja, i.e.) by his name and gotra.

1689) (Mahāvīra —) You are thinking, 'Do the elements (and things in general) exist or not?' This is your doubt. You do not know the (true) meaning of the Vedic statements. This is what they mean.

(1690) You have a doubt regarding the elements that they may be like dreams (dream-objects) or like magic (illusory like objects projected by magical power); for when scrutinised they are never found to stand the test of reason.

(1691) You think that if there could be a doubt regarding elements, etc., then what to say of soul, etc.! You, suspecting everything to be void, regard the world as illusory (comparable to dream and magic-objects).

(1692) (Your reasoning is), O Vyakta, that things being relative, like long-short, are established not by themselves, nor by others, nor by both, nor by something other than both these.

(1693) Are existence and jar one or different? (In any case) there would be the contingency of everything being identical (one) and such other difficulties. Hence things are undefinable or utterly void.

(1694) Neither a produced, nor a non-produced, nor a both-produced-and-non-produced thing nor that which is being

produced, is (can be) produced, as there would be the contingency of *regressus ad infinitum*, or utter non-being, or both. Hence the Void alone (stands to reason).

(1695) The effect is not perceived in the constituents of the complement of causes and conditions severally but only when the full complement is together. (What does not exist in the constituents severally cannot be found in their aggregate; hence there can be nothing like an effect). When there is (thus) sheer non-existence of all, the causal complement (too) does not exist.

(1696) (Of any thing) the hinder part is not seen and the immediately nearest part is subtle. There being (thus) the non-perception of both, there is the non-perception of all things, and hence there is (but) Void.

(1697) O Vyakta, entertain no doubt; doubt would not (even) arise with respect to what is non-existent as it does not in the case of a sky-flower or an ass's horn. It is possible only in the case of (existent things like) post, man.

(1698) What is that peculiarity as a result of which, even when everything is non-existent, there is a doubt with respect to post, man, but not with respect to sky-flower, etc? Why should the reverse not be found (doubt as regards sky-flower, and absence of it with respect to post, man)?

(1699) Things are known to us by Perception, Inference or Verbal Testimony. How can there be doubt when all these sources of valid knowledge and their objects do not exist?

(1700) For doubt, etc. are modes of knowledge and that is connected with (i.e. based upon, dependent on) the knowable; if (as you say) there is the non-existence of all knowables, you should not have any doubt whatsoever.

(1701) Therefore, O gentle one, as you have a doubt with respect to these things, they do exist, like post, man. If you regard the example as unreal (because the existence of

post, man has not been established), then there should be absence of doubt (also).

(1702) If it is argued that a doubt can arise even when nothing is existent, as it does in a dream, (the reply is) it is not so. In a dream it is caused by memory, etc.; there is not utter non-existence there (too).

(1703) Experienced things, perceived things, things much thought about (or worried about), things heard of, disorder of humours, (influence of some) deity, marshy land, merit, demerit — these are the causes of a dream; but not non-existence (of things).

(1704) Dream is positive existence, because it is of the nature of knowledge, like the knowledge of jar. Or, it is brought about by the instrumental causes mentioned above and so is positively existent as the jar is.

(1705-6) And if everything were non-existent, how could there have been such empirical utterances as 'This is dream, (that) non-dream, true, false; Gandharva-city, Pāṭaliputra; literally true, figurative; effect, cause; what is to be established, what establishes; doer; speaker, statement, what is to be stated; another's stand-point and one's own stand-point'?

(1707) Or how could these have been determined as certain features — stability (or solidity of earth), fluidity (of water), heat (of tejas), movement (of wind), colourlessness (of ether); and how could it be determined that sound, etc. are knowables, and that organs of hearing etc. are the instruments of knowledge?

(1708) And if there is but Void, why is there not the same position for all (all as dream or as non-dream, etc.) or or just the opposite position, or non-cognition of everything? And how can you say that (knowledge of) Void is true or that knowledge of objects as existent is false.

(1709) And how could there be the notion of own, other, both; and how could objects be non-established mutually? If it is

said that this statement is made from the opponent's point of view, how can one distinguish between one's own view and that of another?

(1710) Would you have the knowledge of 'long' and 'short' simultaneously or successively? If simultaneously, where is the question of one depending on the other? If successively on what did the earlier knowledge depend?

(1711) Or, on what does the very first cognition (knowledge) of a newly born child depend? Or what mutual dependence could there be between two things alike in all respects, cognised simultaneously e. g. the two eyes?

(1712) Why (do you say that) on the basis of 'short' we have knowledge of 'long'? Why does not knowledge of 'long' depend on 'long' or on 'sky-flower'? Or why does not knowledge (of long - short, etc.) with regard to sky-flower take place in dependence on 'sky-flower'?

(1713) Or what have you to do with relativity (or dependence) itself? If it be argued that it is the 'own nature' itself, then svabhāva means sva (one's own), bhāva (existence), and that cannot hold good of a barren woman's son.

(1714) Particular knowledge or mere expression as to 'long', or 'short' may take place on account of relativity, but never existence and the other attributes (colour, taste, etc.).

(1715) Otherwise, in the event of their being the absence or non-existence of 'short' there would be the utter destruction of 'long'. But this does not happen. Hence existence, etc. of jar, etc. are not dependent or relative.

(1716) Even this dependence (relativity) is not without reference to the act of dependence, that which has dependence and that on which it depends. If all these are (admitted as being) existent, there can verily be no Voidness.

(1717) Some things are intrinsically established, some are extrinsically established, some are established in both the ways and some are eternally established; e.g. cloud, jar, man, ether (respectively). This is to be considered as from the empirical stand-point.

(1718) But again from the real stand-point, everything is self-established by only the use of the external instrumental factors. For even when the instrumental factors are present, non-being (e.g. ass's horn) is not established, (as it is not self-established), (that is to say it does not become 'being', as it has essence of its own).

(1719) Once the jar is admitted as existent, the discussion whether existence and jar are one or different is (but) a discussion of modes only; otherwise why should it not be held with respect to ass's horn?

(1720) Even if jar and Void are different, O gentle one, what is this void over and above the jar? If they are one, the jar alone is there. The Void is not an attribute of jar.

(1721) If knowledge and expression (Everything is void) on the one hand and the speaker (Nihilist) are one, then its existence is established. If they are different, how can one who is deficient in knowledge and speech say this?

(1722) The existence of jar is an attribute of the jar and so is non-different from it, but is different from cloth, etc. When one says '(jar) exists' how does it necessarily mean 'The jar alone (exists)'?

(1723) Or how can there be the contingency of everything being jar viz. 'whatever exists is jar'. Or when it is said 'jar exists', how can the existence of all be obstructed. (The other things cannot be prevented from existing).

(1724) Therefore when it is said 'exists' it refers to both jar and non-jar, but when 'jar' is mentioned it means that the

jar necessarily exists; as 'Tree' gives us knowledge of 'mango' and 'non-mango', but 'mango' means that it is necessarily a tree, (not a non-tree).

(1725) What is it that you regard as 'produced', when what is produced, not produced or both has been proved to be non-produced? If even (then) (it is argued that) the produced is not produced, why is this not contemplated with respect to 'sky-flower'?

(1726) If it is utterly non-produced, how is it that it is apprehended after its birth or is not apprehended before its birth and is, again, not apprehended when it perishes after some time.

(1727) As the statement of 'Void' even though non-produced in all respects is (somehow accepted as) produced, so are all things (regarded as produced). If even what is produced is (regarded as) non-produced, by what will the void be illuminated (propounded)?

(1728) The effect — produced, non-produced, produced-non-produced, being produced — is here produced according to what is intended to be conveyed, and in certain cases is not at all produced.

(1729) As possessed of colour, the jar is the produced that is produced; from the point of view of figure, it as non-produced is produced; from the point of view of both (i. e. colour and figure) it as produced non-produced is produced, and for the moment it as being produced is produced.

(1730) The jar formerly made can in no way be produced as a jar, or as of alien modes, or in both ways (as jar and as alien modes), and even as being produced it can in no way be produced as cloth.

(1731) Hence the eternal ether, etc. cannot be produced in any of these ways (produced, non-produced, both, being produced), O gentle one. This should be understood from the

point of view of the basic substance. But on a consideration of the modes all the alternatives can be resorted to.

(1732) You said, "Everything is made by the causal apparatus and it does not exist (as everything is non-existent)." This statement is, in fact, contradictory. Why is the apparatus giving rise to the hair of the tortoise not directly perceived (while that of the jar is — when all things are equally non-existent) ?

(1733) The speaker is equipped with the apparatus (tongue, lips, palate, etc.). If such a speaker and his statement exist how can you say that there is void? If they do not exist, in the absence of the statement (and the speaker) by whom was the statement made and by whom was it heard ?

(1734) "Because the speaker and the statement do not exist, even so the things to be expressed do not exist. Therefore there is the void". Is this statement true or false ?

(1735) If it is true, then non-existence is not there (for at least the statement exists); if it is false, it is not authoritative or valid. If it is argued, "It is accepted by us (whatever it be)", this is not consistent with the view that there is non-existence (of all).

(1736) Why is oil not obtained from sand (which can as well be) the causal apparatus (when everything is on a par being equally non-existent) and why does it exist in sesamum? Or why does not everything result from the causal apparatus of sky-flowers ?

(1737) It is not an absolute rule that everything is produced out of the causal apparatus as the atom is devoid of space-point. If that too were possessed of space-point, that (would be called) the atom where gradation stopped (i.e. the smallest possible entity would be called an atom).

(1738) (If it is said that as the atom does not arise out of the causal apparatus it does not exist at all, then the

statements that) everything is seen to arise out of the causal apparatus and that atoms do not exist are mutually contradictory. And, if atoms do not exist, did everything arise out of sky-flowers?

(1739) That the fore-part of a thing is seen and that it does not exist are contradictory. Even while everything is non-existent, why is that (fore-part) of ass's horn not seen?

(1740) 'As the hind-part is not perceived, the fore-part too does not exist'— what sort of an Inference is this of yours? Why do you not argue that the existence of the hind part is established on the perception of the fore-part?

(1741) When everything is non-existent, how can there be this division into a number of parts— fore, hind and middle. If it be said that it is from another's point of view, how can there be this specification as to one's own view and another's view?

(1742) If this distinction of fore, hind and middle parts is admitted, there can be no Void. Even if they are not admitted, there can be no as such distinctions as in the case of the ass's horn.

(1743) When everything is non-existent, how is it that the fore part is perceived and not the hind part? Why is there not the non-cognition of all, or just the opposite (perception of hind part and non-perception of fore part)?

(1744) The hind-part of crystals, etc. can be perceived, so they are certainly existent. If (it is said that) they too are not existent, then 'because the hind part is not seen' is no Reason at all.

(1745) Why do you not say, 'Because nothing is perceived? If this latter be accepted, there would be the fault of giving up what was formerly accepted and contradicting direct perception (and it would not be justified).

(1746) If it be thought that the hind and the middle parts do not exist for they are not perceived, then you will come to a fix where you will have to accept the existence of sense-organs and their objects, or give up the reason 'because it is non-perceived'.

(1747) Even what is non-perceived may be existent; e. g. your cognition of the nature of doubt, etc. If it does not, what is the Void and whose and by whom is it apprehended ?

(1748) It is not proper for you to have a doubt with respect to Earth, Water, Fire which are perceptible; you may have it with respect to Air and Ether, though that too is not proper, as there is an Inference (to prove their existence).

(1749) Touch, etc produced by some unseen factor must have a substratum since they are qualities, as jar is the substratum of the quality colour. That which is the substratum of these is Air.

(1750) Earth, etc. must have a receptacle (support), as jar is of water, for they are corporeal. O Vyakta, that which is the support of the elements is, clearly, Ether.

(1751) O Gentle one, accept these (five elements) which are established by the means of valid knowledge – Perception, etc. They are characterised by the soul and a number of uses as the support, etc. of the body.

(1752) If it is asked as to how they can be said to have a soul (the reply is) – The four up to Air (i.e. Earth, Water, Fire, Air) (have a soul) because (of the cognition) of its mark. The Ether being non-corporeal is merely a support but has not a soul.

(1753) Trees are animate since they have, like women, birth, old age, life, death, healing of a wound, food, longing during pregnancy, and disease, cure, etc.

(1754–5) The Sprṣṭa-prarodikas (shy plant) (are animate) for they contract the moment they are touched, like small insects

(or worms). O Vyakte, masses of creepers are animate for they move (to trees) for support. Śamī, etc. are admitted to be animate on account of sleeping, waking, contracting, etc. Bakula, etc. (are animate) for they enjoy seasonally their respective object, sound, etc,

(1756) Cluster of trees, coral, lavaṇa, upala, etc, as long as they are firmly rooted (are animate), since sprouts of the same type are found to spring up (even when they are cut off), like flesh coming up (in piles).

(1757) Water is said to be (animate) like a frog since it springs up naturally when the ground is dug; or because, like fish, it transforms itself naturally as clouds and falls from the sky.

(1758) Air (is animate), since it like the bull without being goaded by anyone moves about in the directions horizontally and irregularly. Fire is animate since increase and change are seen in it by its beings fed (fuelled).

(1759) The elements up to Air are bodies of the corporeal class different from the changes of clouds. They are soulless or having a soul according as they are struck by a weapon or not.

(1760-1) O Gentle one, many souls attain salvation and there is no possibility of new ones being born. The inhabited universe is of limited dimension. For those who do not admit souls with one sense, there would be an end of wordly life altogether (there would be no soul in the world). But because this is not desired, it is established that there is an infinite number of souls and that they have the elements as their support (i.e. they are embodied).

(1762) (Vyakta —) (If the earth etc.) were so crowded with souls, their could be no Ahiṃsā (Non-injury). (Mahāvīra —) It is not so since it has been said that what is struck by a weapon is soul-less. There cannot be Hiṃsā simply because (the universe) is crowded by souls.

(1763-4) Simply by killing one does not become harmful, and one who does not kill is not necessarily innocent. And it is not that one could be innocent if there were few souls and harmful (only) because there were very many.

Even when not killing one is known to be harmful on account of evil designs, like a hunter (or a butcher). Even when injuring one is not injurious on account of good intentions, as for instance a doctor.

(1765) Being equipped with the five samitis (self-regulations) and the three guptis (self-controls) a wise man is non-injurious (non-killer), not otherwise. It (sin of injury) may accrue to him or may not through obstruction (injury) to souls.

(1766) It is the evil motive that is Injury. In certain cases it depends on the external agency and in certain others it does not, since the external agency is inconclusive (not absolutely necessary).

(1767) Injury to the soul is regarded as Injury if it is the cause of an evil result or if it has an evil motive. For whom this is not the instrumental factor, it is not injury even when it (i.e. injury to the soul) is there.

(1768) As sound, etc. do not result in passions for a person free from infatuation owing to the purity of his intentions, so even injury to the soul is not Injury for one with a pure mind.

(1769) When the Śramaṇa's (Vyakta's) doubt was set at nought by the Jina, free from old age and death, he became a monk along with his 500 followers (pupils).

GAṆADHARVA 5 — SUDHARMAN

(1770) Sudharman, hearing that they had become monks, came to the Jina (thinking) 'I shall go, bow down to him and wait upon him.

(1771) The Jina who was free from birth, old age, death and was all-knowing and all-seeing, accosted him (Sudharman) by his name and gotra.

(1772) You are thinking as to whether one will be in another life also as he is in this life. You do not know the meaning of the words of the Veda. This is what they mean.

(1773) You believe that the effect is similar to the cause, as the sprout is to the seed. It is not proper (or right) that (on the basis of this) you know everything in the other worldly life as similar to that in this.

*(1774) Śāra springs out of Śṛṅga, and Bhūṭṛṇaka springs out of it if it is besmeared with sarṣapa (mustard). Dūrvā grass is produced out of the conjunction of the hair of kine and the hair of sheep (i. e. wool).

(1775) As thus in the science pertaining to Medicine of Trees (Botany) and pertaining to Yoni (source of birth) (Biology) birth is observed from dissimilar things, therefore, O Sudharman, this rule (like cause, like effect) is not absolute.

(1776) Or even as it is accepted that the effect is like the cause, even so know the soul to be of different modification from one life to another.

* Śāra — a sort of reed or grass, Saccharum Sara.

Śṛṅga — a kind of medicinal or poisonous plant.

Bhūṭṛṇa — a species of grass.

(1777) Karma is the seed of the sprout in the form of worldly life, and as that is said to be of different varieties, the varieties of the sprout of worldly life result from the variety in the cause.

(1778) If karma is admitted and if it is admitted to be of different varieties on account of variety in its cause, then know, O gentle one, its fruit also to be of different varieties for the transmigratory being.

(1779) Transmigratoriness (is of different varieties) because it is the fruit of karma (of different varieties); as here in the world there is fruit of different varieties of actions which are correspondingly of different varieties.

(1780) Modification of karma is of different varieties as it is the modification of Matter like the external (modifications of Matter). The diversity of karma, again, is due to the diversity of its cause.

(1781) Or, even if the other-worldly life is admitted as similar to this life here in this (world), even so accept the fruit of karman in the other-worldly life to be similar to that in this-worldly life.

(1782) What does this amount to? Men perform here different kinds of actions. If they are the enjoyers of their fruits, then it is but proper that there should be the same position in the other world too.

(1783) If it be said that action yields fruits in this world and not in the other world, then there will be no similarity whatsoever. There will be the contingency of attaining the fruit of what has not been performed or loss of what has been done, or the non-existence of karman.

(1784) And in the absence of karman, whence could there be another life, or similarity in its absence? And if another life be (looked upon as being) without a cause, then destruction also would be such.

(1785) if it be argued: "What wrong is there if (the other world is there) just naturally as the effect, jar, etc. befitting the cause emerges just naturally?"

(1786) Could this Nature be a thing or non-causality or an attribute of a thing? If a thing, it does not exist because it is not perceived like a sky-flower.

(1787) If it is said to be existent even though it is never perceived, then why is not karma said to be existent? Whatever accounts for its existence, can account for the existence of karman also.

(1788) Or 'Svabhāva' may be (another) name for karman. Let it be. What wrong is there? Or how is it that this Svabhāva remains eternally similar (always similar)?

(1789-90) Is it corporeal or non-corporeal? If it is corporeal, it cannot always be similar, because of modification, like milk. If it be non-corporeal, it cannot be the cause of the body, because of absence of causal apparatus. O Sudharman, if it is non-corporeal (it cannot be the cause) as the effect is corporeal and it cannot be non-corporeal as there are the sensations of pleasure, etc.

(1791) If 'by nature' ('naturally') means 'without a cause', even then how could there be similarity? Would not dissimilarity occur without a cause, or (even) the end of worldly life be uncaused? (Certainly it would).

(1792) Or if Svabhāva be the attribute of a thing, even that will not be eternally similar, since the modes of a thing — origination, persistence, destruction — are various.

(1793) Or what wrong is there if Svabhāva is the attribute—modification of karman which is of the nature of matter, and if it is the variegated cause of the world?

(1794) Or Sudharman, every thing at every moment is born in respect of certain modes, perishes in respect of certain modes and persists in the same form in respect of certain modes.

(1795) Even the same thing, by virtue of its earlier (previous) attributes, is not similar to its later attributes (then what to say of one thing being similar to another?) And (in a way) it is similar to all the three worlds in respect of certain universal characteristics.

(1796) What is absolutely similar or dissimilar in this worldly existence or in the other worldly life? Everything is similar-dissimilar, eternal-non-eternal and so on.

(1797) As a young man is not similar to his own attributes as a child or an old man and yet is similar to the whole world in respect of existence, etc.; such is the case with the soul in another worldly life (which is dissimilar to itself as it was in the previous worldly life and in a way is similar to everything, so it is no use pointing out that the soul in the subsequent worldly life is absolutely similar to the soul itself in the previous one).

(1798) A man who becomes a god (in the next worldly life) is similar even to the whole world in respect of existence, etc., and is dissimilar in respect of godhood, etc. He is in the same way eternal and non-eternal.

(1799) If similarity be insisted upon, there would not be any betterment or deterioration even in the same class and the fruit of charity, etc. would be lost (i.e. would be in vain).

(1800) The Vedic statements like 'He is born a jackal....' and the fruit in the form of heaven, all that would be inconsistent in this view regarding similarity.

(1801) When this doubt was removed by the Jina free from old age and death, the Śramaṇa became a monk along with his five hundred followers.

GANADHARA 6 — MANDIKA

(1802) Hearing that they had become monks, Mandika came to the Jina (thinking), "I shall go, pay my respects to him and wait upon him."

(1803) The Jina free from birth, old age, death, and all-knower and all-seing--accosted him by his name and gotra.

(1804) You think, 'Are there bondage and emancipation or not?' This is your doubt. You do not know the meaning of the words of the Veda. This is what they mean.

(1805) You think that if bondage is the connection of the jīva (soul) with karma, was jīva prior and karma later or vice versa or were they simultaneous?

(1806) The origination of the soul before (karma) is not possible for it like ass's horn would have no cause; and what is produced without any cause perishes also without any cause.

(1807) Or it (soul) is beginningless and there cannot be the union of the soul with karman without any cause. If this union is regarded as occurring without a cause, it will recur in the case of an emancipated (soul) also.

(1808) It would be eternally emancipated; or what emancipation could it have in the absence of bondage? The sky is not spoken of as 'free' in the absence of bondage (because it has no bondage).

(1809-10) And karman could not possibly be produced (before jīva), in the absence of the doer. If it be born without cause it too would be such (i. e. would perish without a cause). In the case of their being produced simultaneously, (the drawbacks of both the alternatives would be present) and in the event of

their being produced simultaneously it would not be proper to term *jīva* the 'doer' and *karman* the effect, just as this relation is not found in the world between the horns of a bull (produced simultaneously).

(1811) Even if the union is beginningless, emancipation does not stand to reason. What is beginningless is also endless, like the connection between *jīva* and sky.

(1812) Thus bondage and emancipation cannot be explained by reasoning. And (yet) in the Vedas there are statements regarding bondage and emancipation; hence you have this doubt. Listen why this doubt should not be entertained.

(1813) The continuum of body and karma like that of seed-sprout is, oh Maṇḍika, beginningless, since they are related to each other as cause-effect.

(1814) There is a body which is the cause of (the future) *karman* and which is the effect of another (previous) *karman*; and there is (again) *karman* which is the cause of the body, and which is the effect of another (previous) body.

(1815) *Jīva* is the doer of *karman* through the instrumentality (of body) as the potter is of the pot. So also *jīva* is the creator of the body, because there is possibility of the instrumentality of *karman*.

(1816) If you think that karma is not established as an instrument, (our reply is) that it is established by reason of the effect. Moreover, know it to be established from the fact that it is the fruit of activity, as did Agnibhūti.

(1817) As to the argument that the continuum being beginningless is also endless, this is not an absolute rule; for it is seen at times coming to an end even when it is beginningless, e. g. the continuum of seed and sprouts.

(1818-19) If either the seed or the sprout were to perish before giving rise to the effect, the continuum would be snapped; so also in the case of hen and eggs and so on. Or the conjunction of gold and dust here even though handed down in a beginningless continuum is cut off if the (proper) means are employed; so also the union of soul and karman.

(1820) (Maṇḍika)—Now then, is the union like that of the soul and the sky or like that of gold and dust? (Reply) The union of soul and karman is said to be of both the kinds and there is no contradiction in this.

(1821) The former (kind of union) is that of the abhavya souls (who are never to be emancipated); that of bhavya souls is like that of gold and dust. (Maṇḍika—) When soulness is common to all why this distinction of bhavya and abhavya?

(1822) If this distinction were caused by karman there would be no contradiction (i.e. difficulty) as in the case of the distinction of nāraka (denizens of hell) and others. But you regard the bhavya and abhavya souls as such by their very nature and hence the doubt.

(1823) (Reply) Even when 'substanceness' etc. are common, the distinction of jīva and ākāśa accounted for by soul-non-soul, etc. is due to their very nature; such is the distinction in the case of bhavya and the other kind of souls (even though all are souls).

(1824) (Maṇḍika—) Even so, if being bhavya is the very nature of the thing like 'soulness', it should be eternal; and if that is so there should be no emancipation.

(1825) (Reply—) As the prior non-existence of jar even though beginningless by nature, comes to an end, so what wrong is there if there be the non-existence of bhavyatva brought about by action?

(1826) If it be thought that non-existence like the ass's horn cannot be an illustration, it is not so, because it is

positive existence only characterised by the non-production of jar.

(1827) (If it is said that) thus there would once come an end to bhavya souls as there comes an end to the hoard in the granary,—it is not so since the bhavya souls are endless in number like the future time and sky.

(1828) As the past and the future time are equal in effect and as an infinitesimal part of the bhavya souls has reached the consummation (state of perfection, emancipation) in the past time

(1829) And as it is proper that only that much part will reach consummation in the time to come, even so all the bhavya souls cannot properly be exhausted. If it is asked as to how this can be established

(1830) That the bhavya souls are infinite in number and that an infinitesimal part of them is emancipated, (the reply is). O Maṇḍika, this is as in the case of time, etc; or accept this on my word.

(1831) Accept this as true because it is my word, like other statements of mine, or because of omniscience, etc. like the statement of an arbiter in the know of facts.

(1832) You think, 'How are you omniscient?' The reply is, 'because I have set aside the doubts of all'. Even when there is no example (of another omniscient person), anyone may ask whatever doubt he has (and make sure whether I am omniscient or not).

(1833) (Maṇḍika —) (You said that) some bhavya souls also will not reach their consummation even in all time, then verily they are abhavya only. Or, what is this bhavyatva of theirs?

(1134) The reply is that bhavya means capable (or fit), having the potentiality for (perfection). All do not attain consummation only by being capable; as even when several materials are

capable (of being turned into images), all are not turned into images.

(1835) Or as in the case of the union of stone and gold, even though it is capable of being dissociated, all such cases are not dissociated, but only that (particular case) whose means (for dissociation) are at hand.

(1836) Moreover the fact of the means being at hand is meant only for that which is capable, not for what is not capable. Similarly emancipation is meant as a rule for the bhavya souls, not for the others.

(1837) (Objection) Emancipation cannot be eternal, because it is caused and on account of such (other) reasons, like jar. (Reply —) It is not so; because posterior non-existence here on the earth even though having that characteristic (i.e. caused, etc.) is eternal.

(1838) It should not be thought that this non-existence too is no illustration; for it is positive existence of the nature of matter characterised by the destruction of the jar.

(1839) What change is brought about absolutely in the soul on the disappearance of mere matter? On the destruction of the jar alone what is added to the sky (what change is effected in the sky)?

(1840) It (emancipated soul), like a guiltless person, is not bound again for there is no cause of bondage. Activities (yoga) are the cause of bondage; and they cannot belong to it (emancipated soul) because it has no body.

(1841) It is not born again in the absence of the seed i. e. (cause), as the sprout is not produced in the absence of the seed. The seed for it is karman and that for it does not exist, so it is eternal.

(1842) If it is thought that if it (the emancipated soul) is regarded as eternal because it is non-corporeal while being

a substance, then there is the contingency of its being ubiquitous, —(the reply is) this is not so as inference goes against it.

(1843) What obstinate insistence could there be regarding eternality? Everything is characterised by origination, destruction, duration. The reference to it (soul) as non-eternal, etc. is only by assigning another mode (i. e. only when a specific mode is prominently in view).

(1844) What is the place for the emancipated soul (i. e. where does the emancipated soul stay)? (Reply—) The summit of the three worlds. (Q -) How does it move? (R—) This is explained by transformation into movement of this kind when it is light of karman (i. e. free from karman).

(1845) (Maṇḍika) If it (soul) is non-corporeal, how can it have activity? (Reply—) Maṇḍika, what is there on the earth that is sentient and non-corporeal? As sentiency is its particular attribute, so also is activity recognised (as a particular attribute) of the soul (even when it is non-corporeal).

(1846) Or it is recognised as being active on account of its being the doer; etc. like a potter; or because the movements of the body are directly perceived, like a machine-man.

(1847) If it be said that effort is the cause of the bodily movements, that too is not found in what is inactive. If it is thought that unseen (adr̥ṣṭa) is the cause,—if it is non-corporeal we come to the same position.

(1848) If it be corporeal, it must be the (karmic) body and a cause must be pointed out for its movement (and so on). And it is not proper to regard non-sentient things as having specific movements (naturally).

(1849) (Maṇḍika—) The movement may be there while it is in the worldly existence. But by what is it caused when it (soul) is free from karman? (Reply—) Verily, that is on account of transformation into movement; as consummation occurs (on the destruction of karman) so that (motion) too occurs.

(1850) Why does it not move beyond the abode of perfect souls? Because there is the absence of dharma (principle of motion) which has spatial existence; this dharma that helps motion exists in the loka (world) but not in the aloka (non-world).

(1851) Loka has its counter-entity (viz. aloka), because the word 'loka' is uncompounded, as aghaṭa the counter-entity of ghaṭa does exist. It cannot be said that aloka can be jar, etc (i.e. there is no need to suppose another entity called aloka), because due to negation the counter-entity must be in agreement with the thing negated.

(1852) Therefore, it stands to reason that there are dharma (principle of motion) and adharma (principle of rest) which determine loka. Otherwise ākāśa being the same, how could there be the distinction of loka and aloka?

(1853) If there were not the division of loka, there would not be any obstruction (to the motion of jīva and pudgala) and there would be no end (to their motion). In that case there would not be any relation between them and if that be so there would not be the utterances (about bondage, salvation, etc.).

(1854) Beyond (loka) there is no motion because there is nothing to promote it, as fish cannot move beyond water. The principle that promotes motion is dharma which extends as far as the loka (—which is co-extensive with loka).

(1855) Loka must certainly have a determining (lit. measuring) factor as it is capable of being determined (measured), as knowledge is (the determining factor) of the knowable. And it can exist only if aloka exists (i. e. is recognised as a fact). (Therefore the siddhas are stationed in the uppermost part of loka).

(1856) (Objection) In that case, fall from that place of residence becomes contingent. (Reply) It is not so as the genitive here (in 'siddhasya sthānam') is in the sense of the subject. The station is non-different from the subject.

(1857) (Even if the two are different), the (place) sky being eternal, it cannot be destroyed and there can be no fall from it. Also because there is no karma and because there is no action again.

(1858) Or it would be contingent that sky, etc should fall from their eternal location. If this is not accepted, the rule that a thing invariably falls from its station would not be without an exception.

(1859) (Maṇḍika) According to you one becomes a siddha from the worldly existence, then it is but proper that there should be someone who was the first to become siddha. (Reply) Time being beginningless, this is not proper, just as (there is no) 'first body', (or 'first day', though every day has a beginning).

(1860) (Maṇḍika) How can an infinite (number of siddhas) be accomodated in a limited space? (Reply) Because they are not corporeal; as knowledge, etc. can be accomodated in one object or glances in one form (i e. as a form can become the object of innumerable glances).

(1861-62) You do not know the true meaning of such Vedic expressions as, 'An embodied being cannot be free from pleasure and pain', etc. and hence your doubt as to bondage and emancipation. But you should have no such doubt as it is but clear that the embodied and disembodied existences are bondage and emancipation respectively.

(1863) When his doubt had been removed by the Victor free from old age and death, the Śramaṇa became a monk along with his three hundred and fifty pupils.

GAṆADHARA 7 — MAURYAPUTRA

(1864) Hearing that they had become monks, Maurya came to the Victor thinking, "I shall go, bow down and wait upon him."

(1865) He was accosted by the Victor free from birth, old age and death, and all-knowing and all-seeing, by his name and gotra (as Mauryaputra Kāśyapa).

(1866) Are you thinking in this manner: 'Do the gods exist or do they not?' This is your doubt. You do not know the meaning of the words of the Veda. This is what they mean.

(1867) You think the denizens of hell are dependent and unhappy. They are not able to come here. One may have faith in them (in their existence) even on the basis of verbal testimony.

(1868) While the gods are at their free will to go where they like and they have celestial powers, your doubt about them is on account of the fact that (in spite of this) the gods are never seen.

(1869) Do not entertain this doubt. See for yourself these four kinds of groups of gods of a class quite different from men.

(1870) You should not have had this doubt earlier too for the jyotiṣka (stellar) gods are directly visible. And we can also perceive their favour or disfavour on the world.

(1871) If you regard them as abodes, even then it is proved that like a city they must have denizens. They are the gods. It cannot be that abodes are eternally vacant.

(1872) Or you may have a doubt 'Who knows what this could be?' They are definitely vimānas (abodes) as they are

made of gems and move in the sky like the vimānas of Vidyādhara and others.

(1873) You may have a thought that (all) this is an illusion; still it is the gods who bring about this illusion. Moreover they are not transformations of magic, etc., because like a city, they are always found.

(1874) If the denizens of hell are recognised as being the enjoyers of the fruit of great sins, even so assemblages of gods too must be recognised as the enjoyers of the fruit of very great merit.

(1875) Gods do not come to the foul world of men as they have transferred their affection to celestial things, they are attached to objects of pleasure, they have not performed (all) their duties and human works (efforts and their fruit) are not dependent on them.

(1876) All the same, gods come here on the festive occasion of the birth, dīkṣā (initiation), perfect intuition or nirvāṇa (emancipation) of a tīrthaṅkara. Some of them, o gentle one, come instantaneously out of a sense of devotion, (others as the followers of these), others to dispel their doubt.

(1877) Or on account of previous attachment or as fixed by appointment, on account of austerity, for showing disfavour or favour to multitudes of human beings or for pleasures of love and for such other reasons.

(1878-9) One must have faith in the existence of gods on account of these reasons also: (i) On the basis of the statement of a person who remembers his previous birth or existence, (ii) direct perception, (of someone), (iii) success attained by vidyā, mantra, upayācana, (prayer) (iv) graha-vikāra—possession by ghosts etc., (v) the existence of the fruit of great merit that is accumulated, (vi) establishment of nomenclature ('gods'), (vii) proof of all scriptures.

(1880) The name 'gods' is meaningful because like the name 'ghaṭa' (jar), it is un-compounded (and derived). Or you may think man himself rich in qualities and extraordinary powers is god.

(1881) (But) this is not so. Only when the real thing is known to exist can the name be applied figuratively. Only when the lion exists in reality can we have the term 'man-lion' figuratively.

(1882) If the gods did not exist, the heavenly fruit of acts like Agnihotra and others and of sacrifices and the fruit of (acts of) charity, etc. would be in vain. And this is not proper.

(1883) (The statement that) one wins by sacrifices the heavenly kingdom, etc., of Yama, Soma, Sūrya and Sura-guru (Bṛhaspati) and the invocation of Indra and other (gods) by mantras—all this would be in vain (if the gods did not exist).

(1884) When his doubt had been dispelled by the Victor, free from old age and death, the Śramaṇa became a monk along with his 350 pupils.

GAṆĀDHARA 8 — AKAMPITA

(1885) Hearing that they had become monks, Akampita came to the Jina with the intention, 'I shall go, bow down and wait upon him.'

(1886) He was addressed by the Victor, free from birth, old age and death, and omniscient, all-seeing, by his name and gotra (Akampita—Gautama).

(1887) Are you thinking whether hellish beings exist or not. This is your doubt. And you do not understand the meaning of the Vedic words. This is their meaning.

(1888) You think, "The gods Moon and others are directly known. So also even others are known through the accomplishment of the fruit, etc. by vidyā (science), mantra (formula, charm), upayācana (prayer, solicitation).

(1889) But again those hellish beings whose fruit is śruti (word) alone (i.e. who are merely heard of)—how can they of a kind different (from lower beings, men and gods) because they are not cognised by direct perception or inference, be accepted (as existent)?"

(1890) Admit the (existence of) hellish beings as of soul, etc. on the basis of my perception. Can it be that your own perception alone is perception? Rather

(1891) even the perception of another is recognised as perception in the world, as (for example) the perception of lion, etc. is accepted (recognised), but it is not the perception of all.

(1892) Or is the perception by the sense-organs alone perception? (Rather) it is so figuratively (secondarily); non-sensuous perception is the true one.

(1893) The sense-organs, being corporeal, etc. cannot be cognisers, like jar. They are the doors to cognition, the soul is the cogniser.

(1894) Because there is memory even when they are not functioning and because there is no cognition even when they are functioning, the knower is different from the sense-organs, as the cogniser is different from the five windows.

(1895) The soul which is without the sense-organs (as instruments or aids) sees much more on account of the removal of all obstruction, like a cogniser who is outside the house.

(1896) (Sensuous perception) is not perception since by one attribute (as the cause) there is cognition of only that attribute of the thing, as only non-eternality is established of the jar by its artificiality. (There is not a comprehensive or full knowledge of the thing).

(1897) Or (it is not perception) because it is caused by memory of the relation cognised earlier, as (the knowledge of) fire arises from smoke; or because it arises on account of another instrument; sense-organs are the instruments of the knowing organ (akṣa i.e. jīva).

(1898) As in the case of a person who has not pure and perfect knowledge, intuition of mental modes and visual intuition, all knowledge is but inference, and as that is there with respect to the existence of hellish beings, therefore they (hellish beings) exist.

(1899-1900) There must certainly be some who are the enjoyers of the fruit of very great sin, because that too is karman like the rest. They are regarded as (i.e. called) hellish beings. If it be thought

that those lower creatures and human beings who are very miserable, they (should be) regarded as nāraka (hellish beings), it is not so since that pain or misery is not comparable to the very great happiness of the gods.

(1901) O Akampita, this is true, because it is my statement like other statements of mine; or because it is the statement of an omniscient one, like the statement of one recognised as omniscient (by you).

(1902) My statement is true and intransgressible because there are no (i.e. it is not actuated by) fear, likes, faults, infatuation, like the statement of an arbiter who is in the know of facts.

(1903) If you doubt as to how I am (i.e. can be called) omniscient, (I say) that is obvious, because I have dispelled all doubts. Gentle one, I am free from fear, likes, faults as there is no sign of these.

(1904) When his doubt had thus been dispelled by the Jina free from old age and death, the Śramaṇa became a monk along with his 300 pupils.

GAṆADHARA 9 — ACALABHRĀTĀ.

(1905) Hearing that they had become monks Acalabhrātā came to the Victor thinking, "I shall go, pay my respects and wait upon him".

(1906) He was accosted by the Jina, free from birth, old age and death, all-knowing and all-seeing, by his name and gotra (as Acalabhrāta-Hāritā).

(1907) What are you thinking about? You have a doubt whether puṇya (merit) and pāpa (sin) exist or not. You do not know the true meaning of the words of the Veda. This is their (true) interpretation.

(1908) You think—puṇya alone exists, or pāpa alone exists, or both are mixed or even both are different, or that karman itself doesn't exist. This manifest existence (life) is there just naturally.

(1909) With the increase in puṇya, there is welfare; on account of the graded decline (in it) there is loss (of welfare or of pleasure). When it is exhausted there is emancipation just as in the case of wholesome food.

(1910) With the increase in pāpa, there is lowliness; with the graded decline in it there is welfare; when it is completely exhausted there is emancipation as in the case of unwholesome food.

(1911) If it (puṇya-pāpa) is mixed like mixed colour etc, then by the increase or decrease to the extent of one degree that very (entity) is called puṇya or pāpa (as the case may be).

(1912) In the same way both may be different; or the worldly existence may occur just naturally. (In reply to this) it is said it could not be on account of svabhāva (nature), for if that be accepted,

(1913) could this svabhāva be a thing or non-causality or an attribute of a thing? If it be a thing it could not be existent because of non-apprehension, like sky-flower. [Same as 1786]

(1914) If it is said to exist even though utterly uncognised then why could not karman be existent? Or whatever be the reason for its existence, the same could be the (reason for the existence) of karman. [Same as 1787]

(1915) Or svabhāva may be just (another) name for karman. Let it be, what harm is there? [Same as 1788ab] And on account of specific form being there it cannot be the cause (of body, etc.) as (the potter alone) cannot be of jar.

(1916-17) Is it corporeal or non-corporeal. If it be corporeal, then karman and svabhāva could be different (only) in name (they would be really identical). If it be non-corporeal, it would not be the cause of body, etc. like the sky. On account of effects, etc. corporeality stands to reason. If it is non-causality, then let ass's horn, etc. be existent.

(1918) If it is the attribute of a thing, then it is the transformation of karman and jīva, called puṇya-pāpa. It can be inferred from cause-effect (relationship).

(1919) On account of activities being the cause and body, etc. being the effect, karman (exists). Accept karman also because it is stated by me (to be existent), as Agnibhūti did.

(1920) Know that itself to be puṇya-pāpa distinct by nature on account of the goodness or foulness of body, etc. and also of actions.

(1921) Pleasure and pain must certainly have a fitting cause, as they are effects, as atoms are (the cause) of jar. The cause in this case is puṇya-pāpa.

(1922) (Objection —) If karman be the cause of pleasure-pain and if it be a (cause) befitting the effect, it should be arūpin (formless); if it has form, then it is not a befitting (cause).

(1923) (Reply—) The cause is neither entirely in agreement nor entirely different. If these be accepted (or insisted upon) by you, could there be cause-effect or could it be a thing?

(1924) If everything be similar-and-dissimilar, then what is this 'being befitting the effect'? It means O gentle one, that the effect is its own mode and the rest are 'alien modes'.

(1925) Is karman the cause of pleasure, etc. as a corporeal thing is the cause of an incorporeal one? Is karman the cause just as food, etc. are the cause of pleasure, etc.?

(1926) Let that (food, etc.) be the cause, what have we to do with karman? It is not so, for even in the case of persons with the same resources the result is different. That difference must have a cause; karman is the cause.

(1927) And on account of this too it is corporeal, as it imparts strength to corporeal things, as is jar. (It is corporeal) because its effects, body etc. are corporeal. When this is pointed out, he again says:

(1928) Therefore is it corporeal because body, etc. are corporeal: and is it formless (incorporeal) being the cause of pleasure-pain?

(1929) Karman alone is not the cause of pleasure, etc; jīva too is their cause. It (jīva) is the material cause; karman is the other (cause — auxiliary). So what harm is there?

(1930) Karman thus being established to be having form (corporeal) and the cause of pleasure and pain, it is not proper that there should be abundance of pain simply on account of the decline of merit.

(1931) It is certainly produced by the prakarṣa (abundance) of karman, because it is of the nature of the experience of abundance; this abundance is experienced, as experience of

abundance of happiness is caused by plentifulness of merit.

(1932) It is also dependent on the plentifulness of external means. For otherwise it would not here require the plentifulness of the force of the external means which are opposed to it (i.e. which produce the opposite sensation).

(1933) The body is not caused by decline (of merit), because it is corporeal, as also in the case of abundance of merit. Or it would be small; but how could it be very foul and big in size?

(1934) This must similarly be applied reversely in the case of the destruction (exhaustion) of all sin. Karman has not a mixed nature (merit-demerit), because there is no cause for it.

(1935) Karman is caused by yoga (activity). That can be good or bad at one time but not of a mixed nature. Therefore karman too has a corresponding nature.

(1936) (Objection) — Verily activities of the mind, speech and body are seen to be both good and bad at one time. (Reply) There can be a mixed nature in the physical (yoga), but not in the psychical cause (instrument i.e. bhāva-yoga).

(1937) Meditation is either good or bad, but not mixed. And the coloration too that occurs on the cessation of meditation, is either good or bad. Therefore karman, too, is either good or bad.

(1938) The karman formerly bound can be turned into one of mixed nature by force of transformation or can be turned into one of the other nature as to rightness or perversity; but not at the time of binding.

(1939) Excepting the longevity determining, attitude-deluding and character-deluding, in the case of the remaining types, transference of the sub-types can be resorted to.

(1940) That which has attributes like good colour, etc. and which has a good fruition is merit. What is just the opposite of this is sin. It is neither gross nor very subtle.

(1941) As a person besmeared with oil catches (binds) dust exactly in accordance with it, so the soul catches (dravya of the karma-group) which is in the same sphere by all its space-points.

(1942) In the world full of pudgala which is non-differentiated the division of karma into gross and subtle may be justified; (but) how could there be the distinction between good and bad at the time of grasping (binding)?

(1943) It is not of any special kind (it is neither good nor bad). But the soul in grasping it immediately turns it into good or bad on account of the transformation (resolve) and the nature of the support, as in the case of food.

(1944) As even when the food is the same we get milk of a cow and poison of a serpent by virtue of (the difference) of transformation and support (receptacle), such also is the transformation into merit and demerit (sin).

(1945) Or as even in the same body, the same food results in good or bad (healthy or unhealthy) transformations, such also is the division of karma into good and bad.

(1946) Comfort (vedanīya), rightfulness (darśana-mohanīya), mirth (cāritra-mohanīya), male-sex, love, good life, name, lineage — these (types) are merits; the rest should be known as sin. Both are with or without fruition.

(1947) If merit and sin were non-existent, the external performance of agnihotra, etc. in the case of one desirous of heaven and the fruit of acts of charity, etc. in the world would be in vain (inconsistent).

(1948) When his doubt was dispelled by the Victor free from old age and death, the Śramaṇa became a monk along with his 300 pupils.

GAṆADHARA 10 — METĀRYA

(1949) Hearing that they had become monks, Metārya came to the Victor (thinking), 'I shall go, bow to him and wait upon him.'

(1950) He was accosted by the Victor free from birth, old age and death, and omniscient, all-seeing, by his name and gotra (as Metārya Kaundīnya).

(1951) Are you thinking 'Does the other world exist or not'. This is your doubt. And you do not know the meaning (import) of the words of the Veda. This is what they mean.

(1952) You think, 'If consciousness is an attribute of the material elements, as intoxication (wine-spirit) is of the constituents of wine, then there is no other-world, for these (elements) being destroyed, it is destroyed.

(1953) Now, even if it (consciousness) is an entity different from them (material elements), still because it is not eternal, there will be the same fault (i.e. it will not transmigrate, as it is perishable), like perishable fire different from the fire-wood. (Hence consciousness will perish and it is not necessary to imagine another world).

(1954) If it be all-pervading and inactive, even then there would be no other-world, because there would be no movement to another place, as in the case of the sky which is present in all bodies.

(1955) If the world of gods, etc. be looked upon as 'other world' because it is other than this world, that also is

not directly perceived. Even so there is no other world. And (still) it is mentioned in the Vedas. Hence (your) doubt.

(1956) Consciousness is an attribute of (an entity) other than the material elements, sense-organs (etc.), and know it to be eternal from the point of view of the basic substance, as Vāyubhūti did, on account of (reasons like) remembrance of (previous) birth, etc.

(1957) It is not one, all-pervading, inactive, because there is difference of characteristics, etc. Therefore, like Indrabhūti, know that they (souls), like jars, are many.

(1958) O gentle one, the world other than this does exist. The world of gods and of hellish beings is the other world. Accept this, as did Maurya and Akampita on the basis of the proofs put forth.

(1959) (Objection) If the soul is of the nature of consciousness (vijñāna), that is non-eternal, hence there is no other-world. If it is different from vijñāna, then it is non-knower, like ākāśa (sky).

(1960) Hence too it is not the doer and enjoyer. Even so there is no other-world; and (there is no other-world) because it does not move (transmigrate), on account of its being without knowledge (like a piece of wood) and without corporeality like the sky.

(1961) (Reply) You regard consciousness as perishable on account of reasons like 'because it has an origin and so on; like a jar.' But oh gentle one, these very reasons can prove its indestructibility (imperishableness).

(1962) Or (there can be a counter-inference to this effect:) Consciousness is not penishable, because it is a thing like jar. If it is argued, "How can jar when it has an origin, etc. be imperishable?"

(1963) (The reply is:) Because jar signifies (a conglomeration of) colour, taste, scent, touch, number, structure, substance (clay), and potencies (to carry water and so on). These are characterised by origination, destruction and duration.

(1964) The lump (of clay) is here produced in the form of the modes, viz the shape (form) of jar, and potencies simultaneously with the destruction of the modes, viz. shape of lump (of clay) and (its) potencies.

(1965) But from the point of view of (or as) colour etc. and the substance (clay), it is neither produced nor destroyed, so it is eternal. The everything is known to be of the nature of origination-destruction-duration (persistence).

(1966) Destruction (in its capacity) as cognition of jar is simultaneous with production (in its capacity) as cognition of cloth, but there is duration (or persistence) as continuity (of consciousness in general), so in the present context in the case of this-world, other-world and soul.

(1967) The destruction of this-world (existence) in the form of man is simultaneous with the production of other-world in the form of gods; etc. and there is persistence as soul (in general). (From the point of view of the basic substance—soul), there is neither this-world nor other-world.

(1968) What is non-existent cannot be produced. Or if it is (produced), then let ass's horn (too be regarded as produced). And there cannot be the utter destruction (of what is existent) because (in that case) there would be the contingency of the extinction of all.

(1969) So the persistent thing is destroyed from the point of view of (or as) some attribute and is produced from the point of view of another. Extinction of all is not recognised as it would mean the end of all dealings. (Thus the soul persists even after death and so there is other-world).

(1970) And if the other-world were not existent, (the injunction regarding) Agnihotra etc. for one desirous of heaven would be inconsistent, and (so also) all the fruit of charity, etc. in the world.

(1971) When his doubt had been dispelled by the Victor free from old age and death, the Śramaṇa became a monk along with his 300 pupils.

GĀṆADHARA 11 — PRABHĀSA

(1972) Hearing that they had become monks, Prabhāsa came to the Victor (thinking), 'I shall go, pay my respects to him and wait upon him'.

(1973) He was addressed by the Victor free from birth, old age and death, and all-knowing and all-seeing, by his name and gotra (as Prabhāsa Kauṇḍinya).

(1974) What are you thinking? Your doubt is as to the reality or otherwise of nirvāṇa (emancipation). And you not know the meaning of the words of the Veda. This is what they mean.

(1975) You are thinking 'Is the nirvāṇa of the soul like the extinction of the lamp or is it a state of the form of extinction of pain etc. of it, an existent entity?'

(1976) Or the contact of the soul with karman being beginningless, as it is with ākāśa (ether), there cannot be their disjunction and hence there can never be the negation of the worldly state.

(1977) You, like Maṇḍika, recognise the absence here of the conjunction of karma and soul due to knowledge and action even though it be beginningless, as in the case of gold and mineral.

(1978) Existence as hellish beings, etc. is saṁsāra; what jīva is there distinct from the (modes)—hellish etc.? You believe, when that (existence as hellish being etc.) is destroyed, the soul is destroyed.

(1979) (Reply —) There is not recognised the utter destruction of the basic substance—soul, on the destruction of

only the modes—hellish state, etc., as gold does not perish when the ring is destroyed.

(1980) Samsāra is caused by karman; it is but proper that it should perish when that (karman) perishes. But the 'soulness' is not caused by karman; (so) how could it perish when that (karman) is destroyed?

(1981) It is not perishable by nature, because as in the case of ākāśa (so here too) no change is noticed. What is perishable is here seen to have change, e. g. pieces in the case of a jar.

(1982) If it be thought that on account of being artificial (caused) etc., it would perish at another time (with the passage of time) like the jar, it is not so, as (we find) here that posterior negation (pradhvainsābhāva) though having that characteristic (i. e. though caused) is eternal.

(1983) If it be thought that negation is no illustration, like the ass's horn, it is not so, because it (negation of jar) is a positive material state characterised by the destruction of jar.

*(1984) Or what great (complete) change is effected in the soul on the disappearance (destruction) of only the pudgalas (matter) (that it should be called kṛtaka, caused or artificial)? What is added to the sky on the destruction of only the jar?

(1985) Being a substance and (yet) non-corporeal, the emancipated soul is eternal, like the sky on account of its being a substance. Now if it be said that in that case there would be the contingency of its being ubiquitous, etc., it is not so, on account of inference (going against this).

†(1986) Or what is this obstinate insistence on its being eternal? Everything is characterised by origination-destruction-

*Same as Gā. 1839.

†Same as Gā. 1843.

persistence (duration). A thing is (i. e. can be) called 'non-eternal' etc. from the point of view of the modes (i. e. according to the point of view one takes).

(1987) And there is not the utter extinction of fire, because it is (only) modified, like milk (into curds), pot (into potsherds), potsherds (into powder), because such a change (modification into another form) is perceived.

(1988) If there is not utter destruction of the fire, why is it not directly perceived? On account of the subtle (very fine) nature of the modification (transformation), like the transformation of cloud, or like particles of eye-ointment (blown off by the wind; and not an account of non-existence).

(1989) Skandhas (matter-aggregates or compounds) being cognisable by one of the sense-organs become (transformed so as to be) cognisable by another sense-organ or not cognisable at all. Various (diverse, of different kinds) is the transformation of pudgala (matter).

(1990) Like things constituted of wind, etc. cognisable by one particular sense-organ, things constituted of fire having been cognisable by the eye attain the state of being cognisable by the organ of smell.

(1991) As the lamp which has attained another transformation is said to be nirvāṇa (extinguished), so the soul which has attained a transformation free from all pain is said to be parinirvāṇa (emancipated).

(1992) The emancipated soul has perfect bliss like the sage on account of there being (perfect) knowledge and no affliction. It is such on account of there being the absence of the factors that bring about obscuration and affliction.

(1993) (Objection—) The emancipated soul on account of the absence of sense-organs is non-knower, like the sky. (Reply —) Well, this is contradictory, for from this itself it

would also follow that it is non-soul. (The Objector —) says, Well, it may be such.

(1994) (Reply) On account of its natural genus (jīvatva), like 'substance' and non-corporeality, it is not proper that it should attain another genus that is quite the opposite of it, as sky cannot attain the genus 'soul' (soulness).

(1995) Being corporeal, etc., sense-organs are not the possessors of cognition (cognisers) like a jar. They are the doorways to cognition (i. e. means of cognition) and it is the soul that is the cogniser.

*(1996) The soul is different from the sense organs because there is remembrance (memory) even when they stop functioning and no cognition even when they are operating, as the cogniser is different from the five windows.

(1997) Soul cannot be devoid of knowledge, because that is its very nature, as an atom cannot be devoid of the state of corporeality. It is contradictory that it exist and be devoid of knowledge.

(1998) How can it be said that knowledge is its nature? (Reply —) Why, from the direct experience in one's own body! It is to be accepted as such even in another's body, by virtue of the signs of action and inaction.

(1999) When all the obstructions are removed it attains its purest state, like the sun. As the senses are not of the form of knowledge, it is not proper that it (soul) should be non-knower in their absence.

(2000) Thus the soul is of the nature of knowledge (illumination). It shines forth only to a small extent because it shines (only) through the peep-holes (the sense-organs) like a lamp covered with an utensil having holes.

* See Gāthās 1657–1660.

(2001) The emancipated soul knows very much more (i. e. everything) on account of the removal of all obscuration, like a man who is outside the house or like a lamp from which the covering (utensil) has been removed.

(2002) (Objection—) Pleasure and pain are caused by merit and demerit (respectively); when these latter are destroyed, the former also should perish and so the emancipated soul should have neither pleasure nor pain, like ākāśa (ether).

(2003) Or, it would not have pleasure or pain, like the sky, on account of the absence of body, sense-organs, etc, because it is the body that is the locus of the cognition (experience) of pleasure and pain.

(2004) (Reply) The fruit of merit (too) is (of the form of) pain itself, because it rises from karman, like the fruit of demerit (sin). (Objection—) Well, this would be true of the fruit of demerit also; moreover this also contradicts our perceptual experience).

(2005) (Reply—) (It is not so), Gentle one, for what you experience (as pleasure) is not pleasure, it is only pain. It has been looked upon as different only because it is so established (considered) by way of a remedy. Therefore that which is the fruit of merit is only pain (is pain in reality).

(2006) Pleasure derived from objects is only pain, because it is a counteraction (remedy) against pain, like medicine. It is called pleasure secondarily, and there can be no secondary usage without the reality being there.

(2007) Therefore what is the happiness of the emancipated soul that is reality (real happiness); because it rises without fail not by way of remedy on the destruction of pain, like the happiness of a sage free from obstruction.

(2008) Or the soul is of the nature of knowledge and the obscuration overpowers knowledge; sense-organs are aids (to

knowledge); when there is the destruction of all obscuration, there is purity (knowledge in its purest state).

(2009) Similarly, the soul is of the nature of happiness; demerit (sin) should be known as overpowering it; merit is an aid to it; when all (merit-demerit) is destroyed, there is perfect happiness.

(2010) Or as by the destruction of karman, one attains the transformation into perfectness (siddhatva), etc, so it is from that alone (as a result of the destruction of karman alone) that one obtains supra-mundane happiness.

(2011) Pleasure and pain are both pain; and there is (true) happiness (only) in their absence (when they are got rid of); so there is pain when the body, sense-organs are there and happiness in their absence.

(2012) Or this contingency may be there from the point of view of one who recognises happiness as resulting from body, sense-organs. (But) this happiness of perfectness, which is supra-mundane is quite a different thing.

(2013) If it be thought, "How is this to be known?" (the reply is:) Why it has already been said that it is on account of knowledge and freedom from obstruction. (Objection —) Then knowledge too should be non-eternal, because it is an attribute of a sentient entity, like rāga (love, passion).

(2014) Or because it is brought about and so on. (Reply—) It is not so, because there is no cause of obscuration and obstruction. Or this is no fault, on account of its being of the nature of origination-duration-destruction.

(2015) As to statements like 'An embodied being cannot be free from what is pleasurable and painful (desirable and undesirable), etc., these would not be consistent in meaning if there were no emancipation, or if there were destruction (of the soul) or if there were no bliss (in mokṣa).

(2016) (Objection) What is devoid of body, is dead only (non-existent like ass's horn), and pleasure and pain, desirable and undesirable do not touch (affect) it. It is obvious that 'aśarīra' (bodiless) means dead. What wrong is there (in this interpretation)?

(2017) (Reply) You do not know correctly the meaning of the words of the Veda. Listen to this (correct meaning) of theirs.

The term 'aśarīra' is like 'adhana' (moneyless) because there is negation of an attribute in something which is existent.

(2018) Because of negation by 'na', there is meant something which is other than it, but certainly like it. Therefore by 'aśarīra', it is proper to understand soul and not ass's horn (which being non-existent is entirely different from saśarīra).

(2019) (And) Because 'vā vasantam' expresses it as existent. 'Vā' suggests that (pleasure and pain do not touch) even an embodied being. The particular pleasure and pain do not affect an ascetic (sage) free from passions (likes and dislikes).

(2020) Or 'vāva' is an indeclinable having the same meaning as 'vā'; and 'santam' means 'bhavantam'-existing. Or 'ava' means 'know!' and 'vā santam' means existent or existent as qualified by knowledge, etc.

(2021) ('aśarīraṁ vā avasantam') If it be thought that 'avasantam' (non-existent) is 'na vasantam' (not existent), it is not so, for we have the word aśarīra (which can refer to a soul alone as shown above) and even the qualification of touch is recognised to be only with reference to an existent thing.

(2022-3) (Objection) Even if the emancipated soul is such (existent), the condition of being free from both pleasure and pain is there (and so it cannot be said to be perfectly happy). (Reply-) It is not so; for pleasure and pain caused by merit

and demerit (sin) do not affect one who is free from likes and dislikes on account of there being knowledge and freedom from obstruction. Nothing is dear or not-dear to him. His is the happiness of the emancipated. What contingency is there here?

(2024) When his doubt was dispelled by the Victor free from old age and death, the Śramaṇa became a monk along with his 300 pupils.



Explanation based on Maladhārī Hemacandra's Commentary.

1 — INDRABHŪTI REGARDING JĪVA

Lord Mahāvīra rose above attachments and aversions and became omniscient. He was in the Mahāsena Vana and people were coming to him in numbers. The Brāhmaṇas assembled in the sacrificial enclosure became inquisitive as to who this great one was who was attracting hosts of people. In the fulness of pride, the most prominent and intelligent amongst them, Indrabhūti Gautama decided to approach Mahāvīra. Seeing him Mahāvīra said, "Indrabhūti Gautama, you have a doubt as regards the existence of the soul." Indrabhūti's reasoning was to this effect: The soul is not known by perception (pratyakṣa), as the jar can be perceived; and it should be acceptable to all that what is utterly imperceptible does not exist just as the sky-flower does not exist. Atoms too cannot be directly perceived, but they become perceptible when they are transformed into their effects, jar, etc.. Not so the soul. Inference (anumāna) also will not help us to know the existence of the soul, because inference is based on perception. Hence where perception itself does not work, inference is of no avail. "The Mountain is fiery, because it is smoky. Wherever there is smoke there is fire, e. g. in the kitchen. There is, on the mountain, smoke which is the determinate concomitant of fire; therefore it is fiery." Here 'smoke' is the middle term (the liṅga, mark), fire is the probandum (the signified, liṅgin — that of which smoke is the mark). A person can infer in this way the existence of fire on the mountain provided he has previously cognised the relation of smoke (the liṅga) and fire (the liṅgin) in places like the kitchen and has determined that wherever there is smoke, fire also must exist, because fire is the cause of smoke, and remembers that on the perception of smoke on the mountain. But

the connection of the soul with any mark has not been perceived. Moreover had it been so, it would have been a clear case of perception and we would not then have to resort to inference. The soul cannot even be established by the *sāmānya to-drṣṭa* type of inference (where a relation is established between *līṅga* and *līṅgin* on the basis of the perception of likeness in general) as is possible in the case of the movement of the sun. The sun is in the East in the morning and in the West in the evening; this change of place is not possible without movement. Devadatta can change his place only when he moves. Therefore the sun too must be moving. In the present case there is no *līṅga* or mark found in any illustration, which is invariably concomitant with the existence of the soul and hence which could lead to the inference of the existence of the soul.

The soul cannot be known through verbal testimony (*āgama*) also, for this latter does not differ in essence from inference. *Āgama* or verbal testimony is two-fold according as it concerns an object that can be perceived or an object that is not amenable to sense-perception. In the former the process is as follows: A person has observed the use of the word 'jar' in connection with an object which has a particular shape, etc.. He hears the words 'Bring a jar'. He argues to himself, "An object having a protruding shape in the middle and like characteristics is called a jar, because the word 'jar' is used with reference to it, as noticed before in the shop. Here, I hear the word 'jar' again. So I am expected to bring an object of the same description and called 'jar'." Inferring thus he brings the jar. Hence verbal testimony concerning a perceptible object is not different from inference. But the word 'self' (*ātman*) has not been noticed to be used in connection with any object other than the body, so that hearing the word 'self' one could have the knowledge of the soul. Even as regards objects that cannot be perceived, e. g. heaven, hell, etc., verbal testimony consists of the words of a trustworthy person in whose statements no discrepancy or incompatibility is found

(avisainvādin), that is to say, whose statements are infallible, e. g. the forecast regarding eclipse, etc. It can be easily seen that this too falls within the scope of inference. And we do not find anyone who has had the direct perception of the soul and hence whose words could be accepted as verbal testimony. The scriptures too make conflicting statements regarding the soul. Hence too, it is but natural that one should be confounded and as a consequence start questioning or doubting the very existence of the soul. The Cārvākas say that only that much exists as can be perceived by the senses; even the very wise arrive at absurd conclusions when they resort to inference. A man made certain marks in the dust on the road from which wise people came to the conclusion that a wolf had frequented the streets at night. Hence inference too is not reliable, then what to say of the other means of knowledge ?

(Etāvān eva loko'yam yāvān indriyagocaraḥ,
bhadre vṛkapadam paśya yad vadanti bahuśrutāḥ.)

A seer* too has said : 'Vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāny evānu vinaśyati'— "The mass of consciousness itself rises from these material elements, and follows them in destruction, and there is no consciousness after death." This shows that the soul has no independent existence; it is but an epiphenomenon of the elements aggregating in a certain proportion. Buddha too has said, 'Rūpa is not pudgala (soul)', that is, the external object that can be perceived is not soul. In this manner referring to all entities existent, Buddha has proved that there is nothing which can be looked upon as the soul. With this testimony we could have conclusively said that the soul does not exist. But we have statements referring also to the existence of the soul. To take but a few illustrations, the Chāndogya Upaniṣad states : 'Na ha vai saśarīrasya priyāpriyayor apahatir asti, aśarīraṁ vā vasantam priyāpriye na sprśataḥ /-' As long as it is embodied, it cannot be free from what is pleasurable

* This is a sentence from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. (2. 4. 12), uttered by Yājñavalkya, and not a statement of (Kumārila) Bhaṭṭa as stated in the commentary

and what is painful; but these latter do not affect one that remains disembodied. This asserts the existence of the soul apart from the body. etc. So also we have injunctions which enjoin, for instance, the performance of the Agnihotra sacrifice on one who desires heaven (agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ). This can be understood only if the soul continues its existence after the corporal death. Sāṃkhya also refer to the soul as non-doer, qualityless, enjoyer, of the nature of sentiency (asti puruṣo-kartā nirguṇo bhoktā cidrūpaḥ). What can be regarded as verbal testimony is thus seen to be conflicting. Therefore we have no proof of the existence of the soul from perception, inference and verbal or scriptural testimony.

Certain schools of philosophy accept other positive means of proof—analogy (upamāna), presumption or postulation (arthāpatti). 'As is the cow so is the gayal'—such a statement of resemblance can give us knowledge of a remote object. But there is nothing similar to the soul in all the three worlds, by the knowledge of which we could know the soul. Time, ether (ākāśa), space etc. cannot serve the purpose of analogy. They are incorporeal no doubt; but not being amenable to sense-perception their existence itself would be questionable. Thus analogy is of no help in attaining knowledge of the existence of the soul. Presumption too does not work. No object has been seen or heard of in the world which depends for its existence solely on the soul and therefore whose existence could decisively establish the existence of the soul. Thus the soul is beyond the range of these five means of valid knowledge which are concerned with existent objects. Hence the soul must be the object of the sixth pramāṇa viz. anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) which establishes non-existence. Indrabhūti's doubt seems to be a genuine one, and his reasoning too appears to be cogent (1549-1553).

Lord Mahāvīra's reply was as follows:— 'The jīva or soul is perceived by Indrabhūti, hence no other means of proof need be resorted to. The apprehension of the nature of doubt and other knowledge is itself the jīva (soul) because jīva is of the

nature of knowledge. Knowledge is self-luminous and hence jīva being of this nature is established by self-consciousness. If thus the jīva is directly perceived, it is not at all necessary to resort to other means of proof. We do not need any other means of proof for establishing sensations like pleasure and pain which are self-cognised. It may be argued that even though the world is established by perception, we have to resort to other means of proof like inference to convince the Śūnyavādin Buddhist, so here too the soul requires to be established by other means of proof even when it is established by perception. But there is a difference in the two positions. The Buddhists argue that all ideas or judgments (pratyaya) are without an objective basis, because they are mental constructs, like dream-ideas (Nirālambanāḥ sarve pratyayāḥ, pratyayatvāt, svapna-pratyayavat).^{*} And we have to refute such a contradictory argument. But here in the case of the perception of the self, there is no contradictory means of proof to set aside which we would have to resort to other means of proof (1554).

We use expressions like 'I did', 'I do', 'I shall do', 'I said this', 'I say this', 'I shall say this', etc. Here there is a reference to action of all the three times — past, present and future. The consciousness of 'I' is present throughout and this shows that the soul is directly known. This 'I' consciousness is not known by inference, because there is no mark (liṅga) here. Āgama, etc. could not be possible here, for even very ordinary people who have no access to āgama, have this introspective 'I' consciousness as self-illuminated and this is the perception of the soul. But we do not find this in the case of jar, etc. because these have no soul (1555).

Further, if the soul did not exist, how could one have the 'I' consciousness? It could not exist without its object. It may be urged that the body is the object of this consciousness; e. g. we say 'I am weak', 'I am stout'. But the consciousness of 'I' is not present with reference to a dead body and this means

^{*}(See Pramāṇavārtikālaṅkāra, p. 22).

that the 'I' consciousness refers to the soul. Thus that Indrabhūti has the 'I' consciousness means that the soul is known to him. And hence there is no scope for the doubt as to its existence; on the contrary there should be a conviction about it. And if Indrabhūti still has a doubt regarding the soul, he must point out what the object of the 'I' consciousness is, because no notion can arise without an object and Indrabhūti does not accept the existence of the soul (1556).

If the doubter *jīva* does not exist who would have the doubt: 'Do I exist or not?' Doubt being of the nature of cognition is a quality and there could be no quality without something which it can qualify, that is to say, without a substance; and therefore the soul must be existent for without it the quality 'doubt' could have no existence. Doubt cannot be regarded as a quality of the body because this latter is corporeal and inanimate, while knowledge is non-corporeal and of the nature of *bodha*, awareness. If their nature is so divergent, it follows that there cannot be the relation of quality and the thing qualified between them, otherwise we could have also thought of colour as a quality of *ākāśa* (ether). Moreover if one doubts his own existence, what thing in the world would he possibly not doubt? He will be sceptical about everything. And if in spite of having the 'I' consciousness one were to infer, 'Soul does not exist because the five means of proof cognising existent objects do not operate with respect to it', then the proposition or thesis being contradicted by perception turns out to be a sham-thesis as happens in the case of 'Sound is inaudible'. It is also contradicted by inference; there are inferences to establish the existence of the soul, as we shall see later on, and by these the inferential cognition that the soul does not exist will be contradicted, as 'word is eternal' of the *Mīmāṃsakas* is contradicted by the *Naiyāyika* by an inference establishing that word is not eternal. To argue further, when one doubts the existence of the soul, one admits 'I am the doubter' and then if he says that the soul does not exist he is contradicting his own view. This is what the *Sāṅkhyas* also

would do if at the outset they admit that the puruṣa (soul) is non-doer, eternal, of the nature of sentiency, and then proceed to look upon it as doer, non-eternal and non-sentient. If one denies the soul that means contradicting our empirical experience, because the soul is well known to all—even the simple cowherds and women and all. It is equivalent to saying “Śaśī (luna) is acandra (non-moon)”. The statement, ‘Do I exist or not?’ is self-contradictory like ‘My mother is a barren woman’. If the thesis of the inference—‘The soul does not exist’—is a sham one, the reason, ‘Because the five means of proof cognising existent objects do not operate with respect to it’ also cannot be its attribute and thus it becomes unreal (asiddha) with reference to it and hence fallacious. Moreover we can never know the size of the Himālaya by any means of proof; the five sources of positive knowledge do not operate with respect to it, nor with respect to ghosts, etc., but this does not mean that they are non-existent. Similarly the means of proof may not be able to operate with regard to the soul and yet the soul may be existent. Thus the reason given above is anaikāntika, inconclusive. In fact, the soul will be established even by inference later on, in which case the mark (liṅga) given above can be shown to be existent in heterologous cases only, and so is viruddha, contradictory also. Therefore a doubt should not be entertained with regard to the existence of the soul; but the soul should be determined by perception. (1557)

The qualities of the soul viz. memory, desire to know, desire to do, desire to go, doubt—which are all particular forms of consciousness are established through self-apprehension. Therefore the substratum of these qualities must also be directly known, just as the jar is known by perception because its qualities, colour, etc. are known by perception. One may feel like arguing that this is not conclusive, because sound, the attribute of ether is perceptible, but not so ether. But this is not correct. Sound is not an attribute of ether, it is a modification of matter, because it like colour, etc., is amenable to the senses (1558).

We may pursue this inquiry differently. Is the thing possessing the attributes identical with them or different from them? If it is identical, it follows that the jīva should be immediately apprehended by the apprehension of its qualities—knowledge, etc., just as if colour is identical with cloth, this latter is automatically cognised when the colour is cognised. If the thing possessing the qualities is different from them, then it is true that it will not be perceived even when the qualities are perceived. But this will apply to all objects. Jar, etc. too will not be perceived even when their qualities are perceived. In that case it is not necessary to isolate the soul for a special treatment and say that it does not exist. It cannot also be said that the soul does not exist because it is not perceived, while the jar exists because it is perceived (Gāthā 1549). The existence of the jar will have to be first established before this could be said. If it is argued that the thing and its qualities are different, but the qualities cannot remain without it, therefore the perception of colour, etc. establishes the existence of the jar, — then the qualities memory, etc. too cannot remain without their substratum. The apprehension of memory, etc. establishes thus the existence of the soul of which they are the attributes. Thus the existence of the soul has to be recognised even though it is not accepted that the soul is perceptible and identical with the qualities. It may be argued that it may be accepted that the qualities knowledge, etc. have a substratum, but it does not follow that it is the soul; body can be the substratum because like leanness, stoutness, etc. knowledge etc. are found in it. The rejoinder to this is that knowledge, etc. cannot possibly be qualities of the body, because it is corporeal and visible like the jar; and yet qualities cannot reside without an appropriate substratum — a substance. The substratum which to be worthy of the qualities knowledge etc., is non-corporeal and invisible is the jīva or the soul which exists over and above the body. It cannot be urged that perception tells us that the qualities, knowledge, etc. reside in the body, because this is contradicted by inference: The knower is different from the senses, because even when they do not operate, there is the remembrance of what has been cognised

by them. That which remembers a thing cognised by another even when this latter has ceased to operate, is known to be different from it as Devadatta who remembers what was cognised through the five windows is different from them. This will be discussed later on when Mahāvīra solves Vāyubhūti's difficulty (1559–1562).

Thus even for Indrabhūti the soul is directly perceptible but partially. But Mahāvīra is free from all passions, etc.; his knowledge is wholly unobscured. This accounts for the fact that he can thoroughly realise the infinite modes (paryāya) of the self—own and alien, while Indrabhūti can know it but partially; as when there is light we see portions only of the jar and yet the whole jar is regarded as having been perceived from the practical point of view. Here too Indrabhūti will have to be satisfied with this partial knowledge of the soul till he has got rid of his passions, etc. which obscure his knowledge, and still admit that the soul can be known by perception. Mahāvīra has convinced Indrabhūti of his veracity by straightaway telling him what the doubt in his mind was. Hence he appeals to Indrabhūti to accept this statement of his regarding the soul as truthful on the basis of his former experience of Mahāvīra's trustworthiness (1563).

Indrabhūti may admit that his own body has a soul, but how is he to know this of the bodies of others? Therefore, Mahāvīra anticipating this says that the soul of the nature of consciousness, in the body of another, can be known as existent through inference. The soul exists in another's body, because we see that it is actuated towards what is attractive or desirable and turns away from anything that is undesirable, as in our own case. Wherever this is observed, it is always in association with the soul, e.g. our own body; hence another's body too which is seen to behave in this way must have a soul. If the soul were not there, there would be no such behaviour; for instance, a jar is never seen to behave in this manner. This establishes the existence of the soul in another's body too (1564).

Indrabhūti had argued that for inference, the *liṅgin* (probandum) should have been observed previously as being always in association with the *liṅga* (probans). But if these two have not been observed previously as concomitant, the *liṅgin* cannot be inferred from the *liṅga* e.g., hare's horn (horn is not seen to be associated with the hare). The *jīva* too has not been known previously as concomitant with any mark (*liṅga*), and hence it is not possible to infer the existence of the soul. Mahāvīra now says that it is not always necessary that the *liṅgin* should have been cognised previously as concomitant with the *liṅga*. A spirit is generally never observed previously making all sorts of gestures and yet from certain gestures like laughing, singing, weeping and other bodily gestures we infer the existence of a spirit in a body. (1565–1566)

Mahāvīra puts forth other inferences also to prove the existence of the soul.

(1) The maker of the body exists because it has a definite shape which has a beginning, like the jar. What does not have a maker, does not also have a definite shape with a beginning, e.g. the modifications of clouds. And *jīva* is this maker of the body. The *Gāthā* does not specifically mention that the shape must have a beginning. But in that case the reason would become inconclusive, since the mountain Meru, for instance, has a definite shape, but no maker or creator. If we add the epithet 'which has a beginning' to 'shape', the inference becomes valid for the shape of Meru is beginningless.

(2) The manipulator of the senses exists, because they are instruments, as the potter is the manipulator of the wheel, staff, etc.; what is not controlled or manipulated is not also an instrument, e.g. ether. *Jīva* is this manipulator of the sense-organs.

(3) The agent of grasping (or grasper) exists, because there is the relation of the instrument of grasping and the thing grasped between the senses and their objects, as the blacksmith is the grasper in the case of the pair of tongs (the instrument of grasping) and pieces of iron (which are grasped). The *jīva* is this grasper. Where there is no grasper, the relation of the

instrument of grasping and the thing grasped also does not exist, e.g. in the case of ether.

(4) The enjoyer of the body, etc. exists, because they are things to be enjoyed; as man is the enjoyer of food, clothes, etc.. That which has no enjoyer is also not a thing to be enjoyed e.g. the ass's horn. But the enjoyables body, etc. exist and therefore they must have an enjoyer. The soul is this enjoyer.

(5) The lord (owner) of the body, etc. exists, because they are of the form of an aggregate or because they are corporeal or sensuous or visible or due to any such reason which is not inconclusive; as the lord of the house, etc. exists; what is without a lord is also not of the form of an aggregate; nor is it corporeal etc. e.g. sky-flower. And body, etc. are of the form of an aggregate, are corporeal, etc.; therefore, their lord must exist. The jīva is this lord (1567-1569).

It stands to reason that the body, etc. must have a maker, enjoyer, etc., but does it follow that the jīva is all this? Yes, it does, for the concepts of God, etc. do not stand the test of reason. One may also feel inclined to argue that these reasons are of the types called viruddha (contradictory) for they establish just the opposite of what is meant to be established. Potters and others who are agents and so on are seen to be corporeal, of the form of a collocation, non-eternal, etc. and hence the jīva also would be established as being of this nature, while our conception of jīva is just the opposite of this. But this is not true for as long as the jīva is in the transmigratory condition, it is, in a way, of this nature — corporeal, etc., because it is enveloped by the aggregate of the eight-fold material karman. Hence what has been established is not the opposite of what was intended to be established (1570).

Moreover, the very fact that Indrabhūti has a doubt establishes the existence of the soul. X sees something which has particular dimensions etc. X has a doubt whether it is a man or the trunk of a tree, because he has noticed only the common features, dimension, etc., but not noticed the particular

features, viz. movement, etc. on the one hand, and bird's nest, climbing creepers, etc. on the other. But man and trunk of a tree are both existent. It is not necessary that both should be found on the same spot; the other one may be anywhere in the world, but the fact remains that that regarding which there is a doubt must be an existent thing. This should not be interpreted to mean that it establishes the existence of ass's horn, as it has been stated that the thing must be existent somewhere — there or elsewhere. When we doubt the existence of the ass's horn, when we say, 'The ass's horn does not exist,' we only mean that the horn is not found on the ass, but it is present on the bull's head and therefore there is no difficulty. Similarly if anyone mistakes a trunk of a tree for a man, this error too is possible only when 'man' exists, not otherwise. If as Indrabhūti has said people have the conception of soul in the body erroneously, that is to say, regard the body as soul it cannot be explained otherwise than by positing the existence of the soul (1571–1572).

We negate the *jīva* when we say 'non-*jīva*' (*ajīva*). Therefore, the counter-positive of 'non-*jīva*' must exist. The rule is that if an entity denoted by an etymologically derived, pure (uncompounded) word is negated, this negation always implies the existence of its counter-positive; e. g. in *aghaṭa*, *ghaṭa* is a word which is both etymologically derived and uncompounded; it is negated and *ghaṭa* is an existent thing. Similarly in the case of *ajīva*, *jīva* must be an existent thing. If the counter-positive does not exist one may take it for granted that the word is not etymologically derived and uncompounded, e. g. 'akhara-*viṣāṇam*, 'non-ass-horn' (ass-horn can be etymologically explained, but it is not uncompounded) and 'aḍiṭṭha', 'non-ḍiṭṭha' (Ḍiṭṭha is uncompounded, but it cannot be etymologically explained, hence Ḍiṭṭha need not necessarily exist). But as pointed above, the *jīva* must be existent, for in *ajīva* we have the negation of an entity denoted by an etymologically derived, uncompounded word. Moreover the very fact that Indrabhūti says, 'The soul does not exist' presupposes the existence of *jīva*,

as when we say 'There is no jar', it is implied that it is existent — but elsewhere. What is utterly non-existent is also not negated, e. g. the sixth element which is non-existent like the ass's horn. But the jīva is negated, therefore it must be existent (1573).

Yet, it may be urged, we do say 'the ass's horn does not exist' and if as has been said by Mahāvīra, that which is negated must be an existent thing, then ass's horn must be real, existent. True, when anything is negated anywhere, it is its conjunction, inherence, genus (universal) or particular that is negated in the present substratum, even while it does exist elsewhere. For example, In 'Devadatta is not in the house', the conjunction of 'Devadatta' and 'house' is negated, though they themselves are existent entities. Similarly when we say, 'The ass's horn does not exist' what is negated is merely the relation of inherence of 'ass' and 'horn' which are existent. So also in 'Another moon does not exist', by negating another moon we are denying merely the class-concept ('moonness'), but the utter non-existence of moon is not thereby established. And in 'Pearls of the size of jar do not exist', the particularity of 'being of the size of a jar' is negated of pearls, but there is no question of denying existence to pearls. This being so, even when we say, 'The soul does not exist', we are negating merely the conjunction of the existent soul with something somewhere, e. g. 'The soul does not exist in the body', and not rejecting outright the existence of the soul.

Even with this explanation there is likely to be an objection. If what is negated must be an existent object, then were someone to say to Indrabhūti, 'You are not the lord of the three worlds,' he should be the lord of the three worlds as lordship of the three worlds has been negated. The point has not been properly grasped by the objector. What is negated is only the particular, viz. 'lordship of the three worlds' of Indrabhūti, as 'being of the size of a jar' is negated of pearls. There is not the utter denial of lordship, since even Indrabhūti can be the lord or master of his own disciples and followers.

So also when we talk of this four-fold negation, we are denying the nature of 'being qualified by the number five' to negation, but we are not denying the reality of negation, since it exists as 'qualified by the number four'. Still one may feel that all this is nonsense for 'Indrabhūti's lordship of the three worlds' and 'negation's being qualified by the number five' are negated and these are non-existent, therefore it is not correct to say that what is negated must be an existent thing'. To set aside such a doubt, Mahāvīra says that 'the quartet of conjunction, etc. too is established as definitely existent in other objects'. The conjunction of Devadatta is denied in respect of his house but this conjunction does exist with respect to another object. For instance, Devadatta is in conjunction with a field or a road and even though the house is not in conjunction with Devadatta it is in conjunction with furniture, etc.. Similarly inherence of the horn is not present in the ass, but it is there in cows etc; genus too is not existent in the moon alone, because there is not another moon and a genus cannot be found in what is only one of its kind, but it is present in other objects, e. g. in jars, kine and so in the other cases too. Lordship of the three worlds is not present in Indrabhūti, but it is certainly there in tīrthāṅkaras and others. Keeping this in view it is said that what is negated does exist, but thereby it is not intended to state that what is negated must exist there only. Indrabhūti cannot at this stage say that he denies the existence of the soul in the body alone, not elsewhere. This would make the task of Mahāvīra very easy. Indrabhūti had started by doubting the very existence of the soul. If now he accepts this, it will automatically be proved that the soul exists in the body. The soul cannot exist without a support, a locus and it is very easily seen that the body is this support for we have marks of its residence in the body, viz knowledge, etc.. One may feel inclined to say that it would be simpler to regard the body itself as the soul, but it is not so. Were it so it would not be possible to explain statements like 'He is living', 'he is dead', 'he has fainted', as the body would be

the same always; these statements refer to the relation of the body to the soul. If the two are related, the person is said to be living; if this relation is dissolved the person is said to be dead and if the soul becomes mūḍha, stupefied, the person is said to have fainted (1574).

The word 'jīva' has a meaning, that is to, say it denotes a real thing because it is both etymologically derivable and pure (uncompounded). It is observed that a word, which being etymologically derivable is uncompounded, has a meaning, that is, denotes a real thing; e. g. the word 'ghaṭa' (jar). The word 'jīva' also is such; therefore it has a denotation. That which has no denotation is also not etymologically derivable and uncompounded e. g. Dītha (uncompounded but not etymologically derivable) and khara-viṣāṇa (ass's horn)–(etymologically derivable but not uncompounded). The word 'jīva' is not such; therefore, it has a meaning. The commentator has added the epithet 'being etymologically derivable' to ward off the fallacy of inconclusive reason, for 'Dītha' has no denotation even when it is an uncompounded word.

Of course, one may say that there is no objection to the word 'jīva' having a denotation. Even the scriptures say 'deha' evāyam anuprayujyamāno dr̥ṣṭaḥ, yathaiṣa jīvaḥ, enam na hinasti'-the word 'jīva' stands for deha, e. g., This is the jīva, he does not destroy it. Jīva is regarded by Mahāvīra and his followers as eternal. Hence if there is in this context a reference to the destruction of the jīva, jīva must necessarily mean the body. This is but a figurative usage based on their association. Mahāvīra's reply to this is that if we study the two sets of synonyms of 'jīva' and 'deha' (body) we find that they are entirely different. (The synonyms of jīvaḥ are jantuḥ, asumān, prāṇī, sattvam etc. and those of dehaḥ are śarīram, vapuḥ, kāyaḥ; kalevaram, etc.). On the contrary we find them distinguished in expressions like 'The soul has gone', 'May this body be burnt (cremated)'. The soul has the qualities knowledge, etc., while the body is unconscious or inanimate. How possibly could they be identical? It has already been explained that the

qualities knowledge etc. cannot belong to the body as it is corporeal and so on. (See 1559–1562). (1575–1576).

Mahāvīra then makes another appeal. His words should be regarded as truthful, like his statement regarding the doubt of Indrabhūti. He is free from the afflictions of likes, dislikes, fear and delusions, hence his statements are truthful and unexceptionable like those of an arbiter who has a thorough knowledge of the circumstances. If still Indrabhūti has any doubt regarding Mahāvīra's omniscience, he can ask anything he does not know and be convinced by Mahāvīra's reply of the latter's omniscience (1577–1579).

Thus Indrabhūti should accept the existence of the soul with conscious activity (upayoga) as its characteristic as established by all the sources of knowledge — perception, inference, verbal testimony. There are two kinds of souls—saṃsārīn (transmigratory) and others (i. e. siddha—perfect). The saṃsārīn souls are again trasa and sthāvāra (1580).

Indrabhūti might still have a doubt as to the number of jīvas. According to the Vedāntins there is but one soul and the scriptures too, according to them, say so; e. g.

- (i) eka eva hi bhūtāmā bhūte bhūte pratiṣṭhitāḥ;
ekadhā bahudhā caiva dṛśyate jalacandravat.
— (Brahmabindu Up. 11).

(The same is stationed in every being. Still it appears as one and also as many like the reflection of the moon in water).

- (ii) yathā viśuddham ākāśam timiroapluto janaḥ;
saṅkīrṇam iva mātrābhir bhinnābhir abhimanyate.
tathedam amalam brahma nirvikalpam avidyayā;
kaluṣatvam ivāpannam bhedarūpam prakāśate.
— (Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārttika 3. 4. 43–44).

[The ether is (one and) pure, but a man afflicted with partial blindness regards it as variegated with different lines. Similarly the one pure Brahman devoid of differentiation

appears due to nescience as if dirty and of the nature of difference].

- (iii) urdhvamūlam adbaḥśākham aśvattham prāhur avyayam;
chandāmsi yasya parṇāni yaś tañ veda sa vedavit-
(Bhagavad Gitā 15-1; Yogaśikhopaniṣad 6. 14).

[The tree with its root upward and branches downward they regard as indestructible. Chandas (Vedas) are its leaves. He, who knows it, is the true knower of the Veda].

- (iv) puruṣa evedaṁ gni* sarvaṁ yad bhūtañ yac ca bhāvyaṁ
utāmṛtatvasyeśāno yad annenātirohati.
(Rgveda 10. 90. 2; Sāmaveda 619; Yajurveda 31. 2;
Atharvaveda 19. 6. 4).

(Whatever was and shall be, all this is Puruṣa. He is the lord of immortality; he grows by food).

- (v) yad ejati yad najati yad dūre yad u antike;
yad antar asya sarvasya yat sarvasyāsya bāhyataḥ.
(Īśā Up. 5).

[What trembles (moves) and what does not, what is far and what is near, what is within all this and outside all this (is the Puruṣa)].

Mahāvīra anticipating that Indrabhūti too may feel inclined to believe that there is only one soul, replies that it is not so. If there were one soul, like ether, in all bodies, it would have the same characteristics in all of them. But this is not what we find; hence there cannot be one soul in all the bodies. Because of differences of characteristics it can be seen that the souls are many, like jars, etc.. If there were but one soul there would not be pleasure, pain, bondage, liberation, for one and the same soul cannot experience pleasure and pain or bondage and emancipation at the same time (1581-1582).

* The Yajurvedins pronounce Anusvāra occurring in the middle of a pāda aṣ guṁ. This seems to have crept in here as 'gni', as the latter is not found in any place where this verse occurs.

Upayoga or conscious activity is the characteristic of the soul, but this upayoga is known to be different according to its different degrees of excellence and accordingly the souls too are infinite in number. If the soul were one, it would be all-pervading and if so there could not possibly be any pleasure or pain or bondage or emancipation as is true of the all-pervading ether. It would not also be the doer, enjoyer, thinker or even transmigratory. That which is all this, is also not all-pervading, e. g. Devadatta. Hence the souls are infinite in number (1583-1584).

There are infinite souls of the type of nāraka (hellish), tiryak (lower) etc. and they are all unhappy. As compared with these, few souls are happy. Innumerable souls are in bondage and few have been emancipated. If they were all one this one soul would not be happy or liberated as it would be unhappy and in bondage to a far greater extent. If a man is diseased all over his body excepting a little finger would you call him healthy or happy? So also, if a man is nailed all over and only his finger is free would you call him free? This shows that the souls have to be accepted as many (1585).

The souls may be many, but can they not be ubiquitous or all-pervading as the Naiyāyikas and others regard them? No. The characteristics of the soul are found only within the expanse of the body and so can exist only in the body. It is of the same size as the body. Or to put it the other way round, the characteristics of the soul are not found outside the body, so it too cannot exist outside the body as a jar cannot exist in cloth. A thing is existent only where its qualities are found. Hence the soul resides in the body and is not ubiquitous. It being so, it stands to reason that the soul is the doer, enjoyer, etc. and that the souls can experience pleasure, pain, bondage, emancipation, transmigration (1586-1587).

Mahāvīra interprets the Vedic passage *Indrabhūti has in mind in the light of the latter's view. (See Gāthā 1553). 'Vijñānaghana evaitebhyah....'* This passage, *Indrabhūti* believes,

conveys the idea that the soul which is a mass of consciousness is but an epiphenomenon of the aggregate of the elements constituting the body, as wine-spirit is a result of the conglomeration of the constituents of wine. It is not that the soul is different from the body and comes from some other world and occupies it. There is nothing like the soul which is over and above the body and which is of the nature of *jñāna* (knowledge) and *darśana* (indeterminate intuition). The soul perishes when the aggregate of the elements is dissolved, and there is no after-death existence as most of the systems of philosophy would have it. We never have the knowledge regarding any one that he had a particular name in a previous birth or that he was formerly a denizen of hell or was a god. In short, there is no transmigration from one existence to another (1588–1590).

On the basis of such an interpretation *Indrabhūti* believes that the soul does not exist. But there are other Vedic passages where the existence of the soul is affirmed, e.g. 'nā ha vai saśarīrasya.....' Moreover only if a soul exists can it enjoy in another world e.g. heaven, the fruits of sacrifices which are enjoined in the Vedas. This explains why *Indrabhūti* was confounded and why he entertained a doubt regarding the existence of the soul. The fact is that he has not grasped the true meaning of the Vedic statements — which *Mahāvīra* now explains to him (1591–1592).

Vijñāna mean particular knowledge i.e. *upayoga* which is two-fold — *jñāna* (determinate knowledge) and *darśana* (indeterminate intuition). The soul is non-different from *vijñāna* and abounding in it, is referred to here by the word 'vijñānaghana', (a mass of consciousness); or it is so called because there is an aggregate of infinite *vijñāna*-modes in every *pradeśa* or space-point of the soul. 'Eva' stresses that this is the very nature of the soul; otherwise it would not be inherently conscious like the soul of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and others who do not regard the soul to be of the nature of *vijñāna*. In 'bhūtebhyah samutthāya', 'bhūta' signifies objects like

jar, cloth etc.. Particular knowledge (vijñāna) arises from these that have assumed the form of knowables. These vijñānas (ghaṭavijñāna, etc — ‘This is a jar’) are different modes of the jīva and hence it can be said that the jīva, from this point of view arises out of the knowables, jar, etc. Similarly, when these objects pass out of view by being covered or by disappearing on some account or when owing to absent-mindedness or due to some such reason this particular knowledge does not arise or when we leaving one object concentrate on another, that particular knowledge can be said to have perished on the destruction of that object in its capacity as a knowable, and hence that particular mode of the soul too can be said to have perished (1593-1594).

But this should not be misunderstood to mean that the soul perishes utterly. When the upayoga is directed to an object other than the previous one, the previous particular knowledge perishes and another comes into existence. These particular cognitions are looked upon as particular modes of the soul. Hence the soul too can be said to perish with respect to the previous vijñāna and be born with respect to the other (present) vijñāna. But there is a continuity of vijñāna which should not be lost sight of and with respect to this the mass of consciousness, jīva is imperishable. The jīva thus has a threefold nature and in the Jaina view everything has this threefold nature of origination, destruction and persistence. The previous particular knowledge does not remain only because upayoga is diverted to another object; but this does not mean that the soul has perished, because it persists in the midst of this sort of origination and destruction.. ‘Vijñānaghana’ of the Veda stands for the soul (1595-1596).

Indrabhūti might still have the impression that knowledge is an attribute of the material elements, earth, etc., for it rises only when the material object is present as a knowable and perishes when it is removed. But it is not so. Even according to the Vedic tradition, consciousness can exist even in the absence of objects: ‘astamite āditye Yājñavalkya candramasi

astamite, śānte'gnau, śāntāyām vāci, kimjyotir evā'yam puruṣaḥ; ātmajyotir evāyām samrāḍ iti hovāca'. (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. 4. 3. 6)—“When the sun and moon set, O Yājñavalkya! when fire and speech fade away, what will be the light of the puruṣa? ‘O King, the self is its own light’, said Yājñavalkya”. This means that the soul is self-luminous. This luminosity is the same as jñāna and this shows that this jñāna-nature of the soul is in no way dependent upon the existence or non-existence of material objects. Particular knowledge alone is dependent upon the presence or absence of objects in their capacity as knowables, as pointed out above. But consciousness in general is not so; it is not an attribute of the material objects. It exists even in their absence. In the state of emancipation it exists even when the material objects are not present. And in the case of a dead body, there is no knowledge even when the material objects are present. Hence knowledge is different from material objects just as jar and cloth are different as there is no direct relation of agreement with regard to presence and absence between them (1597–1599).

Indrabhūti does not know the meaning of these Vedic words — in fact he does not know the meaning of any Vedic expression. In the case of every word he has the doubt whether it conveys just word or sound as that of the drum, etc., or the particular knowledge of an object expressible in words when the word (e. g. jar,) is uttered, or the knowledge of the difference of things — e. g. the word ‘ghaṭa’ expresses an object jar which has a particular shape, etc., but not cloth, etc.; or it expresses genus (universal) or substance or action (e. g. he runs) or an attribute (white, etc.). Such a doubt is not proper. Much depends on what is intended to be conveyed. That it can be this alone and not another is not proper. If the statement is from the point of view of *sva-paraparyāya* (i. e. from the point of view of own and alien modes) i. e. from the comprehensive point of view, everything is characterised by everything else and hence such a doubt as of Indrabhūti’s should not rise at all, A thing can be omniform, and hence the word ‘jar’ can express all the

meanings — substance, quality, action, etc.. for these are the different aspects of a thing. But from a particular point of view, there can be only one meaning; that is to say, from the svaparyāya point of view, everything is different from everything else. 'Jar' from the general point of view expresses all the meanings — substance, quality, etc.; from the particular point of view it has only the conventional meaning viz. an object jar of a particular shape, etc.. This is how all words can be explained (1600-1603).

After this exposition, Indrabhūti was convinced of the greatness and veracity of Mahāvīra, and he became a monk along with his five hundred pupils (1604).

It may be noted that henceforth what is common to the discussions has not been repeated, only the new and distinctive points have been discussed. The reader is expected to supply the common arguments and maintain a compact argument in each discourse.

2. AGNIBHŪTI REGARDING KARMAN

Hearing that Indrabhūti had become a monk and a follower of Mahāvīra, his brother Agnibhūti was very much perturbed. He decided to defeat Mahāvīra in debate and to bring back Indrabhūti. He could not understand how Indrabhūti, a master mind could be reduced to this state, when ordinarily people did not even dare to approach him for a proper logical discourse. It might have been that he was defeated by the tricks of logic viz. quibble, futile rejoinders, etc., or Mahāvīra might have exercised his sorcery and thus turned the minds of all—men, gods and all. No one knew what had actually taken place. Hence it was highly necessary that he should go to the spot and get first-hand information and expose Mahāvīra and his tricks. But as Agnibhūti approached Mahāvīra the latter addressed him as Agnibhūti Gautama. Agnibhūti was taken aback, but even then he argued to himself that it was not very surprising that Mahāvīra should know his name so well for he was a well known figure. If Mahāvīra could read his thoughts then alone there would be some ground for wonder and admiration (1606–1609).

‘Agnibhūti’, said Mahāvīra then, ‘you have a doubt regarding the existence of karma, whether there is really anything like karma.’ Agnibhūti had found conflicting statements in the Veda regarding karma and this had led him to doubt karma. On the one hand the Vedas say ‘Puruṣa evedaṁ sarvaṁ . . .’ and it is also stated: ‘Puṇyaḥ puṇyena karmaṇā, pāpaḥ pāpena karmaṇā’ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. 4. 4. 5) (‘He becomes meritorious by meritorious action, sinful by sinful action’). (See Gāthās 1581, 1643). Moreover, like Indrabhūti in the case of the jīva, Agnibhūti believes that karma cannot be regarded as real because it does not fall within the scope of the means of knowledge.

Mahāvīra now explains to Agnibhūti that the latter has not grasped the meaning of the words of the Veda and that karma is not beyond the reach of knowledge. It is known to Mahāvīra by direct perception and even Agnibhūti could infer its existence from its fruit, viz. the experience of pleasure and pain. It should not be argued of course that if Mahāvīra can perceive it directly, all must be in a position to do so if it is at all a real entity; there are many things in the world—lion, etc.—which have been perceived by only a few and yet no one has the slightest doubt regarding their existence. Mahāvīra's word has to be relied upon, for we have the evidence of Mahāvīra knowing immediately Agnibhūti's doubt. As pointed out earlier there cannot be any doubt as regards Mahāvīra's omniscience. Moreover even though atoms are imperceptible, we admit their perception in their form as effects, because we perceive their effects viz. jar, etc.. Similarly karma itself being supersensuous may not be known directly by our ordinary perception, but we do have the perception of it in the form of its effects—pleasure, pain (1610–1611).

The inference can be stated thus: The cause of pleasure and pain exists; because they are effects, as seed is the cause of a sprout. Karma is this cause. It may be argued that the cause of pleasure can be a visible one—garland, sandal-wood, etc.—and of pain snake's poison, thorn, etc.; as long as a visible cause can be traced it is not proper to imagine an invisible one. This reasoning involves a fallacy. Even when the same means or causes are present for pleasure or for pain, we find that there are different degrees of them; and what is still more significant what yields pleasure to one may be painful to another. To take an illustration, a garland makes a man honoured by it happy, but it causes inconvenience or even pain to a dog which would like to get rid of it. This difference in the case of pleasure and pain even when the means are the same can be explained only by inferring an unseen cause; karma is this unseen cause (1612–1613).

Other arguments too may be adduced. The body of a child just born must be preceded by another body, because it is

possessed of sense-organs or pleasure and pain or the vital breath or winking, life, etc., like the youthful body which is preceded by another body (child's body). This body preceding the child's body is the karmic body. The body of the previous life or existence cannot be regarded as the cause of the child's body, because in the intermediate stage the *jīva* (soul) has lost its association with this body and is moving in the direction of the place where it is to be re-born. Thus, in this condition the soul is free from the gross body and hence the gross body of the former life cannot be regarded as the cause of the child's body. Nor can the soul move to the new place in a bodiless state as there would then be nothing to decide which womb the soul should have access to. Thus the soul must have the karmic body which would determine the place of the new birth as also be the cause of the new gross body. It cannot be argued that *svabhāva* (nature) would be the deciding factor. This will be discussed later. The scripture also says that after death the soul takes nourishment through activity of the karmic body (*joṇa kammaṇaṃ āhāreṃ aṇantaraṃ jīvo—Sūtrakṛtāṅga Nir. 177*) (1614).

Moreover, it is universally admitted that the actions of animate beings always bear fruit, e. g. agriculture. Hence acts of charity, etc. must have a fruit and karma is this fruit. It is observed that at times the activities of animate beings, viz agriculture and others, do not yield fruit; but this does not go against the universal rule as this happens on account of lack of right knowledge or because the means are insufficient or defective. Similarly, if the full complement of operative causes is not there, as for instance, if charity is not accompanied by purity of heart, etc., it too may be fruitless. Another argument can be anticipated here. As long as we can find a perceptible fruit or result we should not assume an imperceptible one. Agriculture, to take the same instance, has a tangible fruit—crop. So it is not reasonable to regard karma as the fruit of acts of charity, etc., when tranquillity of mind or any such fruit can be shown to result from them. But this is not so. Tranquillity of mind too

is an act and it too, therefore, must have a fruit. Karma is this fruit, because pleasure or pain, the effect of this karma is experienced later on. There is no conflict in the two statements in the former of which acts of charity, etc. were referred to as the cause of karma and the latter one in which tranquillity of mind is regarded as such. Tranquillity of mind is the cause of karma, but acts of charity, etc. are the cause even of tranquillity of mind. Being the cause of the cause, acts of charity, etc., are regarded figuratively as the cause of karma (1615-1616).

Still someone may urge that it is not necessary to go into all these confounding details. Our common sense tells us that we attain tranquillity of mind by acts of charity and then feel more inclined to perform acts of charity which yield greater tranquillity and so on. It is not at all necessary to imagine an intangible fruit. But this is incorrect reasoning. Acts of charity, etc. are the cause of tranquillity of mind, as lump of clay is of a jar. What is the cause of a thing can never be the effect of that very thing. How is it possible to think of acts of charity, etc. as effects of tranquillity of mind? (1617).

Even now the opponent may not be convinced as it is still possible to point out a tangible fruit. Acts of charity etc. may be said to be performed for fame which is its result or fruit. Why should we posit an unseen fruit? If people slaughter a beast, it is for the meat (flesh) and not for the sin which is supposed to accrue from it. People are mostly motivated by the tangible fruit in view and not even an infinitesimal part of the activity of the world is seen to have an unseen or intangible fruit in view (1618-1619).

The answer to this is that activities with a tangible fruit do have an unseen fruit also. Slaughter, agriculture etc. may lead to some visible gain, but sin too accrues to the performer. Otherwise if, as has been stated, people mostly act with a tangible fruit in view and if these actions of theirs have no

unseen fruit at all, we would not be able to explain the very existence of innumerable worldly beings or transmigratory souls. The fact is that even while performing the activities of agriculture, etc. and attaining its fruit, crop, etc., they bind unto themselves the unseen fruit in the form of sin even though it was not intended by them and thus bound down they continue their transmigratory course. The very few performers of acts of charity, etc. obtain an unseen fruit of the nature of dharma or merit and thus are gradually liberated. It can be argued that those who perform good activities like acts of charity, etc. with an unseen fruit of the nature of dharma may attain it; no one should have any objection to this. But those who go in for activities like agriculture, slaughter etc. without intending to attain the unseen fruit of the nature of adharma, should have nothing to do with it. But this is not true. If the causal apparatus is perfect the fruit is bound to follow whether one intends it or not. If a farmer while sowing barley drops unknowingly seeds of other grain, if there is enough supply of water and there are also such other factors, these seeds will invariably sprout forth and grow even though the cultivator himself did not intend that they should. Similarly when a person indulges in cultivation, slaughter, etc. when the full complement of operative causes is present, the unseen fruit of the nature of adharma does invariably arise irrespective of the doer's intention. A truly wise person has no eye on the fruit of meritorious activities like charity, etc. and yet the fruit of the nature of dharma does arise. Thus all activities good or bad must have an unseen fruit—merit or demerit—as the existence of an infinite number of transmigratory souls could not be otherwise explained (1620).

Further, if those who perform activities like cultivation, slaughter, etc. only for the purpose of attaining a tangible fruit, do not attain along with it the unseen fruit (karma) also, they would not have the bondage of karma and thus would be liberated immediately on their death without any effort on their part. On the other hand, for those who perform good

activities with an unseen fruit in view there would be endless transmigration as they would incur karma by the performance of these activities, experience the fruition of karma in another birth, inspired by it again indulge in activities like charity, etc., again incur karma and so on; thus transmigration would be an endless affair for them and their existence would be full of pain and suffering. Even to this we should have no objection; but if this were true, in the absence of the accumulation of the unseen fruit of activities like cultivation, etc., there should not have been found anyone performing these activities and there should not have been found anyone experiencing the fruition of demerit or sin; while there should have been found only those who indulge in good activities like charity and those who enjoy the fruit of merit. But this is not what we find (1621).

What we find in the world is the reverse of this. And yet it may be noted that those who perform (sinful) activities like cultivation, etc. do not have the unseen fruit of the nature of adharma (demerit) in view. This shows that all action good or bad has an unseen fruit accordingly good or bad, of the nature of dharma or adharma. There are very many people in the world who perform sinful activities and very few who perform meritorious acts of charity, etc.. We may note that those who perform sinful activities like cultivation, etc. have only the tangible fruit in view and yet they do attain the unseen fruit which it was not their intention to obtain. Thus the unseen fruit follows invariably in the wake of an act of a sentient being. It may, further, be noted that the seen or the tangible fruit does not result invariably on the performance of an activity; all perform the same activity, yet some attain the tangible fruit—crop, wealth, etc., of cultivation, trade, etc., while others do not. The complement of operative causes being the same, this difference in the result can be explained only on the basis of some unseen cause and karma is that cause. This has been explained earlier (Gāthā 1613). Karma is an effect and activity the cause; hence karma is essentially different from the cause (1622–1624).

If from the existence of bodies, etc., the existence of their cause, viz. karma is established, it follows, someone might feel inclined to say, that like the effect, body, the cause, karma too must be corporeal. Mahāvīra says that in that case his task becomes very easy for then the opponent would be accepting what he usually has to take great pains to prove. It stands to reason that karma should be corporeal, for its effect (body, etc.) is corporeal, as in the case of paramāṇus or atoms, the cause of the corporeal jar. If the effect is incorporeal, the cause also is such, e. g. the soul which is the cause of knowledge. It may be noted that by 'cause' is meant the material or the constituent cause (samavāyi-kāraṇa); hence it cannot be argued that pleasure and pain are effects of karma and they being incorporeal it follows that karma too is incorporeal. It is the soul that is the samavāyi-kāraṇa and it is incorporeal as pleasure and pain are; while karma, like the other factors—food, drink etc. — is but the instrumental cause. It can be seen that there is no difficulty whatsoever in accepting the rule that like causes (samavāyi-kāraṇa) produce like effects (1625). There are many other inferences demonstrating the corporeal nature of karma:— A few are given by way of illustration:—

(i) Karma is corporeal, because in relation to it there is the experience of pleasure, etc..

That in relation to which there is the experience of pleasure, etc., is observed to be corporeal, e. g. edible food. And in relation to what is non-corporeal, there is no experience of pleasure, etc.; e. g. in relation to ether there is no such experience.

And pleasure, etc. is experienced in relation to karma,
Therefore karma is corporeal.

(ii) That in relation to which there is the rise of feeling is observed to be corporeal; e. g. fire.

And there is the rise of feeling in relation to karma,
Therefore karma is corporeal.

- (iii) Karma is corporeal, because while being distinct from the soul and its qualities (knowledge, etc.) it gains strength on account of such external factors as garland, sandal-wood, etc., which become the cause of perversity of outlook, like a jar, which becomes strong by the application of oil, etc..
- (iv) Karma is corporeal, because being distinct from the soul, etc., it undergoes modification, like milk.

It should not be argued that the reason 'because it undergoes modification 'is asiddha (unreal, inadmissible) because it does undergo modification as that whose effect is subject to modification must itself be such; for instance, curds can be modified as sour milk, and hence it can be ascertained that the cause of curds, viz. milk too is subject to modification (1626-1628).

Agnibhūti again raises a point. As there are a number of transformations of clouds, etc. and we are not required to assume karma as the deciding factor, similarly even without karma the transmigratory souls can experience different grades of pleasure, pain, etc. and we need not assume karma to be the cause of these (1629).

Mahāvīra says it is really surprising that Agnibhūti while prepared to accept variety in respect of such things as shapes and forms of clouds, etc., which are external and hence not influenced by the soul, is reluctant to do so in the case of karma which is associated with the souls. There is a greater reason to accept variety in the latter case just as we willingly admit a greater variety in designs and imagery undertaken by an artist than in the case of the clouds. The jīvas bind unto themselves karma which clings to them and there is no reason why this karma should not have variety in its transformations as producing different degrees of pleasure and pain (1630-1631).

Agnibhūti is still not convinced. Mahāvīra accepts variety in karma and through that in the degrees of pleasure and pain. Why can he not admit that just as there is variety in the transformations of the clouds, etc. naturally, without a cause,

so the body also can have variety of appearance, of conditions of pleasure and pain and so on without a cause, just naturally? Why does he want karma to explain these latter? Mahāvīra calmly argues that karma too is body (kārmaṇa-śarīra). If Agnihūti admits variety in the body, he ought to admit it in the karmic body too which also is material — only it is super-sensuous subtle and internal because it clings closely to the individual soul. So if variety be accepted of the gross body on the ground of its similarity to clouds, etc., it should be accepted of the karma-body too (1632).

Agnihūti, sceptical as he is, argues that he personally does not admit even the reality of the karmic body which is not perceived, much less variety in it and he fails to see what is lost by not accepting it. Mahāvīra's reply is that on death a soul has no connection whatsoever with the gross body. If the subtle karmic body were not there, the soul would not be associated with a body again, because there would be no cause or deciding factor for doing so. If this were to happen all would be emancipated; there would be an end to transmigration for all without any effort (1633).

There would be the contingency of the emancipation of the entire assemblage of souls. If it were to be argued that even the bodiless can transmigrate, then all would be undergoing metempsychosis without any cause and even the siddha (perfect soul) would be thrown without a cause into the whirl of transmigration and then no one would have faith in the fact of emancipation (1634).

Agnihūti now feels inclined to admit the reality of karma, but he cannot understand how corporeal karma can be related—by conjunction (saṃyoga) or by relation of inherence (samavāya) to the soul which is incorporeal. Mahāvīra adduces instances to show that there is no difficulty so far as this is concerned. The corporeal jar is related by conjunction to the sky and there is the relation of inherence of the corporeal finger to its action — movement, which is incorporeal (1635).

Or, as the external gross body is seen to be connected with the soul so the soul must be admitted to be conjoined with the karmic body when it passes from one life to another, for otherwise there would not be the taking of another body as pointed out earlier. If it is said that the external body is connected with the jīva on account of dharma (merit, good), and adharma (demerit, sin, evil), then are these latter corporeal or incorporeal? If they be corporeal, how could they be related to the incorporeal soul? If they be related somehow, then karma too could be so related, If they are incorporeal, even then it will have to be shown how they can be related to the external gross corporeal body. If they are not related to the body, they will not be instrumental in bringing about the activity of the body. And if the relation of the incorporeal dharma, adharma to the corporeal body be admitted, there should be no difficulty in accepting the relation of the soul and karma (1636).

Agnibhūti objects as to how karma even though related to the incorporeal soul can influence it — favourably or unfavourably by according pleasure or pain to it. The sky though related to fire, is not influenced by it. Mahāvīra explains that there is no such rule that a corporeal thing cannot influence favourably or otherwise an incorporeal thing. Consciousness, memory, etc., the attributes of the soul though incorporeal are influenced by corporeal things—unfavourably by the consumption of wine, poison, etc. and favourably by that of milk, ghee, etc. so the soul though incorporeal can be influenced by the corporeal karma (1637).

Mahāvīra has, till now, merely set at nought Agnibhūti's misconception that a corporeal thing cannot influence something incorporeal. But in his view the soul in the transmigratory condition is not utterly incorporeal; it is also in a way corporeal. As iron coming into contact with fire assumes the nature of fire, so the soul coming into connection with the beginningless karma comes to be of the nature of the modification

of karma. Thus it, being in a way non-different from karma, can be influenced favourably or otherwise by karma. The sky is not influenced by the corporeal fire, etc., because it is itself incorporeal and insentient. But the transmigratory soul is sentient and hence it stands to reason that it should be influenced by karma (1638).

The stream of karma, again, is beginningless because body and karma are related as cause-effect. A seed produces a sprout and this in its turn produces a seed and so on. Similarly, the body leads to karma which leads again to the acceptance of a body and so on. There is always a beginningless stream of things related to each other as cause-effect (1639).

Agnibhūti has referred to certain Vedic statements which seem to go against the acceptance of karma. But the very truth of the Vedic statements rests on the acceptance of karma. There are Vedic injunctions regarding the performance of agnihotra, etc. for a person desirous of heaven. By performing agnihotra, an apūrva (unseen)-karma is produced in the soul which leads to heaven in a future life. On death the soul loses its association with the body; if karma were not admitted, there would be no determining factor as regards the soul's journey to heaven. Hence it cannot be argued that the Vedas do not admit the reality of karma. Moreover, even according to popular belief, heaven is regarded as the fruit of good actions like acts of charity, etc., which also would not be possible if karma were not accepted (1640).

Agnibhūti may argue that if the pure soul or God or Avyakta (Unmanifest Matter), Time, or Destiny, Chance were regarded as the cause of the variety and manifoldness of body, etc., it would not be necessary to admit karma (1641).

But there is no consistency in this. If these be not helped by karma, they would not be able to give rise to the body, etc., for no effect is possible without the necessary complement of causal conditions. The potter cannot make a jar without the staff or the wheel. No apparatus other than karma would be

available, because the soul in the womb would not be associated with karma, and without karma it would not be able to take unto itself the constituents of the body, viz. blood, etc. and thus would not be able to create the body. Another argument is that the soul devoid of karma cannot create the body, etc. as it is motionless; what is motionless, e. g. the ether, cannot create the body, etc.. The soul devoid of karma is motionless and hence it cannot create the body, etc.. Other reasons may be adduced, viz. — The soul devoid of karma cannot create the body, etc. because it is incorporeal or bodiless or inactive or ubiquitous (omnipresent), etc. like ether, or because it is one, like the unit atom. Hence the existence of karma has to be admitted. It cannot also be argued that God with a body creates all effects like the body, etc. for there would be the same difficulties as regards God's body. Does God create His own body, being devoid of karma? This is not possible, for no effect can be created without the necessary complement of causal conditions. If it is argued that another God creates His body, has this second God a body or not? If He is bodiless, He cannot create because He lacks the necessary causal apparatus. If He has a body, again he could not have created it if he were devoid of karma. Thus another God would have to be imagined and so on. All this is unwanted. Therefore it should be acceptable that not God, but jīva along with karma is the creator of the body, etc.. If God created body, etc. without a purpose in view, He would be as good as mad; and if he had a purpose, He would be bereft of Godhood. He who is eternally pure cannot entertain the desire to create the body, etc., as he is free from attachment and aversion. There can be no desire without these and no construction without desire. Hence God cannot be the creator of the manifoldness and variety of body, etc. Thus, only the jīva associated with karma can be the creator of these. Thus the existence of karma is established. This also disproves the existence of Viṣṇu, Brahmā, etc. (1642).

Agnibhūti might still be in favour of regarding svabhāva or nature as the cause of all manifoldness of body, etc., because

of the Vedic statements regarding the 'mass of consciousness', etc. (see Gāthās 1553, 1588, 1592-94, 1597). Some have said, "The origination of things is not regarded as dependent upon any cause by the Svabhāvavādins. They do not regard even 'sva' as cause. Who is responsible for the diversity of the tenderness of the lotus and the pricking of the thorn? We cannot also account for the variegated colours of the feathers of the peacock and the whiteness of the moonlight. Where there is the element of chance, all that is without any cause; e. g. sharpness of thorns and these pleasures and pains".

[Sarvahetunirāsaṁsam bhāvānāṁ janma varṇyate;
Svabhāvavādibhis te hi nāhuḥ svam api kāraṇam. 1.
rājīva-kaṇṭhakādīnāṁ vaicitryaṁ kaḥ karoti hi;
mayūracandrikādir vā vicitraḥ kena nirmitaḥ. 2
kāḍācitkaṁ yad atrāsti niḥśeṣaṁ tad ahetukaṁ;
yathā kaṇṭaka-taiḥṣṇyādi yathā caite sukhādayaḥ. 3]

Agnibhūti admitting this might say that the variety and manifoldness in the world is due not to karma, but to svabhāva. Lord Mahāvīra inquires if Agnibhūti has a clear idea regarding this svabhāva. Is it a particular thing or is it non-causality or the attribute of a thing? It is not a particular thing for it does not fall within the scope of any of the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). If in spite of this it is admitted, there is no reason why karma should not be admitted even if, as Agnibhūti has said, it does not fall within the scope of any of the pramāṇas. Moreover if this svabhāva, a particular thing is regarded as corporeal, it is only another name for 'karma'. If it is incorporeal, it cannot be the creator of anything as it is incorporeal and has no complement of causal conditions, just as ether cannot create anything. And it does not stand to reason that the effect, the corporeal body, etc., should have an incorporeal cause. If svabhāva means non-causality, it would amount to saying that body, etc. originate without a cause. And if this is true, there is no reason why all bodies should not originate all together. Moreover this means

that body, etc. originate without a cause, just by chance. But this is not consistent for whatever originates without a cause or by chance has no particular shape, e. g. transformations of clouds, etc.. Body, etc. have a beginning and a particular shape; hence their origination cannot be just accidental, but must be brought about by karma. It follows that body, etc. having a particular shape have been created by a creator with his full causal apparatus. In the condition when it is in the womb, the jīva has no causal complement other than karma. Hence all the manifoldness and variety in the world is not there just by chance, but is due to karma.

If svabhāva is conceived as the attribute of a thing even then if it be an attribute of the soul as consciousness is, it could not be the cause of the body, etc. as it would be incorporeal. If it be regarded as an attribute of a corporeal thing, this would be equivalent to accepting what was intended to be established, as karma too is accepted by Mahāvīra as a particular mode of matter (pudgalāstikāya-paryāya-viśeṣa).

There is a Vedic statement: puruṣa evedaṁ sarvaṁ yad bhūtaṁ yac ca bhāvyaṁ, utāmṛtatvasyeśāno yad annenātirohati; yad ejaṭi yad naijaṭi yad dūre yad u antike yad antar asya sarvasya yat sarvasyāśya bāhyataḥ. (See Gāthā 1580). This is interpreted by Agnibhūti to mean that the puruṣa (soul) alone exists. ['Eva' is taken to negate the existence of karma, prakṛti (matter), God, etc.]. Whatever is past (i. e. saṁsāra from the point of view of the emancipated) and what is future (i. e. emancipation from the point of view of the bound saṁsārin), he who is the lord of immortality (emancipation), who grows by food, what moves (animals, etc.) and what does not (mountains, etc.), what is far (Meru, etc.) and also what is near and what is within the sentient and the insentient and what is without these, all this is puruṣa alone. Agnibhūti thus believes that according to the Veda, the existence of nothing other than the puruṣa is admitted, which means that the existence of karma, etc. is negated. Moreover it has been said in the Veda: 'Vijñānaghana evaitebhyaḥ bhūtebhyaḥ.....' (see Gāthā 1553); here also, in the view of

Agnibhūti, the existence of karma, etc. which are other than consciousness is rejected. But this interpretation of the Vedic statements is not correct. Here is their true significance. Statements like 'Puruṣa evedaṁ sarvaṁ' are commendatory. They preach the doctrine of non-duality just for the removal of pride based on caste, etc. by praising the puruṣa; they propound non-duality, but are not meant to negate the existence of everything other than the puruṣa. Their purport is that all souls are alike and there should be no notion of inequality leading to a false unjustified pride of caste, etc.. Some Vedic statements are meant to lay down injunctions we could not have got elsewhere; they are novel. Other statements have arthavāda in view i. e. are commendatory or denunciatory and still others merely repeat what is already known. 'One who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra' is a vidhi — an injunction. Arthavāda can be by way of praise or censure. It either recommends something by praising it or dissuades us from pursuing it by censuring it. In 'Puruṣa evedaṁ sarvaṁ' and such other statements, e. g. 'Sa sarva-vid yasyaiṣa mahimā bhuvī divye brahmapure hy eṣa vyomni ātmā supra-tiṣṭhitas tam akṣaraṁ vedayate yas tu sarvajñāḥ sarva-vid sarvaṁ evāviveśeti',* and 'Ekayā pūrṇayā hutyā sarvān kāmān avāpnoti' (by one full sacrifice, one attains all one's desires — desired objects — Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa 3. 8. 10.5), arthavāda by way of praise is pre-eminent. This latter sentence cannot be taken as a vidhi, because if it were literally true all injunctions regarding the performance of agnihotra, etc. would become useless. Moreover 'Eṣaḥ vaḥ prathamāḥ yajño yo' gniṣṭomaḥ, yo' nenāniṣṭvā'

*This text is found with a slight difference in two different upaniṣads:—(a) yaḥ sarvajñāḥ sarva-vid yasyaiṣa mahimā bhuvī; divye brahmapure hy eṣa vyomny ātmā pratiṣṭhitaḥ. — Muṇḍaka 2. 2. 7. He who is omniscient and all-knower, whose glory that is such is spread on the earth and in the divine world of Brahman, that soul is established in the sky or heaven. (b) tad akṣaraṁ vedayate yas tu sonya sa sarvajñāḥ sarvaṁ evāviveśeti. — Praśnopaniṣat 4-10,

nyena yajate sa gartam abhyapatat' — Tāṇḍya-mahābrāhmaṇa 16. 1. 2. — Agniṣṭoma is the first sacrifice; he who without performing this sacrifice performs another, falls into a pit — This statement is meant to show that it is not proper to perform the animal sacrifice, etc. before performing Agniṣṭoma and this it does by arthavāda of the type of censure. Dvādaśa māsāḥ saṁvatsaraḥ (Twelve months are a year — Taitt. Br. 1. 1. 4), Agnir uṣṇaḥ (fire is hot — Taitt. Br. 1. 1. 4), Agnir himasya bheṣajam (fire is the antidote for cold or frost — Taitt. Br. 1. 1. 4)—such sentences merely repeat what is already well known. Hence all the Vedic statements should not be interpreted in the same way. Thus 'Puruṣa evedaṁ sarvam' is by way of praise. Similarly 'Vijñānaghana evaitebhyaḥ...' means that the puruṣa, the mass of consciousness is different from the elements. And it has already been proved that this puruṣa (soul) is the creator and body, etc. are the effects. Now where there is the relation of creator, created, the instrument or the means must be present; e. g. blacksmith is the agent or creator, ball of iron is the thing created and pincers (saṁdamśa) are the instrument. In the creation of the body, etc., by the ātman, there must be an instrument and karma is that instrument. Moreover there are Vedic statements which directly establish the existence of karma, viz. Puṇyaḥ puṇyena karmaṇā, pāpaḥ pāpena karmaṇā (see Gāthā 1611). Thus karma is established by the testimony of the scriptures also (1643).

Mahāvīra thus dispelled the doubt of Agnibhūti regarding karma, and the latter became a Jaina monk along with his five hundred followers (1644).

3. VĀYUBHŪTI REGARDING BODY-SOUL

Hearing that Indrabhūti and Agnibhūti had become monks, a third Vāyubhūti came to have great faith in, and respect for, Mahāvīra. He very humbly decided to approach Mahāvīra respectfully and place his difficulties before him. But so overawed was he by Mahāvīra's personality and extra-ordinary knowledge that he could not utter a word as he stood before him, even as the latter accosted him by his name and gotra as Vāyubhūti Gautama. Mahāvīra realising this said, "You have a doubt as to the identity of the soul and yet you do not ask me. 'Is the soul identical with the body or is it different from it?'—This is your problem. You do not understand the meaning of the texts and hence you are confounded" (1645-1649).

Before discussing the meaning of the words of the Veda, Mahāvīra explains in very clear words Vāyubhūti's own difficulty to him. Vāyubhūti believes that the soul is an epi-phenomenon resulting from the aggregate of the four elements — Earth, Water, Fire, Air. The wine-spirit is not found in the constituents of wine severally, but being non-existent previously it comes into existence when there is a conglomeration of them; similarly consciousness is not found in the elements severally, but emerges when these elements form an aggregate. Wine-spirit remains in existence for some time and then on the means of its destruction being present it perishes. So also consciousness not existent in the elements severally, comes into existence in the aggregate, remains for some time and then disappears when this conglomeration is disturbed. Thus consciousness is an attribute of the aggregate of the elements. There is the relation of identity between the attribute and what possesses it for this relation of attribute-substance cannot exist between things that are different. Hence Vāyubhūti is inclined to regard the body and soul as identical. But statements like 'Na ha vai saśarīrasya...'

establish that the soul is distinct from the body. This is why Vāyubhūti cannot come to a conclusion whether the soul is identical with the body or distinct from it (1650-1651).

Mahāvīra explains that if consciousness were absolutely non-existent in the constituent elements severally, it would not emerge at all in the aggregate of these; as oil not being present in the particles of sand does not emerge even when they form an aggregate (1652).

The wine-spirit or the power to intoxicate, etc. is certainly present to some extent in the constituents of wine severally. To take but a few illustrations: The dhātakī flowers by themselves can cause a reeling sensation; molasses, grapes, sugar-cane juice are satisfying and water quenches thirst and so on. Similarly only if consciousness were present to some extent — however slight — in Earth, etc. could it become full and distinct on their forming an aggregate (1653).

Moreover, if the wine-spirit were utterly non-existent in the constituents of wine, it would not be necessary for us to seek these very constituents for obtaining it or for forming their aggregate. One desirous of wine need not then necessarily resort to these but should be able to achieve his aim by means of other constituents—ash, stones, cowdung, etc. all together resulting in wine. But this is not what we find. Hence wine-spirit is present in each and every constituent of wine (1654).

If it is argued on the basis of this that consciousness exists to some extent in each one of the elements — Earth, etc., and it is this that becomes distinct when the elements are brought together, the reply is that this reasoning is fallacious, for consciousness is not observed in the aggregate of the elements. The aggregate called body comprises not only the elements but also the soul and if consciousness exists in this aggregate, it is not on account of the conglomeration of the elements but because it is an attribute of the soul. If it were due to the conglomeration of the elements it should exist in a dead body also. If it be argued that consciousness is not perceived in a dead body owing to the non-existence of Air, this argument

could be rebuffed by pointing out that consciousness does not reappear even when Air is pumped in. Similarly it does not reappear even when Fire (Heat) is introduced. If it is urged that consciousness is not observed in a dead body on account of the absence of a special type of Fire, Air, then this is but another name for the soul (1655).

Vāyubhūti feels that Mahāvīra's statement that consciousness does not pertain to the aggregate of elements is one that contradicts direct perception as it is there that it is actually perceived. You cannot deny the jar its colour. Mahāvīra says it is not so as there is an inference that sets aside this sense-perception. We see green grass where there is an aggregate of Earth and Water, but this does not mean that it is a product of the aggregate of these; we have an inference that establishes the existence of grass-seeds — the material cause of grass. Similarly in the present context there is an inference establishing the existence of ātman of which consciousness is an attribute and which is distinct from the elements. In fact, it is Vāyubhūti's stand that consciousness exists in each element because it exists in their aggregate that contradicts direct perception as consciousness is not perceived in any of the elements (1656).

The inference establishing the existence of the soul as distinct from the elements or sense-organs is as follows:— Consciousness belongs to something distinct from the elements or sense-organs (Thesis), because it remembers what has been cognised earlier by the elements or sense-organs (Reason); as consciousness is an attribute of Devadatta who remembers what has been cognised earlier through five windows (Example). The purport is that if there is an individual thing that remembers all that has been cognised by many it must be distinct from them. If it be not distinct but identical, it being one could not remember what was cognised by many, as a mental cognition cognising sound, etc. can cognise that alone. Moreover, if Vāyubhūti's argument were to be pursued, it would end with Devadatta's being identical with the five windows. If

Vāyubhūti rejoins that if the sense-organs themselves can cognise, nothing other than these need be established,—his position would not be justified, for it will presently be shown that there is no cognition at times even when the sense-organs are operating (1657).

That there is a soul distinct from the sense organs can also be seen from the fact that even when the sense-organs stop operating — e. g. in the condition of blindness, deafness etc. — there is remembrance of what was cognised earlier by the sense-organs; or the fact that even when the sense-organs are operating, there is no cognition — in the condition of absent-mindedness or when the attention is directed elsewhere. If the sense-organs were the only cognisers, this would never happen as long as they were in a perfect condition and the objects were amenable to perception. It follows, therefore, that knowledge belongs ultimately to something distinct from the sense-organs as it belongs to Devadatta who sees different objects through the five windows. This Devadatta can remember the things cognised earlier through them even when they are shut; and if he is absent-minded, will not perceive anything even when they are open (1658).

Other inferences may be adduced: (i) Soul (jīva) exists over and above the sense-organs, because cognising through one, it reacts to the objects with the help of another. X sees a man eating tamarind and his mouth (organ of taste) starts watering. Or, a man sees a jar through one window and takes it through another and is thus clearly distinct from both the windows. The soul grasps with the hands what has been perceived with the eyes (organ of sight) and is thus distinct from the hands and the eyes (1659).

(ii) The soul is distinct from the sense-organs because it can remember the objects individually cognised by the sense-organs; as a man having the knowledge of all the five knowables—touch, taste, smell, colour, sound — is different from the five men who by their wish cognise one each. The purport is that that which cognises all that has been cognised by many is distinct

from them. Vāyubhūti might object that from the example given of five men who cognise colour, etc., it could be established that the sense-organs are the cognisers of colour, etc.; but this is not what is desired by Mahāvīra who regards the sense-organs not as cognisers but only as instrumental in bringing about the cognition. But Mahāvīra by the qualification 'by their wish' in the case of men has given the hint that the two cases are not to be treated as alike in all respects inasmuch as the sense-organs can have no wish and hence cannot be looked upon as cognisers, unless it be but figuratively. Till now Mahāvīra has resorted to reasoning to establish the existence of the soul; but he would like to make it clear to Vāyubhūti that Ātman is supersensuous and hence we should not rely on reason alone. It has been said: 'For the knowledge of the existence of supersensuous things, āgama (verbal testimony or scripture) and upapatti (reasoning) are perfect means of valid knowledge. (Āgamaś copapattiś ca sampūrṇaṁ dṛṣṭikāraṇam; atīndriyāṇām arthānāṁ sabbhāvapratiṭṭhaye) (1660).

(iii) Child's knowledge must be preceded by another knowledge because it is of the nature of knowledge. Whatever knowledge there is is known to be preceded by another knowledge, as a youth's knowledge is preceded by his knowledge as a child; that knowledge which precedes a child's knowledge is distinct from the body, as even when the previous body is given up, it remains as the cause of this-worldly knowledge (or of the knowledge during this life); moreover, it is an attribute and hence requires a substratum; ātman is this substratum. Thus, the ātman (soul) is distinct from the body. Vāyubhūti can object that the reason (hetu) 'because it is knowledge' is the same as the thesis and hence the hetu (reason) is asiddha (inadmissible), because the thesis has not itself been established. But this does not stand to reason. Knowledge in general is given as the hetu (proband, reason) and particular knowledge (child's knowledge) is the subject (pakṣa) of the thesis and hence there is no reason why the hetu should be looked upon as fallacious. 'Word (or sound) consisting of letters is non-eternal because it is sound,

like the sound of thunder—' This is accepted as a correct inference. If so, our inference too is valid. If the general has been established it is possible to demonstrate the particular (not yet established) on the basis of that. The hetu would be *asiddha* in an inference of the type: Sound is non-eternal, because it is of the nature of sound — where sound (the subject) and sound (the hetu) are both general (1661).

(iv) Child's desire for breast-feeding must be preceded by another desire, because it is of the nature of experience, as our present desire is preceded by another or because it is of the nature of desire*, just like our present desire. Now this desire preceding the child's first desire for breast-feeding must be distinct from the body, for even when the previous body perishes, it persists and becomes the cause of the child's first desire for breast-feeding in the next life. Desire is an attribute (knowledge-attribute) and therefore requires a substratum. The persisting soul alone can be regarded as the substratum of this desire. The reason (hetu) 'because it is of the nature of desire' may perhaps be looked upon as 'inconclusive' on the ground that the desire for emancipation is not preceded by a desire for emancipation and yet it is desire all the same and that this stultifies the universal rule that desire should be preceded by another desire. But note should be taken here of the fact that the universal rule does not insist that a particular desire should be preceded by a desire of the same type. What is meant is that it should be preceded by desire in general -- some desire, whether it be of the same type or another. Desire for emancipation, it will be admitted, is preceded by some sort of desire and if so the reason given above is not-inconclusive (*avyabhicāri*) (1662).

(v) Child's body must be preceded by another body, because it is possessed of sense-organs, etc.. Whatever has sense-organs is seen to be preceded by another body, e. g. a youth's body is preceded by his body as a child. That which precedes a

*This second reason is suggested by the commentator.

child's body could not be the previous gross body for it has already perished and cannot therefore be the cause of a child's body. Karmic body is the cause of a child's body. The karmic body cannot subsist by itself; it must have something of which it could be the body, which it could embody, and this something is the soul which persists from one life to another. Thus, again, it can be seen, the body and the soul are not identical (1663).

(vi) Child's pleasure, pain, etc. must be preceded by other pleasure, pain, etc., because they are of the nature of experience; like our present pleasure, pain. These pleasure, pain, etc., preceding the child's pleasure, pain, etc., must be distinct from the previous body for they persist even when the previous body has perished and become the cause of the child's pleasure, pain, etc.. Being qualities, they must have a substratum and that is *âtman*;—which again proves that the *âtman* is distinct from the body (1664).

(vii) Body and karma are related to each other as cause-effect and their continuum is beginningless, like that of seed-sprout. If karma and body are related to each other as instrument and effect, there must be some agent over and above these to manipulate them, as the potter is there with respect to stick and jar. The *atman* is this agent (1665-66).

[For other arguments demonstrating the existence of *âtman* see *gâthâs* 1567-1570].

Mahāvira anticipates an argument from someone with a Buddhist bent of mind to the effect that the soul may be distinct from the body; yet being momentary like it, it perishes along with it and hence there is no sense ultimately in establishing its existence as something independent of the body. *Mahāvira's* reply is that everything in the world is not momentary; The basic substance is eternal, only its modes are non-eternal or even momentary. Hence the soul need not be regarded as perishing along with the body. It remembers its previous existence and hence could not have perished with the previous body. A man can remember in youth or old age

what happened in childhood or a man in a foreign country remembers what happened in his own country because the soul has persisted amidst all the changes; so also if there is remembrance of the previous life, it only means that the soul has not perished with the body. It cannot be argued that the subsequent moments (or point-instants) are stamped with the impressions of the immediately preceding ones and this can explain the memory-factor, because if the preceding moment perishes absolutely without having any connection with the subsequent one, the subsequent moment is absolutely different from the previous one. And one cannot remember what has been experienced by another as it would amount to the absurdity of Yajñadatta remembering what Devadatta experienced (1671).

It cannot also be argued that remembrance can be explained on the basis of a stream of point-instants of consciousness, even when the soul is momentary; for if a stream of consciousness be accepted as distinct from the body, it is as good as accepting the existence of a soul of the nature of a continuous stream of momentary consciousness (1672).

Mahāvīra thus convinces Vāyubhūti of the existence of the soul even though it be of the nature of a stream of momentary consciousness. Then he says that consciousness cannot be absolutely momentary* for it could not then remember what was previously perceived, as a child who dies immediately after birth does not remember what happened in the past in this life (as it has no past). But we find that a man remembers in his old age what happened in childhood or youth, and what is still more significant he remembers even his previous life (1673).

The Buddhists believe that cognition is one (not helped by another) and being one it can cognise only one object. Moreover, it is momentary, for in the Buddhist view, whatever

*Momentariness is in a way—from a particular point of view—acceptable to Mahāvīra and so he says that knowledge is not absolutely momentary.

is existent is momentary (yat sat tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam—Hetubindu, p. 44; kṣaṇikāḥ sarva-saṃskārāḥ—All things are momentary). But how possibly could they establish this? If all the momentary things could be brought together, then alone could there be a cognition of all of them as being momentary; again, this knowledge could not have been originated by all the things, because the Buddhists believe that one cognition can have but one object. If there could be simultaneous cognitions of the momentariness of all individual things and if the soul were to assimilate them this could be possible, but the Buddhists do not accept the simultaneous origination of a number of cognitions of all objects. Hence with their tenets, it is not possible to have knowledge of the momentariness of all the objects of the world. Even if knowledge being one and of one object, were not momentary — perishing immediately after its origination — it could have been possible to have this knowledge of momentariness of objects; but knowledge too, in their view, is momentary. Looking to these difficulties, knowledge should not be accepted as momentary. And being a quality it requires an appropriate substratum viz. the soul. This proves the existence of the soul as distinct from the body (1674).

There would be still another difficulty in the Buddhist view. A cognition, according to it, is confined to its own object, i. e. it can have but one object. If so, how could such a cognition ever tell us of the attributes — momentariness, essencelessness, painfulness, etc. — of the objects of a great number of cognitions? Thus it is not all possible to have the knowledge of the momentariness of things (1675).

It can be argued that though cognition is one, of one object only and momentary, still it can know the momentary nature of all cognitions and objects on the basis of the inference grounded on the nature of itself and its own objects, and thus there is no difficulty whatsoever. To this the reply is that such an inference would be fallacious, for only a thing which is known to exist can be the subject of an inference (tatra pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmī — Nyāya-praveśa, p. 1); while the very existence of the

subject of this inference — viz. other cognitions and their objects — has not been established. What is the sense in discussing the attributes (momentariness, etc.) of things the very existence of which is a matter of doubt. The one momentary cognition having but one object cannot do this work, viz. establish that there are other cognitions, they have their own objects and these objects have their attributes — capability of producing knowledge about themselves, etc.. How can cognition tell us of the momentariness of these, when they themselves are not known. It may again be urged that inference from itself and its object can establish all this: “Just as I am, so other cognitions also exist; just as my objects exist, so also the objects of other cognitions; and as I and my object are momentary, so other cognitions and their objects are momentary.” But this, too, is not correct. The knowledge cognising the momentariness of all these is momentary; it perishes as soon as it originates; it cannot, therefore, cognise its own destruction and momentariness — much less can it cognise other cognitions, their objects and the momentariness of all these. Moreover, it cannot cognise the momentariness even of its own object, because the cognition and its object perish simultaneously. Should the cognition perish after having seen its object perish and having ascertained its momentariness, then this could be possible. But both perish simultaneously after having given rise to their respective point-instants. Perception of the nature of self-consciousness (*sva-saṁvedana*) or sensuous perception cannot cognise momentariness in the Buddhist view and that inference cannot help in this direction has been shown above. So momentariness of things cannot be established (1676).

It cannot also be argued that the previous cognition creates such an impression on the succeeding one that cognition though momentary and of one object, can know the attributes (existence, momentariness, etc.) of other cognitions and of their objects. This is possible only if the impressor-cognition and the cognition impressed upon meet in one moment and not when a cognition perishes as soon as it is born. If, to avoid this difficulty,

the two cognitions be regarded as existing simultaneously that would conflict with their momentariness. Again, is this impression momentary or is it not? If it is momentary, it too, as shown above, cannot establish the momentariness of all; and if it is not momentary, that goes against the Buddhist view that everything is momentary. Thus even the introduction of the concept of *vāsanā* (impression) in the explanation does not help us to establish the momentariness of all things of the world (1677).

If while accepting that knowledge is momentary, the Buddhists also want the knowledge of the momentariness of all things, there would be a number of difficulties:

- (a) It will have to be accepted that for the knowledge of all the objects in the three worlds a number of cognitions can rise simultaneously and the existence of a permanent entity—soul—as one that can be the substratum of these cognitions and can remember the objects cognised by them, will have to be accepted;
- (b) One cognition will have to be accepted as having a number of objects,—which goes against the Buddhist view;
- (c) Cognition will have to be accepted as having a prolonged existence (i. e. as non-momentary) so that it could cognise all the things one after another. Does this not amount to the acceptance of *ātman* or soul by a different name?
- (d) Buddhism would be throwing to the winds its doctrine of *pratītya-samutpāda* (dependent origination) according to which there is no connection whatsoever between cause and effect; the cause does in no way persist in the effect. If this *pratītya-samutpāda* be accepted all the empirical behaviour—remembrance of past things, etc.—would be flouted as memory, etc. are possible only when there is a co-ordinating factor as the locus of past cognitions. *Ātman* (soul) can supply this void and we need not rue the loss of *pratītya-samutpāda* even here, for the Buddhist tenets themselves cannot sustain it. If *Ātman* (soul) is accepted as of the nature of origination, destruction, persistence, knowledge, none of these difficulties

remain and all empirical behaviour can be explained. The soul is persistent and eternal from the point of view of the basic substance — dravya — and liable to origination and destruction according as its modes rise and perish. Hence instead of the stream of momentary consciousness, soul of the nature of eternality, origination and destruction should be accepted as existent over and above the body (1678–1679).

Vāyubhūti would like to know what kinds of cognitions the soul has and how it has them. When there is destruction-cum-subsidence of the coverings or karma-obscurations of mati-jñāna (sensuous knowledge), śruta-jñāna (verbal or scriptural knowledge), avadhi jñāna (visual intuition) and manah-paryāya-jñāna (intuition of mental modes), these latter arise. The destruction-cum-subsidence of coverings of different kinds and degrees produces corresponding kinds and degrees of cognitions in the soul. These are momentary as modes (paryāya), but persisting in other times or moments or even eternal as the basic substance (dravya) (1680).

But when the coverings are utterly destroyed, kevala-jñāna (omniscience or pure knowledge) arises. It is perfect, eternal and does not admit of variation; it has an infinite number of things as its objects and persists in a pure condition perpetually (1681).

Vāyubhūti is still a bit sceptical and wonders why, if the soul has an existence independent of the body, it is not seen entering the body or leaving it. Mahāvīra explains that non-perception is two-fold. An utterly non-existent thing, e. g. ass's horn cannot be perceived. But even an existent thing may not be perceived on account of one or more of these reasons:

- (i) Dūrabhāvāt — if a thing is very far; e. g. heaven or Mount Meru;
- (ii) Atisannikarṣāt — if a thing is very near; e. g. eye-lashes;
- (iii) Atisaukṣmyāt — if a thing is very subtle; e. g. atoms;
- (iv) Mano'navasthānāt — if the mind is perturbed and inattentive; e. g. those unconscious cannot see anything, and an absent-minded person does not perceive an object before him.

- (v) *Īndriyāpāṭavāt* — if the sense-organs are not highly efficient; e. g. in the case of one slightly deaf.
- (vi) *Mati-māṇḍyāt* — dullness. A dull person cannot grasp things which are deep and subtle.
- (vii) *Aśakyatvāt* — if perception is not possible; e. g. it is not possible to perceive one's ears, head, back, joint of the neck.
- (viii) *Āvaranāt* — if the eyes are covered or something stands between the sense-organ and the object; one cannot, for instance, see an object covered by a mat or behind a wall.
- (ix) *Abhibhavāt* — when a thing is overpowered; e. g. the stars are overpowered by the light of the sun and hence cannot be perceived in daylight.
- (x) *Sāmānyāt* — extreme similarity; even when a grain of pulse is very closely examined and then mixed up in a heap of pulse-grains, it is not possible to find it out and distinguish it from the others as they are all extremely similar.
- (xi) *Anupayogāt* — lack of attention and interest; if a man is concentrating on the perception of colour, he does not perceive odour, etc. even when they are present, for he is not interested in them and hence does not pay attention to them.
- (xii) *Anupāyāt* — if the means are not there; e. g. seeing the horns, one cannot have an idea of the quantity of the cow's milk, because the horns are no means of knowing the quantity of the cow's milk.
- (xiii) *Vismṛti* — Forgetting. If a man forgets, he does not know what was previously perceived.
- (xiv) *Durāgamāt* — wrong instruction or testimony; if a man for instance, has been deceived or misguided and has all along known sand of a golden colour as gold, he will not then know gold even when it is before him.
- (xv) *Mohāt* — Stupefaction. If a person's intellect has been stupefied, he does not perceive the soul, etc. though they are existent entities.

- (xvi) Vidarśanāt — lack of sight. One born blind cannot see anything.
- (xvii) Vikārāt — Deterioration; when due to old age, a person's energies flag, there is non-cognition even of what was cognised earlier a number of times.
- (xviii) Akriyātaḥ — lack of activity. If a man does not dig the ground he cannot see the root of the tree.
- (xix) Anadhigamāt — Non-acquirement. If a man has not studied the scriptural texts, he will not know their meaning.
- (xx) Kālaviprakarṣāt — separation by time; one does not perceive past and future things.
- (xxi) Svabhāva-viprakarṣāt — the thing's nature being not amenable to perception; e. g., one does not perceive the sky or evil spirits.

Thus in any one of these twenty-one ways, it might not be possible to perceive a thing even though real and existent. In the present context, on account of svabhāva-viprakarṣa, i. e. because the soul is incorporeal, it cannot be perceived. The karmic body is subtle like an atom and hence it too cannot be perceived; and so the transmigratory soul accompanied by the karmic body cannot be perceived as it enters the gross body or leaves it. The soul or the karmic body should not, on account of this, be regarded as utterly non-existent, for the existence of these is established by a number of inferences (1682-1683).

On the basis of Vedic testimony also it is easy to realise that the soul is distinct from the body. The Veda enjoins agnihotra, etc. on one who wishes to go to heaven. Now the body is reduced to dust or ashes when a person dies. If the soul is not distinct from the body, there would be no one to enjoy the fruit of agnihotra, etc. in heaven, and the Vedic injunctions would be serving no purpose; they would be proved false. Similarly people believe that one who performs good deeds, acts of charity, etc., goes to heaven. This would hold good only if the soul be distinct from the body. Vāyubhūti had not understood the true meaning of the Vedic statements and hence

was inclined to regard the soul as identical with the body. But Lord Mahāvīra explained the Vedic passages to him and also established by inference that the aggregate of elements in the form of the body must have an agent-creator, for the body has a beginning and a fixed shape, as the potter is the maker of the pot. There are Vedic statements which clearly say that the soul is distinct from the body: *Satyena labhyas tapasā hy eṣa brahmacaryeṇa nityaṁ jyotirmayo viśuddho yam paśyanti dhīrā yatayaḥ saṁyatātmanaḥ* — *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, 3. 1. 5. — ‘By truth, austerity, sexual continence, the bright, pure one can always be obtained. The wise, controlled sages see him’,—and such others Hence it must be accepted that the *jīva* (soul) has an existence independent of the body (1684–5).

When his doubt had thus been removed, Vāyubhūti became a monk along with his 500 pupils and followers (1686).

4. VYAKTA — REGARDING THE OBJECTIVE REALITY OF THINGS.

A fourth Gaṇadhara named Vyakta too decided to approach Mahāvīra with reverence and have his doubts dispelled. Mahāvīra accosted him by his name and gotra as Vyakta Bhāradvāja and told him straightaway that he had a doubt as regards the five elements Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether and that that was so because he found apparently conflicting statements in the Veda. One of them says : Svapnopamain vai sakalam ity eṣa brahmavidhir añjasā vijñeyah—which Vyakta interpreted as meaning, 'Everything is but of the nature of a dream (like a dream); this brahma-vidhi, way of the ultimate truth should be understood truly and instantly', and hence he was inclined to believe that there is nothing like the elements. On the other hand there are statements like dyāvāpṛthivī sahāstām — Taitt. Brāh 1. 1. 3, pṛthivī devatā, āpo devatāḥ—which establish the existence of the elements. Hence Vyakta was confounded whether the elements are really existent or not. But the fact was that he did not know the true meaning of, and the logic behind, the Vedic statements. Before explaining this Mahāvīra proceeds to expound Vyakta's doubt in clear terms to him (1687-89).

Vyakta believes that the elements are like objects seen in a dream or like objects created by magic—illusory, having no real existence. A poor man may see in his dream elephants, and horses at his door and his coffers full to the brim with jewels and gold. But he awakes as poor as he was, for all the dream-objects were unreal. So also in an illusion projected by a magician, utensils of gold, jewels, pearls and silver and parks, flowers, fruits may be seen, but they are all unreal. Similarly the elements we perceive empirically are unreal, because they topple down when subjected to the test of reason. If one doubts

the reality of the elements which are perceptible, one is sure to doubt the reality of soul, merit, demerit, etc. which are all supersensuous, or not amenable to sensuous perception. Vyakta too is apt to believe that the entire world is unreal (1690-1691).

Vyakta's argument is that the moment we start reasoning, things looked upon as real start tumbling down from their pedestal of so-called reality. Everything in the world is relative like the notions of long-short. A thing cannot be established by itself, or by another, or by both or by anything other than these. Everything in the world is either an effect or a cause. An effect is so called because it is produced by a cause and a cause is so called because it produces the effect. These expressions are thus mutually dependent and relative. There would be no 'cause' if the 'effect' did not exist and vice versa. Thus *kārya* (effect), etc. are not established intrinsically, i. e. by themselves. And what cannot be established by its own nature cannot be established by another. So also a thing cannot be established both by itself and by another, because what they cannot do severally, they cannot achieve jointly too. If oil is not found in the grains of sand taken severally it is not also found in their aggregate. And in this there would be the fault of mutual dependence, for one cannot be established till the other has been established and a thing cannot be established by anything other than these (itself and another), since nothing other than these exists and that would lead to the contingency of a thing being established without any cause, i. e. having no cause. Hence the fourth alternative also fails to help us. This is what happens with respect to 'long', 'short' also. The index finger is 'long' when it is referred to the thumb, but that same finger is 'short' when referred to the middle finger. By itself it is neither long nor short. Longness and shortness are thus not self-established and so cannot be established by another. The other two alternatives too are of no avail in establishing their existence. It is well said :

Na dīrghe' stīha dīrghatvān na hrasve nāpi ca dvaye;
tasmād asiddham śūnyatvāt sad ity ākhyāyate kva hi.

hrasvam pratīya siddham dīrgham dīrgham pratīya hrasvam api;
na kiñcid asti siddham vyavahāraśād vadanty evam.

[There is nothing like longness in what is (called) long, nor in what is (called) short, nor in both. Hence longness is not established. Being (thus) void where possibly could it be regarded as existent? 'Long' is established in dependence on 'short', and 'short' is established in dependence on 'long'. Nothing is in fact an established entity; people talk of things as if they were established under the compulsion of practical necessity (i. e. to carry on their empirical dealings)] (1692).

Approaching the problem of reality from another point of view, one may ask: Are existence and jar one or different? If they are one i. e. non-different, whatever has existence would be a jar and so all the things in the world would be of the nature of the one jar. And then cloth, etc. which are non-jar could not exist at all, everything existent being of the nature of jar. Or to put it differently, the jar would not only be jar but also everything else (ghataḥ sarvātmakaḥ). Or, existence being identical with jar, that alone would exist and nothing other than it. Or even that would not exist; for 'jar' is so called only because it is the counter-positive of 'non-jar'; but if this 'non-jar' is not there, jar too will cease to exist. Hence there is but void. If jar and existence are different, then being devoid of existence, jar, like ass's horn, would not be existent. Existence means being existent. If existence be absolutely different from the existent jar, etc. which are its support, then it would be non-existence; for the attribute, the supported can never exist apart from the supporter, the substratum. As none of these alternatives is possible, jar and all like objects are undefinable or utterly void (1693).

There is no sense in discussing anything about that which is not produced, e. g. ass's horn. But even of what is produced, causality does not stand the test of reason, and so it too is void. What is produced cannot be produced, as it has been already produced, e. g. jar. If even a produced thing can be produced, then there would be no end to this repeated origination. What is non-produced, that too cannot be produced; otherwise we

would have to accept the origination of non-existence, e. g. ass's horn, as it too is non-produced. Even produced-non-produced cannot be produced, for the difficulties of both the above alternatives would be present here. But, is there any such thing as 'produced-non-produced'? If it exists, it can be called 'produced' alone, and not both. If it does not exist, it can be 'non-produced' only. And the difficulties in either case have been pointed out. So also, 'what is being produced' cannot be produced, for it too if existent should be classified under 'produced', and if not existent under 'non-produced', and the same difficulties would present themselves. It has been said :

gatañ na gamyate tãvad agatañ naiva gamyate;
gatãgata-vinirmuktañ gamyamãnañ na gamyate.

(Mãdhyamika-kãrikã 2. 1) — 'If motion has already taken place, the question of motion does not arise at all; and it does not arise even if it has not taken place. And the condition other than 'motion' and 'non-motion' (the process of motion, what is being gone through) is not found.' Thus, as causality does not stand to reason, the world should be regarded as void (1694).

Another argument can be advanced to demonstrate the inconsistency of the concept of causality — which leads to the view that everything is void. The inherent (or material or constituent — *hetu*) and the instrumental (*pratyaya*) are the causes held responsible for the production of a thing. And it is held that the constituent and the instrumental causes taken severally cannot produce the effect. But if the capacity to cause or originate does not exist in each factor of the full causal apparatus, how can it exist in the total causal apparatus as pointed out earlier too? Then there would be no effect and the causal-apparatus too would not exist and the world would be void. It is said :

Hetu-pratyaya-sãmagrĩ-prthagbhãveṣv adarśanãt;
tena te nãbhilãpyã hi bhãvãḥ sarve svabhãvataḥ.
loke yãvat samjñã sãmagryãm eva drśyate yasmãt;
tasmãd na santi bhãvã bhãve' sati nãsti sãmagrĩ.

— The effect is not found in the constituent cause and the instrumental cause severally and till the effect, e. g. jar, is not produced it cannot be called jar, etc.; hence by nature it is undefinable. Whatever nomenclature we find in the world is with reference to the total (causal) apparatus, hence things do not exist. And if things do not exist the causal apparatus too does not exist (1695).

What is imperceptible is, like the ass's horn, unreal. But even if we take into consideration perceptible things, they are not indivisible wholes, they are made up of parts. Roughly speaking everything has a fore part, middle and hind part. The latter two are not visible as they are covered from view by the fore part. The fore part too can be infinitely divided into parts so that these will be just atoms and so not perceptible. Therefore things like post, etc. cannot be perceived in reality. Being non-perceived they are unreal like the ass's horn. This again proves that everything is void. It is said :

Yāvad drśyam paras tāvad bhāgaḥ sa ca na drśyate;
tena te nābhilāpyā hi bhāvāḥ sarve svabhāvataḥ.

—‘Of what is perceptible, the hind part is not seen. Thus all things are by nature undefinable’. By such reasoning Vyakta argues out a case in favour of the unreality of all things. The Vedas, on the other hand, refer to the existence of things. On account of this, Vyakta has a doubt as to the existence or non-existence of things in reality (1696).

After having set forth the doubt in Vyakta's mind, Mahāvīra shows that this doubt itself does not hold good in that context. If, as Vyakta argues, there are no objects whatsoever in the world, no one would entertain a doubt as to their existence or otherwise. No one even for a while has any doubt regarding sky-flower or ass's horn. Doubt can arise only with respect to existing things as when we say ‘Is this a man or a post?’ If everything is regarded as unreal, no special reason can be adduced on account of which doubt as regards man-post is justified but does not present itself in respect of sky-flower. It could have

been equally possible to have a doubt regarding sky-flower and no doubt in respect of man-post—just the opposite of what we have at present. But this is not what we find. It follows that everything is not non-existent like sky-flower (1697–98).

The doubt with regard to man-post can be justified. Things are known to us by any of the three means of valid knowledge—perception, inference, verbal testimony. Doubt can arise only where knowledge is possible. But how can there be any doubt with regard to things which cannot be known by any of the means of knowledge? This explains why we entertain doubts as to man-post, but not with regard to sky-flower (1699).

Doubt, error, indefinite knowledge, definite knowledge etc., are all modes of knowledge which can arise only in dependence on an object. So where there is no object, there is no knowledge and hence no doubt or error or any of these modes of knowledge. But there is doubt, as Vyakta says, and hence there is knowledge which invariably presupposes the existence of objects e.g. post, man. It may be argued that the example is fallacious—an inadmissible (asiddha) one for the existence of post or man has not been established. But then there would be no doubt also. Thus the existence of objects can be inferred on the basis of the existence of doubt (1700–1701).

It can be argued that there is no such rule that a doubt cannot arise if no object is existent. A sleeping man has nothing beside him that can be the object of his knowledge, and yet he doubts, 'Is this an elephant or a mountain?' This means that doubts can arise even when there are no objects. But it should be noted that even in a dream doubt is caused by memory, etc., of what was perceived or experienced earlier or due to any such factor; it never operates where there is absolute negation of all existence. Dreams too cannot originate without the instrumentality of some such factors: something experienced in the waking condition, e.g. bathing, eating, anointing, etc; or something perceived at some time—elephant, horse, etc; or something one thinks about very often or worries about, e.g. inability to attain one's

beloved; or something heard of—heaven, hell, etc; or disorder of the humours—wind, bile, phlegm; some deity, favourable or otherwise; marshy land. Or merit may be the cause of a good dream; or demerit of an evil or inauspicious dream. This shows that even a dream is something positive; if that is so, how can we say that the world is void? (1702–1703).

Other reasons too can be adduced to show that dreams are positive in nature: Dream is positive, because it is of the nature of knowledge, like the knowledge of a jar; or dream is positive, because like a pot, it is brought about by instrumental factors — any of those mentioned above (1704).

Moreover, if there were non-existence of everything, how could we distinguish between dream and non-dream, true and false; Gandharva-city (City of Illusion) and the city of Pātāliputra; what is literally true (e.g. a real lion) and what is figurative (e.g. man-lion)? How could we speak in terms of effect, cause, what is to be established and what is the reason which establishes, doer, speaker, statement (whether it has three members in the syllogism or five) and what is to be stated (i. e. the intent of the statement)? And how could we accept one view as our own and say that the other view is another's. If everything were void, non-existent, how could we use such expressions even under the compulsion of practical necessity? And how could it have been determined that Earth is solid, Water fluid, Fire hot, Wind moving and Ether colourless (formless or incorporeal); and that sound, etc. are respectively the objects of the organ of hearing, etc.? (1705–7).

If everything were void or non-existent, everything should be alike and there could not be any classification of the type of dream — non-dream, etc.; or things could have been determined in just the opposite way — a dream could have been non-dream and vice versa, or Water could have been solid and Earth fluid; or there should have been no cognition whatsoever in the absence of an object. If it is argued that all this nomenclature, etc. and inconsistency with respect to cognition, etc. are themselves due to bhrānti, error or illusion, then the reply is that it is

not so, for cognitions are determined by place, time, nature, etc.. Again is this bhrānti itself real or not? If it is real it goes against Vyakta's view of the unreality of everything; and if it is unreal, the cognitions of objects as existent are free from error and so objects are real. Hence it is wiser to give up the doctrine of the non-existence of things and regard things as existent. And if one clings to the view that everything is void, there is no strong point which could lead to the conviction that knowledge of the void is correct and knowledge of the existence of objects is not. If everything be void, it would not even be possible to distinguish in this way (1708).

Vyakta has argued that a thing cannot be established by itself or by another, or by both or by anything other than these. To controvert this, Mahāvīra says, if everything is non-existent there cannot be the notions of 'self' ('itself') and 'another'. And if these do not exist, Vyakta cannot establish that things do not exist by the above argument based on 'itself', 'other', 'both', 'other than these'. Moreover, it is contradictory to say on the one hand that the existence of things is relative (short-long) and on the other to point out that a thing cannot be established by itself, other, etc. And it is not quite correct to say that the existence of things is only relative; things also have the efficiency to produce knowledge regarding themselves and this itself is a mark of their existence. 'Short', etc. give rise to knowledge concerning themselves and so they must be existent; they should not be looked upon as non-existent. If the finger which is unreal can be short or long when referred to another, then even the ass's horn should be spoken of as 'long' or 'short', as the two cases are parallel; or the index-finger should be short by itself with reference to itself, because non-existence holds good everywhere. But this is not what we find. The fact is that the finger exists in its own right. It has numerous attributes which become manifest as they have in their vicinity a corresponding auxiliary cause. But if the finger were utterly non-existent, it could not have been short or long only because it was referred to another and the alternatives of 'itself', 'other', etc.

would not be possible. This is true of all things. The Nihilist, again, cannot argue that he himself does not accept the notions of 'itself', 'other', etc, but he utilises them because they are accepted by his rival thinker;—that he speaks of them only from the opponent's point of view. The Nihilist forgets that for him there is nothing like one's own view and another's; and if he accepts this, he should give up his stand regarding Nihilism (1709).

Vyakta has argued that nothing has existence, there is merely the void and that our empirical knowledge of 'long', 'short', etc. arises only relatively. A thing is called 'long' or 'short' only when it is referred to another. Now, do the two cognitions of 'long', 'short' occur simultaneously or one after the other? If simultaneously, the two cognisables appear in their own knowledge independently and one could not possibly depend on the other. If they take place one after the other, the index finger, to take an instance, has appeared as 'short' in its own cognition which occurs first and so does not need to depend on the other cognition, viz. of the middle finger as 'long'. And to cut the matter short, can you point out anything on which the very first cognition of a newly born child as it opens its eyes depends? And if two objects are alike in all respects like the two eyes and if they are cognised simultaneously, they appear in their own nature in their own cognitions and no mutual dependence of these two cognitions could be thought of. The fact is that objects appear in their own nature in their respective cognitions without reference to another; and at a later stage when we have the curiosity to inquire into the details regarding form, etc. we are helped by auxiliary factors like the memory of their pratipakṣa (opposite) and thus by a synthesis we speak of the object as 'long' or 'short'. But all things are existent in their own right— are self-established (1710-1711).

If, as Vyakta says, there is sheer Nihilism, all objects are equal in being unreal. In that case why has he to explain the knowledge 'long' with regard to the middle finger by referring

to short objects like the index finger, etc. Why cannot a thing be called 'long' with reference to a long object, or even a sky-flower when everything is equally unreal and non-existent; or why by referring things to a sky-flower do we not call things 'long' or 'short'? But this is not found to be the case. So Nihilism cannot be accepted and reality of things has to be admitted (1712).

If Nihilism be accepted, even the concept of relativity should not be accepted as it is not consistent with the fundamental doctrine of Nihilism. It cannot be asserted that it is the very nature of things to be called relatively 'short' or 'long' and nature (svabhāva) cannot be questioned. Who is to be questioned as to why fire burns and not ether (agnir dahati nākāsam k'otra paryanuyujatām)? If the Nihilist were to put forth this argument, his case would be doomed. Nature or svabhāva is one's own existence or character. Here there is distinction between 'itself' and 'another' and this militates against the doctrine of Nihilism. Moreover if everything were unreal, would it be possible to discuss and argue in terms of one's own nature (svabhāva)? Can you ever imagine the essential nature of the 'barren woman's son' or of any such thing utterly non-existent? Only existent things can have svabhāva, their own nature. Thus Nihilism stands refuted (1713).

Mahāvīra himself is not against relativity as such. We may know things as, or call them, 'short' or 'long'. But the very existence of things does not depend on anything. And the qualities of things e. g. colour, form, taste, etc. too as distinct from the relative ones — 'shortness', 'longness', etc. are self-established, not relative. The existence of these does not depend on anything and hence they cannot be regarded as non-existent. Hence the doctrine of Nihilism cannot be upheld (1714).

Were even existence, etc. relative, the long thing itself would perish if the 'short' did not exist. But this is not what we find; the thing would exist even then, only it would not be called 'long'. This shows that existence, colour and such

attributes are self-established, and so Nihilism cannot hold good (1715).

Even Dependence or relativity has reference to depending, depender, that depended upon; these will have to be accepted as existent, so Nihilism is out of question (1716).

Certain things in the world are regarded as being self-established, e. g. cloud which is the result of a particular arrangement of the basic substance, but does not depend on any doer or maker; some things are extrinsically established, e. g. jar made by a potter; some are established in both the ways, e. g. man, determined by his parents and also by his own karman; others are eternally established, e. g. ether. This consideration is from the empirical point of view (1717).

But from the real or ultimate stand-point everything is self-established, intrinsically established; the instrumental factors it depends upon are external to it; this can be seen from the fact that even when such external agencies exist a thing which has no essence in itself, e. g. ass's horn, does not come into existence for it is itself not intrinsically established. A person arrives at the truth by a proper consideration of both the points of view — empirical and ultimate or real (1718).

The very fact that Vyakta could ask as to the identity or otherwise of jar and existence implies that they are real and existent; and that he is discussing merely the modes. If it was not so, why did he not say anything regarding ass's horn or barren woman's son being identical or not with existence? (1719).

A similar question can be asked, 'Are jar and the Void identical or not?' If the Void is something different from the jar, what is it? We see merely the jar and nothing else over and above it called the Void? If they be identical, even then it is the jar that should be admitted, for it is amenable to perception and no attribute of it called Void is cognised (1720).

Again, is the Nihilist identical or not with the conception, 'All the three worlds are void' and the expression of it? If he is identical, then Nihilism stands refuted for identity is an existent fact as in the case of 'treeness' and 'simśapāness'. If he is not identical, then the Nihilist is devoid of knowledge and speech, and under these circumstances how could he possibly prove Nihilism; a heap of stones cannot argue out a case? (1721).

Vyakta had argued that if jar and existence were identical, everything would be of the nature of jar; or as the contradictory non-jar would be non-existent, jar itself would cease to exist.* Mahāvīra's rejoinder is that 'existence of the jar' is an attribute of the jar and identical with it, but it is certainly different from all the other things, cloth, etc.. Hence when it is said that the jar exists it does not necessarily mean that the jar alone exists, for everything does have its own existence. Thus this reasoning of Vyakta or of any Nihilist has no force. This also shows that the existence of jar will not serve as an obstruction to the existence of other things for each thing has an independent existence of its own (1722-3).

The sum and substance of the argument is that 'existence of jar' is an attribute of the jar alone, and is different from cloth, etc., is not found in them. When we talk of existence in general terms it may be referred to jar or non-jar. But when it is specifically said, 'Jar exists' it can refer to the jar alone. This can be clarified by giving an example: 'Tree' refers to mango and non-mango trees; but 'mango-tree' necessarily means a tree and not a non-tree for the latter can never be a mango-tree (1724).

Vyakta had said that neither the produced nor the non-produced, nor the produced-non-produced, nor the being produced can be produced. Such a thinker may be asked what is that thing which he regards as produced? If this something is admitted by him then Nihilism falls to the ground and all

* See Gāthā 1693 and its commentary.

this discussion regarding the inconsistency of causality is in vain. Moreover if this thing be a produced one, how could it be called 'non-produced' by these alternatives; and it would be self-contradictory as one and the same thing cannot be both produced and non-produced. And if this 'produced' be something unreal, then the alternatives regarding 'produced', etc., will not have anything to stand upon. If it could be possible to think in terms of such alternatives even of non-existent things Vyakta or any one should have discussed sky-flower which is non-existent in the same fashion. As said before (see Gāthā 1708) if everything is equally non-existent the situation could have been the reverse of what is at present, viz dream could be non-dream and vice versa; or produced and non-produced should be of the same kind or what is produced should be non-produced and vice versa and so on. It cannot also be argued by the Nihilist that he discusses these alternatives of 'produced', 'non-produced', etc., not because he accepts them as such, but because he wants to defeat the opponent on his own ground, for if he accepts 'own' view and 'other's view' that would be giving the lie to Nihilism (1725).

Mahāvīra argues that even our commonsense tells us that things must be produced. A thing becomes perceptible only after its birth, its production; it was not cognised before and again will not be cognised when with the passage of time it has perished. This shows that production is an established fact (1726).

By the above-mentioned alternatives, even the knowledge (conception, idea) that everything is void, and its expression can be proved to be non-produced; yet the idea and its expression have necessarily to be somehow taken as 'produced'. Similarly all things can be looked upon as produced, whether the alternatives are applied or not. If the knowledge and its expression are not accepted as produced, the void will not be propounded by anything (1727).

Vyakta could disprove the concept of causality by dialectical reasoning. But Mahāvīra has the advantage of his

non-absolutism according to which causality can be explained in the case of things, produced, non-produced, both and those being produced while there may be some things which are not produced at all. As possessed of colour the jar as produced is produced, for colour in the earth exists even earlier; from the point of view of shape the same jar as non-produced is produced, for shape did not exist in the lump of clay. From both these points of view, the jar as produced-non-produced is produced. The past has perished and the future is still unborn; no activity is possible in these; it is possible only in the present; so it is the jar that is being produced that will have to be admitted as produced. But there are things that cannot be said to have been produced from the point of view of any of these alternatives. As for example, a jar that was produced in the past cannot possibly be produced again; so it can never be produced and the produced jar can never be produced in the form of another's mode, for instance, as cloth. Again, the already produced jar which is already produced from the point of view of its own modes and non-produced from the point of view of the modes of another, cannot be produced, for it is already produced on the one hand and cannot be produced as another's mode on the other. Thus even the produced-non-produced can never be produced. The jar that is 'being produced' as jar can never be produced as cloth. Thus causality can be explained or not according to the point of view we adopt in viewing it (1728-1730).

The sky again is not produced at all as it is eternally produced or existent. To sum up, things are not produced as the basic substance as it is always there; and these alternatives apply to the modes as pointed out above (1731).

As to Vyakta's argument that all effect is produced out of the causal apparatus, but if everything is non-existent there is no question of this apparatus,—Mahāvīra's reply is that this statement is quite contradictory, for utterance as the effect and throat, lips, palate, etc. as the causal apparatus are directly perceived. The Nihilist can still say that owing to the illusion caused by Avidyā, even what is non-existent appears as existent

for it is said: "Owing to attachment, dream, fear, intoxication, illusion caused by Avidyā, people see things even though they are really non-existent, e. g. woolly substance when the eyes are pressed with the finger". (Kāmasvapnabhayonmādair avidyopaplavāt tathā; paśyanty asantam apy arthain keṣoṇḍukādivat). But can the Nihilist explain why all things being equally non-existent, we do not perceive the causal complement of the hair of the tortoise, but we do perceive that of speech? If the doctrine of the void is true and if everything is equally non-existent and unreal, there is no reason why the causal complement of all should not be perceived, or that of the hair of the tortoise should not be perceived while that of speech is perceived (1732).

Moreover do the speaker equipped with the causal complement (chest, head, throat, lips, palate, etc.) and his utterance exist or not? If they do Nihilism is out of the question. If they do not and if everything is non-existent, there would be no one to make the statement, 'The world is void' and no one to hear it (1733).

If the Nihilist says that this is exactly the position, there is no speaker, no statement, nothing about which a statement can be made, that everything is void,—he may be asked if this statement of his is true or false; if it is true, Nihilism stands disproved; and if it is false, it will have no validity and will not be able to establish Nihilism. If in spite of this Nihilism is somehow accepted, even then is this acceptance true or false? In either case there will be the same difficulty; even otherwise acceptance would presuppose the existence of the one who accepts, the acceptance and the thing to be accepted, which again would go against the doctrine of Nihilism (1734-1735).

If non-existence of all is accepted, all our empirical dealings and behaviour will be upset, will crumble down. Everything being equally non-existent, we should be in a position to obtain oil from grains of sand also and not necessarily from sesamum seeds. And the entire assemblage of effects

could be obtained from the causal complement in the form of sky-flower. But this is not what we find; our experience is that an effect arises from a particular thing alone as the cause and this cannot be true if Nihilism is accepted (1736).

Moreover there is no invariable rule that everything must be produced out of the causal complement. Bodies of binaries, etc. having space-points are made of two or more atoms; but the atom is devoid of space-point and so is not produced by anything and yet it is existent as can be inferred from its effect as the *liṅga* (mark). It has been said : The atom can be inferred from corporeal things; it is without space-point, it is the final cause, is eternal, has one taste, one colour, one odour and two kinds of touch. It can be inferred from its effect (*mūrtair aṅur apradeśaḥ kāraram antyam bhavet tathā nityaḥ; ekarasa-varṇa-gandho dvisparśaḥ kārya-lingāś ca*).

If even the atom is regarded as having space-point we will have to go still backwards, but will have to stop somewhere and that will be the atom. But even that will contradict the supposed rule that everything is produced by the causal apparatus (1737).

If *Vyakta* says that the atoms do not exist at all as they are not produced by the complement of causal factors, then it means that *Vyakta* is contradicting himself as he himself has previously said that everything is observed to be produced by the complement of causal factors, and the existence of these could not be explained in the absence of atoms. That would be as self-contradictory as saying, 'All statements are false'. Moreover if atoms do not exist, should the world of effects be explained as produced out of sky-flowers? Therefore if it is believed that everything is produced out of the causal apparatus, atoms must exist (1738).

As to the argument that the hind part of a thing is not seen, only its fore-part is seen and so on* leading to Nihilism, there is contradiction even here, for it is admitted that the fore-part is cognised and yet upheld that it does not

* See *Gāthā* 1696.

exist. It cannot even be said that everything being non-existent the cognition of the fore-part is illusory; for if it be so, all things being equally non-existent, there should be the cognition, though illusory of the fore part of the ass's horn. Either both must be cognised, as they are equally non-existent, or there should be just the reverse situation, viz the fore part of ass's horn should be cognised and the fore part of pillar, etc. should not be seen. But this is not what we find and so it cannot be accepted that everything is void (1739).

What an inference is this, 'The fore-part too does not exist, for the hind part is not seen'? How can one set aside by inference what is established by direct perception? One can never demonstrate by inference that fire is cold. It would be more reasonable to say 'The hind part exists because the fore part is cognised; 'Fore-part' is relative, it can exist only if the hind part is there; if the fore part is cognised, its existence establishes that of the hind part too. It is not also reasonable to imagine a fore part of this fore part and so on infinitely unless the existence of the hind part is admitted. Moreover it cannot be said that a thing does not exist simply because it is not perceived. Non-perception can be accounted for in a number of ways (1740).

If everything is non-existent, how can one talk of fore, hind or middle parts; it cannot be from another's point of view also for with Nihilism there cannot be anything like one's own or another's point of view. If such parts are accepted Nihilism cannot be admitted; and if they are not admitted, there is no sense in imagining such parts of a non-existent thing as in the case of ass's horn. If everything is void, why is the fore part alone seen and not the hind part? Why is there not non-perception of both or the reverse position, viz the hind part being seen and not the fore part? (1741-43).

If it be accepted as a rule that a thing does not exist if it is not seen then the existence of crystal, etc. will have to be recognised as their hind part is seen; if even their existence is not admitted then the reason 'because it is not perceived'

will not be a reason at all; instead one should say, 'Because nothing is perceived'. Even this inference that 'Everything is void, because nothing is perceived' will contradict what Vyakta has said before, viz. 'because the fore part is perceived'; again, town, river, jar, cloth, etc. are perceived by all, so it would be contradictory to perception to say that nothing is perceived. Thus Nihilism cannot be established.

Somebody might argue that a reason (hetu) to be valid need not be present in all homologous (similar) cases, but must be absent in all heterologous (dissimilar) cases; e. g. 'sound is non-eternal, because it is produced by effort'. All non-eternal things are not produced by effort, e. g. lightning, cloud, flower, etc.; yet this reason is not found in any heterologous case, as there is no eternal thing which depends on effort for its production; eternal things, in fact, have no origination, so effort is out of question. Similarly, here too 'non-perception of the hind part' may not be present in void (śūnya) things like crystal, etc., but it is found in a great many cases and so can be regarded as a valid reason. The rejoinder to this is that in the case of 'because of non-perception', the negative statement of the universal rule (vyatireka-vyāpti) cannot be established, as in that of the argument given as an instance. It is quite proper to say: 'What is not non-internal is not also produced by effort, e. g. ether'. But would it be right to say: 'Wherever the Void does not exist, there is not also the non-perception of the hind-part'? Where can this be demonstrated if nothing whatsoever is existent? Hence it will have to be admitted that 'because the hind part is not perceived' is not a valid reason (1744-5).

If it is said that the hind and the middle parts do not exist as they are not perceived, and relatively to them the fore part too does not exist, this is not proper for even here there will be the contingency of the acceptance of the existence of sense-organs and object which are indispensable for perception; and if they are admitted as existent, one cannot talk of Nihilism in the same breath. Or 'because of non-perception'

should not be adduced as a reason to establish Nihilism, for the nomenclature 'perceptible' or 'non-perceptible' does not hold good in the absence of sense-organs and object (1746).

Again, 'because it is not perceived' is an inconclusive reason. There are things which are not perceived and yet are existent, e. g. Vyakta's cognition of the nature of doubt, etc. If even this is non-existent, then what is the void, whose is it, by whom is it cognised? If Vyakta has not this doubt, then no one else has it and the discussion ends here since the existence of village, town, etc. is acceptable to all the others (1747).

Mahāvīra thus refutes all the arguments of Vyakta. By way of instruction he proceeds to say that one should never entertain a doubt regarding perceptible things like Earth, Water, Fire as one does not doubt one's own nature. Air too is perceptible as its quality touch can be felt, like a jar. Or one may say that Air and Ether are not perceptible, so one may doubt their existence. But it is possible to establish even their existence by inference. Touch, sound, health, shaking, etc. are qualities of Vāyu (or arising from Vāyu), so they must have a substratum, though it be imperceptible, and Vāyu (Air) is this substratum. Therefore Vāyu is existent. Similarly there must be a container, receptacle, support of Earth, Water, Fire, Air, because they are corporeal, as jar is the receptacle of water; the container of these is *clearly** Ether. If it is said that no example can be adduced for this inference as the example would be a part of what is to be proved, then we could have inferences of this type: 'Earth must have a container, because it is corporeal, like Water; Water must have a container, as it is corporeal, like Fire, and so on (1748-50).

These five elements are thus vouched for by the means of cognition and should be recognised as existent. They are animate, possessed of sentiency or soul till they are injured or struck by weapons; they are the support of the body and are enjoyed by the soul in a number of ways. Earth, Water, Fire, Air are

*There is a pun on the word Vyakta (Vyakta, Suvyakta). Vyakta should have a clear knowledge of things and not doubt,

possessed of a soul, as the characteristics of the soul are observed in them; whereas Ether is only the support or container of the soul, but is itself not possessed of a soul as it is incorporeal (1751-2).

Instances can be cited to show that characteristics of the soul are observed in earth, etc.. Trees are animate, since they, like women, have birth, old age, life, death, healing of wounds, foods, a queer fancy for things during pregnancy, sickness, cure, etc.. It can be said that this reason is inconclusive, for even inanimate things are said to be born, etc; e.g. curds are produced, live poison, dead potion of safflower (kusumbhaka); — and yet these are not animate. But it must be noted that in curds, etc. all the characteristics are not observed as in the case of human beings, hence such expressions are merely figurative in respect of curds, etc: — as if produced, as if live, as if dead; but trees like human beings manifest all the characteristics and so they are animate. The shy plant contracts itself the moment it is touched exactly as a worm would do; creepers move to trees, etc. for support; Śami, etc. are known to have the characteristics of animate beings — sleep, waking, contraction, etc.. And it is known that Bakula, Aśoka, Kurabaka, Virahaka, Campaka, Tilaka enjoy in their seasons, sound, beauty, fragrance, taste, touch respectively. This holds good of Kūṣmāṇḍī, Bijapūraka and such other trees in respect of their pregnancy—longing. Further, trees, corals, lavaṇa (salt) upala (precious stone, rock) as long as they are in their own birth—place, are not uprooted from their source, are animate, for they are known to sprout forth, as flesh sprouts forth in piles. Mahāvīra wants to prove that earth is animate; yet he has spoken of trees first and then of earth in the form of coral, salt, rock as animate for two reasons: Trees are known as the modification of earth; secondly the characteristics of the soul are manifest to a greater degree in trees than in rocks, etc.. Earth is thus shown to be animate (1753-6).

Water is animate, for water akin to the earth springs up naturally when the earth is dug; or water of the atmosphere is animate as it forms itself into clouds and falls. Vāyu without

being goaded by another, moves about horizontally in the different directions as it likes, like a bull, so it is animate, Fire is animate for like human beings it grows stronger or weaker according as it is fed (fuelled). In general, the four elements—Earth, Water, Fire, Air are bodies brought about by the soul, are its support, are corporeal and are different from transformations such as clouds, etc.—these latter are excluded as they are aggregates of bodies that are loose and not modified. These elements are animate as can be seen from their colour, odour, taste, touch, etc. if they are not injured, cleft asunder by weapons; but are inanimate when thus struck (1757–1759).

There is another point to be considered. Numerous souls attain emancipation; and it is admitted that no new soul is born; this would mean that a time would very soon come when there would be an end of all worldly existence, as the world is of limited dimensions and only a few gross souls can live in it. But this does not happen for there are souls with one organ, e. g. trees, etc. No thinker of any school admits that the world will one day come to an end. This means that an infinite number of souls will have to be admitted, and they must be embodied—having the elements as their support, they are born in it. Where can such souls live but in trees, etc.? Hence trees, etc. are animate (1760–1).

One should not fear that because earth, etc. are so crowded with souls, there would be *hiṃsā* (injury) at every step whether one wills it or not. It has been pointed out earlier that what is struck by a weapon is not possessed of a soul. There will not be injury simply because the world is crowded with souls. It is the intention that ultimately matters. From the real point of view, a man does not become a ‘killer’ only because he has killed or because the world is crowded with souls, or remain innocent only because he has not killed physically, or because souls are sparse. Even if a person does not actually kill, he becomes a killer if he has the intention to kill; while a doctor has to cause pain, but is still non-injurious, innocent, because his intention is pure. A wise man equipped with the five *Samitis*

and the three Guptis and practising restraint thereby, is non-injurious; not one who is of just the opposite type. Such a man of restraint is not regarded as injurious irrespective of whether he kills or hurts or does not; for it is the intention that is the deciding factor, not the external act which is inconclusive. From the real point of view it is the evil intention that is hiṃsā (injury) whether it materialises into an evil act of injuring or not. There can be non-injury even when the external act of injury has been committed and injury even when it has not been committed. (1762-6).

Does this mean that the external act of killing is never injury? Much depends on the evil intention. That external act of killing which is the cause of an evil effect, or is caused by evil intention is hiṃsā (injury). But that which is not caused by evil intentions or does not result in an evil effect is not hiṃsā in the case of the above-mentioned wise man. For example, sounds, etc. do not rouse the passions of a man free from attraction and infatuation because his mind or intention is pure, undefiled. A good man does not have infatuation for his mother however beautiful she may be; similarly, the external act of injury is not hiṃsā in the case of a man of a pure mind. Thus that the world is crowded with souls does not mean that there is hiṃsā at every step. Therefore there are five elements, and of these the first four are possessed of soul. As to the statement that 'everything is comparable to a dream', that does not mean what Vyakta took it to mean — that everything is non-existent. It is only meant to prevent worldly souls capable of being emancipated from being stupefied by over-attachment to worldly objects like wealth, gold, son, wife; 'comparable to dream' does not mean that they are unreal, non-existent; but that there is no worth in them, one should not lodge all faith in them, but must strive for emancipation. But the things of the world do exist (1767-8).

When Vyakta was convinced by Mahāvīra of the impropriety of his doubt and of the reality of things, he became a monk along with his five hundred followers (1769).

5. SUDHARMAN — REGARDING SIMILARITY OF THE OTHER LIFE TO THIS ONE

Hearing that all these had become monks Sudharmā too decided to approach Lord Mahāvīra respectfully. As he approached, the Lord addressed him by his name and gotra as Sudharmā Agniveśyāyana, and told him about the doubt in his mind. It is said in the Veda that after death a man remains a man and animals continue as animals (*puruṣo mṛtaḥ san puruṣatvam evā'snute, paśavaḥ paśutvam*). Further, it is also said that he who is cremated along with the faces is reborn a jackal (*śṛgālo vai eṣa jāyate yaḥ sapurīṣo dahyate*). Owing to such conflicting statements Sudharmā had a doubt whether man's condition in the other world or life is similar to that in this world or dissimilar to it. But this was so because he did not understand the true meaning of the Vedic statements which Mahāvīra explained to him at the end of the discussion (1770-2).

Sudharmā's line of argument is that the effect is in agreement with the cause, e. g. barley-sprout with the barley-seed. This-worldly existence or life is the cause of another birth which must, therefore, be similar to it. Hence a man must be reborn as a man only and so on (1773).

But this is not so. There is no universal rule that the effect must be in agreement with the cause, for Śara springs even from Śṛṅga and a kind of grass Bhūṛṅga springs out of it only when it is besmeared with Sarsapa (mustard). Dūrvā grass springs from the hairs of cattle and sheep. Thus Vṛkṣāyurveda (Botany) tells us that diverse herbs spring from the combination of different substances. Again in Yoniprābhṛta where there is a description of yonis (wombs, sources), we can see that diverse things like serpent, lion, etc. and jewels, gold, etc. are produced out of the combination of a number

of diverse substances. Hence it cannot be said that the effect must invariably be in agreement with the cause (1774-5).

Or even because the effect is recognised to be in agreement with the cause, condition in another existence should be different in respect of caste, family, strength, dignity, etc. from what it is in this one. Not man, but karman is the seed, cause of the sprout in the form of other-worldly existence and karmans are diverse in nature as they have diverse causes. If karmans be admitted and also recognised as diverse in nature, their fruit in the form of worldly existence as denizens of hell, lower creatures or human beings or gods for the transmigratory soul too must be recognised as correspondingly diverse. The causes of karmans are diverse, viz. mithyātva (perversity, predilection for the untruth), avirati (intense attachment, non-abstinence), pramāda (spiritual inertia), kaṣāya (passions) and yoga (activity) and so their effects or fruits must be accordingly diverse (1776-8).

The inference is as follows: The transmigration of souls as denizens of hell, and so on is diverse, as it is the fruit or effect of karmans which are diverse, like the diverse fruit in this world of actions which are of different kinds e.g. fruit of agriculture, etc. (1779).

That karman is diverse can be seen from the fact that it is a modification of pudgala (matter) just like the external modifications as clouds or like the modifications of Earth, etc.. What has not diverse modifications is not also a modification of pudgala, e.g. Ākāśa. Karmans are all alike in being modifications of pudgala, yet their peculiarity in being āvaraṇa (cover) etc. should be accounted for by the diversity of their causes, viz. mithyātva (perversity), etc. (the common ones) and hatred of the wise and such others which are the special causes (1780).

Or, if as Sudharmā argued, the other-worldly existence be admitted to be similar to the present worldly existence, and if action in this-worldly existence be diverse—good and evil—then the fruit of action in the other-worldly existence must

be correspondingly diverse. That is to say, it is but evident that men perform different kinds of actions which can lead them to hell, heaven, etc.; if they are expected to experience the fruits of these actions in another world, then there should be found the same diversity and dissimilarity among these beings in the other world as was found in this world. As one is in this world (performer of good or sinful action and therefore one who binds good or sinful karman) so will he be in the other world (enjoyer of good or sinful karman) (1781-2).

It can be argued here that action yields fruit only in this world and not in another, that is to say, agriculture, etc. can bear fruit in this world, but acts of charity, etc. which are for another world cannot bear any fruit in the other world; consequently there would be no fruit in the other world, and hence no dissimilarity in the conditions. But here the rival thinker forgets that in that case the similarity of the souls he is driving at will not be possible, since karman is the cause of the soul's birth in another life, while the fruit of karman in another world is not recognised by him. It cannot be said that a soul is born in a similar state in another world even without karman. For in that case, it would be as good as saying that similarity is produced even without any cause and at the same time there would be the loss or destruction of karman which is the result of acts of charity, injury etc. which are already accomplished. Or there would be the contingency of there being no karman at all; for acts of charity, injury, etc. would be looked upon as fruitless; karman would not be binding and in the absence of the cause; the other-worldly existence would not be there, leave alone similarity in it. If the other-worldly existence be admitted in spite of there being no karman, it would be without any cause; if even this be admitted, then that worldly existence would come to an end too without any cause and all efforts at the practice of austerity, self-control etc. would be useless. And if worldly existence is looked upon as uncaused, then dissimilarity of souls too can be looked upon as uncaused for the position is the

same in the two cases. There is no reason why they should be looked upon only as similar and not as dissimilar (1783-4).

One may feel like saying that the other-worldly existence can occur just naturally even when there is no karman just as the effect, jar, befitting the cause, lump of earth, emerges just naturally, without any karman. The other-worldly existence in the form of a series of similar births of creatures will emerge just naturally. There can be nothing wrong in this. But one should bear in mind that even the jar is not produced just naturally; it requires the agent, the causal apparatus etc. so here too the agent soul stands in need of some instrument for the effect in the form of body, etc. of the other-worldly existence, and that should be distinct from the agent and the effect as the causal apparatus wheel, etc., is distinct from the potter and the jar. The causal apparatus that the soul requires for bringing into effect body, etc. is karman. It cannot be argued that jar, etc. may have agents like the potter, etc. because they are directly perceived; but the effect, body, etc. will come into existence just naturally like the modifications, clouds, etc. and hence karman cannot be established. One should bear in mind that body, etc. cannot come into existence naturally since they have a beginning and a definite shape, like the jar. And as to the similarity of the other-worldly existence which is admitted on the basis of the law that 'the effect is always consistent with the cause', that too would have to be abandoned if Svabhāva-vāda be accepted on the basis of the example of the modifications of clouds, etc. for the modifications of clouds are utterly distinct from the substance which is their cause (1785).

Again what is this Svabhāva (one's Nature)?* Is it a thing or non-causality or attribute of a thing? It cannot be a thing as it is not perceived, like sky-flower. And if Svabhāva is accepted as existent even when it is not-perceived then karman

* Svabhāva has been discussed in Gāthā 1643. In fact, the commentator has refuted Svabhāva in his comm. on Gāthā 1643, keeping in view Gāthās 1786-1793. See the summary of the comm. of Gāthā 1643.

too should be admitted as existent. Whatever accounts for the existence of Svabhāva can also account for the existence of karman. Or there should be nothing wrong if Svabhāva is but another name for karman. Again this Svabhāva will have to be admitted as always remaining the same, if the other-worldly existence is to be accepted as similar to this one, that is to say, if man is to be reborn as man. But on account of what can this Svabhāva remain similar? If it be said that it is by its very nature that Svabhāva remains similar, then in favour of the thesis of dissimilarity of worldly existence, can it not be said that it is the very nature of Svabhāva to be eternally dissimilar, and so give rise to a dissimilar worldly existence? (1786-8).

Moreover is this Svabhāva corporeal or not? If corporeal, how is it distinct from karman? It is but another name for karman. And being modificatory it cannot remain similar, like milk, etc; or even because it is corporeal it cannot remain similar, like the modifications of clouds, etc.. If Svabhāva is incorporeal it cannot possibly be the causal agent of body, etc. for it would have no instruments, like the potter without the instruments, staff, etc. or even because it is incorporeal, like ether. Again, Svabhāva cannot be incorporeal, since its effect, body, etc. is corporeal. An incorporeal thing, e. g. ether, cannot have a corporeal effect. Svabhāva cannot be incorporeal if feelings etc. are to be accounted for. Karman has been established in Gaṇadhara-vāda, 2 as corporeal because its effect is corporeal and on account of feelings of pleasure, etc.. These arguments hold good for the corporeality of Svabhāva too* (1789-90).

Svabhāva cannot mean 'non-causality'. 'Naturally' should not be understood to mean 'without being caused', for that cannot vindicate Sudharmā's view that the other-worldly existence is similar to this one. If similarity can occur without being caused, there is no reason why dissimilarity also should not occur without a cause. And so also the destruction

* See Gāthās 1625-6.

of worldly existence can take place just accidentally without any cause, that is to say mokṣa (emancipation) should not require any cause or effort. And if body, etc. can emerge without being caused, ass's horn should also so emerge, but that is not what we find. Moreover, if body, etc. have no cause, how could they have a definite shape? Why could not the body emerge without a definite shape as the clouds do? All these problems cannot be solved if Svabhāva is taken to mean 'non-causality'. Hence Svabhāva cannot mean 'non-causality' (1791).

Even if Svabhāva means 'attribute of a thing', it cannot remain eternally similar, and so cannot give rise to a similar body, etc.. The modes of a thing are diverse—of the form of origination, persistence, destruction—and they do not eternally remain the same. The attributes of a thing, e. g. blue colour, etc. are seen to undergo other transformations. So Svabhāva as 'attribute of a thing' cannot always remain similar. Moreover, if Svabhāva is taken to mean 'attribute of a thing', it will have to be clarified whether it means 'attribute of soul' or 'attribute of matter'. If it is the former, it being incorporeal, cannot be the cause of body, etc. which are corporeal, as the incorporeal ākāśa cannot be the cause of corporeal things. If it is attribute of matter, it is the same as karman, since Mahāvīra and his followers recognise karman as an attribute of pudgala or matter having spatial existence (pudgala-astikāya) (1792).

Thus there is nothing wrong if svabhāva is accepted as a modification i. e. attribute of a thing in the form of karman which is material, and if it is recognised as the cause of the diversity in the world. But it cannot be maintained that it remains eternally similar. On the contrary it is of diverse varieties on account of the diversity of its causes—perversity, etc., and so its effects too are diverse. Thus it should not be insisted upon that there is complete similarity in the other-worldly existence; the possibility of dissimilarity should be admitted (1793).

The fact is that not to speak of worldly existence alone, the nature of every thing in the world is such that certain

modes, similar or dissimilar are originated or are destroyed every moment, while its basic substance remains the same. One and the same thing does not remain the same in the next moment, but becomes different. Thus if a thing cannot remain similar to itself, one cannot think of its similarity to other things; and still a thing cannot be looked upon as absolutely dissimilar from all the other things in the world for there are certain universal attributes, existence, etc. which are common to all. Thus if a thing is similar to all the other things in the world, there can be no doubt whatsoever as regards the similarity, on account of these common attributes, of a thing to its previous conditions. But no absolute stand-point can be maintained. Nothing is absolutely similar or dissimilar to itself or other things in this worldly existence or another. Every thing is similar-cum-dissimilar, eternal-cum-non-eternal and so. Hence similarity alone in the other-worldly existence should not be insisted upon by Sudharmā or any one (1794-6).

A youth has no similarity to his own condition in childhood or old age, i. e. is not absolutely similar to himself by virtue of the past modes of childhood and the future modes of old age, even though there is nothing in the world to which he is not similar in respect of such common modes as existence, etc.. Thus the soul in another worldly life is similar-cum-dissimilar to everything including itself, and it is no use insisting that the soul is absolutely similar to itself alone as it was in the previous worldly existence (1797).

To explain this point further, suppose a human being dies and is reborn a god. He is then similar to all the three-worlds in respect of the common modes, existence, etc. but by his modes of godhead, etc. is dissimilar to them as he is to himself as he was in the previous worldly existence. Thus there cannot be absolute similarity anywhere. Similarly a thing is eternal as the basic substance, but non-eternal on account of the modes, and so on. Sudharmā may argue that he did not insist on similarity in all respects in the other-worldly existence, but only in respect of birth; e. g. a man dies

and is reborn a man. This too is not proper. The other-worldly existence is caused by karman which having diverse causes is diverse in nature. If karman is diverse, its effect, the other-worldly existence too must be diverse and so it cannot be said that a man should be reborn as a man and so on, that is to say, that the jāti (genus) should remain the same (1798).

Moreover if genus or class (jāti) were to remain the same then the betterment or deterioration in the same class could not be explained. He who is prosperous in this life should be prosperous in the other-worldly existence also and he who is poor should be such. Thus there should be no scope for betterment or deterioration in the other-worldly existence. If this were so, acts of charity, etc. would be in vain, that is to say, would have no fruit. But this cannot be, for people are inspired to perform acts of charity, etc. in the hope that they will get the prosperity of gods and thus better their lot. If such auspicious acts were to bear no fruit, people would not perform them. Hence even similarity in respect of genus should not be insisted upon (1799).

Further if similarity in respect of class is insisted upon, the Vedic statement that he who is cremated along with the feces will be born a jackal, will be contradicted for according to it a man is said to be reborn as a jackal. We have other statements to the effect that 'One who desires heaven should perform Agnihotra' (agnihotrāṇ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ) and 'One wins the kingdom of Yama by Agniṣṭoma' (agniṣṭomena yamarājyam abhijayati) and which yield promises of betterment of lot in heaven. This shows that even in the Vedic view there is no indication that the jāti (genus) remains the same. As to the statement that a man is reborn as man and animals as animals (puruṣo vai puruṣatvam aśnute paśavaḥ paśutvam), Sudharmā had not understood its meaning and hence his doubt. What it means is that a man who is by nature good, polite, kind, free from malice binds unto himself such two karmans called nāma (body-making) and gotra (status-determining) as enable him to be reborn as man again after he is dead. But this is not so

as a rule. All men do not bind unto themselves such karman only and so take different kinds of birth, i. e. are born in different wombs. Similarly, animals who in this-worldly existence have on account of their deceit. etc. bound unto themselves nāma and gotra karman pertaining to animals, are reborn as animals. But all animals do not bind such karman and so all are not necessarily reborn as animals. Thus the state of a jīva is dependent upon karma. (1800)

When his doubt had been removed by Lord Mahāvīra, Sudharmā became a monk along with his five hundred followers (1801).

6. MAṆḌIKA — REGARDING BONDAGE AND EMANCIPATION

Then Maṇḍika decided to approach Lord Mahāvīra who accosted him by his name and gotra as Maṇḍika Vasiṣṭha. Mahāvīra also explained to him the doubt that disturbed him. Are there bondage and emancipation or not? There are Vedic statements which should mean that there is nothing like bondage or emancipation for the soul; e.g. *Sa eṣa viḡuṇo vibhur na badhyate saṁsarati vā, na mucyate mocayati vā, na vā eṣa bāhyam abhyantaram vā veda*—This soul is ubiquitous and free from guṇas. Neither is it bound nor does it transmigrate. It is not freed (from karman) nor does it free (karman), that is to say, it is non-doer. It knows neither the external nor the internal (for knowledge is an attribute of prakṛti). On the other hand we are told: *Na ha vai saśarīrasya priyāpriyayor apahatir asti, aśarīram vā vasantam priyāpriye na sprśataḥ*—‘The embodied soul is never lacking in respect of the pleasant and the unpleasant i. e. can never be free from pleasure and pain, whereas these do not have any effect whatsoever on the soul as it exists in an unembodied state’—which would suggest that the soul has the conditions of bondage and emancipation. Maṇḍika was puzzled on account of these conflicting statements—both of the Veda—and hence his doubt. But the truth is that he did not know the true meaning of these Vedic statements (1802-4).

Dialectical reasoning also has led Maṇḍika to question bondage-emancipation. If bondage means the union of the jīva (soul) with karman, has this union a beginning or not? If it has, which of the two is earlier, jīva or karman? Or were they simultaneously produced. Bondage cannot be explained in the light of any of these alternatives;

(i) Jīva cannot exist before karman, for in that case it like the ass's horn would have no cause, and hence could not be said to have been produced. What is produced must have a cause, e. g. jar. And what is produced without a cause, should also perish without one. If it is argued that jīva is beginningless and there is no question of its being originated, even then it cannot have any union with karman if there is no cause for it. If this union is regarded as uncaused, it would recur in the case of emancipated persons also, for there is no determining factor for its appearance; and if that is so there is no reason why people should have any faith in emancipation. Therefore the union of jīva and karman cannot be uncaused. If the soul be regarded as having no union with karman, it would be eternally emancipated, or in the absence of bondage what emancipation could there be for it? The unbound sky is never looked upon as being emancipated. There can be no emancipation without bondage preceding it. Hence the first alternative—first jīva, then karman—is not acceptable; it does not explain bondage and emancipation.

(ii) Karman cannot be produced before jīva, for jīva is regarded as the kartā, doer, and karman as the kārya, effect, and there cannot be the kārya without the kartā. Karma, cannot, like jīva, be produced without any cause, for its destruction also should then be brought about without there being any cause. Origination and destruction can never be uncaused. So karman cannot be regarded as existing before the jīva.

(iii) Jīva and karman cannot also be regarded as having been produced simultaneously, for the drawbacks of both the above-mentioned alternatives would accrue. Moreover, if they are produced simultaneously, one cannot be regarded as the kartā and the other as kārya; such a relation is not found in the case of bull's horns which are produced simultaneously (1805–1810).

To say that the union of jīva and karma is beginningless also does not stand to reason because it cannot explain emancipation. What is beginningless is also endless; and jīva and karma

would never be dissociated, and the soul never be emancipated, as is the case with the union of *jīva* and sky (1811).

Thus Vedic passages and dialectical arguments have led Maṇḍika to believe that the *jīva* cannot have bondage and emancipation and yet there are statements in the Veda pertaining to these. Maṇḍika is therefore in a fix as to the acceptance or otherwise of these concepts. Mahāvīra proceeds to resolve his doubt (1812).

The stream of *jīva-karma* is beginningless, since they like seed-sprout are related to each other by the cause-effect relationship. Hence there is no scope for the alternatives as to the prior existence of one. That the stream or continuum of *karma* is beginningless can be seen from what follows:

A particular body is the cause of a future *karman* and is itself the effect of a past *karman*. Similarly a *karman* is the cause of a future body, but is itself the effect of a past body. Thus *karman* and body being related to each other as cause-effect, their streams are beginningless; and so the stream of *karman* is definitely beginningless. It may be questioned here that this discussion aims at establishing the facts of bondage and emancipation; and it is simply irrelevant to prove that the stream of *karman* is beginningless. But it is not so. 'Karma' is derived from the root 'kr', to do. What is not done is not *karma*; and the '*karma*' done is itself the *bandha* or bondage. And if the stream of *karman* is beginningless, bondage too is such. True, it may again be argued, but this is an attempt to prove the cause-effect relationship between body and *karma*. What has it do with *jīva*? And how can this prove that the union of *jīva* and *karma* is beginningless? But the one advancing this argument has not grasped the link properly. The cause-effect relationship does exist between body and *karman*, but neither would be produced in the absence of *kartā*, an agent, a doer. Hence it has to be admitted that *jīva* is the *kartā*, that it creates the body through the instrumentality of *karman*; the *jīva* creates *karman* also through the instrumentality of body. Thus *jīva* is the *kartā* of both body and *karman*, as the potter creating a pot through the instrumentality of the staff is the

kartā of the jar. Thus if the stream of body and karman is beginningless, jīva too will have to be looked upon as beginningless, and its bondage too will be such (1813-15).

It should not be said here that karman being supersensuous is not established, much less can its instrumentality be established. Karman is proved through its effect. Body, etc. must have an instrument, for they like jar etc. are made; pot, etc. being effects cannot be produced without the instrumentality of staff, etc.; so the body being an effect cannot be produced without the instrumentality of something and this is karman. Or soul and body being agent-effect, must be related to some instrument; as the potter and pot standing in the relation of agent-effect have the staff as the instrument. If soul is the agent and body the effect, karman must be accepted as the karaṇa or instrument. Moreover, acts of charity, etc. of sentient beings must have a fruit as agriculture, etc. have. Karman is this fruit of acts of charity, etc. of sentient beings. This point has been discussed earlier in the discussion with Agnibhūti, and the existence of karman should similarly be admitted by Maṇḍika too (1816).

As to the argument that the continuity of the union of jīva and karman being beginningless is also endless, this is no absolute rule. At times the continuity is seen to come to an end, as seen in the case of seed-sprout. If either the seed or the sprout perishes before it has produced the effect, the continuity or the stream would be snapped off. This is true of hen-egg, father-son relationships and so on. The union of gold and soil even though handed down in a beginningless line can be cut off on account of the heat of fire, etc.. Similarly the union of jīva and karman though it may have come down in a beginningless line can be terminated by such means as austerity, self-control, etc. Thus it should not be said that if bondage be beginningless there could not be emancipation (1817-19).

Lord Mahāvīra further clarifies that the mutual relationship of jīva and karman which is beginningless is like that of jīva and sky and also like that of gold and soil and there is no contradiction in this. The former type which is beginningless and endless

can be seen in the case of abhavya souls who will never be emancipated; the latter type—beginningless but having an end—is true of bhavya souls. It may be questioned that when all are alike souls, why should there be this distinction of bhavya and abhavya: The distinctions of nāraka (denizens of hell) etc. among souls are due to karman, they are not natural. The distinctions of bhavya-abhavya, on the other hand are not on account of karman, but are intrinsic. How can this be accounted for? (1820–22).

But the answer to this doubt is that jīva and ākāśa are alike in both being dravya (substance). They have other attributes in common, e.g. existence, knowability, etc. yet they are essentially different inasmuch as one is jīva, the other is non-jīva, one is sentient, the other is not, and so on. Similarly, even though all may be jīva, there should be no difficulty in some being bhavya and others abhavya (1823).

It may be argued that bhavyatva being the very nature of the soul is eternal exactly as 'soulness' is, and hence nothing can put an end to it and therefore there can never be emancipation; and that if this is so it is useless to distinguish between bhavya and abhavya souls; as perfect (siddha) souls know of no such distinction (siddho na bhavyo nāpyabhavyaḥ). This argument is not correct. Even what is beginningless can have an end. The prior non-existence of jar (ghaṭa-pūrvābhāva) is essentially beginningless, but it comes to an end as soon as a jar is produced; similarly bhavyatva, though beginningless can be put an end to by acts of austerity, etc. (1824–25).

This prior non-existence of jar can very well serve as an illustration, as it is not non-existent like the ass's horn. It is positive character. It is of the nature of the assemblage of pudgala (matter), only this assemblage has not assumed the form of a jar, and hence is called prior non-existence of jar (1826).

It should not be thought that if there can be an end to bhavyatva, bhavya souls would go on decreasing in the world and a time would come when there would be no bhavya soul, just as however enormous the amount of grain in a granary,

it is reduced to nothing if it is drawn upon continually. This will not be the state of things. The bhavya souls are infinite in number, and a time will never come when there will be no bhavya soul. For instance, time keeps on passing, but we find that even with the subtraction of time-points, the infinite future always persists, or even if we keep on subtracting space-points, the infinite ākāśa will never come to an end. Similarly bhavya souls being infinite in number there will never be an end to them even if every moment some of them are emancipated (1827).

The effect or result of the past and the future is the same. If only an infinitesimal part of the assemblage of bhavya souls has become siddha (perfect), has reached the state of perfection in the past, an equal number will be emancipated in the future. Hence there will never come a time when the number of bhavya souls will be exhausted. One may feel like asking as to how it can be ascertained that the bhavya souls are infinite in number and that only an infinitesimal part of it has reached the stage of perfection, have become siddha, Mahāvīra's reply is that this is exactly as in the case of Time and Ākāśa (ether or space) which are infinite and are never exhausted. Moreover Maṇḍika should have faith in Lord Mahāvīra's words, as he has reason to do so on the basis of Mahāvīra's veracity right till then starting from his knowledge of Maṇḍika's doubt. Mahāvīra is omniscient and free from likes and dislikes, so his words should be accepted as true like those of a dispassionate arbiter in a dispute, who is in the know of facts. Mahāvīra has removed the doubts of all, hence this claim of his. If still there is any doubt, it is open to all to seek of Mahāvīra a solution to whatsoever doubt they have and make sure for themselves of Mahāvīra's omniscience (1828-32).

It may be questioned that if, as Lord Mahāvīra says, even the bhavya souls will not be emancipated in all time, then they are abhavya and there is no sense in distinguishing them as bhavya as against the abhavya ones. But there is a misunderstanding here. By 'bhavya' is meant one who is capable

of attaining the stage of perfection or becoming a siddha, not one who will attain siddhi (perfection) without fail. That one is worthy of siddhi does not by itself imply that he will attain siddhi; this can happen only when factors leading to siddhi are favourable. For instance, each one of gold, jewel, stone, sandal-wood, etc. is capable of being turned into an image; yet all do not turn into an image, but only those which the necessary implements reach. But this does not mean that the others cannot be transformed into images. Similarly the bhavya souls will become siddha only when the factors leading to siddhi are favourable. But this does not make them abhavya, for at some time or the other they will be emancipated, but the abhavya souls never. Or, as in the case of the union of gold and rock (or soil) in all cases there is the possibility of their being separated, but they are separated only when the apparatus for separation is available. But things which are not capable of dissociation will never be separated even when the means are available. Similarly, emancipation which is characterised by the extinction of all karman will occur as a rule in the case of bhavya souls only, not in the case of abhavya souls. This is the distinction between bhavya souls and abhavya ones (1833-36).

It should not be argued that emancipation is not eternal because it is caused by means, or because it comes after effort or because it has beginning etc. like jar. All the reasons adduced are inconclusive (anaikāntika), because they are present even in vipakṣas (dissimilar-cases),—posterior non-existence of jar etc. (ghaṭādi-pradhvaṁsābhāva) even though caused is eternal. Pradhvaṁsābhāva like prāgabhāva, should not be regarded as a non-entity or negation of being and therefore as no example at all; for it is positive, of the nature of an assemblage of pudgalā (matter) which is characterised by the destruction of jar. This discussion keeps in view the caused nature or artificiality of mokṣā, but mokṣa is not in reality artificial or caused. Mokṣa is the separation of soul and karmic matter. When at the time of mokṣa, karmic matter is separated from

jīva by austerity, restraint etc. what change is really wrought in the essential being of jīva that mokṣa should be regarded as kṛtaka, caused or artificial? When the jar is destroyed with a stick, there is no special change by way of addition, in the sky or space. Mokṣa is destruction of karma; on this ground it should not be regarded as non-eternal, the destruction being caused by austerity, etc. like the destruction of jar brought about by a stick. Such an argument would mean that one has not understood the conception of destruction of jar or of karma. Destruction of jar means nothing else than the existence of ākāśa alone, and no change is brought about in ākāśa thereby, since it remaining the same is eternal. Similarly in the present case, destruction of karma signifies the jīva existing by itself; it is not different from the soul, nor is there any change brought about in the jīva by it, for it too like the sky or space is eternal. Hence emancipation is neither caused (or artificial) nor non-eternal. If it is said that mokṣa is in a way non-eternal, Mahāvīra has no objection to it, for each and every thing is eternal-cum-non-eternal, being of the nature of both dravya (basic substance) and paryāya (modes). But mokṣa is not absolutely non-eternal (1837-39).

Maṇḍika should not have any suspicion lurking in his mind that the karmic matter which has been thrown away by the soul after its dissociation from it will continue to exist in the loka (cosmos, inhabited universe) in which the jīva also exists and so they will come into relation, even as ākāśa dissociated from jar comes into contact with its kapālas (potsherds); and again the soul will be bound by karmic matter. The free soul will not be bound again, since there is no cause for bondage as is the case with a guiltless or innocent person. The activities of mind-speech-body are causes of bondage and an emancipated person not having a body will not indulge in these. Bondage does not occur simply on account of contact (relation) with the matter of karma-groups, for such a bondage exists in all kinds of souls and this would be ati-prasaṅga (absurd over-extension). Mere relation of jīva and karmic matter is not bondage which occurs only on account

of defects (doṣa) like perversity of attitude and on account of activities (yoga) (1840).

Here a further question arises. The Buddhists believe that an emancipated soul comes to worldly life over and over again. What is Lord Mahāvīra's view in this respect? An emancipated soul is not reborn, does not come back to worldly life, since there is no cause for it, as a sprout cannot come up when there is no seed. The cause or seed of rebirth is karman and that is not present in the case of an emancipated soul. Hence mokṣa is eternal and the emancipated soul too (1841).

The emancipated soul is eternal also because being a substance it is incorporeal, like the sky. The contingency of its being ubiquitous also like the sky should not be urged because inference goes against this. Soul cannot be ubiquitous because it is karṭṛ, doer, agent, like a potter. That it is an agent is established by the fact that it is enjoyer, seer, etc. which it would not be if it were not karṭṛ (doer) (1842).

Lord Mahāvīra does not insist on the absolute eternality of the soul. He has to take the trouble of proving that it is eternal only to counteract the Buddhist view of its being non-eternal. But, in fact, for the Jainas all things are of the nature of origination, destruction, persistence. The jar, for example, from the point of view of the mode of lump of clay can be said to perish, from the point of view of the mode of jar to have been produced and it can be said to have persisted in its existence as clay. When we refer to a thing as destroyed, etc. it is only because we have only one aspect of the thing prominently in view. So the emancipated soul can be said to have perished from the point of view of its worldliness, it persists from the point of view of its soulness, its upayoga (conscious activity), etc; and can also be said to have perished from the point of view of its perfection of the first time-point, to have been originated from the point of view of the perfection of the second time-point and to have persisted as substance, soul, etc. Hence it is sometimes referred to as being eternal, etc. but this is only from different points of view (1843).

If the emancipated soul is not ubiquitous, where does it stay? It stays on the summit of the loka (cosmos, inhabited universe), that is to say, at its uppermost limit. Of course, all activities of the soul are on account of karman, but here there is this movement to the uppermost limit of the loka because when the soul on the removal of karmic matter becomes light, this transformation in the form of upward motion occurs exactly as it attains siddhatva (status and nature of a siddha). On account of this upward movement the soul reaches its destination in a single time-point. Besides we have scriptural passages in support of the upward movement of the emancipated soul: "lāu ya eraṇḍaphale aggī dhūmo ya isu dhanuvimukko; gai puvvapaḅeṇaṃ evaṃ siddhāṇa vi gai u." (As there is momentum in a gourd, castor-seed, fire, smoke, an arrow shot from the bow on account of former activity, such also is the movement of the siddha).

If a gourd is besmeared all over with mud and drowned in water, it comes to the surface of the water as soon as the mud is washed off, so the soul moves upwards when the karma-covering is removed. The castor seed shoots upwards as soon as its outer covering or sheath breaks off, so the soul shoots upwards as soon as it emerges from the sheath of karman. Fire and smoke move upwards naturally, so also the soul. The arrow shot from a stretched bow keeps on moving on account of the initial act, so also the soul moves upwards. Another illustration is the potter's wheel which when once set in motion keeps on moving for some time even when no fresh movement is given to it. Thus one should not have any doubt as regards the upward movement of the emancipated soul for one time-point (1844).

Our experience tells us that incorporeal things are devoid of activity, e. g. ākāśa, kāla (Time). If it is so, it may be argued, Ātman being incorporeal cannot have any activity and so cannot move upwards. But we forget that things have their own peculiar attributes. Things, for example, which are incorporeal are also non-sentient e. g. ākāśa; and still we

accept the incorporeal emancipated soul as sentient. Though the soul and ākāśa, etc. have incorporeality in common, still sentiency is a peculiar attribute of the soul, similarly motion or activity also can be its peculiar attribute and there should be no objection to this (1845).

That the soul has activity can also be demonstrated by inference. The soul is active, because like the potter, it is a doer or because it is an enjoyer. Or the soul is active, because movements of the body are directly perceived as in the case of a machine-man (1846).

If it is urged that the effort of ātman is the cause of the bodily movement, but not the activity of ātman and hence the ātman cannot be shown to be active, the reply is that even effort is not found in inactive things e.g. ether or space and so if we want ātman to make efforts for the movement of the body it itself must be active. Further if the incorporeal effect is the cause of bodily movement, what is it that makes this effort capable of being the cause of bodily movement? And if this effort can be such irrespective of any other force why cannot the ātman by itself be the cause of bodily movement? It is not necessary to bring in effort. If it is further argued that some unseen (adr̥ṣṭa) is the cause of bodily movement and not the ātman which is inactive, this hypothesis should be examined. Is this adr̥ṣṭa corporeal or not? If it is incorporeal there is no reason why the incorporeal ātman should not be accepted as the cause of bodily movement. If it is corporeal it cannot be anything other than the karmic body. And this karmic body can be the cause of bodily movement only if it itself has movement, not otherwise and there must be some cause of this movement of its and so on ad infinitum. If it is said that this karmic body has movement by its essential nature, in that case, even the external body can have movement just naturally and it is not necessary to recognise the existence of even the karmic body. But this position is not acceptable because the external body is insentient. Further we know that that which is spontaneous

and so has not the expectancy of any cause is either always existent or always non-existent (nityam sattvaṁ asattvaṁ vā hetor anyānapekṣanāt). If accordingly the body has movement naturally, that movement will persist eternally. What we find is that the movements of the body are of a specific kind. This can be explained only by the functioning of the ātman along with karman. Hence ātman has movement. It can be easily understood that the transmigratory soul associated with karman is active; but even the emancipated soul free from karman is active for, as explained above, it is so on account of transformation into movement, exactly as by the destruction of karman the soul attains siddhatva (or state of perfection). It can thus have motion also in the state of emancipation (1847–1849).

But a further question arises. Why does not the emancipated soul move beyond the abode of the siddhas? Beyond the abode of the siddhas is aloka and dharmāstikāya (the principle of motion which has spatial existence) that helps motion does not exist there. It follows that the soul cannot move beyond the abode of the siddhas (1850).

Some may be inclined to question the existence of aloka. The rule is that if a word is un-compounded and derivative the counter-entity of the thing denoted by it must exist. For instance, ghaṭa (jar) is one such word. So aghaṭa, the counter-entity of ghaṭa does exist. Similarly loka must have its counter-entity aloka existing. But this aloka can be anything other than loka, e. g. jar, etc.. Is it necessary to recognise the existence of another entity called aloka? The difficulty can be resolved thus—na lokaḥ alokaḥ; paryudāsa niṣedha (negation by exclusion) is intended here by 'nañ' ('a' in aloka). The counter-entity must be a fitting one for the thing negated. The thing negated here, loka is a particular ākāśa, space; and so its contradictory must be befitting it; as by apaṇḍita we mean 'a sentient person alone who is bereft of a particular knowledge' and not just jar, etc. So here too aloka must be a worthy counter-entity of loka. It has been said:

“Nañyuktam ivayuktam vā yadi kāryam vidhiyate;
tulyādhikarāṇe 'nyasminṅloke' py arthagatis tathā.”

(If in a grammatical formation 'nañ' or 'iva' is employed, a thing which is similar to it but distinct from it is understood to exist in the world) and “Nañ-ivayuktam anyasadrśādhikarāṇe tathā hy arthagatiḥ ('A word to which 'Nañ' or 'iva' is affixed denotes a thing different from it but similar to it'). It follows that the existence of aloka, the counter-entity of loka must be admitted (1851).

From this it follows that dharma (principle of motion) and adharma (principle of rest) exist since it is they that determine loka and render it distinct from aloka. Otherwise ākāśa being the same everywhere it would not have been possible to divide it into loka and aloka and distinguish between them. That ākāśa in which the astikāyas, dharma and adharma exist is loka; that in which they do not exist is aloka (1852).

If dharma and adharma do not exist and do not divide the loka from the aloka the souls and matter which had once started moving would continue to do so infinitely in space as there would be no obstruction to their motion; they would move into aloka too and that being infinite souls and matter would not have any mutual relation. If this were to happen there would not be the different arrangements gross or other of matter—skandhas, and in that case there would be no, what are called, bondage, emancipation, pleasure, pain, transmigration etc. for the souls and the souls too would not come together and so there would be no help or obstruction, etc. caused by them. Hence jīva and pudgala have no motion in aloka beyond the loka, for there is the absence there of the principle that helps motion, just as the fish cannot move out of water there being nothing to help its movement there. That principle which helps the movement of jīva and pudgala is dharmāstikāya which is co-extensive with loka. There can be an inference to this effect: There must be something that measures or determines loka, because it is measurable or knowable as knowledge exists for the knowable object. Or jīva and pudgala are called loka, hence there must

be some entity that determines because it is determinable (knowable), as there is the prastha measure for rice, etc.. That which determines here is dharmāstikāya. The existence of dharma can be justified only if the existence of aloka is recognised since ākāśa is the same everywhere. Hence it has to be accepted that the siddhas remain stationary at the summit of the loka and do not go beyond (1853-55).

A further point to be considered in this context is: 'sthāyate'-sminniti sthānam', that where one stays is place. Thus the word 'sthāna' denotes a substratum: Siddhasya sthānam siddhasthānam—siddhasthāna is the place of the siddhas. If it is so, the siddhas are likely to fall off, topple down from this place as Devadatta falls down from his lofty position on a mountain or a tree, or as fruit falls down. But this fear is unfounded. The genitive in 'siddhasya sthānam' is in the sense of the subject, it means 'the siddha stays', siddha and sthāna are identical; there is no sthāna other than it (1856).

Even if siddha and sthāna are not identical, this sthāna is nothing other than ākāśa and that being eternal cannot be destroyed and hence there is no likelihood of the emancipated soul's falling. Again, karman is the cause of such activities as falling, etc. on the part of the soul; the soul has no karman and so there is no possibility of its falling off. The upward movement for one time-point is, as pointed out earlier, on account of previous momentum. That movement cannot be repeated as there is no cause for it. Moreover, its own effort, attraction, repulsion (vikarṣaṇa), etc. are the causes of falling, and there is no possibility of these in the case of the emancipated soul and hence there being no cause for falling, the siddha will not fall off from its sthāna (1857).

That because a thing is in a place it should fall is quite inconclusive, is not an absolute rule. On the contrary there is an inherent contradiction in the statement that a thing falls from its place; for a thing can fall from what is not its place, not from its place. If you want a thing to fall from its station then the ākāśa etc. should be continually falling from their

eternal place. But this is not what we find. Hence 'fall because of location' is definitely inconclusive (1858).

Someone may have a doubt that a siddha is emancipated from the worldly existence, and siddhas have thus a beginning as far as their emancipated state of existence is concerned; hence there must have been someone who was the first to become siddha. But this is not true; there is no such rule that whatever has a beginning, is an effect, must have some one entity which is the first of its kind. Day and night have a beginning; but Time is infinite; so there is nothing like 'first night' or 'first day'; all bodies have a beginning, yet there is no 'first body'. Similarly there is no one like the 'first siddha' (1859).

There is likely to be still another doubt. Souls have continued to become siddha from time beginningless and the abode of the siddhas (siddhi-kṣetra) is finite in dimension; how possibly could this infinite number of siddhas be accommodated in this limited space? There should be no difficulty here since the souls are not corporeal. Every thing becomes the object of the pure and perfect knowledge and intuition (kevalajñāna-darśana) of siddhas; that is to say, as an infinite number of jñānas and darśanas can stay in one limited thing; glances of thousands of spectators can be accommodated in one dancing girl; so there should be no difficulty in an infinite number of incorporeal siddhas being accommodated in a place of finite dimensions. Even a number of corporeal things like the light of a lamp and so on can stay in one small place, then what to say of incorporeal things (1860).

Lord Mahāvīra explained in the beginning the concept of bondage-emancipation by means of reasoning. Then he explained it with the help of Vedic passages. Maṇḍika had not understood the meaning of such Vedic passages as 'Na ha vai saśarīrasya priyāpriyayor apahatir asti, aśarīraṁ vā vasantam priyāpriye na sprśataḥ'; and hence his doubt as regards bondage-emancipation. But there is no ground for this doubt. It is obvious that the embodied and the disembodied states refer to bondage and emancipation. The embodied state means bondage

of the nature of a series of bodies external or internal (āḍhyātmika); and the disembodied state means emancipation which is characterised by the removal of all kinds of body. Likewise Maṇḍika took such statements as 'Sa eṣa viguṇo vibhur na badhyate' to mean that there is no bondage or emancipation for a soul in worldly existence or in the transmigratory condition. But such passages refer not to the transmigratory soul but to the emancipated soul which has no bondage, etc.. Thus there is no mutual conflict in the Vedic passages about bondage-emancipation (1861-1862).

When Maṇḍika's doubt was thus dispelled by Lord Mahāvīra, he became a monk along with his 350 pupils and followers (1863).

7. MAURYAPUTRA—REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF GODS

Hearing that Maṇḍika and others had become monks, Mauryaputra decided to approach Mahāvīra. Mahāvīra accosted him by his name and gotra as Mauryaputra Kāśyapa and told him about his doubt as to the existence of gods on account of there being Vedic statements in support of either side. 'Sa eṣa yajñāyudhī yajamāno'ñjasā svarga-lokaṁ gacchati' (The sacrificer with sacrifice as his weapon decidedly goes to heaven), 'Apāma somam amṛtā abhūma aganma jyotir avidāma devān, kiṁ nūnam asmān kṛṇavad arātiḥ kim u dhūrtir amṛta martyasya*' (We drank soma and became immortal; we approached light and knew the gods. What possibly, oh Immortal One, could the enemy do to us; of what efficacy is the cunning of mortal men? — RV. 8.48-3) — such Vedic statements lead us to recognise the existence of gods in heaven. On the other hand, we find a statement like 'Ko jānāti māyopamān gīrvāṇān Indra-Yama-Varuṇa-Kuberādīn' (Who knows the existence of gods like Indra, Yama Varuṇa, Kubera who are Māyā-like?). But the truth is that Mauryaputra did not know the true meaning of these statements which Mahāvīra explained to him later on to dispel his doubt (1864-1866).

Mauryaputra's argument to prove the non-existence of gods is as follows: The denizens of hell undergo great torture and are dependent on a number of factors, so it is understandable that they cannot come to the earth. Hence we should recognise their existence even relying on the words of others if we cannot perceive them. But the gods are said to have the freedom to go wherever they like and to have celestial powers and yet

*The text in the printed edition of Gaṇadharavāda is corrupt. The meaning given is according to the correct text.

they never flit across our span of vision. Even then they are referred to in Śruti and Smṛti works. Hence the doubt as to their existence (1867-8).

Mahāvīra tells Mauryaputra to entertain no such doubt, for even if he set aside Śruti and Smṛti works, he could apprehend directly four kinds of gods — Bhavanapati, Vyantara, Jyotiṣka, Vaimānika — who had come to attend the Samavasaraṇa in order to pay their homage to him (Mahāvīra) (1869).

There was no reason for Mauryaputra to doubt the existence of the gods even earlier for the jyotiṣka gods, sun, moon, etc. can be perceived by him; and if he directly perceives one group of gods it is not reasonable to doubt the existence of the different types of gods. Moreover no one doubts the existence of a king who shows favour or disfavour to his subjects; the gods too are known to make some people prosperous and to ruin others and hence one cannot possibly have any doubt as to their existence (1870).

It may be questioned that sun, moon, etc. are but abodes and so it cannot be said that the jyotiṣka (stellar) gods are directly perceived, as these abodes like cities may be just vacant, devoid of inhabitants. It is not so; an abode is always seen to be occupied by someone, as Devadatta and others live in the abodes of Vasantapura, etc.. Sun, moon, etc. to be abodes must have some inhabitants and these should be gods. Men cannot live in these abodes which are distinct and different from the abodes of men and so which must have inhabitants too of a distinct type, viz gods as distinct from men. Abodes are, it is true, not always occupied by inhabitants, they may be at times vacant as are the abodes of men. But they are not always unoccupied. Abodes certainly have inhabitants in them some time or the other—in the past, in the present or in the future; so they are occupied by inhabitants and are not always unoccupied. Hence gods can be looked upon as the denizens of such abodes as moon, etc. if not now at least in the past or in the future (1871).

Another difficulty may be considered here. It may be argued that sun, moon, etc. may not be abodes; the sun may be just a ball of fire, the moon may be just pure water; and thus the jyotiṣka vimānas (abodes) may be just balls made of shining gems. But it is not so; they are decidedly vimānas, because like the abodes of the vidyādhara they are made of gems and move in the sky. Clouds and wind are not vimānas as they are not made of gems (1872).

Sun, moon, etc. cannot also be illusory fabrics projected by some magician. Even if they are such, we will have to recognise the existence of gods who would be the magicians projecting this illusion, for men could not have brought it about. But it is not proper to regard sun, moon, etc. as illusory, because like cities like Pāṭaliputra they are always found while a magical illusion is not found to be permanent, it disappears after a short time. So sun, moon, etc. are as real as Pāṭaliputra and other cities (1873).

Still another reason may be adduced to prove the existence of gods. People who commit very great sins go to hell to experience the fruit of their sinful actions and the existence of denizens of hell is accordingly recognised. Similarly those who perform highly virtuous actions must be recognised as becoming gods to enjoy the fruits of their actions. It is true that we see men and lower creatures whose condition is highly miserable and as such they are experiencing the fruit of their sinful actions, and at the same time there are men who are very happy and so may be looked upon as enjoying the fruit of their virtuous actions. Then why should one posit the existence of denizens of hell and of gods whom we cannot see? But there is a difference. We never see anyone on this earth experiencing unalloyed pain or unalloyed pleasure; there is always an adulteration however small of pleasure or pain as the case may be. Very happy persons suffer from some disease of the body or on account of the pain resulting from old age, etc., while even the very miserable have a tinge of pleasure in their lives at some time, e. g. enjoyment of a cool breeze. Hence we have to

admit the existence of denizens of hell experiencing only pain as the fruit of their highly sinful actions and of gods experiencing only pleasure or happiness as the fruit of their highly virtuous actions (1874).

But if the gods exist why do they not come to the mortal world even when they are free to go wherever they like? As a rule they do not come as they have transferred their affections to celestial things, they are attached to the objects of pleasure there, they have not completed all their duties there, there is no special reason for them to come here as the work of mortals is not dependent on them. Moreover the world of mortals is ugly and they would not be able to bear the foul smell emitting from it. For these reasons jointly or severally gods as a rule do not visit the mortal world (1875).

But it is not true to say that they never come. They come on joyous occasions like the birth of a tīrthaṅkara, his initiation, his attaining omniscience, his nirvāṇa. Some gods like Indra come instantaneously out of a sense of devotion, other gods follow him; still others come to dispel their doubts. There are other reasons also for their coming, viz. attachment to a son, friend, etc. of a previous life; appointment given to a friend, etc. for giving enlightenment, by being attracted by the severe austerity of great beings and ascetics; intention to harm a foe of a previous life or to favour a friend, son etc. of a previous life; solely for pleasure, to test good persons, and so on (1876-7).

The following inferences can prove the existence of the gods: One must have faith in the existence of gods, because

- (i) Reliable persons, who have the power to know their previous existence, say that in a previous existence they were gods,
- (ii) there is direct perception of the gods in the case of some persons possessed of such attributes as austerity, etc;
- (iii) some persons get their work accomplished through the gods by means of vidyā (lore), mantra (prayer, incantation) upayācana (entreaty), etc;

- (iv) the bodies of some persons are possessed by some unseen spirit other than the soul, because abnormal activities are observed;
- (v) there must be the fruit of the great merit accumulated by acts of austerity, charity, etc; and
- (vi) because there is the nomenclature 'deva' ('god').

Moreover all the āgamas are unanimous about the existence of gods. Hence one should have no doubt whatsoever on this point.

A few points may be clarified here. How can it be said that certain actions of the body of man are the result of the influence of graha (possession)? This is easy to understand; a machine-man cannot walk, but if a man enters into it, the machine starts moving; similarly the body may not be able to perform a certain act and yet if it is seen doing it, it must be so on account of the fact that it is inspired by some unseen spirit other than the soul; and this spirit is some god. Persons are thus seen performing extra-ordinary actions. As regards the nomenclature 'deva' (god), it must have a meaning, for like 'ghaṭa' it is a derivative, uncompounded word. Deva is derived from 'div', to shine. 'Deva' can mean 'man', it may be argued, e. g. accomplished gaṇadhara and others and cakravartins (sovereigns) and others possessed of prosperity who are called gods, and so it is not necessary to imagine the existence of gods who are not seen. But it should not be forgotten that gaṇadhara, cakravartī, etc. are called 'gods' only figuratively. If, for example, a real lion does not exist at all, a man cannot be called a lion 'figuratively'; so if the gods did not exist at all, gaṇadhara, etc. would not be called gods figuratively. Hence 'deva' must mean 'a god different from man' (1878-81).

The Vedic statements do not seem to be conflicting if they are correctly understood. If the gods do not exist, the fruit of Agnihotra and such rites as is laid down in statements like 'Agnihotraṁ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ' (one desirous of attaining heaven should perform Agnihotra), the fruit of sacrifices and

of acts of charity as are well-known in the world would all be in vain. Heaven is the fruit, but how could heaven be there if there were none to dwell in it! Sentences like ‘Sa eṣa yajñāyudhī...’ establish the existence of the gods—as is accepted by Mauryaputra too. And sentences like ‘ko jānāti māyopamān...’ do not maintain that the gods do not exist; they only emphasise that even the gods are illusory and transient, much more so other kinds of prosperity, etc.. If this be not so the statements about the existence of gods, and the invocation, by the mantras, of the gods would be meaningless. Statements like “One attains victory over the heavenly kingdom of Yama, Soma, Sūrya, Sura-guru (Yama-Soma-Sūrya-Suraguru-svarājyāni jayati) by kratu like uktha, ṣodaśin, etc.” take for granted the existence of the gods and so would be meaningless if the gods did not exist. Kratu is a sacrifice in which the yūpa (sacrificial post) is used, while a sacrifice in which the yūpa is not used and in which there are acts of charity, etc. is called a yajña. There are invocations of Indra, etc. by the words of Vedic mantras like ‘Indra āgaccha medhātithē meṣavṛṣaṇa’. All this would be meaningless if the gods did not exist. Thus the existence of the gods has to be recognised on the basis of the scriptures as also on that of reasoning (1882-3).

When Mahāvīra free from old age and death thus dispelled the doubt of Mauryaputra, the latter became a monk along with his 350 pupils (1884).

8. AKAMPITA REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF DENIZENS OF HELL (NĀRAKAS)

Hearing that Mauryaputra and others had become monks, Akampita decided to approach Lord Mahāvīra and pay his respects to him. Mahāvīra accosted him by his name and gotra as Akampita Gautama, and told him straightaway that he had a doubt in his mind as to the existence of hellish beings. On account of Vedic statements like 'Nārako vai eṣa jāyate yaḥ sūdrānam aśnāti' (He, who partakes of the food of a sūdra is born a hellish being), he was led to have faith in the existence of hellish beings; on the other hand there is a statement: 'Na ha vai pretya nārakāḥ' (Jīvas do not become nārakas after death or there are no nārakas in the other world) which suggests that there are no hellish beings. Hence the doubt of Akampita as to their existence. But the truth is that Akampita had not grasped the true meaning of these Vedic statements which Mahāvīra proceeded to show later, after arguing with him on the ground of reason (1885-87).

Akampita's argument in favour of the non-existence of nārakas is as follows: Gods like moon, etc. are known by direct perception; the existence of others can be demonstrated by inference from the accomplishment of the fruit or desired end by vidyā (lore) mantra (prayer incantation) upayācana (entreaty, request, etc.). But we merely hear the word 'nāraka'; the object denoted by it is not directly apprehended anywhere, nor can its existence be demonstrated by inference. Therefore the existence of 'nārakas' who cannot be cognised by any means of knowledge and so must be different from lower beings, human beings and gods cannot reasonably be accepted. But Akampita should bear in mind that though he himself cannot directly apprehend these nārakas, Lord Mahāvīra on account of his omniscience can and so they

must be existent. Akampita should not obstinately urge that his pratyakṣa, direct perception alone is pratyakṣa; the pratyakṣa of others also is pratyakṣa. We find in the world that the pratyakṣa of reliable persons is given as much importance and validity as one's own pratyakṣa. All do not have the direct knowledge of lion, śarabha,* haṃsa (swan) and yet no one regards them as not known or uncognised or uncognisable. Akampita himself has not seen all places, times, villages, towns, rivers, oceans and yet he recognises them as existent and cognisable, and he also recognises the pratyakṣa of others as pratyakṣa. Therefore, if nāraḥas are, directly cognised by Mahāvīra, they should be recognised as directly knowable (1888-91).

Moreover, is it true to say that sensuous perception is the only perception and that Mahāvīra's perception being super-sensuous cannot be accepted as such? In fact it is only by courtesy that sensuous perception is called perception. It is supersensuous perception that is the only true perception as it does not depend on extraneous help and pertains to the soul alone. Sensuous perception is really indirect, but it is called direct perception only figuratively inasmuch as it does not have to depend on the knowledge of an extraneous object, as inferential knowledge of fire depends on the knowledge of an extraneous mark, viz. smoke. But sensuous perception too is, as a matter of fact, not direct, because as in inference we do not have the cognition of fire directly but through smoke, so here also the akṣa (perceiver) i. e. ātman does not have the knowledge of a thing directly but through sense-organs which are other than the soul. Hence what is called direct perception is really as much indirect as inference. Super-sensuous perception is the only real perception. Hence the nāraḥas must be recognised as perceptible on the basis of Lord Mahāvīra's pratyakṣa (1892).

It should not be argued that even though in sensuous perception the soul does not know the object directly, yet the

* A mythological creature supposed to have eight legs and to inhabit snowy tracts. Śarabha also means camel, young one of an elephant, butterfly, locust, etc.

sense-organs are the cognisers and they cognise the object directly and so perception by the organs is perception in the primary sense of the term. It is not so; sense-organs cannot be the cognisers of things, because being of the nature of aggregate of matter, they are corporeal, or because they are insentient and so on, like jar. Cognition produced by them is not, therefore, direct perception. Sense-organs are merely the doors to cognition and soul is the agent of the cognition, the cogniser, as Devadatta sees through the five windows even though the windows themselves cannot see anything. The five sense-organs are merely instruments and with their help the soul cognises things (1893).

Sense-organs and soul cannot be regarded as identical, because even when the sense-organs have stopped functioning, there is memory of the object cognised through them; and a person if he is absent-minded does not cognise a thing even when the sense-organs are functioning. This shows that the cogniser soul is distinct from the instruments, the sense-organs, as a person looking through five windows is distinct from them (1894).

One should not for a moment have a doubt that supersensuous cognition cannot give as much knowledge as sensuous perception, since in the latter the soul gets help from the sense-organs. In fact, the soul which gets no help whatsoever from the sense-organs i.e. an omniscient soul perceives much more than the soul functioning with the help of the sense-organs, or to be exact, perceives everything. A person sitting within the house and gazing through the five windows of the house sees a few things; but if the man goes out he is not obstructed by anything and he sees many more things. This is true of the soul also which perceives unobstructed, without the help of the sense-organs (1895).

Other reasons can be adduced to prove that sense-perception is not direct perception. A thing has infinite attributes, yet one can cognise through the organ of sight, etc. only a particular object with the attribute colour, etc. only. Hence

sense-perception is indirect like inference in which through a mark of inference e.g. the attribute artificiality, one can only demonstrate an object as characterised by only one attribute viz. 'non-eternality'. In sense-perception too through the organ of one attribute one can establish a thing as characterised by that attribute alone. Sense-perception does not give us a full knowledge of its object (1896).

Inferential knowledge of fire through the knowledge of smoke with the help of the remembrance of the relation cognised earlier is indirect; so sensuous perception too is indirect as in it the memory of convention grasped earlier is indispensable. On account of familiarity, this memory of convention takes place so immediately at times that one loses sight of it; still it is indispensable; otherwise one who has not the knowledge of the convention, would not have the knowledge 'This is jar' on seeing a jar. But this is not what we find. One perceives a jar as jar. Memory is thus as much indispensable to sense-perception as it is to inference, and so both are indirect. That knowledge alone is direct in which the soul does not require any help from any instrument, e.g. visual intuition (avadhi), intuition of mental modes (manah-paryāya) and pure and perfect knowledge (kevala-jñāna); but in sense-perception the soul requires the help of the sense-organs which are thus the instruments of the perceiver (akṣa), soul and hence sense-perception is indirect like inference (1897).

It comes to this that leaving aside pure and perfect knowledge (kevala-jñāna), intuition of mental modes (manah-paryāya) and visual intuition (avadhi) all other cognitions are but inferential, indirect as have for their object a thing that is not directly perceived. The above mentioned pratyakṣa and also inference establish the existence of hellish beings. Therefore they exist. The pratyakṣa is in this particular case the pure and perfect knowledge of Mahāvīra's. The inference is as under: There must be some enjoyers of the fruit of extremely sinful actions, for that too is fruit of karma like the fruit of the low and middling types of karman. Lower creatures and human

beings are the enjoyers of the low and middling types of karman, so we must accept that it is the narakas who are the enjoyers of the fruit of extremely sinful actions. We cannot regard those lower creatures and human beings as the enjoyers of the fruit of extremely sinful actions, as we do not see that same climax of misery amongst the lower creatures and human beings as we see the climax of happiness amongst the gods. There is no lower creature or human being who experiences only pain or misery unalloyed with some happiness, for such a one also has the pleasure however little of enjoying cool breeze or the shade of a tree and so on; and we never see such a one experiencing the well known extreme tortures of hell, e.g. piercing, cutting, baking, burning, hurling on a stone, etc.. So we must recognise the existence of hellish beings (narakas) as distinct from lower creatures and human beings. It has also been said :

Satatam anubaddham uktam duḥkaṁ nārakeṣu tīvrapariṇāmam;
tiryakṣūṣṇa-bhaya-ksut-trḍādi-duḥkhaṁ sukhaṁ cālpam.

sukhaduḥkhe manujānām manah-sarīrāśraye bahuvikalpe;
sukham eva tu devānām alpam duḥkhaṁ tu manasibhavam.

(It is said that there is continually enduring pain of severe consequences amongst the narakas. Among the lower creatures there is the pain of heat, fear, hunger, thirst, etc. and little happiness. There are mental and physical pleasures and pains of many kinds amongst the mortals; but the gods have pleasure alone and little of mental unhappiness) (1898-1900).

Akampita should recognise the existence of narakas relying on Mahāvīra's word, for he is omniscient and therefore his word is authoritative like the word of other omniscient beings, Jaimini and others — recognised as such by Akampita (1901).

There can be no doubt regarding Mahāvīra's omniscience since there is the absence in him of fear, likes, faults, infatuation, etc. which actuate a person to utter lies and malicious words. Mahāvīra's words should be accepted as truthful and free from malice like those of an arbiter who is in the know of facts. That Mahāvīra is omniscient can be seen from the fact that he has

dispelled all the doubts and because there are no fear, likes, dislikes, etc. in him an account of which a person becomes ignorant or stupefied. There are no external signs of these and hence Mahāvīra's words are those of an omniscient being and so authoritative (1902).*

As for the Vedic statement 'Na ha vai pretya nārakāḥ santi' which led Akampita to doubt the existence of nārakas, it does not mean that the nārakas do not exist at all, but that there are not in the other world such nāraka beings as are eternal like Meru, etc.; those who commit very great sin become nārakas after death; hence one should not commit such sin as would make one go to hell after death. The emphasis is on the teaching that one should not commit sin and not on the non-existence of hellish beings (1903).

When Akampita's doubt was dispelled by Lord Mahāvīra, free from old age and death, he became a monk along with his 300 pupils and followers 1904.

* This Gāthā has occurred earlier, Gāthā 1578,

9. ACALABHRĀTĀ REGARDING THE REALITY OF PUṆYA-PĀPA (GOOD-EVIL)

Hearing that they had become monks, Acalabhrātā decided to approach Lord Mahāvīra with the intention of paying his respects to him. As he approached, Mahāvīra accosted him by his name and gotra as Acalabhrātā-Hārīta and told him that he had a doubt as to the reality of merit (puṇya) and sin (pāpa). There are Vedic statements like 'Puruṣa evedaṃ gni sarvaṃ'* which Acalabhrātā interpreted as meaning that there is nothing in the world except the Puruṣa; on the other hand most people believe in puṇya and pāpa. Hence his doubt. But the truth was that he did not understand the true meaning of this Vedic statements (1905-7).

Moreover a number of views were set forth by different thinkers as to puṇya and pāpa and Acalabhrātā, not being able to decide which was acceptable, was confounded :

(i) Puṇya alone exists, not pāpa.

(ii) Pāpa alone exists, there is nothing like puṇya,

(iii) There is only one thing of the nature of both puṇya and pāpa. As the mecaḥa-maṇi (a jewel) has a number of different colours and yet is one, similarly being one this thing yields both pleasure and pain.

(iv) Pleasure-yielding puṇya and pain-giving pāpa are different entities;

(v) There is nothing like karma or pāpa-puṇya; the manifold worldly existence just goes on by itself, by its own nature (1908).

The arguments in favour of these views, are respectively as follows :

* See Gaṇadharavāda, 2

(i) *Punya* alone can explain pleasure and pain, and so it would be superfluous to recognise the reality of *pāpa*. As *punya* goes on increasing there is increase in pleasure and good and when *punya* reaches its height it gives rise to the pleasure of heaven. As it goes on declining, decreasing, pleasure also decreases and pain increases and when the the least possible *punya* is left it results in the pain of hell. But if *punya* is completely destroyed, there is *mokṣa* or emancipation. The case is similar to that of wholesome food. The more one partakes of it, the more healthy and strong one becomes, but by gradually giving it up health starts disappearing and a person becomes unhealthy; and when it is completely abandoned a person dies; similarly when there is no *punya*, there is *mokṣa* or liberation from this world. Thus *pāpa* does not figure at all as the cause of pain and hence *punya* alone is real (1909).

(ii) Those who recognise the reality of *pāpa* alone give the analogy of unwholesome food. The more one partakes of it, the more prone to disease one becomes. So also as *pāpa* increases, one suffers more and more pain, and when it reaches its climax one experiences the greatest possible pain viz. that of hellish beings. But as *pāpa* declines, there is decrease of pain and gradual increase of pleasure or happiness and when *pāpa* is at its lowest ebb there is the pleasure of heaven, exactly as by decreasing the quantity of unwholesome food there is more and more of health and less of disease. When unwholesome food is completely given up there is the gain of perfect health, so when *pāpa* is completely eradicated one attains emancipation or *mokṣa*. *Pāpa* alone can explain pleasure and pain; *punya* is superfluous (1910).

(iii) *Punya* and *pāpa* are not distinct, but are one entity. Different colours form one variegated colour-pattern; the *mecaka-maṇi* with many colours is but one; bearing the forms of man and lion, *Narasimha* is but one; so there is only one entity which bears the names *punya* and *pāpa*. When the proportion of *pāpa* goes up that same thing is called *pāpa*; and when the *punya*-element increases, it is called *punya* (1911).

(iv) Pleasure and pain which are effects do not occur simultaneously, so they must have separate causes; these are puṇya and pāpa which are therefore independent entities.

(v) There is nothing like pāpa or puṇya; the manifold worldly existence goes on by its own essential nature (svabhāva).

Of these the fourth view alone recognising the independent existence of puṇya and pāpa stands to reason; the others are faulty and can be sublated by reasoning. Svabhāva, to take the view mentioned last, cannot explain the existence of pleasure and pain in all their variety. What is this Svabhāva? Is it a thing or non-causality or attribute of a thing.* Svabhāva cannot be recognised as a thing because it is not apprehended like sky-flower (1912-3).

And† if its existence is recognised even when it is not apprehended, then there should be no objection to recognising the existence of karma of the form of puṇya-pāpa. Whatever reason is put forth to account for svabhāva even though it is not apprehended the same will be the reason for the existence of karma (1914).

Or there is no harm in regarding svabhāva as but another name for karman.‡ Moreover, svabhāva being uniform in nature, cannot give rise to the manifold effects like body, etc. which have a fixed shape. The potter cannot make jars of a specific shape without the help of his manifold apparatus; so the variety of pleasure-pain cannot arise without manifold karma; svabhāva, uniform in character, cannot be regarded as their cause (1915).

Again, if this svabhāva§ is a thing is it corporeal or incorporeal. If it be corporeal, it would differ only in name from

* Same as Gāthā 1786. For the refutation of Svabhāvavāda, see Gāthā 1643 commentary.

† Same as Gāthā 1787

‡ Same as 1788 ab.

§ The same questions have been raised in Gāthās 1789-90 but answered differently. And we have the same discussion as we have here in the commentary on Gāthā 1643.

karman; svabhāva would in essence be the same as karman. If it be incorporeal, it could not, like ākaśa (ether), give rise to any effect, much less produce body, etc. or pleasure-pain. As the effects, body, etc. are corporeal, the cause svabhāva too must be corporeal, and if it be corporeal, it would be the same as karma as explained above, only with a different name.

If svabhāva is looked upon as non-causality* (—that is to say, effects have no cause-), then ass's horn should also be produced as much as jar, etc.; but this is not what we find, since ass's horn has no cause; hence every effect must have a cause and svabhāva cannot be interpreted as non-causality (1916-7).

If svabhāva be an attribute of a thing, it would be a transformation of jīva and karman, called puṇya-pāpa. This transformation can be established as the basis of the inference of the effect from the cause and of the cause from the effect. This is as follows: Acts of charity etc. and injury etc. are causes, therefore they must have their effects and these effects are nothing but the transformations of jīva and karman in the form of puṇya and pāpa as the act of ploughing etc. has rice, barley, wheat, etc. as its effect. It has been said:

“Samāsu tulyaṁ viṣamāsu tulyaṁ satīṣv asac cāpy asatīṣu sac ca;
phalaṁ kriyāsv ity atha yannimittaṁ tad dehināṁ so'sti nu
ko'pi dharmāḥ.

—‘Like activities bear like fruit, and unlike activities too yield like fruit; at times there is no fruit even when activities are undertaken and at other times there is the fruit even without activities. This shows that the fruit of activities does not depend entirely on them; it must be dependent on some attribute of embodied beings; karman is this attribute.’

Inference from effect is as follows: Body, etc. must have a cause because they are effects, like jar, etc.. Karman is this cause of body, etc.. This has been discussed at length in the conversation

* This alternative has been differently answered in the comm. on Gāthā 1643 and in Gāthā 1791.

with Agnibhūti. It may be argued that we directly apprehend parents etc. as the cause of body, etc. and so there is no need to imagine the existence of invisible karma. But it is not so. Children of the same parents are unlike one another; some may be good to look at, while others may be ugly and it is on account of this that karman as distinct from the visible causes, parents, etc. has to be recognised. And this karman has again to be recognised as of the form of puṇya and pāpa; for puṇya - karman can be inferred as the cause of śubha (good) body, etc. and pāpa-karman as the cause of aśubha (bad, inauspicious) body, etc.. Moreover the cause in the form of good action gives rise to good karman or puṇya and foul action as the cause gives rise to bad karman or pāpa. Hence the two types of karman—pāpa and puṇya—are different by their very nature. It has also been said:—

“Iha dr̥ṣṭahetvasambhāvīkāryaviśeṣāt kulālayatna iva;
hetvantaram anumeyam tat karma śubhāśubham kartuh”.

—“When a particular effect does not arise from visible causes, another cause has to be inferred like the effort of the potter, and that is the śubha (good) or aśubha (bad) karman”. Moreover, Acalabhrātā must recognise the existence of śubha and aśubha karman relying on the words of Mahāvīra who is omniscient (1918-20).

The two-fold classification of karma into puṇya and pāpa can be established in a different way also. Pleasure and pain are effects and they must have a befitting cause (agreeing with their nature). Atoms are the befitting cause of jar and threads of cloth; similarly puṇya-karma is a befitting cause of pleasure and pāpa-karma of pain, and the two should be regarded as distinct (1921).

One may raise an objection here that if karman is the cause of pleasure and pain and if it is in conformity with the effect, then it too should be arūpin (without form) and if it has form, it is not a befitting cause, since pleasure and pain are not corporeal, whereas karman would be corporeal (1922).

The answer to this is that cause and effect are not in absolute agreement, nor also do they completely differ. If they be regarded as absolutely agreeing with each other, they would be identical and both would be of the nature of cause or both of the nature of effect, but would not stand to each other in the relation of cause-effect. If they be different from each other in entirety, if the effect be regarded as a real existent entity, the cause would not be one at all. Hence the cause and the effect are neither in absolute conformity, nor are they completely different. Hence the cause, karman need not be formless, because its effect, pleasure-pain is such (1923).

Of course it remains to be explained why the cause is said to be one befitting the effect, when not only cause-effect but everything in the world is both similar and dissimilar. Even when everything in the world is both similar and dissimilar to every other thing in the world, the effect is an essential mode of the cause and hence it is required that the cause should be befitting the effect; the things other than the effect are alien modes, and hence the cause does not agree with their nature. That is to say, while the cause is transformed into the effect, it is not transformed into any other thing, and hence it is said that the cause is in conformity with the effect; the cause may be similar to other things in other ways but from this particular point of own and alien modes, the cause is not in conformity with things other than its own effect. In the present context, pleasure and pain are the essential modes of their cause as follows: the conjunction of soul and merit is the cause of pleasure and the latter is its mode; and the conjunction of soul and demerit is the cause of pain which is its mode. As pleasure is said to be good, auspicious, etc. these very attributes are applied to its cause—the material punya also; and the material pāpa is called bad, inauspicious, etc. because its effect pain is said to be such. Hence it is from this particular point of view that merit-demerit are said to be befitting causes of pleasure-pain (1924).

The corporeal blue object is the cause of the incorporeal cognition illuminating or presenting it, so corporeal karman of the form of merit-sin can be the cause of incorporeal pleasure-pain; our experience tells us that corporeal food, garland, sandal-wood, woman, and serpent, poison, thorn, etc. are the causes of pleasure and pain, so is karman their cause. It may be argued that if this is what Lord Mahāvīra's view amounts to, then let these food etc. which are directly perceived be the cause of pleasure-pain; it is not necessary to posit the existence of karman which is not seen. But it is not so. Even in the case of persons with the same resources in respect of food, etc. there is seen to be a great difference in the resulting pleasure and pain. The same food confers health on one while it brings illhealth to another. This difference in results must have some special cause; if there were no cause it would be eternally existent like ether; or eternally non-existent like ass's horn. Karman is this cause and it can be seen that it is highly necessary to posit its existence, even though it may not be seen (1925-6).

Karman is regarded as corporeal though it is not seen, because difference in results in the case of persons with the same resources is caused by it and because it imparts strength to the corporeal body, etc. as a jar does. The jar as an instrumental cause imparts strength to body, etc. and is corporeal.* Or karman is corporeal because its store is strengthened by corporeal things like garland, sandal-wood, etc., just as the jar is strengthened, made firm by corporeal things like oil, etc.. Or karman is corporeal, because its effects, body, etc. are corporeal, as atoms are corporeal since their effects—jar, etc.—are corporeal. It can be urged here that if the effect should determine for us the nature of the cause, then karman as the cause of the corporeal body, etc. should be corporeal and as the cause of the incorporeal pleasure-pain should be incorporeal.

*This seems to mean that the body by itself cannot fetch water, but if it is helped by a jar, which serves as an instrumental cause, it attains the strength or capability of bringing water.

But it is not so. Lord Mahāvīra does not intend to state that if the effect is corporeal or incorporeal, all its causes should be accordingly corporeal or incorporeal. Karman alone is not the cause of pleasure-pain; soul too is the cause; and of the two it is the soul which is the material or constituent cause and the karma is the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* (non-constituent cause); hence it is but proper that the soul, the material cause should be incorporeal as its effects, pleasure-pain are incorporeal; and it is not at all necessary to infer that the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa*, karma should be incorporeal because pleasure, etc. are such. Hence there is no difficulty in establishing that the cause viz. karma of body, etc. which are corporeal is corporeal (1927-1929).

If karma though corporeal is established as the cause of pleasure and pain, it is not reasonable to state that there is abundance of pain simply on account of the decline of merit. But abundance of pain is certainly on account of the abundance of its corresponding kārman, viz. *pāpa-karma*, because there is abundant experience of pain; just as the experience of the abundance of pleasure is caused by the abundance of the corresponding karma, viz. *puṇya-karma* (1930-31).

Moreover the abundant pain experienced by embodied souls is not caused merely by the decline in merit; but an external factor, viz. abundance of undesired food, etc. too is necessary. If it be caused merely by the decline in *puṇya*, then it should appear even when there is the decline of desired food alone which accrues on account of *puṇya*, and would not depend on the abundance of the force of external means like undesired food, etc. which accrue on account of *pāpa* and which are opposed to it. The purport of this discussion is that if pain were caused merely by the decline of *puṇya*, then it would be brought about merely by the decline in the means such as desired food, etc. which are attained by the rise of *puṇya*, but this is not what we find; on the contrary it is caused by virtue of the abundance of the means like undesired food, etc. which are opposed to it. Decline of merit can cause decline of desired resources, but never increase of undesired

resources. An independent cause, viz. sin has to be supposed for it (1932).

Again if the happy body were determined by abundance of puṇya alone and the miserable body by only the decrease of puṇya alone, and if there were nothing like sin (pāpa), then the body being corporeal it would be huge on account of the abundance of puṇya and small on account of the decrease in puṇya. And the big body should be pleasurable and the small one painful. But we do not find this. The body of an elephant is bigger than that of a sovereign lord, and yet there is abundance of merit in the case of the sovereign lord. If, as said above, decline of merit were to determine the body, then the elephant's body should be very small, but it is very big. Again puṇya is good and auspicious, and even a small amount of puṇya should bring about a good effect; in no case can it become inauspicious. Gold, for example, in a small quantity makes a small golden jar, but never an earthen one or a copper one. The elephant's body too should be small and auspicious, but not big and aśubha (foul, inauspicious, ugly). But if it is such, an independent pāpa-karma should be responsible for this (1933).

The same discussion in the reverse form applies to the view that there is sin alone and no good or merit; pleasure cannot be caused by decline of demerit or sin; for if poison is fatal, even a little poison should cause harm, but never good. But puṇya-karma has to be postulated to account for pleasure. Karma cannot be of a mixed nature too, as there is no cause of such a karma. Yoga (activity) is the cause of karma. Yoga can be either good or bad at one time, but not of a mixed good-cum-bad nature; its effect too should be good, viz. puṇya or bad, viz. pāpa, but not of a mixed form—puṇya-cum-pāpa. Perverted attitude, non-abstinence, spiritual inertia, passion and activity (yoga) are the causes of bondage; of these yoga alone is such that it is invariably connected with karma-bondage; that it to say, karma-bondage is not possible without yoga. Hence yoga alone of all the causes has been mentioned here. Yoga is three-fold according as it pertains to mind, speech or body (1934-1935).

It may be objected that activities of the mind, speech and body are seen to be of a mixed nature—to be good-cum-bad—, so the above statement is not correct. To wit, some one thinks of giving in charity, in a way not in accordance with what is prescribed, then the mental activity is both good and bad inasmuch as the pious attitude is indicative of good, but the non-observance of the enjoined method is indicative of 'bad'. Similarly if one instructs another to give in charity, not in the prescribed way, there is the activity of speech which is good-cum-bad. And if one worships the Jina by bowing down, etc. not according to the prescribed way, that is good-cum-bad bodily activity. True, but it should not be forgotten that yoga is two-fold — dravya (physical) and bhāva (psychical). The material substances inspiring the activities of the mind, etc. are dravya-yoga and so also all the vibrations of the mind, etc.. Adhyavasāya (determination, motive, intention) is the cause of both these kinds of dravya-yoga. Dravya-yoga may be of a mixed nature both good and bad. But the cause of it viz. adhyavasāya can be at a time either good or bad, but can never be of a mixed nature. Dravya-yoga too is said to be of a mixed nature only from the vyavahara-naya i. e. the empirical point of view; but from the ultimate point of view (nīscaya-naya), it can be only good or bad at a time. In the inquiry into the real nature of things, it is the nīscaya-naya that is more important than the vyavahāra-naya and it constitutes the import of the scriptures. In the case of bhāva-yoga, the mixed state is not possible from any point of view. Adhyavasāya can be either good or bad; in no scripture do we find a reference to a third type of adhyavasāya of a mixed nature—good-cum-bad. When the adhyavasāya is good there is the binding of puṇya-karma and when the adhyavasāya is bad there is the binding of pāpa-karma; but there being no adhyavasāya of a mixed nature—good-cum-bad, there can never be any karma which is of a mixed nature—puṇya-cum-pāpa. Hence puṇya and pāpa should be regarded as independent and not of a mixed nature (1936).

Now it should be explained why bhāva-yoga is not of a mixed nature. Bhāva-yoga is two-fold—of the nature of dhyāna

(concentration) and leśyā (coloration). Dhyāna can be righteous (dharma) or pure (śukla) and auspicious (śubha) or mournful (ārta) or cruel (raudra) and inauspicious (aśubha); but never of a mixed nature. On the cessation of dhyāna, the coloration is good—taijasa, etc. or bad—kāpota, etc. but not of a mixed nature. Bhāva-yoga also which is of the two-fold nature of dhyāna and leśyā, thus cannot be of a mixed nature; karma too which is bound by this bhāva-yoga can be auspicious, of the nature of puṇya, or inauspicious, of the nature of pāpa, but not of a mixed nature. Therefore pāpa and puṇya should be regarded as independent entities (1937).

An objection can be put forth here: If karma is not of a mixed nature, why is the nature of mohaniya-karma of the form of right-cum-perverted attitude and so good-cum-bad? The fact is that the nature of mixed mohaniya is not mixed from the point of view of binding; that is to say, the karma that is bound by yoga is from that point of view either good or bad; but this previously bound karma-prakṛti can be turned by the force of adhyavasāya (determination) from good into bad and from bad into good. The formerly bound aśubha karman of the nature of perverted attitude can be transformed into the nature of right attitude by purifying it by good adhyavasāya (determination). Similarly bad or impure adhyavasāya can transform the good pudgalas of (karma of) right attitude into the nature of perverted attitude, and some karma-pudgalas of perverted attitude can be half-purified. Thus from the point of view of the existing karman (persisting after being bound), mixed mohaniya-karma is possible; but at the time of binding, there is never the binding of mixed mohaniya karma (1938).

As to the transformation of one kind of karma-prakṛti (karmic matter) into another there is no possibility of such transference as far as the eight basic karma-prakṛtis are concerned — viz. jñānāvaraṇa, darśanāvaraṇa, vedanīya, mohaniya, āyu, nāma, gotra and antarāya; i. e. one karma-prakṛti cannot be transformed into another. But transformation among the sub-types of each basic karman is possible except in

the case of āyu and mohanīya karmans. To wit, manuṣya, deva, nāraka, tiryāñca are the four sub-types of āyu-karma; they cannot be transformed into one another; similarly of the two-types of mohanīya karma—darśana-mohanīya and cāritra-mohanīya—one cannot be transformed into the other. In the case of others, transformation is possible in the case of the sub-types of karman. This is how the transformation is to be considered: There are 47 dhruva-bandhini uttara-prakṛtis (sub-types of the bondage of karman), viz. 5 jñānāvaraṇas, 9 darśanāvaraṇas, 16 kaṣāyas, mithyātva, bbaya, jugupsā, taijasa, kārmaṇa, colour, taste, scent, touch, agurulaghu, upaghāta, nirmāṇa, 5 antarāyas. These sub-prakṛtis which are non-different from the mūla-prakṛtis (basic karmic matter) keep on being transformed from one sub-type to another. About the adhruva-bandhin prakṛtis it should be noted that the non-bound prakṛti is transformed into the bound; but the bound is never transformed into the non-bound. This is the way of transformation of prakṛti (karmic matter). The remaining process of the transformation of pradeśa (numerical strength), etc. can be seen from 'mūlaprakṛtyabhinnāsu vedyamānāsu saṅkramaḥ bhavati—' There is transformation into one another amongst those that are known to be non-different from the original prakṛti' (1939).

Puṇya and pāpa can be distinguished as follows: That which has such attributes as good colour, scent, taste, touch, and that which has good fruition is puṇya. That which is just the reverse of this, that is to say, has foul colour, etc. and foul fruition, is pāpa. These pāpa and puṇya are both pudgala (matter); but they are neither very gross like the mountain Meru, etc. nor are they very subtle (1940).

The universe is full of pudgalas and yet the soul binds (catches) only such matter of the karma-group as is fit for karman in the form of pāpa and puṇya; it does not bind paramāṇus subtler than the substance of the karma-group and substance of the very gross (audārika) group and such other groups. If a man besmears his body with oil and sits in the open, particles cling to his entire body in proportion to the oil

besmeared, so the soul besmeared with likes-dislikes catches only such pudgalas as are fit for karma as puṇya, pāpa. Again the soul catches all over its expanse only those pudgalas as are within the pradeśa (space-points) it occupies. It has been said :

Egapaesogādhan savvapaesehi kammuno joggain;
bandhai jahuttaheum sāiyamañāiyain vāvi.

(Pañcasaṅgraha, Gāthā, 284)—

“The soul binds with all its space-points as much matter fit for karman as is situated in the space, occupied by it. This is accounted for by the causes mentioned above (i. e. perversity, etc.). This bondage has a beginning or is beginningless from the point of view of the series”.

The soul which has fallen off from the path of subsidence, (upaśama) starts binding the mohaniya and other karmans afresh; and in the case of the jīva who has not yet started on the path of subsidence, the bondage is said to be beginningless (1941).

A point can be raised here to the following effect: All the space-points are crowded with pudgalas irrespective of whether they are śubha or aśubha; there is no division like space reserved for śubha pudgalas or for aśubha pudgalas. Just as the body besmeared with oil can distinguish between dust-particles big and small, but not between auspicious and inauspicious, so the soul can bind unto itself karmic matter by distinguishing between gross and subtle, but it cannot distinguish while binding karmic matter, between auspicious and inauspicious pudgalas and take unto itself only the auspicious ones (1942).

This can be answered as follows: As long as karma-pudgala is not bound by the jīva, it is neither auspicious nor inauspicious; but as soon as jīva binds it it transforms it into auspicious or inauspicious by virtue of the peculiarity of the transformation in the form of adhyavasāya (determination) and also of the support, as in the case of food. That is to say, the jīva while binding karman produces in it auspiciousness or inauspiciousness in accordance with the transformation of the jīva into auspicious or inauspicious adhyavasāya; again, the jīva

which is the support of karman has such a peculiar nature on account of which it can transform karma even while binding it; the karma too has such a nature that it is thus transformed even while being bound by the jīva with auspicious or inauspicious adhyavasāya. In the same way jīva produces also the manifoldness of type, duration, intensity of fruition, scantiness of space-points or extensiveness of space-points, even as it binds it. This has been pointed out in the following Gāthās :

- (i) Gahaṇasamayammi jīvo uppāei guṇe sapaccayao;
savvajīvāṇantaḡuṇe kammaḡaesesu savvesu.
(Karma-prakṛti, Bandhana-karaṇa, Gāthā, 29)
- (ii) Āyugabhāgo thovo nāme goe samo tao ahigo;
āvaraṇamantarāe sariso ahigo ya mohe vi.
savvuvuri veyañīe bhāgo ahio nu kāraṇaṇiṃ kiṃtu;
suhaduḡkhakāraṇatā ṡhīi viseseṇa sesāsu.
(Bandha-śataka, Gā. 89-90).*

- [(i) The soul while binding karma-pudgalas produces in the karma-pradeśas, on account of its transformations, infinite attribute-units, infinitely times the souls.
- (ii) In the karma-pradeśas the smallest portion is that of the āyuh-karman; more than that, but equal amongst themselves, is that of jñānāvaraṇa, darśanāvaraṇa and antarāya karmans. More than that is the portion of mohaniya, but the greatest of all is the portion of vedaniya, because it is the cause of pleasure and pain. The portions of the other karmans is in proportion to their duration] (1943).

The case of karman pudgala is parallel to that of food. Even when the food is the same, there are different modifications caused by the peculiarity of modification and of the support or receptacle. Even if a cow and a serpent are given the same food, the cow's food turns into milk and that of the serpent into poison. As there is this peculiarity in the nature of the food that it undergoes different modifications in different

*Compare Karma-prakṛti Cūrṇi, Bandhana-karaṇa, Gā. 28.

receptacles (āśraya), so the support or the receptacle of the food also has the peculiar capability or efficiency of transforming it differently. Karma, similarly, has the energy or capability to undergo an auspicious or inauspicious transformation on resorting to a jīva with an auspicious or inauspicious adhyavasāya (resolution); and the supporting jīva too has the capability to bind karman and to transform it into auspicious or inauspicious i. e. into puṇya (merit) or pāpa (sin) (1944).

This example cannot be stretched to the extremest possible end because it can only prove that some jīvas can transform karman into auspicious (śubha) and other jīvas can transform karma into inauspicious (aśubha) but it cannot be said that one and the same jīva has the capability to produce in karman both śubha and aśubha transformations. Another example can be given for this. Even in the same body, the same food immediately undergoes modifications both substantial and unsubstantial, good and foul. It is well known that our body turns the food eaten into substantial things like juices, blood, flesh and into foul things like urine, faeces. So the jīva can transform the karman it has bound into śubha or aśubha in accordance with its own modifications or adhyavasāya—śubha or aśubha (1945).

It is easy to see that śubha karman is puṇya and aśubha karman, pāpa. But it remains to be seen as to which of the types of karma-bondage are śubha and which aśubha. Comfort-giving (sātavedanīya), right belief (samyaktva, a particular state of purity of the mithyātva-pudgala), laughing, male sex, rati (improper and confirmed prejudicial liking), good quantum of life (āyu), good name (nāman), good lineage (gotra), —these types are called puṇya. In the śubha-āyu (quantum of life) are included deva (god), manuṣya (man) and tiryāñca (lower beings), that is to say, hellish beings are excluded. Śubha-nāma includes 37 types, viz. devadvika i. e. devagati and devānupūrvī, yaśaḥ-kīrti (fame), tīrthakara (potency of revealing truth and establishing religious community), etc. Śubha-gotra means high lineage. These 46 types being auspicious are puṇya and the remaining are pāpa. Some ācāryas regard all the sub-types of mohaniya-karman as

pāpa because they bring about some harmful effect or the other for creatures. Thus by excluding samyaktya, laughing, male-sex, and raṭi there are 42 puṇya-prakṛtis: sātavedanīya, uccagotra (high lineage), manuṣya-deva-tiryāñc-āyu and 37 types of nāma-karman, viz. devadvika i. e. devagati and devānupūrvī, manuṣyadvika i. e. manuṣyagati and manuṣyānupūrvī, beings with five sense-organs, 5 bodies, viz. gross, subtle, āhāraka (of ascetics), luminous, karmic; triad of aṅgopāṅga, viz. gross, subtle, āhāra angopāṅgas; prathama-saṁhanana — vajra-ṛṣabha-nārāca, caturasra-saṁsthāna (symmetrical structure), auspicious colour, taste, scent, touch; agurulaghu, parāghāta, ucchvāsa, ātāpa, uddyota, praśasta-vihāyogati, trasa, bādara, paryāpta, pratyeka, sthira, śubha, subhaga, susvara, ādeya, yaśaḥ-kīrti, nirmāṇa, tīrthakara. These have been enumerated as the 42 puṇya-prakṛtis by the Jina.”*

The remaining 82 karma-prakṛtis are inauspicious i. e. pāpa. — the 5 saṁsthānas viz. nyagrodhaparimaṇḍala, sādi, kubja, vāmana, huṇḍa; apraśasta vihāyogati; 5 saṁhananas. viz. ṛṣabha-nārāca, nārāca, ardhanaārāca, kilikā, chedavṛtta; tiryaggati, tiryagānupūrvī, asātavedanīya, low lineage, upaghāta, birth with one sense-organ, with two, three, four sense-organs, naraka-gati, narakānupūrvī, naraka-āyu, sthāvara, sūkṣma, aparyāptaka, sādharmaṇa, asthira, aśubha, durbhaga, duḥsvara, anādeya, ayaśaḥ-kīrti, aśubhavarṇa, aśubhagandha, aśubharasa, aśubhasparśa, kevalajñānāvaraṇa, kevaladarśanāvaraṇa, nidrā, nidranidrā, pracalā, pracalāpracalā, styānagrddhi or styānarddhi, anantānubandhi-krodha, anantā^omāna anantā^omāyā, an^olobha, apratyākhyānāvaranakrodha, apr^omāna, apr^omāyā, apr^olobha, pratyākhyānāvaraṇa krodha, pr^omāna, pr^omāyā, pr^olobha,

* Sāyam uccāgoyam nara-tiri-devāuyāim taha nāme;
devadugam manuyadugam paṇidajāi ya taṇupaṇagam.
aṅgovaṅgānā tigam paḍhamam saṅghayanam eva saṁsthānam;
subhavaṇṇāicaukkam agurulahū taha ya paraghāyam.
ūsasam āyavam ujjoya vihagāi viya pasatthā:
tasa-bāyara-pajattam patteyathiram subham subhagam.
sussara āejja jasam nimma tittayaram eva eyāo;
bāyalam pagaio punnam ti jinehim bhaniāo.

mithyātva, matijñānāvaraṇa, śrutajñānā°, avadhijñānā°, manah-paryayajñānā°, cakṣuḥ-darśanā°, acakṣuḥ-darśanā°, avadhidarśanā°, sañjvalana-krodha, sañmāna, sañmāyā, sañlobha, hāsyā, rati, arati, śoka, bhaya, jugupsā, strīvedā, puṁveda, napuṁsakaveda, dānāntarāya, lābhāntarāya, bhogā°, upabhogā°, vīryā°.

The status of samyaktva is rather a puzzling one. That too is regarded by Lord Mahāvīra as aśubha — pāpa. But then how is it called samyaktva? The samyaktva in the form of the ruci or predilection of the jīva is śubha; but that is not the point of consideration here. Here samyaktva is a particular state of the purity of mithyātva-pudgalas; and as these cause undesirable states like doubt, etc., they are aśubha, and hence pāpa. These pudgalas are figuratively said to be of the nature of samyaktva inasmuch as they do not very much obscure the good predilection of the soul. They are in reality the pudgalas of mithyātva. Both these pāpa and puṇya are also classified as with fruition and without fruition. The type-bondage which fructifies in the same form as it was bound in is called savipāka-prakṛti; it affects the soul. The soul can lessen the intensity of fruition and when the lessening is so much that the karman almost loses its effect on the soul, the fruition of that karman is non-effecting and only its space-units are experienced. This is the avipāki prakṛti.

Thus it can be seen that puṇya and pāpa are independent of each other. Had they been mixed, all the souls would have experienced their effect in a mixed form; that is to say, no one would have experienced pleasure alone or pain alone; but only pleasure-pain in a mixed form. The gods experience only pleasure and hellish creatures and others experience only pain; if the cause puṇya-pāpa were of a mixed form, the effect pleasure-pain too would be of a mixed form; it can never be that one of the constituents of the mixture is generated in an intense form in the effect and the other has no effect whatsoever. Hence the cause of abundance of pain viz. pāpa must be quite distinct from the cause of the abundance of pleasure viz. puṇya. The

effect resulting from the *mecaka-maṇi* does not reveal intensity of one of the colours. It may be argued that *pāpa-puṇya* as mixed can appear as one, but when there is increase of *puṇya*-constituent and a corresponding decrease of *pāpa*-constituent, abundance of pleasure is experienced and when *pāpa*-constituent increases and *puṇya*-constituent correspondingly decreases, there is the experience of abundance of pain; this can explain the experience of gods and hellish beings etc., even when *puṇya* and *pāpa* are of a mixed form. But this argument is not correct. If *puṇya* and *pāpa* were one in form, when one increases, the other should also increase; but what we find is that when one increases, the other decreases. Hence they must be independent and different entities, as *Devadatta* and *Yajñadatta* are different in that the prosperity of one does not affect the other. Thus *puṇya* and *pāpa* are different entities, though there is no objection to their being regarded as of one form (one) in as much they are both of the form of *karma*. The three alternatives as to *puṇya-pāpa* have been quashed, hence the fourth one alone that *puṇya* and *pāpa* are independent entities holds ground. Hence too *Svabhāvavāda* is not acceptable, as proved earlier in the discussion with *Agnibhūti* (1946).

The Vedas do not intend to say that the *Puruṣa*—*Brahman* alone exists, and nothing external to it; for if there were nothing like *puṇya* and *pāpa*, the injunction regarding the performance of *Agnihotra* in the case of one desirous of heaven would be meaningless. Moreover, people believe that acts of charity, etc. yield *puṇya* and the fruit of injury is *pāpa*; this too would have no consistency. Hence the Vedas cannot be interpreted as negating *puṇya* and *pāpa* (1947).

When *Acalabhrātā*'s doubt was thus removed by Lord *Mahāvira* free from old age and death, he became a monk along with his 300 pupils and followers (1948).

10. METĀRYA REGARDING THE OTHER-WORLD

Hearing that they had become monks, Metārya too decided to approach Lord Mahāvīra and have his doubt dispelled. As he approached, the Jina accosted him by his name and gotra as Metārya Kaunḍinya and told him that he had a doubt in his mind regarding the existence of the 'other world'. This was because he found what seemed to him conflicting statements in the Veda viz. The mass of consciousness rising from these elements, etc.* But he did not know the true import of the Vedic passages and hence his doubt (1949-51).

Metārya's argument is that as the wine-spirit emerges from molasses, dhātaki, etc. being identical with them, so consciousness emerges from the material elements—earth, etc. and is non-different from them. If these elements are perishable, consciousness too would perish along with them being their attribute, as the colour of the cloth perishes with it. So no other-world need be imagined (1952).

Even if consciousness be regarded as a distinct entity, not identical with the elements, it would be non-eternal since it arises out of them, as fire arising out of fire-wood is perishable. What is non-eternal perishes after some time, so there is no question of its going to another world. Hence too there is no other-world (1953).

If a number of consciousnesses (one in each body) and of the form of the attribute of material elements be not recognised, but only one Ātman, the abode of all consciousness, pervading all the worlds and inactive be accepted as is said in:

'Eka eva hi bhūtātmā bhūte bhūte vyavasthitaḥ;
ekadhā bahudhā caiva dṛśyate jalacandravat.'

—Brahmabindu Upaniṣad.

* See Gaṇadharavāda, 1.

[There is only one elemental self stationed in each and every being (bhūta) and it appears as one or many like the reflection of the moon in water], even then the other-world could not be established. This Ātman being all-pervading and inactive would be present in all bodies everywhere like the ether and hence would not be able to move, and hence the question of going to 'other-world' does not arise (1954).

The world of gods, of hellish beings, etc. can be said to be 'other-world' from the point of view of the world of human beings, but it is not perceived. Metārya's arguments naturally lead him to deny the other-world; but there are references to the existence of the other-world in the Vedas, and hence Metārya's doubt as to its existence or otherwise (1955).

Mahāvīra proceeds to dispel this doubt of his. Consciousness is an attribute of the soul which is different from the material elements, sense-organs, etc. and this soul (ātman) is eternal from the point of view of the basic substance on account of remembrance of previous birth, etc. and non-eternal from the point of view of the modes. This point has been discussed earlier with Vāyubhūti (1956).

It is not proper to accept one all-pervading, inactive ātman, since there are differences of characteristics as in the case of jar; so like the many jars, etc. we must accept many souls. This has been discussed at length with Indrabhūti. Upayoga (conscious activity) is the characteristic of the soul. This upayoga is seen to be diverse on account of the infinite different transformations occasioned by likes-dislikes, passions and objects, etc.. So their substrate, ātman too must be accordingly infinite in number. The ātman is confined to the body, it cannot be all-pervading, as its qualities are found only within the body; the sensation of touch, to take a parallel instance, is found all over the body but not elsewhere, so the sense-organ of touch is said to be co-extensive with the body, but is not said to be elsewhere also. The soul again cannot be inactive, because like Devadatta, it is an enjoyer. This too has been discussed with

Indrabhūti. Hence the souls must be regarded as many, not ubiquitous and not inactive (1957).

That the other world—the world of gods, and hellish beings—exists has been established in the discussion with Maurya who doubted the existence of the world of gods, and with Akampita who had a doubt as to the existence of the world of hellish beings (1958).

It may be argued : Whether jīva (soul) and consciousness are looked upon as identical or not, the existence of the 'other world' cannot be proved. If the jīva is of the nature of consciousness, that is to say, identical with consciousness, then the latter being non-eternal and destructible, jīva too would be such and therefore there would be no other-world characterised by going to another life. If it is said that the jīva is distinct from consciousness, and so eternal, and therefore there is another world, then soul would be non-knower like the ākāśa which is different from knowledge, or like a block of wood (1959).

And if the jīva being different from non-eternal consciousness be looked upon as eternal, then it could not be the doer and the enjoyer, for if being eternal it were doer-enjoyer it would be such always, since eternal things are uniform in nature. But this is not what we find. If soul were not the doer, there would be no other-world, because if it were there, there should be 'other world' even for the siddhas (perfect souls). Even if soul is not enjoyer, it is futile to imagine 'other world' because that which is non-enjoyer has not to enjoy any fruit of action in the other-world. If the soul were non-knower it would not transmigrate, move from one life to another as a log of wood does not move. Again being incorporeal like ākāśa, it would not transmigrate. In the absence of transmigration, how could the 'other world' be established (1960)?

Lord Mahāvīra answers these arguments as follows : Metārya takes it for granted that whatever is capable of being produced is non-eternal like jar, etc.. Vijñāna (consciousness)

can be produced, so it is non-eternal and the soul being identical with it must also be such. He also believes that the modes are non-eternal ('and so on' in the Gāthā), e. g. the modes—newness, oldness of post, etc. which are non-eternal. Vijñāna (consciousness) being a mode is non-eternal and the soul too identical with it is non-eternal and so there is no other-world. But this argument is not sound. The very reasons that prove the soul to be non-eternal can also be adduced to show that the soul is eternal. Thus they are fallacious ones, Inconclusive. Everything is of the nature of origination-destruction-duration (utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya). As an account of its having an origin, a thing is proved to be perishable, so an account of its having duration, it can be proved to be in a way eternal too. Hence it can be argued: Vijñāna (consciousness) is eternal because it is produced, like jar. Jīva (soul) too being identical with vijñāna is in a way eternal and hence there cannot be the negation of 'other-world' (1961).

The argument advanced by Metārya is fallacious, for there is a counter-inference viz. Vijñāna cannot be absolutely perishable because it is a thing like jar. A thing is perishable, from the point of view of modes, but imperishable or eternal from the point of view of the basic substance. It may appear strange that a jar is looked upon as imperishable even when it has a beginning, an origin. Now what is a jar? It is a conglomeration of the aggregate of four qualities, viz. colour, taste, smell, touch, of the number one, structure, material viz. clay and potencies or capabilities to carry water, and the like. Colour, etc. are of the nature of origination—destruction—duration, so the jar can be called as well imperishable as it can be called perishable. And this illustration can establish the soul to be imperishable. To explain at length, the lump of clay is produced in the form of the modes, viz. shape of the jar, potencies, etc. simultaneously with the destruction of the modes, viz. shape of the lump, its potencies whatever they be. But from the point of view of colour, taste, scent, touch, and the substance clay, the lump of clay is neither produced nor destroyed; so from this point of view it is called

eternal. The lump of clay perishes in the form of its own shape and potencies, is born in the form of the shape and potencies of the jar, and persists in the form of colour, etc. and substance clay and so is of the nature of utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya (origination-destruction-duration). Thus the jar also perishes in the form of the previous modes, is originated in the shape of a jar and persists in respect of colour, etc. and substance clay; so it too is recognised to be of the nature of utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya. Hence as the jar is proved to be perishable on account of its having been produced, so it can be proved to be imperishable too. This is true of all things without exception. Vijñāna is thus imperishable even because it is produced. Hence soul which is one with vijñāna is in a way eternal and so there cannot be the negation of other-world (1962-5).

This is how vijñāna is of the nature of utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya. Knowledge of ghaṭa (jar) is ghaṭavijñāna or ghaṭacetanā, and knowledge of paṭa (cloth) is paṭavijñāna or paṭacetanā, and so on. We observe that paṭa-cetanā is produced simultaneously with the destruction of ghaṭa-cetanā but the continuity of cetanā in general (the basic cetanā) of the form of jīva persists. This is how souls of this world are of the nature of utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya; the souls of the other-world also are such. To wit, when a man dies in this world and is born in the world of gods, etc., the this-worldly existence in the form of man perishes, the other-worldly existence in the form of god is produced, but jīva in general persists throughout. There is nothing like this-world or other-world from the point of view of the pure basic substance soul; it is called merely jīva. Thus if the jīva is of the nature of utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya, there cannot be the absence of other-world (1966-7).

It may be questioned as to why the duration-aspect should be recognised when things are not seen to be existent before their production and after their destruction. But it should not be forgotten that what is absolutely non-existent can never be produced, as otherwise we would have to recognise the origination of ass's horn too. Therefore, everything must be existent in

some form or the other. Nor can a thing be absolutely destroyed, for in that case in the course of time there would be the extinction of everything. Therefore, the existent thing is produced, in some one form and destroyed in another. The existent or persisting jīva is destroyed as a human being, but is produced as a god, etc.; absolute extinction is not recognised by the tīrthakṛts (teachers, founders of schools), because in that case all empirical behaviour would come to an end. To take an example, if the pitcher of gold a princess plays with is broken up and a ball of gold is made for the prince out of the gold, then there is distress on the part of the princess, joy on the part of the prince, but only indifference on the part of the king—the owner of the gold, as the gold is not lost in any of the conditions, but persists through them. All such empirical behaviour would come to an end if the utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya nature of things is not accepted. Therefore even after death, the soul persists in a way and there cannot be the absence of other-world (1968-9).

Even the Vedas cannot possibly deny the existence of other-world, since were they to do so, their injunctions regarding the performance of agnihotra, etc. for one who is desirous of heaven would be lacking in consistency. And it is popularly believed that the fruit of acts of charity, etc. is heaven; that too would lose its meaning. Hence it is obvious that no Vedic statement can have negation of other-world for its import (1970).

When Metārya's doubt was thus dispelled by Lord Mahāvīra, he became a monk along with his 300 pupils and followers (1971).

11. PRABHĀSA REGARDING NIRVĀṆA (SALVATION)

Hearing that they had become monks, Prabhāsa decided to approach Lord Mahāvīra, pay his respects to him and wait upon him. As he approached he was accosted by the Jina by his name and gotra as Prabhāsa Kaunḍinya (1972-3).

The Lord told him straightaway that his doubt was as to nirvāṇa (emancipation). In there anything like nirvāṇa or not? Prabhāsa found conflicting statements in the Vedas. It is said in the Vedas: "Jarāmaryaṁ vai tat sarvaṁ yad agnihotram."* —(One must perform agnihotra as long as one lives). The rite of agnihotra is the occasion for the slaughter of creatures, so it is of a mixed form; there is a drawback in it. It can lead to heaven but cannot bring about emancipation. If one has to perform the agnihotra as long as one lives, there is no scope for anything which can bring about apavarga or emancipation, and so there is nothing like mokṣa (emancipation). On the other hand, we find statements like 'Saiśā guhā ḍuravagāhā' (This cave one can enter with great difficulty) and "Dve brahmaṇī param aparāṁ ca, tatra paraṁ satyaṁ jñānam anantaram brahma" (There are two Brahman — higher and lower; of these the higher Brahman is Truth; the other is Knowledge); these appear to be saying that there is mokṣa or nirvāṇa (emancipation). Guhā (cave) here stands for mokṣa, that presents a tough job to those who are attached to worldly things. Of the two Para and Apara Brahman, Para Brahman means Satya (Truth), Mokṣa (Salvation). The other Brahman is Knowledge. If Prabhāsa thus found Vedic statements which maintain the existence of mokṣa and also deny it,

* The reading in the Śata. Br. (12-4-1-1) is: "Etad vai jarāmaryaṁ sattvaṁ yad agnihotraṁ, jarayā vā hy evāsmān mucyate mṛtyunā vā."

pains of all kinds, whose internal (psychological) enemies have been set at nought, rejoice.

Thus Prabhāsa came across statements which corroborated the concept of Nirvāṇa as sheer extinction and also as a particular state of an existent thing, and hence his doubt (1975).

Moreover, Prabhāsa also believes that the connection of soul and karma, like that of soul and ākāśa is beginningless and so it will never come to an end; there will not be an end to saṁsāra, or the transmigratory condition or mundane condition, and so there is not the slightest scope for nirvāṇa. There is nothing like nirvāṇa (1976).

Mahāvīra resolves this problem of nirvāṇa. As he had explained to Maṇḍika, the connection of jīva and karman which has no beginning, can be dissociated by true knowledge and action, as the connection of gold and kanaka-pāśāṇa (ore) can be brought to an end even though it is beginningless, by contact with fire, etc.. This sets at nought the suspicion that there cannot be nirvāṇa (1977).

It may be urged that the soul is always in the state of a hellish being, lower being, god, etc and that is its state of saṁsāra (mundane existence); we have no knowledge of any soul which is not in one of these states; that is to say, the jīva is never known as a basic substance devoid of these paryāyas (modes). So when the saṁsāra in the form of the state of hellish being, etc. is destroyed, the soul itself will be destroyed. Then whose would this mokṣa be? (1978).

But there is no ground for any such apprehension. When the hellish state and such other states which are merely modes (paryāyas) perish, it is not true to say that the soul too absolutely perishes, as when a ring is destroyed, the gold is not absolutely destroyed. As when the ring-mode of gold is destroyed, the ear-ring-mode comes into existence, so when the nāraka and other modes of the soul perish, the mukti-paryāya (salvation-mode) comes into existence; but the basic substance persists all throughout (1979).

It is not true to say that as saṁsāra perishes when karman is brought to an end so the soul also should perish and there can be no mokṣa since saṁsāra is brought about by karman; it is but proper that it should perish in the event of the destruction of its cause; but the soul is not caused by karman, and so it can persist even when there is no karman. It is a rule that when the cause and the more extensive (vyāpaka) entity are not there, the effect and the less extensive entity respectively cannot exist. Karma is neither the cause of jīva, nor is there any relation of concomitance between them wherein karma is more extensive than jīva. So the latter can persist even when karma is no more, and thus there is no difficulty in recognising mokṣa (1980).

The imperishableness of the jīva can be proved by an inference: "Jīva is not perishable, because as in ākāśa, so here too no change or divisibility is observed. What is perishable undergoes change or is divisible, like jar etc. divided into potsherds. The soul is eternal and so mokṣa too should be eternal" (1981).

It can be argued that whatever is kṛtaka, caused, is brought about, caused, and invariably perishes, e. g. jar; mokṣa may not be perishing every moment of its existence, but being caused, it must perish with the passage of time. But this is not true; there is no invariable rule that whatever is caused must invariably be perishable. The posterior non-existence (pradhvaṁsābhāva) of jar, for example, is kṛtaka, caused and yet it is eternal. So mokṣa too can be eternal, even when it is kṛtaka. If it be said that posterior non-existence is no example, as it is tuccha (a non-entity) like ass's horn, this is not true, as it is not tuccha; ghata-pradhvaṁsābhāva is a positive (existent) substance characterised by the destruction of jar (1982-3).

Till now it has been assumed that mokṣa is kṛtaka. But in reality, the soul is not at all affected when it is dissociated from karmic matter and so mokṣa should not be looked upon as something caused. If a jar in space (ākāśa) is destroyed, this has no effect whatsoever on space which remains as it

was before or always was, so even when karmic matter is dissociated from the soul, that is to say, when the contact of karmic matter is brought to an end, the soul regains its pure unaffected nature; nothing more than this happens, nothing is added to the soul. So mokṣa cannot be regarded as non-eternal (1984).

That the emancipated soul is eternal can be proved by the reason (liṅga, hetu) that even though it is a substance it is incorporeal, like ākāśa which is a substance, and is incorporeal and eternal. But ākāśa is all-pervading also; in that case should the emancipated soul be regarded as all-pervading? No, because inference contradicts this: The soul is as extensive as the body up to the skin, since it is here that its qualities are experienced, like touch. Therefore, the soul cannot be all-pervading, but is co-extensive with the body. Similarly it may be argued that the soul too like ākāśa being a substance and incorporeal, should not also be bound or emancipated, as the ākāśa is not bound by anything and so is not also freed from anything. But it is not so. Bondage is possible in the case of the soul; it is bound by puṇya and pāpa, because its actions like acts of charity, injury, etc. bear fruit, like agriculture, etc.. This bondage can be ended because it is of the nature of saṁyoga or contact, like the contact of gold and dhātu-pāśāṇa (mineral). The contact of karma, which is the bondage of the soul, can be destroyed by true knowledge and actions. If the soul is eternal, mokṣa also is established to be eternal (1985).

But there should not be an obstinate insistence as to mokṣa being eternal; for everything being of the nature of origination-destruction-persistence, mokṣa may be anitya (non-eternal) also from one point of view as it is nitya (eternal) from another. This has been discussed in the conversation with Maṇḍika (1986).

The Buddhist view may be considered here, which believes that as the lamp is completely extinguished, so the soul completely perishes in the state of mokṣa. The Buddhists are mistaken; the flame (fire) of the lamp does not absolutely perish, it merely undergoes pariṇāma (transformation); it gives up its pariṇāma as light and assumes that of darkness, as milk turns into curds,

or pot into potsherds and these turn into dust. So it should really be said that just like a lamp the soul does not absolutely perish; it only assumes another form. The lamp is not seen as lamp (fire) when it is extinguished because its modifications become subtler and subtler and are ultimately not seen even when they do exist, though the modification as darkness is certainly perceptible. We may take a few instances to illustrate this: dark clouds when scattered are not seen though they exist because they have assumed a subtle form; eye-ointment too when it is blown of by the wind is not visible as it is in the form of very subtle particles. Similarly the lamp also after extinction is not visible not because it does not exist, but because it has undergone transformation and become subtle (1987-8).

It is the very nature of pudgala (matter) to undergo various modifications. Gold-leaf, salt, dry ginger, haritakī (myrabolan), citraka (castor-seed), molasses—these compounds (skandhas) are in the beginning perceptible by such sense-organs as those of sight, etc. but coming into contact with other collocations of substance, place and time become cognisable by other organs such as those of touch, smell, etc. or even become incognisable. For example, if gold-leaf is made, its gold is perceptible by the eyes; but if in order to purify it, it is thrown into fire and gets mixed up with ashes, it can no longer be perceived by the eyes, but it can be felt by touch; if it is separated from the ashes, it can again be perceived by the eyes. Salt etc. also are perceptible by the organ of sight; but if they are mixed with other medicines to form decoction, powder, electuary, etc. they can only be known by the sense-organ of taste. Musk, camphor and such substances are perceptible by the eyes, but if they are blown off elsewhere by the wind, they can be perceived only by the organ of smell; and if the distance is very great they may not be perceived by any sense-organ; the organ of smell can detect them if they are at the most nine yojanas (i. e. 36 kośas or 81 miles) away. Similarly, every thing must be known to undergo diverse kinds of modifications; and we should not feel surprised if the lamp is not perceived after its nirvāna (1989).

Moreover our experience tells us that air is perceived only by the sense of touch, taste by the tongue, smell by the nose, colour by the eyes and word by the ear alone. But if these undergo a transformation, they may be cognised by other sense-organs. So in the present case, the fire-matter of the lamp is perceived by the eyes, but when it is extinguished it can be perceived by the organ of smell, and so one cannot say that the lamp completely perishes (1990).

As when the lamp is said to be *nirvāna* (extinguished) it only undergoes a modification but does not utterly perish, so when the soul is said to attain '*parinirvāna*', it attains another transformation of the form of unobscured perfect happiness. This means that *mokṣa* or *nirvāna* is a particular state of the existent soul which is characterised by the destruction of misery (1991).

One point should be clarified here. We do not believe that absence of *duḥkha* (pain) is happiness; and so if a soul is just free from pain in the state of *mokṣa*, it cannot be looked upon as experiencing happiness. None the less, the emancipated soul does experience bliss. The emancipated soul enjoys natural (spontaneous) perfect bliss or happiness free from a false sense of ego. This is so because it has excellent knowledge and is free from all afflictions such as birth, old age, disease, death, separation from a loved one, *arati* (prejudicial dislike), sorrow, hunger, thirst, cold, heat, desire (*kāma*), anger, pride, deceitfulness, desire, likes, hatred, anxiety, eagerness (*autsukya*), etc. A sage is free from these and enjoys perfect bliss which a log of wood and such inanimate things cannot enjoy though they are free from these, since they have no knowledge. But what is the criterion for deciding that the emancipated soul has perfect knowledge and is free from afflictions? This can be determined from the absence, on account of removal, of the causes of obscuration of knowledge and from the absence of the causes of these afflictions, *viz.* *vedanīya* (feeling producing) *karman*, etc.. This can be demonstrated by an inference thus :

The emancipated soul is luminous by its own natural light, because it is free from all the factors that obscure light, like the moon. It is said :

“Sthitah śītāṁśuvaj-jīvaḥ prakṛtyā bhāvaśuddhyā,
candrikāvāc ca vijñānaṁ tadāvaraṇam abhavad.”

—Yogaḍṛṣṭisamuccaya, 181

(The jīva in its naturally pure state is like the moon; its consciousness is like the moonlight; and its obscuration is like the clouds). The emancipated soul enjoys unobstructed bliss, since all its afflictions have been dispelled, like a perfectly healthy man who has got rid of his ailment.

It has been said :

Sa vyābādhābhāvāt sarvajñatvāc ca bhavati paramasukhī;
vyābādhābhāvo'tra svacchasya jñasya paramasukham.

(—Tattvārtha-bhāṣyaṭīkā, p. 318, Part II) —

The emancipated soul is perfectly happy as there are no obstructions and it is omniscient; the absence of obstructions is itself the highest happiness of the pure knower (1992).

A point may be raised here; The emancipated soul has no sense-organ, so it, like ākāśa, must be non-knower. But it is not so, for thus one could also say that, like ākāśa, the emancipated soul is ajīva (non-soul), and in that case the hetu 'because it has no sense-organs' would be a fallacious one — viruddha (contradictory), as it denies jīvatva to the emancipated soul which is recognised as a soul by all. The opponent may say that logically he is even prepared to go to the extent of denying jīvatva (soulness) to the emancipated soul; because this contingency would go against Lord Mahāvīra's position also and the responsibility of refuting this would devolve on him. Mahāvīra answers this by saying that he had posed this contingency only as a retort to the opponent's statement that the emancipated soul should be a non-knower, because it has no sense-organs; if so it should be non-soul also. But, as a matter of fact, the emancipated soul is neither ignorant, nor ajīva (non-soul). The soul in the state of emancipation cannot become a non-soul, since the natural

genus of a thing cannot be transformed into one just the opposite of it. The universal 'jīvatva' is as natural to the soul as are the universals 'substance' (dravyatva) and incorporeality (amūrtatva). The soul cannot become adṛavya from being dravya or mūrta from being amūrta; so the soul cannot become ajīva from being jīva. To take an instance, 'ajīvatva' is the universal natural to 'jīva', so the soul—jīva can never become ajīva. As stated above, Mahāvīra posed the contingency of jīva becoming ajīva only to one who tried to show that the emancipated soul if devoid of sense-organs should be non-knower; if so, it should be ajīva also. But in fact, the reason 'not having sense-organs' does not imply that the emancipated soul is ajīva. Universal concomitance (vyāpti) does not hold good in the case of this hetu (reason). The cause-effect relation and the relation of invariable concomitance, that is to say, of vyāpya (less-extensive, determinate concomitant) and vyāpaka (determinant concomitant) can determine vyāpti. If jīvatva were the effect of sense-organs, then it could be said that jīvatva cannot exist in the absence of sense-organs as smoke is not found in the absence of fire, which is its cause. But jīvatva being a beginningless endless entity capable of transformation, is uncaused and is not the effect of any cause. Hence the absence of sense-organs cannot determine absence of jīvatva. Again if jīvatva were the determinate concomitant of sense-organs, the determinant concomitant, as śimśapā is of vṛkṣatva (treeness), then it could be said that jīvatva does not exist in the absence of the sense-organs, as śimśapā is not existent when treeness is not there. But this relation does not exist at all between jīva and sense-organs because they are entirely different; the jīva is incorporeal and sentient, while the sense-organs are corporeal and constituted of matter. Sense-organs have this relation of invariable concomitance (vyāpya-vyāpakabhāva) with body, since both are material. Hence it is not true to say that the emancipated soul becomes non-soul when there is no sense-organ. It remains a soul (1993-4).

The emancipated soul may remain a jīva, but the original question as to how this soul could cognise or know in the

absence of sense-organs and that therefore in this state it should be non-knower, remains unanswered. The answer to this is that the instruments of knowledge, sense-organ, etc. are corporeal so they cannot be the agents in the act of perceiving or cognising, they are merely windows — instruments — opening out on knowledge; it is the soul that is the agent of the act of knowing.* Even when the sense-organs stop functioning, the soul has knowledge of the type of memory, etc.; and even when the sense-organs are functioning the soul may not have knowledge if it is absent-minded. Positive and negative concomitance of knowledge is with reference to the soul and not with reference to the sense-organs. So it is not true to say, that the emancipated soul is non-knower or has no knowledge because there is no sense-organ then. The soul perceives through the windows of the senses as Devadatta would through the windows of his house. But if Devadatta were to leave the house and gaze out in the open, his vision would be very much enhanced, so when the soul is free from the sense-organs when the body perishes, it is able to know all things without being obstructed (1995-6).

The soul can in fact never be devoid of knowledge, since knowledge is its essential nature, as an atom cannot be devoid of form, etc. (corporeality). Hence to say that the emancipated soul exists and that it is devoid of knowledge is to contradict oneself. A thing cannot exist if its essential nature is lost. It has just been explained that a thing having a particular genus cannot be transformed so as to come into possession of a different genus altogether; the soul can never be *jaḍa* (insentient). Thus the soul can never be a non-knower (1997).

One would lose all patience if he were questioned as to how it could be determined that the soul is of the nature of knowledge, for this is something that can be known from experience. As said above, the soul can remember things cognised earlier with the sense-organs, even when these sense-organs are not function-

* See *Gāthās* 1657-1660

ing; and at times does not have their knowledge if it is absent-minded even when the sense-organs are functioning with reference to objects. A person has a vision at times of things not seen or heard of before. This shows that knowledge is the very nature of our own soul. Even the person who raises such a doubt must have this experience and it is surprising that this could possibly be questioned. And as one's own soul is of the nature of knowledge so must be the soul of others also, that is to say, the soul in other bodies also; for we find the same kind of action and inaction, efforts to reach a desired thing and repulsion from a thing not desired. This means that the souls in other bodies are of the nature of knowledge as is our own (1998).

Not only is the emancipated soul a knower, but it is also omniscient. As long as a soul is in an embodied condition, is not free from passions, etc., there are veils which obstruct its knowledge, and so there are gradations in its knowledge in proportion to the removal of this veil, but when it has freed itself from the body and has no sense-organ, all the veils are removed, the soul becomes purer and therefore has perfect illumination of omniscience, like the sun who has freed himself from all the obstructing clouds. The sense-organs, on the other hand, are not of the nature of knowledge, so even when they are not there, there is no lack of knowledge in the soul, which would have been the case if they were of the nature of knowledge. Thus it is clear that the emancipated soul is not a non-knower because there is no sense-organ then (1999).

If a lamp is covered with a vessel having holes, it can shine, radiate light only through these holes, but cannot manifest all its light; similarly the soul's illumination in the bound condition is in an obscured state and can only reveal itself through the outlets of the sense-organs as there is subsidence-cum-destruction of the obscuring factors (2000).

But the emancipated soul has all its veils removed, so its illumination is perfect, that is to say, it is omniscient, it can

perceive everything, just as a man who stands outside the house can see everything around him, or as the lamp from which the covering is removed can shine forth in all its illumination. But what is essential is that the entity in order to shine forth either partially or completely must be of the nature of illumination, otherwise it would not have any illumination whatsoever. Therefore the emancipated soul is a knower (2001).

The emancipated soul may be a knower, but how can it be established that it is happy? Puṇya (merit) brings about happiness, and pāpa (sin or demerit) pain or unhappiness. In the case of an emancipated soul, there is no puṇya or pāpa; since all the karman is eradicated, it can have neither happiness nor pain (misery) like ākāśa. Moreover, it is the body that is the locus of the apprehension of pleasure or pain, and in the state of emancipation there is no body, nor even the sense-organs; hence the soul like ākāśa, can have neither pleasure nor pain (2002-3).

Lord Mahāvīra says it is not so. It is wrong to look upon the fruit of puṇya as pleasure or happiness; as a matter of fact, the fruit of puṇya also is pain or misery, because it is caused by karman, like the fruit of pāpa. Of course, the retort can be that similarly it can be argued that the fruit of pāpa also is pleasure, because it is caused by karma, like the fruit of puṇya. Moreover, the statement that the fruit of puṇya is of the nature of pain contradicts our experience inasmuch as the fruit of puṇya is found to be agreeable, not so that of pāpa. But this is mistaken, because what is regarded on account of intellectual obliqueness as pleasure or happiness is illusory, unreal, and so it is no contradiction to say that the sensation that arises from the enjoyment of sandalwood, etc. is of the nature of pain. There is no true pleasure or happiness in the world; what people attached to worldly things regard as pleasure is not really such, but is only of the nature of a counter-active force, a remedy against pain. If a person is suffering from eczema, he scratches the body and this gives him some relief, but in the long run it will only increase his ailment. Similarly what

we call sensuous pleasure is only such for the time being, as a remedy for longing, attachment etc., but results in pain, and so even the fruit of punya like sovereignty, etc. is of the nature of pain. As has been said :

“Nagnaḥ preta ivāviṣṭaḥ kvaṇantīm upaḡr̥hya tām;
gādhāyāsitasarvāṅgaḥ sa sukhī ramate kila.”

(A passionate man, becoming naked like a spirit of the dead, embraces a woman who is making a whining sound, and even when he experiences great fatigue all over his body, he enjoys feeling happy). An experienced king like Duṣyanta says that kingship is an onerous task, though ordinary people think it something worth envying :

“Autsukyamātram avasādayati pratiṣṭhā
kliṣṇāti labdha-paripālanavṛttir eva;
nātiśramāpagamanāya yathā śramāya
rājyaṁ svahastagataḍaṇḍam ivātapatram.”

(— Abhijñāna-śākuntalam, 5.6).

(Kingship wherein one holds the sceptre of power and responsibility is not so much for the removal of fatigue as for its augmentation, like an umbrella one holds in one's own hand. The very installation in it eradicates whatever eagerness there was for it and the task of protecting what has been obtained is afflicting).

What a man ingrossed in the world regards as pleasure is in the view of a man of renunciation pain :

Bhuktaḥ śriyaḥ sakalakāmadughās tataḥ kiṁ
sampr̥nitāḥ praṇayinaḥ svadhanais tataḥ kiṁ;
dattam padaṁ śirasi vidviṣatām tataḥ kiṁ
kalpaṁ sthitam tanubhṛtām tanubhis tataḥ kiṁ.

(What if one has enjoyed prosperity satisfying all desires? And of what use is it if near and dear ones have been pleased by giving them one's wealth? What if one has been able to tread on the head of enemies? And how will it help if the body of the embodied lasts even for a kalpa?)

“Ittham na kiñcid api sādhana-sādhyajātam
svapnendrajālasadṛśam paramārthasūnyam;
atyantanirvṛtikaram yad apetabādhām
tad brahma vāñchata janā yadi cetanāsti.”

(Thus, there is nothing like means and the end to be achieved; everything is like a dream, a magical illusion, void of reality. Oh men, if you have understanding, have a craving for Brahman which brings perfect bliss and which is free from all obstructions) (2004–5).

Thus even punya can yield only pain which may be looked upon as pleasure by worldly beings. This can be proved by inference also: Sensuous pleasure is as a matter of fact only pain, because it is of the form of remedy against pain, like drinking of decoction, etc. as remedies for leprosy, etc.. If it is popularly known as pleasure, it is only secondarily so; and this implies that true pleasure must be something really existent, as otherwise figurative or secondary usage would not be possible, like the figurative use of the words ‘lion’, etc. for man (2006).

Therefore it is the pleasure or bliss of the emancipated soul that is the true pleasure, because it is natural. It rises out of the removal of all pain, like the blissful state of a sage who is a great knower and is free from all obstruction; that is to say, the rise of true happiness does not depend on any external factor. It is said :

Nirjitamadamadānānām vāk-kāya-manovikārahitanām;
vinivṛttaparāśānām ihaiva mokṣaḥ suvihitanām.

(—Prasamarati, 238).

—They who have conquered pride and love and are free from the depravities of speech, body, and mind, and who expect nothing of others, such men of restraint are emancipated here only) (2007).

Again, as to knowledge, the soul is of the nature of knowledge; the veil of the form of matijñānāvaraṇa, etc. obscures knowledge, and the means, the sense-organs, are helpful in removing the obscuration and helping the manifestation of knowledge; as

the holes in the clouds allow the light of the sun to come out; when all the covering is removed, knowledge shines forth in all its purity, as it is self-luminous. Similarly, the soul is of the nature of inherent infinite happiness; pāpa causes obstruction to this happiness, while puṇya helps in the manifestation of this inherent happiness; when the entire veil is removed, when all karman—pāpa and puṇya—is eradicated, true happiness reveals itself and the perfect emancipated soul enjoys perfect bliss (2008-9).

And as by the removal of all karman, the emancipated soul attains perfection, the culmination of perfection, from even that, it attains true happiness which is beyond the limits of transmigration, and of a nature quite distinct from sensuous pleasure. This is also a fitting answer to the objection that as puṇya and pāpa are eradicated, there will be no cause for pleasure and pain and so the emancipated soul will have no pleasure or pain, like the sky. It cannot be said that there is no cause for pleasure, because the eradication of karma is itself the cause of pleasure (2010).

Thus it can be seen that what is commonly regarded as pleasure is, as a matter of fact, of the nature of pain; it is the fruit of puṇya; and pain, the fruit of pāpa, is obviously such; what is experienced by the body, etc. is pain only and it alone is there in the state of worldly existence; there is no trace of true pleasure or bliss as long as the bodily and other adjuncts are there and it is wrong to believe that there can be no pleasure in the absence of the body, etc. in the state of emancipation or perfectness; on the contrary, there is no bliss as long as the body, etc. are associated with the soul; and absence of body, etc. is indispensable for bliss. Thus the perfect souls, the siddhas experience true pleasure or bliss, even when they have no body, etc. (2011).

The opponent's contention that the state of emancipation would admit of neither pleasurer nor pain in the absence of body and sense-organs is right as far as worldly pleasure or happiness is concerned. Ignorant people delighting in sensuous satisfaction

regard worldly happiness as ultimate; and this contention may hold good in their case; but not in the case of those who have a different attitude altogether—those who mean by ‘sukha’ happiness quite distinct from the pleasure or pain resulting from *punya* or *pāpa*, inexhaustible, incomparable bliss of the *siddhas*, beyond the stage of transmigration. This does not depend on body and sense-organs which on the contrary hinder it or prevent it from manifesting itself (2012).

If proof is demanded for this, it can be provided by way of inference as pointed out earlier.* The *siddha* has perfect bliss, because knowledge or consciousness being there, it is not obscured, as in the case of a *muni* (ascetic). It may be said that it can be similarly argued that bliss and knowledge of a *siddha* must be non-eternal, because they are attributes of a sentient entity, like *rāga* (passion). They are, moreover, those that have been created by austerity, etc. i.e. are artificial or because they have been newly created, like a jar. But it is not so. Knowledge and bliss would be non-eternal if a *siddha* did not continue to experience them. If knowledge and bliss seem at any time to be destroyed, it is on account of the rise of a veil over knowledge and of the rise of *asātavedanīya* (karma causing unpleasant feeling) and such other factors. These obscurations arise or are bound on account of such causes as perversity of attitude, etc.. These causes being absent in the state of perfection, there cannot be the loss of knowledge or of bliss in the case of a *siddha*, and so they are not non-eternal. It is not an invariable rule that *cetanadharmas*—attributes of sentient entities—must be non-eternal for *dravyatva* (basic substance), *amūrtatva* (incorporeality) of soul are not such even when they are *cetanadharmas*. So the reason, ‘because they are attributes of a sentient entity’ is inconclusive. Again it is not true to say that what is caused and is a new creation is non-eternal, and hence knowledge and pleasure of the *siddha* are such, because posterior negation of jar is caused and is a new creation and

*Gāthā, 2007.

yet is eternal. Moreover, this reason 'because it is caused and is a new creation' is asiddha (unreal) as knowledge and bliss are inherent in the soul and so it is not proper to regard these as caused, like a jar, or as new creations like lightning; they were only obscured and in the state of emancipation merely the veils are removed; but they were all along existent like sunlight or moonlight revealing itself when the clouds move away from it. They are not caused like a jar, nor are they new manifestations of things non-existent before, like lightning; and hence they cannot be non-eternal. Moreover, in the view of the Jina everything is of the nature of utpāda-sthiti-vyaya, knowledge and bliss are both eternal and non-eternal; they may be regarded as caused and non-eternal from the point of view of the particular mode of manifestation; the object of knowledge from the point of view of the mode perishes every moment, so knowledge also perishes and is from this point of view non-eternal; pleasure too undergoes transformation every moment, so it too can be looked upon as non-eternal. If from this point of view, knowledge and bliss though inherent are looked upon as anitya, there is nothing wrong in it; that is acceptable even to Lord Mahāvīra (2013 - 14).

Now we turn to the apparently conflicting statements in the Veda: 'Na ha vai saśarīrasya.....' would have no consistency if there were no emancipation, if the soul were destroyed in that state and if there were no bliss in it. So it should be taken as establishing these. 'Matirapi na prajñāyate...' also cannot establish the absence of the soul in the state of emancipation (2015).

Prabhāsa interprets 'Na ha vai saśarīrasya...' to mean that when the body, etc. perish the soul too becomes non-existent like ass's horn, because it also is destroyed; so 'aśarīra' means soul which is non-existent like ass's horn, and the Veda says that pleasure and pain do not affect such a soul. Thus both the Vedic statements are interpreted as having the same meaning, and as being consistent in meaning. Thus he concludes

that the Vedas recognise mokṣa of the type of the extinction of a lamp (2016).

But Prabhāsa has not understood the true meaning; 'āsarīra' like 'adhana' contains a negation of śarīra in the case of an existent entity. As the existing Devadatta is 'adhana' (devoid of wealth), so the existent 'jīva' is 'āsarīra' (devoid of body). Thus 'āsarīra' means the soul without the body. If Devadatta were non-existent like the ass's horn, we would not say of him that he is 'adhana'. Similarly the jīva can be termed 'āsarīra' only if it is existent. But the term in the Veda is 'āsarīra' alone which can refer to anything devoid of a body. Why should this epithet be referred to jīva or soul? This difficulty can be resolved thus. The negation is of the type of paryudāsa (exclusion), and where this is found the import is that of a thing which is similar to it and not entirely different from it. There is a grammatical rule: 'Nañ-ivayuktam anyasadṛśādhikaraṇe loke tathā hy arthagatih' — In popular usage, the word to which 'na' and 'iva' are affixed, means another but similar thing. To take an instance, 'abrāhmaṇa' means non-brāhmaṇa; i. e. one who is not a brāhmaṇa, but yet like a brāhmaṇa, e. g. kṣatriya, etc., but it cannot mean mere non-being, a non-entity. Similarly 'āsarīra' can refer to one who has no body, but yet is like one who has a body, i. e. to the jīva, but not to anything that is utterly non-existent like an ass's horn. That 'embodied—saśarīra' and 'unembodied—āsarīra' denote the same thing is because of similarity, on account of the 'upayoga' (conscious activity) being identical in both cases. In the state of worldly existence, soul and body get mixed up like water and milk, and it is not possible to separate them in that state, so the body should not be put forth as one of the reasons for raising an objection against regarding the embodied soul as similar to the unembodied soul. This clearly demonstrates that 'āsarīra' in 'āsarīraṁ vā vasantam...' means the unembodied soul, and not a non-entity like ass's horn, etc. (2017-18).

Moreover, the expression 'vā vasantam' suggests that the soul continues to exist, abide (vasantam) in the state of mokṣa

also; it does not become extinct and because of 'vā' it means that even an embodied soul in this-worldly existence can be free from the influence of pleasure and pain, the fruit of puṇya and pāpa, e. g. a yogin free from passions, etc. who has subdued or even destroyed his moha (stupefaction, ignorance) and who is in the highest stage of samādhi. Such a yogin is not affected by pleasure and pain (2019).

Or the sandhi (coalescence) in the sentence can be dissolved thus: 'āsarīraṁ vāva santam', where 'vāva' is the same as 'vā'. It states that pleasure and pain have no effect on the unembodied soul existing in the state of mokṣa; 'vā' suggests that it has no effect even on a soul free from attachment, etc. though it be embodied. Or the sentence can be explained as 'āsarīraṁ vāava santam'. 'Ava' is imperative second person singular of the root 'av', to protect, go, love, etc.. Now, roots having the sense of motion are also used in the sense of knowledge. The sentence then means : O disciple, know that pleasure and pain do not affect the unembodied soul existing in the state of mokṣa as qualified by such attributes as knowledge, etc.. 'Vā' suggests that they do not affect even a 'saśarīra'—embodied soul free from passions. (2020).

It can be argued here that Lord Mahāvīra construes the sentence so as to make it yield the meaning he wants from them. But the opponent also could do the same. The statement can be interpreted thus: 'āsarīraṁ vā avasantam....'—the unembodied one which does not exist anywhere.... This would corroborate the stand that the soul does not exist, is annihilated in the state of emancipation. But this is not correct, for as shown above 'āsarīra' points to the existence of the soul in the state of mokṣa and no interpretation can be accepted which contradicts this. Moreover, the statement about pleasure and pain not having any effect can be consistently explained only with reference to an existent thing; there is no sense in saying that they have no effect on a non-existent soul. We never say, 'Pleasure and pain do not affect barren woman's son' because there is no possibility of it in this case. Therefore the

subject in question is 'ásarīra'—the soul in the state of mokṣa and not its non-existence. Thus the statement is 'Ásarīraṁ vā vasantam,' and means that the soul does exist in the state of mokṣa, which is characterised by the dissociation of soul and karmic body. One should, therefore, not entertain the slightest doubt as to the existence of the soul in the state of mokṣa (2021).

There might be yet another difficulty: The soul may exist in the state of mokṣa; but it is free from pleasure and pain, and so it cannot be said to be enjoying perfect happiness. To say so would contradict the Vedic statement that it is free from the influence of pleasure and pain. Mahāvīra says that he too agrees that the emancipated soul is devoid of pleasure caused by puṇya and pain caused by pāpa. These pleasure and pain belong to the worldly state and have no existence in the state of emancipation wherein the emancipated soul is free from all karman of the type of puṇya and pāpa. But this should not lead us to conclude that it has no happiness whatsoever. Being free from attachment, there is no pleasure caused by puṇya and being free from hatred, there is no pain caused by pāpa. But there is the perfect happiness or bliss as distinct from these, which is inherent and spontaneous in the soul, which is incomparable and which is not caused by karman, is not sublated by anything and is endless, and this the soul certainly has in the state of emancipation. So it comes to this that even according to the Vedas, there is mokṣa, the soul exists in mokṣa, and experiences perfect bliss which is unending.

As to the statement "Jarāmaryaṁ vaiśat sarvaṁ yad agnihotraṁ"—on the basis of which Prabhāsa said that if man were to perform agnihotra even in his old age up to death, he could only attain heaven and there would be no scope for the pursuit of emancipation, and therefore, there is, in the opinion of the Vedas, nothing like mokṣa, Mahāvīra says it is not correct to say so. Prabhāsa had not understood the true import of the statement. There is 'vā' in the sentence, which indicates that man should perform the agnihotra as

long as he lives and one longing for emancipation should also perform activities which could lead to emancipation. Thus, it can be proved by reasoning and the testimony of the Veda that there is mokṣa, and one should not have any doubt about it (2022–23).

When Prabhāsa's doubt was thus dispelled, he became a monk along with his three hundred pupils and followers (2024).



NOTES

1

(1549-1553) Mahāsenā Vana — This is according to the belief of the Śvetāmbaras. The Digambaras believe that Mahāvīra came into contact with the Gaṇadhāras on Mount Vipulācala near Rājagrha, and it was there that he propounded his teaching and propagated his school of thought.

Doubt (sainśaya) — When we have knowledge of characteristics which may be common to two entities, and have no knowledge confirming the cognition of one or setting aside that of the other, there is doubt; e. g. is it a serpent or a piece of rope. Only the length, thinness, etc. which are common to both are perceived, but not the distinguishing characteristics of either. Similarly, here there is no evidence which either positively asserts the existence of the soul or denies it. Hence Indrabhūti's doubt as to the existence of a soul.

Pratyakṣa and other pramāṇas — means of valid knowledge. The Cārvākas or Materialists recognise only one pramāṇa, viz. pratyakṣa or perception, and some among them accept anumāna (inference) only if it pertains to objects that are perceptible so that it could be verified. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas admit two sources of cognition — perception and inference. The Sāṅkhyas add āgama (verbal or scriptural testimony). The Naiyāyikas admit a fourth source of knowledge — upamāna (analogy). Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas recognise arthāpatti (presumption — presuming a thing on the basis of a known one which cannot be otherwise explained) as the fifth and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas abhāva (negation) as the sixth pramāṇa (means of valid knowledge). This last operates only where the

other five *pramāṇas* cognising positive existence do not operate, and therefore determines the non-existence of things. The Jainas, it may be noted, admit only two *pramāṇas*—*pratyakṣa* (direct) and *parokṣa* (indirect), including all the other *pramāṇas* under the latter. They believe that the perception on the part of the soul without the help of the sense-organs is the only real perception; yet to keep abreast with the views of logicians of other schools they had to recognise sensuous perception also as *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge), but they termed it empirical direct knowledge (*sāṃvyavahārika pratyakṣa*).

Is the soul directly known? The *Cārvākas* do not recognise soul as an independent entity, because it is not perceived. *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* admits the existence of the soul, but believes that it can be inferred from attributes like knowledge, will, hate, etc. (see *Nyāya-Sū.* 1.1.10; *Praśastapāda Bhāṣya-Ātman*), Even then the older *Naiyāyikas* and *Vaiśeṣikas* accept that the soul can be directly perceived by yogic perception (*Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, 1.1.3; *Vaiśeṣika Sū.* 9.1.11). This means that the soul cannot be perceived by ordinary people, but can be perceived by yogins. But with the setting in of the age of reason, yogic perception was almost reduced to the category of *āgama* or verbal testimony. Consequently *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* regards the soul as something that can be established by inference. But as ratiocination became nicer and subtler, it came to be recognised that the soul can be perceived. Jainas, Buddhists, *Vedāntins*—as a matter of fact, all except the *Cārvāka* and the followers of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* regard the soul as directly experienced.

Atom—Compare “*Saukṣmyāt tadanupalabdhir nābhāvāt kāryatas tadupalabdheḥ.*”—*Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, 8 (about *prakṛti*).

Inference is based on, or preceded by, perception—see *Nyāya Sū.* 1.1.5, and *Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya* on it.

Sāmānyatodrṣṭa-anumāna—Everything has two forms or aspects—the universal and the particular or the individual. *Sāmānyatodrṣṭa anumāna* concerns itself only with the general aspect of things, e.g. movement. It also meant inference of supersensuous things. Inference was classified as *pūrvavat* (from

cause to effect), śeṣavat (from effect to cause) and sāmānyatodrṣṭa. This classification gradually went out of vogue. See Sāṅkhya Kā. 6. For the history of these vide Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā-Notes, p. 139 (by Pandit Sukhlaljee) and Nyāyāvatāravārtikavṛtti, Introduction, p. 71 (Pt. Malavania). See also 'Pre-Diñnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources — Tucci (GOS), Introduction, pp. 17-18.

Āgama—see Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.8.

Bṛh. Up, 2.4.12. Śāṅkara has explained this passage in accordance with his own view of the Absolute Brahman from which everything arises and into which it is merged, like waves, foam, etc. merging into water, the original entity. The Cārvākas quote this passage as countenancing their own view. The Naiyāyikas regard this passage as the prima-facie view (pūrva-pakṣa) of the Upaniṣads and interpret it in the manner of Indrabhūti. See — Yad vijñānaghanādi-vedavacanāṃ tad pūrvapakṣe sṭhitam; paurvāparyavimarsāsūnyahṛdayaiḥ śortho grhītas tadā. — Nyāya-maṅjarī, p. 472.

Rūpa—All matter is called rūpa in the Buddhist view—Earth, water, fire, air and everything that can be accounted for by these. See Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha, 6. Rūpa is not pudgala (soul)—This has been discussed in Saṃyutta Nikāya-12.70.32-37; Dīgha-Nikāya-Mahānidāna sutta 15, Majjhima Nikāya, Chakkaka Sutta 148. One after the other all known things are stated not to be soul.

Pudgala—Soul in Bauddha works. See Puggala-paññatti, where the different types of souls are described. Pudgala means matter in Jaina terminology. See Sparsā-rasa-gandha-varṇavantaḥ pudgalāḥ .23. ... Aṇavaḥ skandhās ca. (atomic or aggregates) 25.—Tattvārtha sūtra, 5). But we find 'pudgala' used in the sense of 'soul' in the Bhagavatī Sū. (8.3.20.2).

The text in the Chāndogya Up. 8.12.1 is 'Maghavan martyam vā idaṃ śarīram āttam mṛtyunā tad asyāśarīrasyā'tmano'-dhiṣṭhānam ātto vai saśarīraḥ priyāpriyābhyāṃ na vai saśarīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayor apahatir asty āśarīraṃ vāva

santam na priyāpriye sprśatah'. See in this connection Gāthās 2015–2023. The portion 'āsarīram vāva santam' can be split in different ways; (i) 'āsarīram vāva santam' as Śaṅkara and almost all do; even Jinabhadra knew this meaning — Gā. 2020, (ii) 'āsarīram vā vasantam' as is done here, (iii) asarīram vā va santam, (iv) āsarīram vā avasantam.

For the Sāṅkhya conception of soul see Sāṅkhya Kā 17–19.

(1554) Here jīva is established as an entity that can be directly known by showing its identity with knowledge which is self-luminous and therefore can be directly known. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards knowledge as different from the soul; it can be produced as an attribute of the soul, but is not found in the state of emancipation. The Vedānta (of Śaṅkara) and the Sāṅkhya–Yoga regard the soul as of the nature of pure consciousness and as non-doer, etc. and knowledge etc. should according to this view, be of the nature of non-consciousness, being attributes of buddhi (intellect). There will be no such difficulty in the case of the other Vedāntins, in whose view the soul is knower, doer, etc.. Jayanta as a Naiyāyika recognises the difference between attribute (guṇa) and substance (guṇin), i.e. between knowledge and soul in the present case, yet he regards soul as an entity that is directly perceptible (Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 433). Jainas, Bauddhas, Prābhākaras, and Vedāntins regard knowledge as self-luminous and self-cognised, that is to say knowledge manifests itself, no extraneous agency is required to reveal knowledge. On the other hand, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy does not regard knowledge as self-luminous, but believes that another cognition called anuvyavasāya (introspection) is necessary for the awareness of cognition. This anuvyavasāya is of the form 'I know jar' and follows the knowledge of jar. In the Sāṅkhya–yoga view all operations of the intellect (buddhi) become luminous by virtue of the puruṣa (soul). Kumārila and his followers regard knowledge as something that can be indirectly known (parokṣa)—it can be established by inference or presumption (arthāpatti). See Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā, Notes p. 13.

(1555) We find the soul established on the basis of 'I' notion from very early times. See Nyāyabhāṣya (3.1.15), Praśastapāda-bhāṣya (p. 360), Nyāyamañjarī (p. 429), Nyāya-vārtika (p. 341), etc..

(1557) The doubter cannot doubt his own existence. Compare Śaṅkara's argument in his commentary on Brahma-sūtra 1.1.1.

Pakṣa—That which has what is to be proved is called the pakṣa, e. g. 'Mountain is fiery, because it is smoky'—here mountain is the pakṣa; the presence of fire on it must be doubtful so as to make it a worthy pakṣa for the inference (sandigdha-sādhyavān pakṣaḥ). What is to be established is also called pakṣa—thesis; see Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra, 3.14-17. For a discussion of the constituents of anumāna (inference), see Tarkasaṅgraha.

(1558) In the view of Praśastapāda, pleasure, pain and such attributes of the soul are experienced on account of the contact of soul and mind. He does not accept the view that if the attributes can be directly known, the substance also is directly known.

(1559-60) Substance-attribute—The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards them as different entities, the Sāṅkhyas and Vedāntins as identical; the Mīmāṃsakas and the Jainas believe that there is bhedābheda (both difference and non-difference) between them. According to the Buddhists there is nothing like a substance in which the attributes inhere, there is only the continuum of attributes.

The attributes cannot exist without their substrate :— see Praśastapāda (p. 360). See also Nyāyabhāṣya (1.1.5), Nyāya-sūtra (3.2.40).

(1561-64) We find a similar argument in Nyāya Sū. 3.2.47ff and in Praśastapādabhāṣya.

(1570) The Jainas alone regard the soul as, in a way, corporeal (mūrta) in the mundane state.

God—Like the Jaina, the Bauddha, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and the Mīmāṃsaka do not regard God as the creator of the world. Vedānta regards God as both the material cause and the

instrumental cause of the world. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards God as the creator of the world.

(1573-74) We find the same reasoning in Nyāyavārtika (3.11).

(1574) Samyoga—conjunction; e. g. of table and finger, where the two things can be joined or separated without disturbing the identity or existence of either. Samavāya—The relation of inherence is admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is the relation between attribute-substance (guṇa-guṇin), substance-action (dravya-karma), substance-universal (dravya-sāmānya), substance-particular (dravya-viśeṣa). Here the two things cannot be separated without one of them perishing. It is recognised as eternal, and all pervading.

Others do not recognise this relation, e. g. the Vedāntins regard it as but identity (tādātmya). The Buddhists do not admit any enduring substance, so there is no question of admitting samavāya.

(1575) Cf. Vyomavatī, p. 407—Ahaṁśabdo bāhyabādhitai- (śabdo hyabādhitai)-kapadatvād avaśyaṁ vācyam apekṣate. See also Nyāyavārtika, p. 337, Tattvasaṅgraha, p. 81.

(1578) The author of the Nyāyavārtika adduces three reasons as contributing to the authoritativeness of a verbal statement (Śabda or āgama)—(i) immediate realisation of a thing, (ii) sense of mercy towards creatures, (iii) truthful nature—the desire to describe things as they are. See Nyāyavārtika, 2.1.69.

(1580) Types of souls:— See Tattvārthasūtra, Chapter 2. We give here a few sūtras:—

Saṁsāriṇo muktāś ca (10)—Souls are of two kinds—mundane and liberated.

Samanaskāmanaskāḥ (11) Mundane souls are of two kinds—those who have a mind and those who do not.

Saṁsāriṇas trasasthāvarāḥ (12)—Mundane souls from another point of view are of two kinds—trasa i. e. mobile or having a

body with more than one sense-organ, and sthāvara, immobile and having only the sense of touch. These latter being in fear do not have the capacity of moving away from the object causing fear.

Ṕṛthivy-ap-tejo-vāyu-vanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ (13)—Immobile one-sensed souls are of five kinds—earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, air-bodied and vegetable-bodied.

Dvīndriyādayas trasāḥ (14)—Mobile souls have two or more senses.

Vanaspatyantānām ekam (22)—The earth-bodied, etc. up to the vegetable-bodied have only one sense—that of touch.

Kṛmi-pipīlikā-bhramara-manuṣyādinām ekaikavṛddhāni (23)—Worms, ants, bees, men—of these each class has one sense more than the preceding one. Worms, etc. have two senses (touch and taste), ants, etc. three senses (touch, taste, smell), bees, etc. four senses (touch, taste, smell, sight), men, etc. five senses (touch, taste, smell, sight, hearing). We may note here that Jainas believe in four kinds of embodied existence of the soul—nāraka (hellish), tiryak (sub-human), mānuṣa (human), daiva (celestial).

(1583) Upayoga corresponds to attention—conscious activity. Dr Nathmal Tatia prefers to render it as 'active consciousness' as opposed to labdhi, 'dormant consciousness'. "The consciousness in its state of dormancy is called labdhi. In other words, the dormant capacity of the soul for knowledge is labdhi. Upayoga on the other hand, is consciousness in its state of activity. The soul is called upayukta or upayogavān when it is actually engaged in knowing something. Mere capacity for knowledge without actual knowledge is labdhi"—Studies in Jaina Philosophy, pp. 55 - 56 — Dr. Nathmal Tatia. The Jainas unanimously maintain the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of two upayogas. Upayoga is the defining characteristic of a soul. This upayoga can be sākāra 'determinate' as also 'anākāra' 'indeterminate'. The former is called jñāna (knowledge) and the latter darśana (indeterminate intuition). See Bhagavatī Sū II. 10; Tattvārtha Sūtra II. 8-9.

(1584) All the philosophers except Śāṅkara and his followers regard the souls as many even in the state of emancipation. See Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 18.

(1586) The soul is of the size of the body — The Jainas regard the soul as of the same size as the body. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Kevalādvaita Vedānta regard the soul as all-pervading; Rāmānuja and the other Vedāntins regard it as atomic. The Buddhists have not given much thought to this aspect of the question as they were more interested in denying the soul as an independent entity. We find many different views in the Upaniṣads. The Kauṣītakī Up., for example, describes the soul as pervading all over the body (4.20); we may infer from this that it regards the soul as co-extensive with the body. Brh. Up. 5.6.1 regards the soul as of the same size as a grain of rice or barley. We find the soul also described as of the size of a thumb (e. g. in Kaṭha Up. 2.2.12; Śvet. Up. 3.13; 5.8-9); It is at some places said to be of the size of a span; it is very frequently stated to be all pervading. At places in the spirit of mysticism it is described as smaller than the smallest and bigger than the biggest (Kaṭha 1.2.20, etc.).

(1597) Consciousness is not an attribute of the material elements. The Cārvākas regard consciousness as but an epiphenomenon of the material elements. For the refutation of this view see Pramāṇavārttika pp. 67 ff (Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana).

(1600-1) Meaning of a word—see Nyāyasūtra 2.2.60; Nyāyamañjarī, p. 297. This problem is discussed in works on poetics. There is divergence of opinion as to what a word means—individual or universal or shape (ākṛti) or quality, or action. The Mīmāṃsakas regard jāti (universal, genus) and ākṛti (shape) as one, and believe that a word means jāti. Nyāyasūtra regards vyakti (individual), jāti and ākṛti all the three as meanings of a word, one being principal and the other two subordinate according to the context. According to the Jainas, everything is of the nature of both universal and particular and it is such a thing that is the meaning of a word. According to the Buddhist a word means anyāpoḥa or

anyavyāvṛtti i. e. exclusion of other things (e. g. 'jar' excludes all that is non-jar).

The three alternatives mentioned in these gāthās represent the views of the Śabdabrahmavādi Grammarians, the Vijñānādvaitavādi Bauddhas and other philosophers who admit an external object which the word is meant to denote. According to the Śabdabrahmavādins, Śabda or Word is the ultimate reality, and all else is a phenomenon of it. Therefore a word can mean Word only. The Vijñānādvaitavādins regard vijñāna or consciousness as the only reality, even the external things are but external projections of ideas. Therefore, in their view, the meaning of a word is vijñāna or knowledge. According to the other philosophers a word means a thing. Words are classified as two-fold—nāman (noun) and ākhyāta (verb). Nouns are of four kinds according as they mean genus, substance (dravya), action or attribute. See Nyāyamañjarī, p. 297.

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2

(1611) Karma—See Introduction—section on karman, a latent impression deposited by acts, physical or mental. The Jainas regard it as pudgala constituted of matter, and as clinging to the soul. All schools of philosophy, excepting the Cārvākas, accept the doctrine of karma.

(1613) Jayanta has in his Nyāyamañjarī brilliantly argued out a case for karman. See Nyāyamañjarī, p. 481.

(1614) The intermediate movement when the soul has abandoned the previous body, but has not taken unto itself a new one is called in Jaina thought the antarālagati, wherein the soul moves to its new destination by virtue of its association with the karmic body. The Bauddhas call this karmic body antarābhava-śarīra (inter-existence body) which in their

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view also is corporeal. See Pramāṇa-vārttika 1.85 (Manorathanandinī Tīkā.

Yoga of the karmic body—Yoga means activity of the mind, speech or body. Here the activity of the karmic body is referred to.

(1620) Compare the doctrine of desireless (or selfless) action in the Gītā, which is not binding and therefore is conducive to the attainment of emancipation.

(1625) Karma is corporeal i.e. possessed of attributes like colour, taste, etc.. See Aṣṭasahasrī, kārīkā 98.

(1643) God is not the cause of the world—not even its creator. For a fuller discussion see Syādvādamañjarī, kā. 6.

Svabhāvavāda — The doctrine that the origination of things is not dependent upon any cause — they just naturally occur. This doctrine is very old and we find it referred to in the Upaniṣads and in the Gītā. The Gītā states that Arjuna cannot escape activity. Prakṛti is by nature active, so Arjuna's body, speech or mind cannot but be active whether Arjuna wills it or not. What is essential is that one must perform all acts in a selfless manner. (See 18. 59–60; 3. 5; 3. 33; 5. 14). Yet there is a difference. The author of the Gītā cannot be called a svabhāvavādin since he admits God and also the soul as controlling prakṛti or matter. The svabhāvavādins believe in just the nature of things and do not admit any other cause as guiding, or operating on, it.

Vidhi—Vidhir vidhāyakaḥ — That which enjoins, an injunction—Nyāyasūtra 2.1.63.

Arthavāda — a statement that commends or denounces — 'Stutir nindā parakṛtiḥ purākalpa ity arthavādaḥ'—Nyāyasūtra. 2.1.64.

Anuvāda—Repetition of what is known from other sources; Vidhi-vihitasyānuvacanam anuvādaḥ—Nyāyasūtra 2.1.65.

(1649) Soul-body-Is the soul identical with the body or different from it? That the soul and body are identical is a view of some of the Cārvākas; it is known as 'tājīvatāccharīravāda' in early works.

(1650) Vide a Cārvāka sūtra quoted in the Tattopaplava-siṃha (p. 1)—Pṛthvy-ap-tejo-vāyur iti tattvāni; tat-samudāye śarīrendriyaviṣaya-sañjñā. Another sūtra of the Cārvākas is 'Tebhyaś caitanyam'. For a refutation of this view of the Cārvākas, see Nyāyasūtra, pp. 301 ff; Nyāyamañjarī, p. 437; Vyomavati 391; Ślokavārttika — Ātmavāda; Pramāṇa-vārttika, 1. 37 ff; Tattva-saṅgraha, kā. 1857-1964; Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bh. 3. 3. 53; Aṣṭasahasrī, p. 63 ff; Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, 110 ff; Nyāyakumudacandra, pp. 341 ff; Syādvādaratnākara, pp. 1080 ff; Nyāyāvātāra-vārttika, pp. 45 ff, Dharmasaṅgrahaṇī, gā 36 ff. Cf. also the Cārvāka sūtra quoted in Brahma Sū. Śāṅkara Bh. 3. 3. 53 'Tebhyaś caitanyam madaśaktivād vijñānam caitanya-viśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ'.

(1657-63) Compare Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 60 and Nyāyasūtra 3. 1. 1-3, 19, 22, 25.

(1160) Compare for 'āgamaś copapattiś ca', Yogadrṣṭi-samuccaya, 101.

(1661) Pratijñā is the statement of what is to be proved, 'Parvato vahnimān'— e. g. Mountain is fiery. Cf. Nyāyasāra— 'Pratipipādayiṣayā pakṣavacanam pratijñā yathā śabdo'nityaḥ... tatra sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭaḥ pakṣaḥ — Pratijñā is the first member of a syllogism. It is the statement of the subject (pakṣa) with the desire of proving something in respect of it; e. g. word is non-eternal (where 'word' is pakṣa and non-eternality is the sādhyā to be proved. The argument of Vāyubhūti in this gāthā is that the pratijñā is yet to be proved, whereas the hetu (liṅga, mark of inference) must be an established fact. Therefore a part (ekadeśa) of the pratijñā cannot be adduced as a hetu.

(1671) Cf.

Pratiksūṇa-vināśe hi bhāvānām bhāvasantateḥ;
tathotpattēḥ sa hetutvād āśrayo'yuktam anyathā. —

Pramānavārttika 1.69.

In this connection, the well-known Buddhist stanza may be quoted—

Yasminneva hi santāne āhitā karmavāsana;
phalaṁ tatraiva sandhatte karpāse raktatā yathā.

See also Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, p. 472.

The attack of the rival thinkers against the Buddhist system of thought is that if the point-instants (svalakṣaṇa) alone are real, memory, recognition, fruition of karma etc. would not be possible. This the Buddhists explain on the basis of the stream (santati) of point-instants being the same.

(1674) The Buddhists believe that one source of cognition (pramāṇa) can have one object only; for example, perception brings about the cognition of specific particular (svalakṣaṇa) only and inference that of universal (sāmānya). Perception cannot cognise sāmānya, nor can inference cognise svalakṣaṇa. The Buddhists are thus pramāṇa-vigrahavādins, as against others who are pramāṇa-samplavavādins; in the view of the latter, one source of cognition (pramāṇa) can have as object even things cognised by other pramāṇas. See

Vijānāti na vijñānam ekam arthadvayaṁ yathā;
ekam arthaṁ vijānāti na vijñānadvayaṁ tathā'. —

quoted in Śaevārthasiddhi (1.12).

Kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasamskārah — See

kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasamskārah asthirāṇāṁ kutaḥ kriyā;
bhūtir yaishāṁ kriyā saiva kārakāṁ saiva cocyate.

—quoted in Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, p. 376.

(1676) Tatra pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmī—Nyāyapraveśa, p. 1. In the inference, Mountain is fiery, because it is smoky, mountain is called the pakṣa, subject of the inference—the minor term. It is also called 'dharmin' the substrate, the attribute (dharma) viz. fire of which is to be proved (sādhya).

The pakṣa in any inference must be a well-known entity, its existence should in no case be doubtful, otherwise nothing could be demonstrated in connection with it. It is only the sādhyā that is doubtful and therefore is to be established by inference.

(1682) Compare:—

Atidūrāt sāmīpyād indriyaghātān mano'navasthānāt;
saukṣmyād vyavadhānād abhibhavāt samānābhīhārāc ca.—
Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 7.

Note:— We have in this section a reference to different fallacies of the līṅga (mark of inference), e. g. asiddha, (inadmissible, unreal), vyabhicārin or anaikāntika (inconclusive). For fallacies of reason, see Tarkasaṅgraha. See also Nyāyasāra—

Tatrānīcitapakṣavṛttir asiddhaḥ; pakṣa-vipakṣayor eva vartamāno viruddhaḥ; pakṣa-sapakṣa-vipakṣavṛttir anaikāntikaḥ; Savyabhicāro' naikāntikaḥ — Nyāya-sūtra.

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4

Vyakta—The name Śucidatta also is found in the Digambara tradition. See Harivaṁśa Purāṇa, 3.42.

The purva-pakṣin of the discussion in this section is the Mādhyamika Bauddha. What the Buddhists really meant by śūnya was 'devoid of any essence of its own', 'devoid of self', 'dependent upon another', 'relative'. Things being momentary are produced anew by the causal apparatus; this being, that is; there is dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda). What originates in dependence on another is śūnya (void). The rival schools interpreted the doctrine of Śūnya as Nihilism denying the existence of everything — which the Buddhists did not intend to propound. What they wanted to deny was the basic entity

persisting through change and the reality of things as they are empirically described and understood. See Saṃyutta Nikāya, 35.85, Bodhicaryāvatāra p. 356; also

Sa yadi svabhāvataḥ syād bhāvo na syāt pratītya samudbhūtaḥ; yaś ca pratītya bhavati grāho nanu śūnyatā saiva. 67.

yaḥ śūnyatām pratītya-samutpādam madhyamām pratipadam ekārtham;

nijaḡāda praṇamāmi tam apratimasambuddham iti. 72.

— Vighrahavyāvartanī.

We find the word used in the later Upaniṣads also in connection with the absolute or qualityless self which does not fall within the scope of any of the worldly categories, is devoid of phenomenal attributes, but yet is existent. See Tejobindu Up. 3.27; 4.43; also Maitrī Up. 3.5.

(1690) Things of the world are comparable to a dream:—
Compare:

Drśyate jagati yadyad yadyaj jagati vikṣyate;
vartate jagati yadyat sarvam mithyeti niścinu. 55.
idam prapañcam yat kiñcid yad yaj jagati vidyate;
dṛṣyarūpam ca dṛgrūpam sarvam śaśaviṣānavat. 75.
bhūmirāpo'nalo vāyuḥ kham mano buddir eva ca;
ahañkāraś ca tejaś ca lokam bhuvana-maṇḡalam. 76.

— Tejobindu Up. 5; also

Yathā māyā yathā svapno gandharva-nagaraṃ yathā;
tathotpādas tathā sthānam tathā bhāṅga udāhṛtaḥ.

— Mūlamādhyamika Kārikā. 7.34.

phenapiṇḍopamaṃ rūpam vedanā budbudopamā;
marīcisadṛśī sañjñā sañskārāḥ kadalinibhāḥ.

māyopamaṃ ca vijñānam uktam ādityabandhunā—quoted in
Mādhyamika-vṛtti p. 41.

Yathaiva gandharvapuram marīcikā,
yathaiva māyā supinam yathaiva;
svabhāvaśūnyā tu nimittabhāvanā,
tathopamaṃ jānatha sarvabhāvan.—Mādhyamika-vṛtti, p. 173.

We have a similar pūrva-pakṣa in Nyāya-sūtra, 4.2.31-32—
Svapnaviṣayābhimānavād ayam pramāṇaprameyābhimānaḥ;
māyā-gandharvanagara-mṛgatrṣṇikāvad vā.

(1692) Things are relative (sāpekṣa), e. g. short-long.—
Yo'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvaḥ tam evāpekṣya sidhyati;
yadi yo'pekṣitavyaḥ sa sidhyatām kam apekṣya kaḥ.
yo'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvaḥ so'siddho' pekṣate katham,
athāpy apekṣate siddhas tv apekṣā'sya na vidyate.—
Mūlamādhyamika Kārikā, 10.10-11.

We have a similar pūrvapakṣa (prima-facie view) and its
refutation in Nyāya-sūtra, 4.1. 39-40.

See Tejbindu Up. 5. 21-29 for similar arguments to
prove the unreality of everything except Brahman. Not by them-
selves, nor by others Also—

Na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṁ nā'py ahetutaḥ,
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana. 1.1.
na svato jāyate bhāvāḥ parato naiva jāyate;
na svataḥ parataś caiva jāyate jāyate kutah. 21.13.—
Mūlamādhyamika Kārikā.

(1694)—Produced, non-produced cannot be produced:—
Utpadyamānam utpādo yadi cotpādayaty ayam;
utpādayet tam utpādam utpādaḥ katamaḥ punaḥ. 18.
anya utpādayaty enaṁ yady utpādo' navasthitiḥ;
athānutpāda utpaunaḥ sarvam utpadyate tathā. 19.
svataś ca tāvad utpattir asataś ca na yujyate;
na sataś cāsataś ceti pūrvam evopapāditam. 20.—
Mūlamādhyamika Kārikā, 7.

(1695) Compare :—

Hetupratyayasāmagryām pṛthagbhāve'pi madvaco na yadi,
nanu śūnyatvaṁ siddham bhāvānām asvabhāvataḥ—
Vigrahavyāvartanī, 21.

hetoś ca pratyayānāṁ ca sāmagryā jāyate yadi;
phalam asti ca sāmagryāṁ sāmagryā jāyate katham. 1.
hetoś ca pratyayānāṁ ca sāmagryā jāyate yadi;
phalam nāsti ca sāmagryāṁ sāmagryā jāyate katham. 2.

Hetoś ca pratyayānāṁ ca sāmāgryām asti cet phalaṁ;
grhyeta nanu sāmāgryāṁ sāmāgryāṁ ca na grhyate. 3.
hetoś ca pratyayānāṁ ca sāmāgryāṁ nāsti cet phalam;
hetavaḥ pratyayāś ca syur ahetuḥpratyayaiḥ samāḥ. 4.
—Mūlamādhyamika Kārikā, 20.

(1702) — Compare :— Smṛti-saṅkalpavac ca svapnaviṣayā-
bhimānaḥ—Nyāya Sū. 4.2.34 and Bhāṣya on it.

(1703) — Dream — See Praśastapāda Bhāṣya, pp. 91-3.
(Kashi Sanskrit Series).

(1705 6) — Syllogism of three members — pratijñā
(thesis), hetu (reason), udāharāṇa (example). Syllogism of
5 members — the above three and upanaya (application) and
nigamana (conclusion).

Parvato vahnimān — Mountain is fiery (pratijñā);

Dhūmāt — Because it is smoky (hetu);

Yatra yatra dhūmas tatra tatra vahnir yathā mahānase —
Where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen (udāharāṇa);
Vahnivyāpyadhūmavān ayam (parvataḥ) — This Mountain has
smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire (upanaya);
Tasmāt tathā (—parvato vahnimān) — Therefore the Mountain
is fiery (nigamana).

The rule of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) forms a part
of the syllogism — udāharāṇa. The illustration can be either simi-
lar or dissimilar, and accordingly the vyāpti is stated positively
or negatively. The above is an example of positive vyāpti
(anvayin); the negative (vyatirekin) being expressed as follows
— ‘Yatra yatra vahnnyabhāvaḥ tatra tatra dhūmābhāvaḥ’ or
‘yatra vahnir nāsti tatra dhūmo’pi nāsti yathā sarasi’ — Where
there is not fire, there is not also smoke, as in a pond.

(1710) Samantabhadra has in his Āptamīmāṃsā (kā. 73-75),
refuted the extreme views that everything is relative (sāpekṣa),
dependent upon others, and that everything is self-sufficient.

(1713) Svabhāva :— Agnir dahati nākāśam ko’tra
paryanuyujyātām.... The whole stanza is as follows :—

Idam evaṁ na vety etat kasya paryanuyojyatām;
agnir dahati nākāśaṁ ko'tra paryanuyujyatām.

—Pramāṇavārtikālaṅkāra, p. 43.

(1718) Vyavahāra and Nīscaya (empirical and real stand-points)—Ācārya Kunda Kunda has distinguished between these. See his Niyamasāra, 11 ff and other works. For a discussion of these, see Nyāyāvatāraṭīkāvṛtti, Introduction, pp. 139 ff by Pt. Dalsukh Malvania.

(1737) The Nyāya—Vaiśeṣika regards an atom as devoid of parts (niravayava) and indivisible. See Nyāya Sū. (4.2.16) and Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. The Buddhists find fault with this as they regard every atom as an aggregate of six units. If the six were to occupy the same space, everything in the world would be of the size of an atom. See

“Ṣaṭkena yugapad yogāt paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṁśatā;
ṣaṅṅāṁ samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād anumātrakaḥ.”

—Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi, kā. 12. For a rejoinder to this, see Vyomavatī, p. 225.

Dvyaṇuka—binary—According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, two atoms form a dvyaṇuka. As regards the composition of tryaṇuka, etc. there is difference of opinion,—according to some, three atoms form a tryaṇuka, four a caturaṇuka and so on; whereas others believe that three dvyaṇukas make a tryaṇuka, four tryaṇukas a caturaṇuka and so on.

Mūrtair aṇur apradeśaḥ..... — A similar stanza is quoted in Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, 5.25. —

Kāraṇam eva tad antyaṁ sūkṣmo nityaś ca bhavati paramāṇuḥ;
ekarasaṅdha-varṇo dvisparśaḥ kāryaliṅgaś ca.

(1740) Non-perception of a thing cannot prove its non-being—This is a stock argument of many darśanas, esp. the Buddhists. Compare Nyāyabindu, pp. 59-60; also Pramāṇavārttika, 2.85 ff; Tattvasaṅgraha 3270 ff.

(1749) For arguments proving the existence of vāyu (air), see Vyomavatī, p. 272.

(1750) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas argue that the quality 'sound' must have a substratum, and sound could not possibly be a quality of earth, water, fire, and air, and therefore there must be ākāśa to serve as the substratum of sound (śabda). See Vyomavati, p. 322. The Jainas do not regard sound as a quality, so they infer the existence of ākāśa on the ground of the argument that the corporeal elements earth, etc. must have something to support them and ākāśa is such a supporting substance, and so on.

(1759) Struck by a weapon—See Ācārāṅga, 1 for a discussion as to which soul is struck by which weapon.

(1765) Five samitis and three guptis—Jaina thinkers have suggested certain means for the stoppage (saṁvara) of the inflow of new karmic matter and also for the dispersion or dissociation (nirjarā) of the accumulated karmic matter from the soul. See "Āsrava-nirodhaḥ saṁvaraḥ; sa gupti-samiti-dharmānupreksā-parīśahajaya-cāritraih; tapasā nirjarā ca; samyag-yoganigraho guptih; īryābhāṣaiṣaṇādānanikṣepsargāḥ samitayah" — Tattvārtha-sūtra IX 1-5.

The first condition for the stoppage (saṁvara) of inflow of karmic matter is the three-fold gupti, control of thought, speech and physical movements. This is aided by (i) the five-fold samiti (regulation of the five main activities for the maintenance of life; (ii) the ten-fold moral virtues (dharma), (iii) twelve-fold contemplation (anupreksā), (iv) patient endurance and conquest of the twenty-two afflictions (parīśahajaya) and (v) five-fold conduct (cāritra)*. The five-fold samiti consists in proper regulation and care in walking (samyag īryā samiti), speaking (samyag bhāṣā samiti), eating (samyag eṣaṇā samiti), lifting and laying things (samyag ādāna-nikṣepa samiti) and excretion (samyag utsarga samiti) so as to cause no injury to anything or anyone. Gupti means desisting from any evil activity or movement of thought, speech and body.

*See Tattvārthasūtra IX.

The point at issue in this section does not seem to represent the stand-point of any particular school of thought. It might have been something about which all were anxious to know. Under the pretext of the treatment of the similarity of this-worldly life to the other-worldly life, the relation of similarity of cause and effect is discussed. Even those who do not accept the view that the effect is latent in the cause, recognise the similarity of the cause and the effect; the Cārvākas would recognise sentiency as a dissimilar effect of the aggregate of material elements. The Sāṅkhya accepts everything as evolving out of Prakṛti and the Vedānta as evolving out of Brahman, irrespective of the later differentiation in respect of the guṇas or Māyā. No system of thought has any objection to the effect being similar to the cause. Only those who do not believe that the effect is latent in the cause recognise dissimilar effects also.

(1800) Nāma (body-making) and gotra (status-determining) karman — See Introduction.

—x—x—

The Cārvāka is the only darśana (system of philosophy) that does not accept the concept of bondage and emancipation. All the other systems of philosophy believe that the soul must be liberated from its bondage or metempsychosis, and that mokṣa or liberation is or should be the goal of all human effort. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga is of the view that it is Prakṛti, that is bound or liberated, because the soul is just an unattached witness of the

dance of Prakṛti, while other systems believe the bondage to be that of the soul. But this is a matter of interpretation, and the concept of bondage and liberation is acceptable to it also.

(1804) Sa eṣa viguṇaḥ ... This statement cannot be traced, but it has a Sāṅkhya tinge. Compare—karmādhyakṣaḥ sarvabhūtādhivāsaḥ sākṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaś ca—Śvet. Up. 6.11.

(1821–1822) This division of the souls into bhavya—those that are capable of being liberated, and abhavya—those that are not—is one for which no thoroughly rational explanation has been given. Ācārya Siddhasena recognises it as something that is to be accepted on faith or on the authority of the scriptures.

(1827) If all the bhavya souls are emancipated, there would be an end to all saṁsāra, mundane existence. Will such a situation ever arise? The Jainas say it will not, as explained in the body of the text. The same problem is attempted to be tackled in the Yogabhāṣya, where it is said that this cannot be answered but one thing is certain that the kuśala (good, pure) are emancipated, not so the akuśala (impure); but it is not possible to say anything of the world as a whole. There is quotation in the Bhāsvatī commentary of the Yogabhāṣya saying that there will never be an end to all mundane existence, as at the present.—‘Idānīm iva sarvatra nātyantocchedaḥ.’ Bhāsvatī also quotes ‘Pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya pūrṇam evāvaśiṣyate’ of the Upaniṣads and also,

‘Ata eva hi vidvatsu mucyamāneṣu sarvadā;
brahmāṇḍajīvalokānām anantatvād aśūnyatā’—to the same effect. See Yogabhāṣya, 4.33.

(1839) Is mokṣa (emancipation) kṛtaka (caused or brought about)? We may note briefly the views of different darśanas in connection with this problem. The Buddhists regard everything as made, as composite (kṛtaka), except nirvāṇa and ākāśa (space). In the Milindapañha, it is recorded that King Milinda once asked Nāgasena if there was anything that was not caused by action (karma) or cause (hetu) or season (ṛtu). Nāgasena replied that there were two things—ākāśa and nirvāṇa that complied

with this condition. But then naturally the question arises that if nirvāṇa is something uncaused, why did the Buddha give instructions regarding the path leading to liberation and also discuss its causes. The answer is that to realise something and to produce are two different things. The causes mentioned by the Buddha are for the realisation of mokṣa, not for its origination. One can go to the Himālayas, but one can never by the same effort take them elsewhere. One can go to the other bank of a river with the help of a boat, but can never bring the other bank physically to himself. Similarly, Lord Buddha can give instruction regarding the path leading to the realisation of mokṣa, but can never point out the causes bringing about mokṣa, because mokṣa or nirvāṇa is something uncaused, it cannot be brought about. Nirvāṇa, in fact, does not fall within any of the categories of empirical thought, still it is not non-existent as it is the object of mental—rather, transcendental—cognition, it can be cognised by the undefiled, pure Mind. See Milindapañha. 4. 7. 12-15.

Even in the Vedānta, mokṣa has only to be realised, for it is eternally present. The ignorance regarding the nature of the pure, undefiled soul has only to be dispelled for the realisation of its true nature which is eternally existent. The path of mokṣa pointed out consists not of originating (utpādaka) factors but of jñāpaka (cognitive) ones that only show the facts as they are. All the Brāhmanical systems of philosophy regard the soul as eternally unchanging and pure, and mokṣa as uncaused. The Bhāṭṭa school of thought alone specifically regards the soul as capable of evolution, and consequently recognises change or modification in it. The Buddhists regard citta as naturally luminous and the impurities as adventitious (Prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittam prakṛtyā "gantavo malāḥ — Pramāṇa-vārttika, 1. 210).

The Jainas regard mokṣa as both kṛtaka (caused) and akṛtaka (uncaused, natural) from different points of view. It is kṛtaka from the point of view of modes, as it gets rid of impurities and attains a state of perfection, but from the point

of view of the basic substance there is no change in it and so it is uncaused. The soul is existent from time beginningless, it was never brought about.

(1841) Saugata—The Buddhists of the Mahāyāna school believe that the Buddha—the Sugata returns to his mundane life repeatedly for the good of the creatures of the world. Compare the theory of Avatāra (Incarnation) in the Bhagavad Gītā and in Vaiṣṇavism.

(1844) The emancipated perfect soul is stationed in the uppermost part of the loka (cosmos). In the Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Śāṅkara schools of thought, the soul is all-pervading so there is no possibility of the emancipated soul moving to another place, only its connection with the body, etc. is cut off. The theistic schools of thought believe that the emancipated soul (which is atomic) goes to the world of Viṣṇu (or of the God recognised by them). The Buddhists of the Hīnayāna do not recognise any place to which the emancipated go. See Milinda-pañha, 4. 8. 93, but those of the Mahāyāna believe that there are places like Tuṣita Heaven, Sukhāvati Heaven where the Buddha resides and from which he returns to the world assuming the *nirmānakāya*.

Lāu ya—This is Gāthā 957 of the Āvaśyaka Nirukti.

(1845-46) Soul is active. Those who regard the soul as vibhu, ubiquitous and kūṭastha, eternally unchanging, do not recognise any activity on the part of the soul. But in the Jaina view the soul is capable of expansion and contraction and so it is quite consistent to accept activity of the form of movement in the soul.

(1847) Effort—The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believes that effort (prayatna) is an attribute of the soul, and being a quality it is different from karman or kriyā (activity).

(1848) Nityam sattvam—This is part of a kārīkā in Dharmakīrti's Prāmāṇavārttika —

Nityam sattvam asattvam vā hetor anyānapekṣanāt;
apṅṣātaś ca bhāvānām kādācitkasya sambhavaḥ (3.34).

—x—x—

All the schools of thought except the Cārvākas recognise the existence of gods. See Introduction.

(1869-79) The gods can be directly perceived— This statement also has in a way to be taken on faith and the authority of the scriptures. We find in early works the tendency to identify the sun, moon, etc. with the power supposed to preside over them, though we find passages where a clear distinction is drawn between the two, and the thinker wants to know the true nature of the presiding power as against the outward appearance.

Gods—See Tattvārtha-sūtra, IV

Devāś caturṇikāyāḥ (1) — Celestial beings are of four groups or classes — bhavanavāsi (residential), vyantara (peripatetic), jyotiṣka (stellar), vaimānika (heavenly).

Bhavanavāsino' sura-nāga-vidyut-suparṇāgni-vāta-stanitodadhi-dvīpa-dik-kumārāḥ (10)

Vyantarāḥ kinnara-kimpuruṣa-mahoraga-gandharva-yakṣa-rākṣasa-bhūta-piśācāḥ (11)

Jyotiṣkāḥ sūryācandramasau graha-nakṣatra-prakīrṇaka-tārakāś ca (12) —

(The sub-classes of stellars are sun, moon, planets, constellations, scattered stars).

Meru-pradakṣiṇā nityagatayo nṛloke(13); tatkr̥taḥ kālavibhāgaḥ(14); bahir avasthitāḥ (15).

[In the human region (i. e. the 2½ dvīpas), the stellars eternally move round their respective Mount Meru. Divisions of time are caused by these movements of the stellars. The stellars outside the 2½ dvīpas are fixed].

Vaimānikāḥ (16); kalpopapannāḥ kalpātītāś ca (17) —

(The heavenly beings are of two kinds — kalpopapanna, born in the 16 heavens, and kalpātīta, born beyond the 16 heavens).

(1869-70) Even in Buddhist works we find the belief that gods come down to the human world. See Kathāvatthu, 4. 7.

All the schools of thought, except the school of the Cārvākas admit the existence of nārakas (denizens of hell).

(1892) Sensuous perception is, as a matter of fact, not direct perception—The Jainas are the only philosophers who believe that the soul's perception is the only pratyakṣa (direct apprehension), sensuous perception being, as a matter of fact, indirect. In their view 'akṣa' denotes the soul, and therefore the soul's perception alone is pratyakṣa in the literal sense of the term. Other systems of thought take 'akṣa' as denoting sense-organ, and thus for them pratyakṣa is sensuous perception which for the Jainas is parokṣa (indirect knowledge). To keep abreast with the times and on the same plane of thought as the others the Jainas also called sensuous perception pratyakṣa, but qualified it as sāmvyavahārika (empirical). Sensuous perception—sāmvyavahārika pratyakṣa.

(1897) Avadhi, manah-paryāya, kevala-jñāna —
Mati-śrutāvadhi-manahpāryaya-kevalāni jñānam (9) — Knowledge is of five kinds—mati (sensuous knowledge), śruta (scriptural knowledge), avadhi (visual intuition), manah-paryāya (intuition of mental modes), kevala (perfect knowledge—omniscience). Tat-pramāṇe; ādye parokṣam; pratyakṣam anyat (10-12)—Tattvārtha-sūtra, I—Mati and śruta are indirect or mediate cognition (parokṣa) and the other three—avadhi, manah-paryāya and kevala are direct or immediate intuition (pratyakṣa). For details see Tattvārtha-sūtra, I and Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Ch. II—Nathmal Tatia (Jain Cultural Research Society, Benares, 5, 1951).

—x—x—

Of the different alternatives discussed here, the view of Svabhāvavāda and the view accepting pāpa and puṇya as distinct are well-known; but it cannot be said as to whose the views recognising the existence of pāpa alone, or of puṇya alone, or of their mixture are. It may be that all possible alternatives are discussed here, without any reference to the schools to which they belong. We may note in passing that Māṭhara has in his introduction to kārikā 13 of Sāṃkhya-kārikā raised a problem similar to the pūrvapakṣa here, viz. Why are sattva, rajas and tamas recognised as three different guṇas, why cannot only one guṇa be admitted ?

(1935) Yoga—activity of mind, speech or body. Cf. “kāyavāñ-manahkarma yogaḥ; sa āsravaḥ.—Tattvārtha Sū. 6. 1-2.—Yoga is the channel of āsrava (inflow of karmic matter into the soul).

Mithyātva (perversity of attitude), etc. Cf. Mithyādarśinā-virati-pramāda-kaṣāya-yogā bandhahetavaḥ—Tattvārtha Sū 8.1—Mithyādarśana (wrong belief), non-abstinence, spiritual inertia, passion, and yoga (activity of mind, speech and body) are the causes of bondage.

Mithyātva—perverse attitude, wrong belief. It may be of the nature of ekānta (one-sided view of a thing of many aspects), viparīta (perverse belief, e.g. animal sacrifices lead to heaven), saṃśaya (doubt, scepticism), vinaya (credulity, taking all religious and views to be equally worthy of pursuit), ajñāna (wrong belief caused by ignorance, indiscrimination of good and bad). Pūjyapāda Devanandin also notices a two-fold classification of mithyādarśana — (i) naisargika (inborn) and (ii) paropadeśa-pūrvaka, acquired from instructions by others. There are four varieties of the latter according as it belongs to a kriyā-vādin (believer in moral and spiritual action), akriyā vādin (non-believer in moral and spiritual action), ajñānin (agnostic) or vainayika (credulous person).

Mithyādarśana may be abhigrhīta (obstinately held) and anabhigrhīta (lightly held). See Tattvārtha Sū. Bhāṣya 8. 1; Sarvārtha-siddhi of Pūjyapāda Devanandi on Tattvārtha Sū. 8. 1; also Siddhasenagaṇin's commentary on it and Samayasāra, 96.

For a clear exposition in English see Studies in Jaina Philosophy, pp. 144ff — Dr. Nathmal Tatia.

It may be noted that mithyādarśana lies at the root of all evils and whatever misery there is in the life of a soul is ultimately due to it (sainsāramūla-bīam micchattam — Bhatta-pariṇaya, 4.59) though yoga may, as pointed out by Maladhāri Hemacandra, be the immediate antecedent of karma-bondage.

Avirati—non-abstinence from sinful behaviour e.g. injury, falsehood etc.. It is of twelve kinds—lack of compassion for six classes of embodied souls, and lack of restraint of five senses and mind.

Pramāda—carelessness, spiritual inertia, not being mindful of what is to be done or not done.

Kaṣāya—passions—anger, pride, deceit, greed.

(1936) Adhyavasāya, the good or bad modifications—motives intentions—of the soul.

Leśyā—coloration. See Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 253 foot-note—Dr. Nathmal Tatia—“Leśyā is a transformation of the soul, dependent upon the activity of the mind. There is leśyā so long as there is association of the soul with the mind. The soul has infinite-fold transformations due to the infinite-fold activities of the mind associated with it. But these transformations are classified for the sake of convenience into six main types which are known as kṛṣṇa (black) leśyā, nīla (blue) leśyā, kāpota (grey) leśyā, tejo (yellow) leśyā, padma (pink) leśyā and śukla (white) leśyā. They are thus nothing but the states of the soul brought about by the various conditions of the mind”. Cf.

“Liśyante iti leśyāḥ, manoyogāvastambhajanita-pariṇāmaḥ... anekatve'pi pariṇāmasya pariśthūra-katipayabhedakathanam eva

suññānatvāt kriyate, na tvaśeṣapariñāma-bhedākhyānam
aśakyatvāt—

Tattvārtha Sūtra Bhāṣya Tīkā, 2. 7.

See also the Doctrine of Karman in Jaina Philosophy by
Dr. H. Von Glasenapp.

The leśyās from kṛṣṇa to kāpota are aśubha (inauspicious)
and those from tejas to śukla are śubha (auspicious).

Dhyāna—concentration, meditation. See
Uttamasamhananasyaikāgracintānirodho dhyānam āntarmuhūrtāt
(27), ārtā-raudra-dharmya-śuklāni (28), pare mokṣahetū (29)
—Dhyāna is confining one's thought to one object. In a man
with the best constitution (of bones, etc.) it lasts at the most
up to one antarmuhūrta (period less than forty-eight minutes).
It is of four kinds — (i) ārtadhyāna — mournful or painful
concentration, (ii) rudra or cruel, (iii) dharmā, righteous,
(iv) śukla, pure concentration, i. e. concentration on the soul.
The last two are the causes of liberation.

Ārtadhyāna is four-fold—(i) On attainment of an unpleasing
object, repeatedly thinking of getting dissociated from it or rid
of it (ārtam amanojñasya samprayoge tadviprayogāya smṛti-
samanvābārah—*Ibid*, 30);

(ii) repeatedly thinking of reunion with a pleasing object on
being separated from it (viparītam manojñasya—*Ibid*, 31);
(iii) on being afflicted by disease or any other source of pain
and anxiety, repeatedly thinking of becoming free from it
(vedanāyāś ca—*Ibid*, 32); (iv) on being over-anxious to enjoy
worldly objects and not getting them in this world, repeatedly
thinking of gaining them (nidānam ca—*Ibid*, 33).

Raudra dhyāna is four kinds — (i) delight in hurtfulness,
(ii) delight in falsehoods, (iii) delight in theft, (iv) delight in
preservation of objects of sense-enjoyments (hiṃsā'nṛta-steya-
viśayasamrakṣaṇebhyo raudram aviratadeśaviratayoh—*Ibid*, 35).
Dharma-dhyāna is of four kinds — Contemplation (i) of the
principles taken on the authority of the scripture as being the
teachings of the Arhats, (ii) as to how the universal wrong
faith, knowledge and conduct of people can be removed,

(iii) of the fruition of the eight kinds of karman, (iv) of the nature and constitution of the universe (ājñāpāya-vipāka-saṁsthāna-vicayāya dharmyam-Ibid, 36).

Śukla-dhyāna also is of four kinds, the first two kinds being possible only for saints possessed of a knowledge of the 14 Pūrvas and the last two kinds are peculiar to the man of perfect knowledge (kevalin) (śukle cādye Pūrvavidāḥ; pare kevalinaḥ— Ibid, 37-38).

The four kinds of śukladhyāna are (i) absorption in meditation of the self, but unconsciously allowing its different modes to replace one another, (ii) absorption in one aspect of the self, without changing the particular aspect concentrated upon; (iii) the very fine vibratory movements in the soul, even when it is deeply absorbed in itself, in a kevalin; (iv) total absorption of the soul in itself, steady and undisturbably fixed without any motion or vibration whatsoever.

(Prthaktvaikatva-vitarka-sukṣmakriyā-pratipātivvyuparata - kriyā-nivartini-Ibid, 39).

See Tattvārthasūtra 9. 27ff and commentaries.

(1938) Mohanīya karma of a mixed nature :

Mohanīya (deluding karman) is of two kinds—darśana mohanīya (right-belief deluding) and cāritra-mohanīya (right-conduct deluding). Darśana-mohanīya is of three kinds—mithyātva (wrong belief which does not allow a person to have a correct knowledge of the nature of things), samyag-mithyātva (mixed wrong and right belief wherein there is wavering knowledge as to the nature of things), samyaktva-mohanīya (right belief clouded by slight wrong belief). See Tattvārtha-sūtra, 8. 9.

(1939) Saṅkrama—Transformation of one karman into another. Transformation is a process by which the soul transforms the nature, the duration, the intensity and the numerical strength of one kind of karmic matter into those of another kind which it is binding at that time by means of the manifestation of a particular kind of potency.

Saṅkramyante' nyakarmarūpatayā vyavasthitāḥ prakṛti-sthitya-nubhāga-pradeśā anyakarmarūpatayā vyavasthāpyante yena tat

sañkramaṇam—Karmaprakṛti (1937), Bandhana-karaṇa, p. 19 (1). By this process the soul either deposits a formerly bound karman into one which it is binding at the time and then transforms it into the latter, or of the many kinds of karmic sub-types that it is binding one karmic sub-type is transformed into another [Badhyamānāsu prakṛtiṣu madhye abadhyamāna-prakṛtidalikam prakṣipya badhyamāna-prakṛtirūpatayā yat tasya pariṇamanam, yac ca vā badhyamānānām prakṛtīnām ḍalika-rūpasyetaretararūpatayā pariṇamanam tat sarvañ sañkramaṇam ity ucyate—Karmaprakṛti p. 1 (2)]. In the case of the three sub-types of the darśana-mohanīya (belief-deluding) karman, however, transformation is possible even in the absence of bondage. A person of right belief (samyag-dṛṣṭi) transforms the perversity-producing (mithyātva) karman into the two karmans that produce respectively right-cum-wrong belief (samyag-mithyātva) and right-belief (samyaktva), even though the latter two are not bound. Similarly he transforms the karma that produces right-cum-wrong belief into one that produces right belief. It may be stressed again here that samyagmithyātva and samyaktva are only the two particular states of purity of the mithyātva-pudgala (i. e. the karmic matter producing perversity). The soul can bind only the karman that produces perversity (mithyātva). It does not bind the karman producing samyag-mithyātva, or the karman producing samyaktva, but only purifies the mithyātva-karman into samyag-mithyātva and samyaktva. [See Karmaprakṛti, p. 2 (2)].

It is to be noted, as Dr. Tatia has drawn our attention, that a person of perverted belief (mithyā-dṛṣṭi) cannot transform his perversion-karman (mithyātva) into the karman that produces right-cum-wrong belief or into one that produces right belief, nor can a person of right belief transform his karma producing right belief into one that produces right-cum-wrong belief or wrong belief [Ibid, p. 3 (2)].*

*See 'Studies in Jaina Philosophy', pp. 255-7—Dr. Nathmal Tatia. We are highly indebted to Dr. Tatia's lucid exposition of the states and processes of karman in his book.

(1939) Dhruvabandhinī prakṛti is that karmic matter which is invariably bound when the conditions of bondage are present; while adhruvabandhinī is that which may or may not be bound even when the conditions of bondage are present.

47-fold Dhruvabandhinī prakṛti—(1-5) Jñānāvaraṇīya—viz. matiśruta-, avadhi-, manaḥ-paryāya-, kevala-jñānāvaraṇīya (knowledgeobscuring) karmans; (6-14) 9 darśanāvaraṇīya—cakṣur-, acakṣur-, avadhi-, kevala-darśanāvaraṇīya (undifferentiated-cognition-obscuring) karmans and nidrākarma, nidrānidrākarma, pracalākarma, pracalāpracalākarma, styānagrddhi; (15-30) 16 kaṣāyas (cāritramohanīya karma)—The passions are krodha (anger), māna (pride) māyā (deceitfulness), lobha (greed). Each of these is four-fold according to the intensity of manifestation—(a) anantānubandhin—of life-long duration, (b) apratyākhyānāvaraṇa—obscuring the energy for even partial abstinence, (c) pratyākhyānāvaraṇa—obscuring only the energy for complete abstinence, (d) saṁjvalana—flaming up and effective only occasionally; (31) mithyātva (darśana-mohanīya); (32-33) bhaya (fear), juguṣā (disgust)—two no-kaṣāyas (quasi-passions), (34-42) taijasa (giving fiery body), kārmaṇa (giving karmic body), varṇa (colour-giving), rasa (taste-giving), sparśa (touch-giving), āguru-laghu (making a being neither heavy nor light), upaghāta (causing annihilation), nirmāṇa (causing the right formation of the body)—these are different types of nāma-karma; (43-47) 5 antarāya—dāna-, lābha-, bhoga-, upabhoga-, vīrya-antarāya (energy-obscuring) karmans.

These can be continually transformed into sub-types of their own basic type.*

The remaining sub-types of the different karmans are adhruvabandhinī and their transformation even into sub-types of their own basic karma is restricted inasmuch as only the unbound karma (that is to say that which is to be bound) can be transformed into that which is already bound, but that which is already bound cannot be transformed into the unbound.

*See The Doctrine of Karma, pp. 5-19 — Dr. Glasenapp

(1941) Oil—This is a very popular example with the Jainas even from the time of the early canonical literature.

Karma-vargaṇā (karma-groups). “The Jainas conceive an infinite number of groups called vargaṇās, of atoms. The first vargaṇā is conceived to contain only such atoms as remain alone and solitary and have not formed composite bodies with others. The second group contains composites of two atoms. The third group contains composites of three atoms. And so on. By this process, we arrive at a group which contains composites of an infinite number of atoms which is fit for the making up of the audārika (gross) body such as of men and animals. This group is followed by an infinite number of groups which are all competent for making the stuff of audārika body. Then follows a number of groups which are incompetent for any kind of body. Again, by the same process we reach an infinite number of groups which are competent to form the stuff of the vaikriya (subtle) body such as of celestial beings. And by following the same process as above, another infinite number of groups are reached which are capable of forming the stuff of āhāraka body such as of an ascetic having special powers. Similarly by repeating the same process we obtain groups which are competent for taijasa (luminous) body, bhāṣa (speech), ānāpāna (respiration), manas (mind) and karman. It is to be noticed in this connection that a composite body of the group that follows consists of greater number of atoms but occupies less space in comparison with a composite body of the group that precedes. Thus a composite body of the karma-vargaṇā consists of more atoms but occupies less space in comparison with a composite body of manovargaṇā, which, again, consists of more atoms but occupies less space in comparison with a composite body of the ānāpāna-vargaṇā. And so on. [See Āvaśyaka Niryuṅkti, 39. Also see Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, 631-637 and the Brhadvr̥tti.]” —Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 65—Dr. Nathmal Tatia.

Upaśamaśreṇi—Path of subsidence:— For the final consummation the soul has to remove the five conditions of

bondage, viz. mithyātva (perversity), avirati (non-abstinence), pramāda (spiritual inertia), kaṣāya (passions), and yoga (activities of body, speech and mind). The most important activity for spiritual progress is the subduing of the passions. This is possible by the repetition of the three-fold processes of yathāpravṛttakarāṇa, apūrvakarāṇa and anivṛttikarāṇa. Yathāpravṛttakarāṇa is the impulse from within to realise the good whose vision, though indistinct, the soul sometimes has in the course of its wanderings. It is a kind of manifestation of energy and is not always effective and consequently does not invariably lead to spiritual advancement. But if the impulse is strong enough to cut the tie of rāga (likes, attachment) and dveṣa (dislikes, repulsion), the soul is successful in the struggle and is bound to be liberated within a limited time. The struggle consists in the two-fold processes known as apūrvakarāṇa and anivṛttikarāṇa. By the yathāpravṛttakarāṇa the soul is confronted with the concentrated force of the passions and the other two enable the soul to overpower and transcend the force. The force of the passions is beginningless, but the soul is feelingly conscious of it only on some occasions. This consciousness is the work of the process called yathāpravṛttakarāṇa. During this process the soul undergoes progressive purification every instant and binds karmic matter of appreciably less duration. Again there is increase in the intensity of the bondage of auspicious karmans along with decrease in the intensity of the bondage of inauspicious karmans. As a result of this the soul gets an indistinct vision of the ultimate goal. It is only the souls having the necessary energy who can overcome the force of passions. The souls manifest such energy by the two processes of apūrvakarāṇa and anivṛttikarāṇa at the end of which the soul develops such spiritual strength as is destined to lead it to the goal of emancipation. The duration and intensity of the karmans which were considerably reduced in the process of yathāpravṛttakarāṇa* are further reduced in the apūrvakarāṇa during which the soul passes through such states as

* The karāṇas are spiritual impulses that goad the soul to realise its ultimate goal, emancipation.

it never experienced before (apūrva). During the process of apūrvakarana, the duration and intensity of the bondage of new karmans as well as the accumulated is considerably affected. This is rendered possible by four sub-processes which begin simultaneously from the very first instant of the main process: (i) sthitighāta, destruction of duration, (ii) rasaghāta, destruction of intensity, (iii) construction of a complex series (guṇaśreni) of the groups of karmic atoms, arranged in geometrical progression with an incalculable common ratio, transplanted from the mass of karmic matter that would have come to rise after an antarmuhūrta, for the sake of their premature exhaustion by fruition, (iv) apūrvasthitibandha, an unprecedented type of bondage of small duration whose length is much smaller than that of the duration hitherto bound. The soul undergoes yet another sub-process, viz. guṇa-saṅkrama (transference of karmic matter) by which a portion of the karmic matter of the inauspicious types of karman is transferred to some other types of karman. The mass of karmic matter thus transferred increases every moment until the end of the apūrvakarana process when the knot (of rāga and dveṣa) is cut, never to appear again.

The third process of anivṛttikarana leads the soul to the verge of the dawn of the first enlightenment that comes like a flash on account of the absolute subsidence of the karmic matter of the vision-deluding (mithyātva-mohanīya) karman. The soul undergoes the same five sub-processes, as are described in the process of anivṛttikarana. There also occurs a new process called antarakarana whereby the soul divides into two parts the karmic matter of the mithyātva-mohanīya karman that was to rise after the anivṛttikarana. The first of the two parts the soul forces into rise during the last few instants of anivṛttikarana, while the rise of the second part is postponed for an antarmuhūrta during which no karmic matter of the mithyātva-mohanīya karman is allowed to rise and produce its effect on the soul. Thus at the end of the process of anivṛttikarana, the mithyātva-mohanīya karman has no effect

on the soul for an antarmuhūrta (a period less than forty-eight minutes). This is its first vision, its first enlightenment which is temporary and disappears within a very short time. The soul now attempts to recapture the vision and make it a permanent possession. The processes the soul has to undergo for this are quite analogous to the processes already described with slight variations. The processes are related to the removal of the five conditions of bondage—mithyātva, etc.. The most important activity for spiritual progress, however, is the subduing of the passions which is possible only by the repetition of the three-fold processes of yathāpravṛttakarāṇa, apūrvakarāṇa and anivṛttikarāṇa. There are now two ways open for the soul. It may climb up the spiritual ladder by suppressing the passions or it may climb it up by totally annihilating them. The former mode of spiritual progress is known as upaśamaśreṇi (ladder of subsidence) and the latter as kṣapakaśreṇi (ladder of annihilation).

While climbing up the ladder of subsidence, the soul suppresses, by the three-fold processes of yathāpravṛttakarāṇa, etc. the four life-long (anantānubandhin—first type) passions at the outset and then the three vision-deluding karmans. The soul then attains such purification as enables it to rise from spiritual inertia. But the progress is not steady. It fluctuates a hundred times between the state of spiritual vigour and the state of spiritual inertia before it reaches the state of steady progress through the repetition of the three processes and begins the gradual suppression of the following sub-types of the conduct-deluding (cāritra-mohaṇīya) karman—the nine quasi-passions (laughter, addiction, dissatisfaction, bewailing, fear, disgust, hankering after women, hankering after men and hankering after both the sexes); the second (apratyākhyānāvaraṇa—obscuring the energy for even partial abstinence), the third (pratyākhyānāvaraṇa, obscuring only the energy for complete abstinence) and the fourth (sainjvalana, fickle and meagre and effective only occasionally) types of anger, of pride, of deceit and the second and third types of greed. Then the soul suppresses the fourth

type of greed and attains a state where all the twenty-eight sub-types of the deluding karman are completely suppressed. The soul's minimum stay at this stage of absolute suppression of the deluding karman is for one instant and the maximum for an antarmuhūrta. After this stay the soul invariably falls down to the lower stages on the rise of the suppressed passions. The stronger the rise of the passions, the lower is the fall. A soul can climb up this ladder of subsidence only twice in the same life. But the soul which has climbed up the ladder twice cannot climb up the ladder of annihilation in that life and so cannot attain emancipation in the same life. The soul which has climbed up the ladder of subsidence only once has the chance of climbing up the ladder of annihilation and thus attaining final emancipation in that very life.

The ladder of annihilation (kṣapakaśreṇi) also is climbed up in almost the same way. Only the souls encased in a strong body can climb up this ladder. By the three processes the soul annihilates at the outset the four life-long (anantānubandhin) passions. Then the three sub-types of the vision-deluding karman are annihilated. If the individual dies at this stage it has to experience three or four more births before it attains emancipation. Otherwise, the soul proceeds further for the gradual annihilation, by means of the threefold processes, of the second and third type of passions, the nine quasi-passions, and the fourth type of anger, pride and deceit. Then last of all the soul annihilates the fourth type of greed and attains a state where all the sub-types of the deluding karman have been annihilated. This is the summit of the ladder of annihilation. The soul is now free from passions and immediately attains omniscience and reaches a stage which is known as the state of embodied freedom (jīvanmukti).

[See Karmaprakṛti with Cūrni and the commentaries of Malayagiri and Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya (1937)—Upāśamanākaraṇa; also Studies in Jaina Philosophy, pp. 269–276 by Dr. Nathmal Tatia. We are very much indebted to Dr. Tatia's exposition.]

Rasāvibhāga—The lowest degree of fruition of karma is known as rasāvibhāga. It serves as a unit to measure the other

graded kinds of fruitions of karma (See comm. 1943, pp. 192, l. 17).

(1946)—46 *Punya* types:—(1) *Sātvedanīya* (causing a feeling of pleasure), (2) *uccagotra* (bestowing high lineage), (3-5) *āyu* (conferring a quantum of life) as *deva* (gods), *manuṣya* (human beings), *tiryak* (lower beings); (6-42) 37 sub-types of *nāma-karma*—conferring *devagati* (celestial state), *manuṣyagati* (human state), *devānupūrvī*, *manuṣya-ānupūrvī* (—*ānupūrvī* causes that the *jīva*, when one existence is over, goes from the place of death in the proper direction to the place of his new birth according to the four states of existence as god, etc.), *pañcendriyajāti* (birth as a being with five senses), *audārikaśarīra* (gross, physical body), *vaikriyaśarīra* (subtle body), *āhāraka* (translocation body), *tajasa śarīra* (fiery body) and *kārmaṇa śarīra* (karmic body); three *āṅgopāṅga nāma karmans* causing the origin of the chief limbs of the body (e. g. arms, etc.) and their parts (e. g. fingers, etc.), viz. *audārika*, *vaikriya*, *āhāraka*; first *sainhanana* (joining) viz. *vajra-ṛṣabha-nārāca* wherein the two bones are hooked into one another, through the joining a tack (*vajra*) is hammered, and the whole is surrounded by a bandage; *caturasra-sainsthāna* (symmetric stature of body), *śubha* (good, pleasant) colour (black and green), *śubha* (good) taste (i. e. astringent, sour, sweet), *śubha-gandha* (smell), *śubha* touch (i. e. light, smooth, rough, warm, adhesive), *agurulaghu* (neither heavy nor light), *parāghāta* (superiority over others), *ucchvāsa* (capability of breathing), *ātapa* (emitting a warm splendour), *uddyota* (emitting cold lustre), *praśasta vihāyogati* (pleasant gait), *trasa* (voluntarily movable body), *bādara* (gross body), *pariyāpta* (complete development of organs, etc.), *pratyeka* (individual body), *sthira* (firm teeth, etc.), *śubha* (beautiful gladdening parts of the body above the navel), *subhaga* (attracting selfless sympathy), *susvara* (melodious voice), *ādeya* (suggestive, meeting approbation), *yaśaḥ-kīrti* (honour and glory), *nirmāna* (right formation of body), *tīrthakara* (position of a *Jaina* teacher or saint); (43) *samyaktva-mohanīya* (correct belief in a preliminary stage), (44) *bāsya* (laughing), (45) *puruṣaveda* (male sex), (46) *rati* (improper and confirmed prejudicial liking).

Some ācāryas believe that no sub-type of mohaniya karman (obstructing true faith and right conduct) is auspicious. Hence samyaktva-mohaniya is regarded as aśubha (inauspicious). So also the last three and consequently forty-two puṇya types are recognised.

82 Pāpa types, viz. those conferring (1-5) five sainsthānas (statures), viz. nyagrodha-parimaṇḍala (body with upper part symmetrical, not the lower), sādi (body with lower part symmetrical, not the upper), kubja (hunch-backed body), vāmana (dwarf-like), huṇḍa (entirely unsymmetrical body), (6) aprasasta vihāyogati (ugly gait), (7-11) five kinds of constitutions or structures, viz. ṛṣabhanārāca (joining like the vajra-ṛṣabha-nārāca, but without the tack or vajra), nārāca (joining without even the bandage), kilikā (weak joining in which the bones are merely pressed together and tagged), chedaprṣṭha (weak joining in which the ends of bones only touch one another), (12) tiryag-gati (lower existence), (12) nāraka-gati (hellish state of existence, (14-15) tiryag-ānupūrvī, nāraka-ānupūrvī (leading after death to the place of lower existence or hellish existence), (16) asātavedaniya (painful feeling), (17) nīcagotra (low lineage), (18) upaghāta (self-annihilation), (19-22) ekendriya jāti (birth as a being with one sense), dvīndriya-jāti (birth as a being with two senses), trīndriya jāti (birth as a being with three senses), caturindriya jāti (birth as a being with four senses), (23) narakāyu (quantum of life of hellish beings), (24) sthāvara (immovable body), (25) sūkṣma (subtle body), (26) aparyāpta (undeveloped organs, etc.), (27) sādharāṇa (body common with others), (28) asthira (infirm ears, etc.), (29) aśubha (ugly, unpleasant lower parts of the body), (30) durbhaga (causing unsympathy), (31) duḥsvara (ill-sounding voice), (32) anādeya (unsuggestive), (33) ayaśaḥ-kīrti (dishonour and shame), (34) aśubha (unpleasant) colour (i. e. red, yellow, white), (35) aśubha (unpleasant) smell, (36) aśubha (unpleasant) taste (i. e. bitter and biting), (37) aśubha (unpleasant) touch (i. e. heavy, hard, dry, cold), (38) kevalajñānāvaraṇa (obscuring omniscience), (39) kevaladarśanāvaraṇa (obscuring absolute

undifferentiated cognition), (40) nidrā (light slumber), (41) nidrānidrā (deep slumber), (42) pracalā (sound sleep when sitting or standing), (43) pracalāpracalā (exceedingly intensive sleep while walking), (44) styānagrddhi (somniaambulism); (45-48) anantānubandhin (life-long) krodha (anger), māna (pride), māyā (deceitfulness), lobha (greed), (49-52) apratyā-khyānāvaraṇa (obscuring the energy for even partial abstinence) krodha, māna, māyā, lobha, (53-56) pratyākyānāvaraṇa (obscuring only the energy for complete abstinence) krodha, māna, māyā, lobha, (57-60) sainjvalana (meagre and effective occasionally) krodha, māna, māyā, lobha, (61) mithyātva (complete disbelief or heterodoxy); (62-65) obscuration of mati (sensuous knowledge), śruta (scriptural knowledge), avadhi (visual transcendental knowledge), manaḥ-paryaya (intuition of mental modes); (66-68) obscuration of cakṣur-darśana (eye-intuition), acakṣur-darśana (non-eye-intuition—intuition by organs other than the eye), avadhi-darśana (visual intuition), (69) hāsyā (laughing), (70) rati (improper and confirmed prejudicial liking), (71) arati (improper and confirmed prejudicial disliking), (72) śoka (sorrow), (73) bhaya (fear), (74) jugupsā (disgust), (75) strī-veda (female sex and corresponding sex-passion), (76) puṃ-veda (male sex and corresponding sex-passion), (77) napuṃsaka-veda (neuter sex and corresponding sex-passion), (78-82) hindrance of energy (antarāya) for dāna (charity), lābha (receiving), bhoga (enjoyment), upabhoga (enjoyment of something which can be taken only once), vīrya (will-power).

[For full details regarding the types and the sub-types of karman, see 'The Doctrine of Karman in Jaina Philosophy', pp. 5-20,—By Dr. Helmuth Von Glasenapp (Translated by G. Barry Gifford and Edited by Hiralal R. Kapadia, 1942.)]

Nothing new can be found here in the discussion regarding other-world. The emphasis is on the utpāda-vyaya-dhruvya nature of the soul, as against the Nyāya, Sāmkhya-Yoga, Vedānta view of its being absolutely unchanging.

(1969) Illustration of a pitcher of gold — Compare :
 Ghaṭamaulisuvarṇārthī nāśotpādasthitiṣvīyam;
 śokapramodamādhyasthyaṁ jano yāti sahetukam—
 Āptamīmāṃsā, 59 of Samantabhadra.

—x—x—

The basis of the doubt expressed here is the Mimāṃsā belief that Vedic rites ought to be performed as long as one lives. We find a similar doubt expressed in the Nyāya system by way of the prime-facie view. See Nyāya-sūtra 4-1-59, Bhāṣya and other commentaries.

(1974) The commentator has put alongside two different upaniṣadic expressions and has perhaps deliberately changed the text of 'satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ' into 'satyaṁ jñānam anantaram' and construed it so as to get the meaning he wants here by explaining 'anantaram' as equivalent to 'aparam'.

(1975) Nirvāṇa (extinction) of the lamp — We find a gāthā corresponding to the stanza of the Saundarananda, quoted in the Mādhyamikavṛtti, p. 216 :-

Atha paṇḍitu kaści mārgate kuta'yammāgatu kutra yāti vā;
vidiśo diśa sarvi mārgato nāgatir nāśya gatiś ca labhyati.

We find some passages in the works of the Mādhyamikas which seem to corroborate the view that nirvāṇa means utter extinction like that of a lamp. See *Catuhśataka*, 221 :

Skandhāḥ santi na nirvāṇe pudgalasya na sambhavaḥ;
yatra dṛṣṭam na nirvāṇam nirvāṇam tatra kim bhavet.

Further the vṛtti on this very work, p. 59 says Nirvāṇa is but a name, but an empirical expression, a myth, just ignorance.

The Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā defines nirvāṇa as 'Upaśamaḥ punaranutpattidharmakatayā ātyantika-samuccheda ityārthaḥ' (p. 350), which supports the view that nirvāṇa is total extinction. So also does the following :

"Yadā na bhāvo nābhāvo mateḥ saṁtiṣṭhate puraḥ;
tadānyagatyabhāvena nirālambā praśāmyati".

(*Bodhicaryāvatāra*, 9.35) and the commentary on it: "Buddhiḥ praśāmyati upaśāmyati sarvavikalpopaśamāt nirindhanavahnivat nirvṛti(nirvṛtti?)m upayātīty arthaḥ" (p. 418).

All the same it cannot be stated that nirvāṇa in the view of the Śūnyavādins or Mādhyamikas is of the nature of sheer non-being. Recent researches and the discovery of Buddhist works have convinced scholars that Śūnya does not mean 'Nothing', but signifies an inexpressible ultimate reality beyond the ken of all empirical cognition. Statements such as the above only deny things as they are known and understood in empirical knowledge. But the Śūnyavādins recognise an ultimate reality and Nirvāṇa is of the essence of that. See :

"Bodhiḥ buddhatvam ekānekasvabhāvaviviktam anutpanna-niruddham anucchedam aśāśvataim, sarvaprapañca-vinirmuktam ākāśa-pratisamaim dharmakāyākhyam paramārtha-tattvam ucyate, etad eva ca prañāpāramitā-śūnyatā-tathatā-bhūtakoti-dharma-dhātvādi-śabdena saṁvṛtim upādāya abhidhīyate"—*Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā*, p. 421.

See also *Mādhyamika-kārikā*, 1.1 and its commentary. Candrakīrti has repeatedly stressed that the Śūnyavādins

recognise an ultimate reality; but the moment an attempt is made to express it in words, the essence of it escapes our grasp and we are left with an illusion. Thus, even Nirvāṇa, as empirically understood and expressed, is a myth, an illusion. See Milindapañha, pp. 72, 265, 306, 309 where also it is stated that Nirvāṇa is a reality, is of the nature of absolute bliss, but details regarding it cannot be expressed in our empirical language with its limitations.

(1980) Vyāpaka (determinant concomitant) and vyāpya (determinate concomitant)—The rule of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) is an essential link in inference. One sees smoke, the mark of inference (liṅga) and infers thereby the presence of fire, that is to be established (sādhyā). But for this one must be convinced of the relation between the liṅga and the sādhyā; the invariable concomitance between them must be known. This relation can be of the type of cause-effect or identity according to the Buddhist; or as Nyāya says by repeated experience of their consistency in respect of presence and absence (anvaya-vyatireka) one must know them to be invariably concomitant, one of them being the vyāpya and the other the vyāpaka. For example, fire is vyāpaka (determinant concomitant, more extensive) and smoke vyāpya (determinate concomitant, less extensive). Fire is present in all those cases where smoke is present and in many more and so the presence of smoke determines the presence of fire, and the absence of fire can determine the absence of smoke.

(1982–1983) Pradhvaṁsābhāva (posterior non-being)—

If one destroys jar with a stick, there is said to be the non-being of the jar caused by its destruction. But this, in the Jaina view, as also in the Sāṅkhya, is not just non-being; it is the potsherd that is the pradhvaṁsābhāva of the pot.

(1992) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that in the state of emancipation the soul has no happiness, or pain or knowledge or any other quality.

विशेषावश्यकभाष्यान्तर्गतौ

गणधरवादः

The text given here consists of the gāthās commented upon by Maladhārī Hemacandra in his Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya-Bṛhadvṛtti as the present work is based on them alone.

The text as edited by Pt. Shri Dalsukhbhai Malāvanīa in his Gaṇadhara-vāda (Gujarātī), has, with his kind permission, been printed here. This text has been edited on the basis of the following :-

- (i) सु०—Maladhārī Hemacandra's commentary on the Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya.
- (ii) को०—Kot'yācārya's commentary on the Vi. Bh.
- (iii) ता०—Copy of a palm-leaf manuscript of the Vi. Bh. found in Jessalmer Bhaṇḍāra (—Muni Śrī Puṇyavijayajī got this manuscript copied by Pt. Amritlāl).

The palm-leaf manuscript being comparatively early and more correct, its text has been given here and only the divergent readings affecting the construction or the meaning have been mentioned in the foot-notes.

[१]

जीवे तुह संदेहो पचचक्खं जण्ण घेप्पति घडो व्व ।
अचंचतापचचक्खं च णत्थि लोए खपुप्फं व ॥ १५४९ ॥

ण य सोऽणुमाणगम्मो जम्हा पचचक्खपुव्वयं तं पि ।
पुव्वोवल्लद्धसंबंधसरणतो लिंगलिंगीणं ॥ १५५० ॥

ण य जीवल्लिंगसंबंधदरिसिणमभू जतो पुणो सरतो ।
तल्लिंगदरिसणातो जीवे संपचचओ होज्जा ॥ १५५१ ॥

णागमगम्मो वि ततो सिज्जति जं णागमोऽणुमाणातो ।
ण य कासइ पचचक्खो जीवो ¹जस्सागमो वयणं ॥ १५५२ ॥

¹ कस्ता०—ता० ।

जं चागमा विरुद्धा परोप्परमतो वि संसओ जुत्तो ।
 सव्वप्पमाणविसयातीतो जीवो त्ति ¹ते बुद्धी ॥ १५५३ ॥
 गोतम ! पच्चक्खो च्चिय जीवो जं संसयातिविण्णाणं ।
 पच्चक्खं च ण सज्ज जघ सुह-दुक्खं ²सदेहम्मि ॥ १५५४ ॥
 कतवं करेमि काहं चाहमहंपच्चयादिमातो य ।
 अप्पा सप्पच्चक्खो ³तिकालकज्जोवदेसातो ॥ १५५५ ॥
⁴किह पडिवण्णमहं ति य किमत्थि त्ति संसओ किध णु ? ।
 सइ संसयम्मि वाऽयं ⁵कस्साहंपच्चओ जुत्तो ॥ १५५६ ॥
 जति णत्थि संसयि च्चिय किमत्थि णत्थि त्ति संसओ कस्स ? ।
 संसइते व सरूवे गोतम ! किमसंसयं होज्जा ॥ १५५७ ॥
 गुणपच्चक्खत्तणतो गुणी वि जीवो घडो व्व पच्चक्खो ।
 घडओ वि घेप्पति गुणी गुणमेत्तग्गहणतो जम्हा ॥ १५५८ ॥
 अण्णोणण्णो व्व गुणी होज्ज गुणेहिं जति णाम सोऽण्णो ।
 णणु गुणमेत्तग्गहणे घेप्पति जीवो गुणी सक्खं ॥ १५५९ ॥
 अध अण्णो तो एवं गुणिणो ण घडातयो वि पच्चक्खा ।
 गुणमेत्तग्गहणातो जीवम्मि कतो वियारोऽयं ? ॥ १५६० ॥
 अध मण्णसि अत्थि गुणी ण तु देहत्थंतरं तओ किन्तु ।
 देहे णाणातिगुणा सो च्चिय ⁶ताणं गुणी जुत्तो ॥ १५६१ ॥
 णाणादयो ण देहस्स ⁷मुत्तिमत्तातितो घडस्सेव ।
 तम्हा णाणातिगुणा जस्स स देहाधियो जीवो ॥ १५६२ ॥
 इय तुह देसेणायं पच्चक्खो सव्वधत्तं महं जीवो ।
 अविहतणानत्तणतो तुह विण्णाणं व पडिवज्ज ⁸ ॥ १५६३ ॥
 एवं चिय परदेहेऽणुमाणतो गेण्ह जीवमत्थि त्ति ।
 अणुवित्ति-णिवित्तीतो विण्णाणमयं सरूवे व्व ⁹ ॥ १५६४ ॥
¹⁰जं च ण लिंगेहिं समं मण्णसि लिंगी जतो पुरा गहितो ।
 संगं ससेण व समं ण लिंगतो तोऽणुमेयो सो ॥ १५६५ ॥

¹ तो-मु० । ² दुक्खा-मु० । ³ कज्जावएसाओ-को० । ⁴ कह-को०, मु० । ⁵ अस्सा^०-को०
⁶ तेसिं-मु०, को० । ⁷ देहस्सडु-को० । ⁸ पडिवज्जा-मु० । ⁹ सरूवं व-ता० । ¹⁰ Here in
 the ता० manuscript, the abbreviation चो० of चोदक (objector) is
 inserted. Similarly the abbreviation आ० of आचार्य is placed in the
 beginning of the ācārya's statement in the ता० manuscript.

1 सोऽप्यातो जाहो लोहो सप्त ण दिट्ठवो वि ।
 भादल्लिदादरिसणातो णहोऽणुस्यो सररिम्म ॥ १५६६ ॥

2 हेरुससि विधाता पतिणियताकारतो षडसैव ।
 अक्खणं च करणतो वण्डाणीण कुललो व ॥ १५६७ ॥

3 अरिथदिथविषयण आदण्णादेयसमावतोऽवस्स ।
 कम्मर देवादाता लोप 4 सवास-लोहण ॥ १५६८ ॥

भावा देहादीण भोजनणतो णरो व ॥ १५६९ ॥ 6
 सवातात्तिसणातो अरिथ य अरथो 5 वरसेव ॥ १५६९ ॥ 6

7 जो क्कालि स जावो सज्जविदुद्धो वि ते मती होजा ।
 सुवात्तिसणातो वण्णो संसारिणो 8 दोसो ॥ १५७० ॥

अरिथ विथ ते जीवो संसयतो सोम्म णणुपरियो व ।
 जं सदिद्धं मात्तम ! ते वण्णारथ वरिथं सुवं ॥ १५७१ ॥

9 एवं णम विण्णं खरस्स पवं ण ते खरे चं व ।
 अण्णरथ तदरिथ विथ एवं विवरीतागहे वि ॥ १५७२ ॥

अरिथ अजावविषययो पडिसिधातो षतोऽवडसैव ।
 णरिथ षवोत्ति 10 व जीवदियत्तपरो णरिथसहे 11 य ॥ १५७३ ॥

असतो णरिथ णिसंयो संजाणविपडिसिधतो सिद्ध ।
 संजाणविचवक्कं वि सिद्धमरथतरे णियवं ॥ १५७४ ॥

जीवोत्ति सरथयमितं सुद्धणतो षवोसिधाणं व ।
 विण्णरथण सरथं सो जीवो अथ मती होजा ॥ १५७५ ॥

अथो देहो विथ से ते णो पज्जावययणमोत्ततो ।
 णण्णादियुणो य जतो मणोतो जीवो ण देहोत्ति ॥ १५७६ ॥

जीवोऽरिथ वयो सच्चं सवयणतोऽवसैसवयणं व ।
 सवणुवयणतो वा अणुमतसवणुवयणं 12 व ॥ १५७७ ॥

अयराणादोद्दोसाभावतो 13 सच्चणविधाति च ।
 सच्चं विथ से वयणं जाणयमच्छरथवयणं व ॥ १५७८ ॥

1 णो-तां । 2 See Gā. 1667 3 See Gā. 1668 । 4 सवास=कों, सुं ।
 5 वरसेव-तां । 6 See Gā. 1669 । 7 See Gā. 1670 । 8 णो दोसो-सुं ।
 9 णो-तां । 10 य-तां । 11 सहे य-तां । 12 य-तां । 13 णोभावा-कों, सुं ।

विष्णाणातोऽण्णो विष्णाणघणो त्ति सव्वसो¹ वाऽवि ।
 स भवति भूतेहिंतो घडविष्णाणादिभावेण ॥ १५९३ ॥
 ताइं चिय भूताइं सोऽणुविणस्सइ विणस्समाणाइं ।
 अत्थंतरोवयोगे कमसो विण्णेषभावेण ॥ १५९४ ॥
 पुव्वावरविष्णाणोवयोगतो विगमसंभवसभावो ।
 विष्णाणसंततीए विष्णाणघणोऽयमविणासी ॥ १५९५ ॥
 ण य णाणसण्णाऽवतिट्ठते संपतोवयोगातो ।
 विष्णाणघणाभिव्वो जीवोऽयं वेदपत²विहितो ॥ १५९६ ॥
 एवं पि भूतधम्मो णाणं तब्भावभावतो बुद्धी ।
 तण्णो तदभावम्मि वि जं णाणं वेतसमयम्मि ॥ १५९७ ॥
 अत्थमिते आतिच्चे चन्दे संतासु अग्गिवायासु ।
 किंजोतिरयं पुरिसो? अप्पज्जोति त्ति णिदिट्ठो ॥ १५९८ ॥
 तदभावे भावातो भावे चा³ऽभावओ ण तद्धम्मो ।
 जघ घडभावाभावे विवज्जयातो पडो भिन्तो ॥ १५९९ ॥
 एसिं वेतपदाणं ण तमत्थं वियसि अधव सव्वेसिं ।
 अत्थो किं होज्ज सुती विष्णाणं वत्थुमेतो वा ॥ १६०० ॥
 जाती दव्वं किरिया गुणोऽधवा संसओ स⁴ चायुत्तो ॥
 अयमेवेति ण वऽयं ण वत्थुधम्मो जतो जुत्तो ॥ १६०१ ॥
 सव्वं चिय सव्वमयं सपरपज्जायतो जतो णियतं ।
 सव्वमसव्वमयं⁵ पि य विचित्तरुवं विवक्खातो ॥ १६०२ ॥
 सामण्णविसेसमयो तेण पतत्थो विवक्खया जुत्तो ।
 वत्थुस्स विस्सरुवो पज्जायावेक्खता सव्वो ॥ १६०३ ॥
 ×* छिण्णम्मि संसयम्मी जिणेण जरमरणविप्पमुक्केण ।
 सो समणा पव्वइतो पंचहिं सह खंडियसएहिं ॥ १६०४ ॥
 एवं कम्मादीसु वि जं सामण्णं तयं समायोज्जं ।
 जो पुण एत्थ विसेसो समासतो तं पवक्खामि ॥ १६०५ ॥

¹ सव्वओ वावि-मु० । ² वेयंपयमिहिओ-मु०, को० । ³ वाभा०-ता० । ⁴ संसओ तवाजुत्तो-मु०, को० । ⁵ चिय-ता० ।

× The gāthās marked * belong to the Niriyukti.

तं पददत्तं सोऽपि विविधो आगच्छती अस्मिन् ।
 वन्द्यासि यस्मात्सि पराविशिन्नात् तं यमम् ॥ १६०६ ॥
 छलितो ज्ञातित्वा सो मूढो मादन्दजालो वति ।
 को ज्ञाति किम्² वत् पचाहे वड्माणी³ से ॥ १६०७ ॥
 सो पक्षधरसोऽपि जाति जात स ततो मि तस्सेव ।
 सीसत् होतव जातो वीचि पचो विष्णुसगास⁴ ॥ १६०८ ॥
 * आस्ये य विभोऽं वाङ्-वरा-मरुणविष्णुमुक्तेः ।
 भासो य भासो य सव्यो सव्यदरेसिं ॥ १६०९ ॥
 * कि मूढो अस्मि कम् उदाहृ ष्ति अस्मि नि संसयो वृत्तं ।
 वेत्तवत्त य अर्थ न यथासे⁵ तेस्यो अर्थो ॥ १६१० ॥
 कम् उह संदेहो मूढसि तं भासागोचरतोऽपि ।
 उह तामुभासागोचरामुभासिभ्यं फलं जस्य ॥ १६११ ॥
 अथि सुह-दुक्खहेतुं कज्जालो वीयसङ्करसेव ।
 सो विद्धि चैव मतो वीयवारतो न तं ज्ञे ॥ १६१२ ॥
 जो वृक्षधाषणां फले विसेसो न सो विणा हेतु ।
 कज्जालो गोतम ! षो व हेतुं य सो⁶ कम् ॥ १६१३ ॥
 गालस्येरे देवदरपुत्रं देवियातिमतातो ।
 जय बालदेवपुत्रो जवदेहो पुत्रमिह कम् ॥ १६१४ ॥
 क्रियाफलमभावतो दाणादीनां फलं किरीणं च ।
 7 तं विद्य दाणादिफलं मण्यसादाति जाति वृद्धी ॥ १६१५ ॥
 क्रियासासामणालो ज फलस्यसावि तं मतं कम् ।
 तस्य परिसामकत्वं सुह-दुक्खफलं जतो मुज्जा ॥ १६१६ ॥
 होतव मणिविष्णु दाणाविक्रयं व जाति फलं वृद्धी ।
 तं न विमिन्नतातो विवृत्तो च षडस्य विवृत्तो ॥ १६१७ ॥

1 वा०-वा० । 2 किरिया-सु०, को० । 3 गन्धर्व-सु० । 4 दिङ्कलसु-सु० । 5 अदिङ्क-सु० ।
 6 वि० गन्धर्व-सु० । 7 वेणु-वा० । 8 अदिङ्क-सु० । 9 केशव-सु० । 10 समारसु-सु०, को० ।
 11 गन्धर्व-सु०, को० । 12 वा०-वा० । 13 आ०-वा० ।

1 एवं वि दिङ्कलता 2 किये न कामफल पयसा ते ।
 सा 3 गन्धर्वकल विचय यथ मयफल पयसिवासा ॥ १९१८ ॥
 पाव च जीवन्ती वदति 4 दिङ्कलसु किरियासु ।
 5 अदिङ्कलसु पुना वदति गान्धर्वसामाना वि ॥ १९१९ ॥
 सोम । जतो विचय जीवा पाव दिङ्कलसु वदति ।
 5 अदिङ्कलसो 6 वि हू तासो पडिबज्ज वेणुव ॥ १९२० ॥
 इयथा अदिङ्कहिता सवे सुचवेज्ज ते अपयसेण 7 ।
 8 अदिङ्कहिता च 9 किलेयवद्विती मवेज्जा हि ॥ १९२१ ॥
 जगन्निद्विमानमाना वद्वितरया ज च णेह मतिपुवं ।
 अदिङ्कहिङ्कल कोइ वि किरिय समारसे 10 ॥ १९२२ ॥
 वेणु पडिबज्ज किरिया अदिङ्कहिङ्कलसु सवत् ।
 दिङ्कलानतफल सा वि अदिङ्कलसामेण ॥ १९२३ ॥
 अवव फलतो काम कज्जलता पयसिहितं पुवं ।
 परमाणवो वड्ढस व किरियाण वयं फलं भिन्नं ॥ १९२४ ॥
 12 अहं णु सुत्तमेव 13 सुत्तं विथ कज्जसुत्तिसत्तासा ।
 इयं वदं सुत्तणतो वड्ढस परमाणवो सुत्ता ॥ १९२५ ॥
 तथ सुदसेवितीतो सुवध वेणुसवता य ।
 वड्ढवलायाणतो परिणामतो य विण्णं ॥ १९२६ ॥
 आहारे इवणल इव वही व वण्णदिङ्कलवलायाण ।
 जीरिसिवादाहारेण्णं कामदेविचणमण्णं ॥ १९२७ ॥
 अथ मत्तसिद्धमेत्तं परिणामतो वि सो वि कज्जसा ।
 सिद्धो परिणयो से दक्षिणपरिणामाणिव पयस ॥ १९२८ ॥
 अन्वयानिचिगारणं यथ वदं विचि विण्णं वि कामं ।
 तथ जति संयादीणं इवेज्ज को णाम लो दोसो ? ॥ १९२९ ॥
 काममि व को सेतो यथ वड्ढवधविचिना सिद्ध ।
 तथ कामपुण्यणलणं वि विचिना जीवयसिहेताणं ॥ १९३० ॥

† This gāthā is repeated later; see 1665.
 १ विद्ध-को०, सु० । २ द्विडा-सु०, को० । ३ पवती-ता० । ४ जीवस्य-ता० ।
 ५ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । ६ अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । ७ ता-को० । ८ वृ-सु० ।

१ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । २ द्विडा-सु०, को० । ३ पवती-ता० । ४ जीवस्य-ता० ।
 ५ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । ६ अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । ७ ता-को० । ८ वृ-सु० ।
 ९ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । १० द्विडा-सु०, को० । ११ पवती-ता० । १२ जीवस्य-ता० ।
 १३ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । १४ अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । १५ ता-को० । १६ वृ-सु० ।
 १७ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । १८ द्विडा-सु०, को० । १९ पवती-ता० । २० जीवस्य-ता० ।
 २१ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । २२ अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । २३ ता-को० । २४ वृ-सु० ।
 २५ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । २६ द्विडा-सु०, को० । २७ पवती-ता० । २८ जीवस्य-ता० ।
 २९ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । ३० अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । ३१ ता-को० । ३२ वृ-सु० ।
 ३३ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । ३४ द्विडा-सु०, को० । ३५ पवती-ता० । ३६ जीवस्य-ता० ।
 ३७ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । ३८ अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । ३९ ता-को० । ४० वृ-सु० ।
 ४१ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । ४२ द्विडा-सु०, को० । ४३ पवती-ता० । ४४ जीवस्य-ता० ।
 ४५ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । ४६ अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । ४७ ता-को० । ४८ वृ-सु० ।
 ४९ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । ५० द्विडा-सु०, को० । ५१ पवती-ता० । ५२ जीवस्य-ता० ।
 ५३ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । ५४ अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । ५५ ता-को० । ५६ वृ-सु० ।
 ५७ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । ५८ द्विडा-सु०, को० । ५९ पवती-ता० । ६० जीवस्य-ता० ।
 ६१ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । ६२ अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । ६३ ता-को० । ६४ वृ-सु० ।
 ६५ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । ६६ द्विडा-सु०, को० । ६७ पवती-ता० । ६८ जीवस्य-ता० ।
 ६९ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । ७० अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । ७१ ता-को० । ७२ वृ-सु० ।
 ७३ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । ७४ द्विडा-सु०, को० । ७५ पवती-ता० । ७६ जीवस्य-ता० ।
 ७७ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । ७८ अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । ७९ ता-को० । ८० वृ-सु० ।
 ८१ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । ८२ द्विडा-सु०, को० । ८३ पवती-ता० । ८४ जीवस्य-ता० ।
 ८५ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । ८६ अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । ८७ ता-को० । ८८ वृ-सु० ।
 ८९ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । ९० द्विडा-सु०, को० । ९१ पवती-ता० । ९२ जीवस्य-ता० ।
 ९३ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । ९४ अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । ९५ ता-को० । ९६ वृ-सु० ।
 ९७ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । ९८ द्विडा-सु०, को० । ९९ पवती-ता० । १०० जीवस्य-ता० ।
 १०१ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । १०२ अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । १०३ ता-को० । १०४ वृ-सु० ।
 १०५ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । १०६ द्विडा-सु०, को० । १०७ पवती-ता० । १०८ जीवस्य-ता० ।
 १०९ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । ११० अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । १११ ता-को० । ११२ वृ-सु० ।
 ११३ वृत्तं विद्ध-को० । ११४ द्विडा-सु०, को० । ११५ पवती-ता० । ११६ जीवस्य-ता० ।
 ११७ जीवस्यस्यि वा (?) -ता० । ११८ अस्त्रिजा-सु०, को० । ११९ ता-को० । १२० वृ-सु० ।

4 तदेतिवामा-वदेत-णमसंयोगादेणो होउअ-ता० । 5 यणसी-सु०, को० । 6 यणसी-ण-ता० । 1 संययमि वि-ता० । संययमि-सु० 2 पचाहे अ ख-ता० । 3 ण not in सु० ।

तस्ससुदरदणियमा वा अणसि वि तो मवेउआ हि ॥ १६५४ ॥
अति वा सव्वाभावो वीसु तो किं तदेणियमास्य ।

तथ अति मूवेसु मवे वेता तो 8 सुसुदण होउआ ॥ १६५३ ॥
ममि-यण-विणउदेतदी पवेय पि हु अथा मवेयसि ।

मउअसि तु मतो वीसु पि ण सववसो णसि ॥ १६५२ ॥
पवेयमभावो वा रेणवेदं व सुसुदं वेता ।

काउदेरे विणससति तथ मूवेणमि वेतण ॥ १६५१ ॥
अथ मउअसि मदी वीसिमहिदो वि सुसुदं होसि ।

पवेयमहिदो वि हु मउअमदी व व सुसुदं ॥ १६५० ॥
वसुधाविमूवेसुदंयसंभूता वेतण वि वे सका ।

वेतणण य अण ७ यणसे 7 वेतिमा अथा ॥ १६४९ ॥
* तउवीवससुरे वि 6 सुसउा ण वि य पुउसं किंवि ।

णामेण य गीसेण य सववण सुवदंरिसे ७ ॥ १६४८ ॥
* अणसि य विणो अडे-अ-मयणविणयसुवेकं ।

वीउउणसससउा वा वेसि पतो विणसमास 5 ॥ १६४७ ॥
4 तदेमिणमवदंणोवासणउेणो होउअ पूवणादे ।

विणयकतणणमा स मदीयमासिणियमणोउा ॥ १६४६ ॥
वीसवेणोवणा सपदमिदमिणमूवेणो अथ ।

वउयमि ण 3 वदेमा वदिता पउववणसामि ॥ १६४५ ॥
* वे पवदेवे सीसु तिया अणउउेती विणसयासे ।

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* विणमि संययमी । विणो अणमरेणोवणयसुवेकं ।
सो सणो पवदेतो पचाहे 2 सहे खडियमवेदेहि ॥ १६४४ ॥

भूताणं पत्तयं पि चेतणा समुदये दरिसणातो ।
जघ मज्जेसु मदो मति ति हेतू ण सिद्धोऽयं ॥ १६५५ ॥

णणु पच्चक्खविरोधो गोतम ! तं णाणुमाणभावातो ।
तुह पच्चक्खविरोधो पत्तयं भूतचेत ति ॥ १६५६ ॥

भूतिंदियोवलद्वाणुसरणतो तेहिं भिण्णरूवस्स ।
चेता पंचगवक्खोवलद्दपुरिसस्स वा सरतो ॥ १६५७ ॥

तदुवरमे वि सरणतो तव्वावारेवि णोवलंभातो ।
ईदियभिण्णस्स मती पंचगवक्खाणुभविणो व्व ॥ १६५८ ॥

उवल्लभण्णेण विगारगहणतो तदधिओ धुवं अत्थि ।
पुव्वावरवादायणगहणविगारादिपुरिसो व्व ॥ १६५९ ॥

सत्विंदियोवलद्वाणुसरणतो तदधियोणुमन्तव्वो ।
जन्न पंचभिण्णविण्णाणपुरिसविण्णाणसपण्णो ॥ १६६० ॥

विण्णाणंतरपुवं बालण्णाणमिह णाणभावातो ।
जघ बालण्णाणपुवं जुवणाणं तं च देहधियं ॥ १६६१ ॥

पढमो^१ थणाभिलासो अण्णाहाराभिलासपुव्वोऽयं ।
^२जघ संपताभिलासोऽणुभूतितो सो य देहधियो ॥ १६६२ ॥

बालसरीरं देहंतरपुवं इन्दियातिमत्तातो ।
जुवदेहो बालातिव स जस्स देहो स देहि ति ॥ १६६३ ॥

अणुसुहदुक्खपुवं सुहाति बालस्स संपतसुहं व ।
अणुभूतिमयत्तणतो अणुभूतिमयो य जीवो ति ॥ १६६४ ॥

^३संताणोणातीओ परोप्परं हेतुहेतुभावातो ।
देहस्स य कम्मस्स य गोतम वीयंकुराणं व ॥ १६६५ ॥

तो कम्मसरीराणं कत्तारं करणकज्जभावातो ।
पडिवज्ज तदब्भधियं दंडघडाणं कुलालं व ॥ १६६६ ॥

^४अत्थि सरीरविधाता पतिणियताकारतो घडस्सेव ।
अक्खाणं च करणतो दण्डातीणं कुलालो व्व ॥ १६६७ ॥

^१ पढमो थणा०—को०, मु० । ^२ जह बालाहिलासपुव्वो जुवाहिलासो स देहहिओ—को० ।

^३ Repetition of gāthā 1639 । ^४ Repetition of gāthā 1567; there is another reading there viz. देहस्सत्थि विधाता ।

¹अर्त्थिदियविसयाणं आदाणादेयभावतोऽवस्सं ।

कम्मर इवादाता लोए संडासलोहाणं ॥ १६६८ ॥

²भोत्ता देहातीणं भोज्जत्तणतो णरो व्व भत्तस्स ।

संघातात्तत्तणतो अत्थी य अत्थी ³घरस्सेव ॥ १६६९ ॥

⁴जो कत्ताति स जीवो सज्झविरुद्धो त्ति ते मती होज्जा ।

मुत्तातिपसंगातो तं णो संसारिणो⁵ऽदोसो ॥ १६७० ॥

जातिस्सरो ण विगतो सरणातो बालजातिसरणो व्व ।

जध वा ⁶सदेसवत्तं णरो सरंतो विदेसम्मि ॥ १६७१ ॥

अध मण्णसि खणिओ वि हु सुमरति विण्णाणसंततिगुणातो ।

तहवि सरीरादण्णो सिद्धो विण्णाणसंताणो ॥ १६७२ ॥

ण य सव्वधेव खणियं णाणं पुव्वोवलद्धसरणातो ।

खणिओ ण सरति भूत जध जम्माणंतरविणट्ठो ॥ १६७३ ॥

जस्सेगमेगबंधणमेगंतेण खणियं च विण्णाणं ।

सव्वखणियविण्णाणं तस्साजुत्तं कदाचिदवि ॥ १६७४ ॥

जं सविसयणियतं चिय जम्माणंतरहतं च तं कध णु ।

णाहिति सुवहुअविण्णाणविसय ⁷खणभंगतादीणि ॥ १६७५ ॥

⁸गेण्हेज्ज सव्वभंगं जति य मती सविसयाणुमाणातो ।

तं पि ण जतोऽणुमाणं जुत्तं सत्ताइसिद्धीओ⁹ ॥ १६७६ ॥

जाणेज्ज वासणातो¹⁰ सा वि हु ¹¹वासेन्तवासणिज्जाणं ।

जुत्ता¹² समेच्च दोण्हं ण तु जम्माणंतरहतस्स ॥ १६७७ ॥

बहुविण्णाणप्पभवो जुगवमणेगत्यताऽधवेगस्स ।

विण्णाणावत्था वा पडुच्चवित्तीविघातो वा ॥ १६७८ ॥

विण्णाणखणविणासे दोसा इच्चादयो पसज्जंति ।

ण तु ठितसंभूतच्चुतविण्णाणमयम्मि जीवम्मि ॥ १६७९ ॥

तस्स विचित्तावरणक्खओवसमजाइं चित्तरूवाइं ।

खणियाणि य कालंतरावित्तीणि य महविधाणाइं ॥ १६८० ॥

¹ Repetition of gāthā 1568 । ² Repetition of gāthā 1569 ।

³ घडस्सेव-ता० । ⁴ Repetition of gāthā 1570 । ⁵ णो दोसो-मु०, ता० । ⁶ सदेहवत्तं-ता० ।

⁷ खयभं²-मु० । ⁸ गिण्हेज्ज-मु० । ⁹ सिद्धीय-ता० । ¹⁰ वासणाओ-को० । वासणा उ-मु० ।

¹¹ वासित्ता⁰-को०, मु० । ¹² जुतो-ता० ।

1 सती व तिर्य-सु० । सती व नीसरी-को० 2 सती-ता० । 3 तमन्-सु०, को० ।
 4 See gāthā 1609 । 5 त्रि मण्णि अरिष म्या उद्वह्नि त्रिष-को०, सु० । 6 शीह-हृत्सण-ता० ।

अथ किर ण सती परती णामयती णावि अणती सिद्धी ।
 भावणमवेकखती विद्यत । अथ शीह-6 हृत्सण ॥ १६२२ ॥

तं सव्वसुणसंकी मण्णसि मायावसं लोय ॥ १६२१ ॥
 भूतविसंखयती जीवातिसु का अथ सि ते बुद्धी ।

ण विद्यारिज्जवाहं मयतिं जं सव्वथा जतिं ॥ १६२० ॥
 भूतसु पुच्छ संका सुविणय-मायावसाहं होउव सि ।

वेवपवण य अरथ ण यणसी वेसिमा अरथ ॥ १६२७ ॥
 * त्रि मण्णि 5 पचमं अरिष व णरिष सि संसया पुच्छ ।

णामेण य मात्तेण य सव्वणं सव्वदरिसी ण ॥ १६२८ ॥
 * 4 आग्नि य विणोणं अतिरमरणविणयुक्केण ।

वत्थामि ण वदामि वदित्ता पउज्जयामि ॥ १६२७ ॥
 * ते पव्वदेवे सीहु विद्यती अणच्छति विणयामां ।

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सो सण्णो पव्वदेतो पचहिं सहे खडियणुहिं ॥ १६२६ ॥
 * विण्णसि संसयन्ती विणोणं अरमरणविणयुक्केण ।

देहण्णं मण्णसि ताणं च पवणमयमरथो ॥ १६२५ ॥
 विण्णणवण्णदीणं वेदपवणं 3 पदरथमविदेतो ।

वेवविहितं विहण्णति दण्णविदं च लोयसि ॥ १६२४ ॥
 देहण्णो व विणुं जमणिहोतादिपणकामस ।

सुहमसुत्तणतो कम्मणुणत्तस जीवस ॥ १६२३ ॥
 अथतो खरिसस व सती वि दूरादिमावतोऽसिहितो ।

कीस ण शीसति मात्तस । हृविषणुवज्जिद्धी सो 2 य ॥ १६२२ ॥
 सो जति देहादणो तो पविसेतो 1 विणिसरेतो व ।

केवलसुदितं केवलमावेण्णवमविकम ॥ १६२१ ॥
 तिन्नी संताणो सिं सव्वाररणपरिसंखे जं च ।

कञ्च वि कारुं वि य सञ्चसिं सधुं वि कञ्च वि ।
 ववा वधुं वञ्च परधुञ्चोऽयं सधुञ्चोऽयं ॥ १७०६ ॥
 सधुञ्चोऽयं व कञ्चो विमिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ।
 सधुञ्चोऽयं व कञ्चो विमिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ॥ १७०५ ॥
 सधुञ्चोऽयं विमिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ॥ १७०४ ॥
 विमिञ्चोऽयं व विमिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ।
 विमिञ्चोऽयं विमिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ॥ १७०३ ॥
 सधुञ्चोऽयं विमिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ॥ १७०२ ॥
 सधुञ्चोऽयं वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ॥ १७०१ ॥
 सधुञ्चोऽयं वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ॥ १७०० ॥
 सधुञ्चोऽयं वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ॥ १६९९ ॥
 सधुञ्चोऽयं वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ॥ १६९८ ॥
 सधुञ्चोऽयं वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ॥ १६९७ ॥
 सधुञ्चोऽयं वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ॥ १६९६ ॥
 सधुञ्चोऽयं वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ॥ १६९५ ॥
 सधुञ्चोऽयं वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ॥ १६९४ ॥
 सधुञ्चोऽयं वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि सञ्चसिञ्चो वि ॥ १६९३ ॥

किचेह विरदवोसिगुनचलवतऽखेविचलगाहं निपदाहं ।
 सदादेवो य गच्छा सोसादीदीयाहं गहगाहं ॥ १७०७ ॥
 सगता विवजजगी वा सव्जगदहं च किण सुगामि ।
 कि सुगता व सप्तम सगताहो कि व सिच्छव ॥ १७०८ ॥
 किम सपरोमयुद्धी कथं च तेषु परोपरमासिद्धी ।
 अथ परमदीप गगानि परमामिबिसेसण कती ॥ १७०९ ॥
 युगं कथं वा ते विण्णं होज ' दीहृदिकेसुसि ।
 जति युगं कावेकखा कथंण पुव्वामि काऽवेकखा ॥ १७१० ॥
 गामिबिण्णं वा जं बालसेहं तस्य काऽवेकखा ।
 गुल्लेसु वि २ कावेकखा परोपरं लोयणद्वीं व ॥ १७११ ॥
 कि ३ हृदिको दीहे दीहोतो च व किण दीहिमि ।
 कोष व ण खण्णको किण खण्णको ॥ १७१२ ॥
 कि काऽवेकखापु चिय होज मती वा सभाव पुवाप ।
 सो ४ मावो वि सभावो वंज्यापुवे ण सो जुतो ॥ १७१३ ॥
 होहं वि व ५ हृदिके वि व ण वु सता सेसवग्गा वा ॥ १७१४ ॥
 हंमरा हंमराभाव सुवविण्णयो हंमज दीहृदिके ।
 ण य सो गहो सतादेवोऽणवेकखा वहादीण ॥ १७१५ ॥
 वाऽवि अवकवऽवकवणमवकवयवविचखण्णजमणवेकवा ।
 सा ण मता सव्वेसु वि सेवेसु ण सुणता णाम ॥ १७१६ ॥
 किचि सती वथ परती वहुमयती किचि सिच्छासिद्धं पि ।
 जलदी वलदी पुसिती ६ णसं च ववहृदिरतो णसं ॥ १७१७ ॥
 होच्छयती पुण वाहिदिमिभित्तमेवोवययानो सव्वं ।
 होति सती जमभावो ण सिच्छति मिभित्तमावे वि ॥ १७१८ ॥
 अस्थितवहकान्णारा य फज्जायमवविचियं ।
 अथि वहे पडिवण्णं हंमरा सा कि ण खरिसिती ॥ १७१९ ॥

१ धर्म-त-० । २ धर्म-त-०, को-० । ३ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० । ४ धर्म-त-०, म-० । ५ पञ्चवक्त्र-०, म-०, को-० । ६ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।

॥ २६०७ ॥ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।
 धर्म-त-०, म-० ।
 ॥ २६०८ ॥ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।
 धर्म-त-०, म-० ।
 ॥ २६०९ ॥ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।
 धर्म-त-०, म-० ।
 ॥ २६१० ॥ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।
 धर्म-त-०, म-० ।
 ॥ २६११ ॥ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।
 धर्म-त-०, म-० ।
 ॥ २६१२ ॥ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।
 धर्म-त-०, म-० ।
 ॥ २६१३ ॥ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।
 धर्म-त-०, म-० ।
 ॥ २६१४ ॥ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।
 धर्म-त-०, म-० ।
 ॥ २६१५ ॥ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।
 धर्म-त-०, म-० ।
 ॥ २६१६ ॥ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।
 धर्म-त-०, म-० ।
 ॥ २६१७ ॥ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।
 धर्म-त-०, म-० ।
 ॥ २६१८ ॥ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।
 धर्म-त-०, म-० ।
 ॥ २६१९ ॥ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।
 धर्म-त-०, म-० ।
 ॥ २६२० ॥ अत्र-अ-०, को-०, म-० ।
 धर्म-त-०, म-० ।

णत्थि पर-मज्झभागा अप्पच्चक्खत्ततो मती होज्ज ।

णणु अक्खत्थावत्ती अप्पच्चक्खत्तहाणी वा ॥ १७४६ ॥

अत्थि अप्पच्चक्खं पि हु जध भवतो संसयातिविण्णाणं ।

अध णत्थि सुण्णता का कास व केणोवलद्धा वा ॥ १७४७ ॥

पच्चक्खेसु ण जुत्तो तुह भूमि-जलाणलेसु संदेहो ।

अणिलागासेसु भवे सो वि ण ¹ कज्जोणुमाणातो ॥ १७४८ ॥

अत्थि ² अदिस्सापादितफरिसातीणं गुणी गुणत्तणतो ।

रूवस्स घडो व्व गुणी जो तेसिं सोऽणिलो णामं ॥ १७४९ ॥

अत्थि वसुधातिभागं तोयस्स घडो व्व मुत्तिमत्तातो ।

जं भूताणं भाणं तं वोमं वत्त ! सुव्वत्तं ॥ १७५० ॥

एवं पच्चक्खादिप्पमाणसिद्धाई सोम्म ! पडिवज्ज ।

जीवसरीराधारोवयोगधम्माईं भूताईं ॥ १७५१ ॥

किध सज्जीवाईं मती तल्लिगातोऽणिलावसाणाईं ।

वोमं विमुत्तिभावादाधारो च्चव ण सजीवं ॥ १७५२ ॥

जम्म-जरा-जीवण-मरण-रोहणा-हारदोहलामयतो ।

रोग-तिगिच्छातीहि य णारि व्व सच्चेतणा तरवो ॥ १७५३ ॥

³ छिक्कप्परोइया ⁴ छिक्कमत्तसंकोयतो कुल्लिगो व्व ।

आसयसंचारातो विय-त ! वल्लीविताणाईं ॥ १७५४ ॥

सम्मादयो य सावप्पवोधसंकोयणादितोऽभिमया ⁵ ।

बउलातओ य सदातिविसय ⁶ कालोवलंभातो ॥ १७५५ ॥

मंसंकुरो व्व सामाणजातिरूवंकुरोवलंभातो ।

तरुण-विद्दुम-लवणो-वलादयो सासयावत्था ॥ १७५६ ॥

भूमिक्खत्तसाभावियसंभवतो द्दुहो व्व जलमुत्तं ।

अहवा मच्छो व्व सभाववोमसंभूतपातातो ॥ १७५७ ॥

अपरप्पेरिततिरियाणियमितदिग्गमणतोऽणिलो गो व्व ।

अणलो आहारातो विद्धि-विकारोवलंभातो ॥ १७५८ ॥

तणवोऽणभ्भातिविकारमुत्तजातित्ततोऽणिलंताईं ।

सत्थासत्थहताओ णिज्जीवसजीवरूवाओ ॥ १७५९ ॥

¹ ण जुत्तोणुमाणाओ-को०,मु० । ² अदिस्सा^०-मु०,अदिस्सा^०-को० । ³ छिक्कपरो-को०,मु० ।
⁴ मेत्त-को०,मु० । ⁵ भिमतो-ता० । ⁶ कालाव^०-ता० ।

* हिंसात् संसर्गसि लोभेन करा-संरगवियुक्तैः ।
 सो यथा पञ्चदशे पत्रे स हिंसात्सर्वे ॥ १०६९ ॥

सद्यो रतिरुत्तमं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ।
 वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ॥ १०६८ ॥

अस्य तु वा सौ हिंसात्सर्वे वा वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ॥ १०६७ ॥

अस्युत्तमं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ।
 वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ॥ १०६६ ॥

अस्युत्तमं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ।
 वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ॥ १०६५ ॥

अस्युत्तमं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ।
 वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ॥ १०६४ ॥

अस्युत्तमं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ।
 वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ॥ १०६३ ॥

अस्युत्तमं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ।
 वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ॥ १०६२ ॥

अस्युत्तमं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ।
 वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ॥ १०६१ ॥

अस्युत्तमं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ।
 वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ॥ १०६० ॥

अस्युत्तमं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ।
 वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं वाच्यं ॥ १०५९ ॥

[५]

- * ते पव्वइते सोतुं सुधम्मो¹ आगच्छती² जिणसगासं ।
वच्चाभि ण बंदामिं³ बंदित्ता पज्जुवासामि ॥ १७७० ॥
- * आभट्ठो य जिणेणं जाति-जरा-मरणविप्पमुक्केणं ।
णामेण य गोत्तेण य सव्वण्णू सव्वदरिसी णं ॥ १७७१ ॥
- * कि मण्णे जारिसो इधभवम्मि सो तारिसो परभवे वि ।
वेतपताण य अत्थं ण याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥ १७७२ ॥
- कारणसरिसं कज्जं वीयस्सेवंकुधो⁴ त्ति मण्णंतो ।
इधभवसरिसं सव्वं जमवेसि परे वि⁵ तदजुत्तं ॥ १७७३ ॥
- जाति सरो⁶ संगतो भूत्तणओ⁷ सरिसवाणुलित्ततो ।
संजायति गोलोमाऽविलोमसंजोगतो दुव्वा ॥ १७७४ ॥
- ⁸ इति रुक्खायुव्वंते जोणिविघ्राणे य विसरिसेहितो ।
दीसति जम्हा जम्मं सुधम्म !⁹ तं णायमेगंतो ॥ १७७५ ॥
- अधव जतो च्चिय वीयाणुरुवजम्मं मतं ततो चव ।
¹⁰ जीवं गेण्ह भवातो भवतरे चित्तपरिणामं ॥ १७७६ ॥
- जेण भवंकुरवीयं कम्मं चित्तं च तं जतोभिहितं ।
¹¹ हेतुविचित्तणओ¹² भवंकुरविचित्तया तेणं ॥ १७७७ ॥
- जति पडिवण्णं कम्मं हेतुविचित्ततो विचित्तं च ।
तो तप्फलं पि चित्तं¹³ पवज्ज संसारिणा सोम्म ॥ १७७८ ॥
- चित्तं संसारित्तं विचित्तकम्मफलभावतो हेतू ।
इध चित्तं चित्ताणं कम्माण फलं व लोगम्मि ॥ १७७९ ॥
- चित्ता कम्मपरिणती पोसगलपरिणामतो जथा वज्झा¹⁴ ।
कम्माण चित्तता पुण तद्धेतुविचित्तभावातो ॥ १७८० ॥

¹ सुहुम-मु० । सुहम्म-को० । ² आगच्छइ-को०, मु० । ³ बंदामी-मु० । ⁴ कुरोव्व-ता० ।
⁵ तमजुत्तं-मु०, को० । ⁶ सिगाओ-मु०, को० । ⁷ सासवाणु-मु०, को० । ⁸ जति- ता० ।
⁹ तो-मु० । ¹⁰ जीयं-ता० । ¹¹ वियत्तणतो-ता० । ¹² वियत्तता-ता० । ¹³ पव्वज्ज-ता० ।
¹⁴ बज्झं-ता ।

अथ इयं सफलं कामं न परं तो सवया न परिषत् ।
 अति ते सफलमाजी परं वि तो परिषत् ज्ञाना ॥ १०८२ ॥
 हि शोभितसिंघं मयुया भाषाभाषिकामकारिणी संति ।
 कामफलं हि इयमवपरिषं पक्षिउज परलोभा ॥ १०८१ ॥
 अथ कामाभावे वि 2 कर्ता भवतेरं परिषत् व तदभावे ।
 लोकार्णवो य भवो जति तो भाषो वि तव चैव ॥ १०८० ॥
 कामाभावे वि मती को दोषो होउज जति समाधीस्य ।
 जय कारणाणिकेव घडाविकउज समाधीन ॥ १०८५ ॥
 होउज समाधी वस्तु लोकार्णवो व वस्तुवन्ती वा ।
 जति वस्तुं नश्य तसोऽनुभवलक्ष्मीतो खयुक्तं व ॥ १०८६ ॥
 अन्वतमणुवल्की वि अथ तसो अस्थि नस्थि कि काम ।
 हेतु व तदस्थि तो भाषु कामस्य वि स पूव ॥ १०८७ ॥
 कामस्य वाग्निहेतुं हेतु 3 समाधी वि हेतु को दोषो ।
 लोचं व सो समाधी परिषो पूव च को हेतु ॥ १०८८ ॥
 सो मुतोऽस्यतो वा जति मुतो तो न सवया संनिषो ।
 परिषातो पूव हि व न वृहेहेतुं जति अमुतो ॥ १०८९ ॥
 उचकरणाभावातो न य भवति सुधम्म सो अमुतो वि 4 ।
 कउरस्य मुत्तिमतो सुहेतुवितोतितो चैव ॥ १०९० ॥
 अथवाऽकार्णवो विद्य समाधी तो वि 5 परिषत् कर्तो ।
 किमकार्णवो न भवे विपरिषत्तो कि व विच्छिन्तो ॥ १०९१ ॥
 अथ 6 वि समाधी धम्मो वस्तुस्य न सो वि परिषत्तो लोचं ।
 उपात-द्वि-धम्म विता व वस्तुपउजवाया ॥ १०९२ ॥
 हेतुं विता जतो होति समाधी वि को दोषो ॥ १०९३ ॥

1 व अहं जोगी कवगो^०सुं, को० । 2 परमो वासवगुणं शब्दगुण-सुं, को० । 3 दृष्टिं
 जति-सुं । 4 गणवगुण-रा० 5 वा०-रा० । 6 कदमिणं सिद्ध-सुं, को० । 7 य-रा० ।

काकादरणी व्व संक्षिप ! महं वयगगती 7 व पहिबवज ॥ 9८३० ॥
 शब्दगुणगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगो व किम व मुक्ती सिं ।

जुनी न समुच्छेदो दौजव मती 6 किम मतं सिद्धं ॥ 9८२९ ॥
 पुस्तैण तन्नियो विचय जुनी ज नी वि संव्यभक्तुणं ।

पुक्ती अणुवमगो शब्दगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगो ॥ 9८२८ ॥
 वं वातीवगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व शि जनी य संक्षिपे ।

तं गणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व ॥ 9८२७ ॥
 5 एवं शब्दच्छेदो कोटिगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व ॥

गगो वि विचय स विविधो कृमगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण ॥ 9८२६ ॥
 अणुदृष्टिगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व मती न तं अहं ।

जतिशब्दवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व मती ॥ 9८२५ ॥
 अथ शब्दवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व मती ॥

प्रावति शिच्छो तस्मि य तदवश्यं गति 4 गिज्जगुणं ॥ 9८२४ ॥
 एवं सि शब्दवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व मती ॥

जीवजीवगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व मती ॥ 9८२३ ॥
 दृष्टवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व मती ।

गणव य शब्दशब्दवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व मती ॥ 9८२२ ॥
 दृष्टि व 3 जति कम्मकरो न विरोधो गणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व ॥

जीवो जीवगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व मती ॥ 9८२१ ॥
 परमो 2 शब्दगुणं विचय शब्दगुणं कवगुणवत्तमगुण व ।

जीवस्य य कम्मस्य य गणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व मती ॥ 9८२० ॥
 नी कि जीवगुणं व 1 जोगी अथ कवगुणवत्तमगुण व ।

वत्तमगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व मती ॥ 9८१९ ॥
 अथवे कवगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व मती ॥

तय दृती संवागो कवगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व ॥ 9८१८ ॥
 अणुवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुणवत्तमगुण व मती ॥

सुवसे कोऽवकाशो स्यात् । तिलोपसिद्धं गती किं पशे ।
 कम्मलवृतावधामादिपरिणामादीहि मणिवसिद्धं ॥ १८४४ ॥
 किं सिकारिमसकं मलिय । भुवि चेतणं च किमकं ।
 अथ से^१ विसेधमो चेतणं तथ मतां किरिया ॥ १८४५ ॥
 कतादिचेतणो वा सिकारियोऽयं मतो कुललो व ॥
 २ देहकंदणतो वा पच्चकखं चतपुरिसो व ॥ १८४६ ॥
 २ देहकंदणहेतुं होज्ज पयसो ति सो वि णाकिरिणं ।
 होज्जादिद्धो व मतो^३ तदकवित्ते णणु समण ॥ १८४७ ॥
 कवित्तिम स देहे वच्चो त्पकंदणे पुणो हेतुं ।
 पतिणिपवपरिपकंदणमचेतणणं ण वि य ज्जेत् ॥ १८४८ ॥
 हेतुं किरिया भवथसेस कम्मरिहिवसेस किणिमित्ता सो ।
 णणु तत्तातिपरिणामो^४ अथ सिद्धं तथ सो वि ॥ १८४९ ॥
 किं सिद्धंअपरतो ण गती धम्मसिधकायविरहातो ।
 सो गतिउवयगहकरो लोमिम्म जमसिध णालोण ॥ १८५० ॥
 लोमसेस सिध विवकखो सुद्धचेतणो पडसेस अथलो व ॥
 स पडवित्तिं चिच्च मतो ण सिसेधातो तदणुक्खो ॥ १८५१ ॥
 तदहा धम्मोऽयममा लोमपरिच्छेवकारिणो ज्जेत्ता ।
 देधरिणसेसं पुंछे लोमोऽलोमो ति को भवो ॥ १८५२ ॥
 लोमविमगाभावे पडिधाताभावेतोऽणवस्थतो ।
 संववहरारोभायो संवधाभावेतो होज्जा ॥ १८५३ ॥
 परिणुग्राहत्तणतो ण गती परतो जलविधं झपसेस ।
 जो गमणणुग्राहिया^५ सो धम्मो लोमपरिमणो ॥ १८५४ ॥
 अस्थि परिमाणकारी लोमसेस पंचयमावतोऽवसेसं ।
 णणुं पि व णयसेसालोमस्थिते य सोऽवसेसं ॥ १८५५ ॥
 पडण पसत्तमेव अणतो ते च णो जतो छट्ठी ।
 देध कत्तिलकखणायं कचुरणरथंवरं अण ॥ १८५६ ॥

१ लिप्यभिन्ना-सु० । २ लिप्याभिन्ना-सु० । ३ अक्षुद्धि-को० । ४ अक्षुद्धि-सु० । ५ संप्रकाश-वा० ।

पञ्चसु पञ्चकख विषय चक्षुषि विषय चक्षुषि ॥ १८३९ ॥
 मा क्व संसयमेते ५ सुदरे मण्यतिभिन्नावातीप ।
 व म कवाइ वि परिभासुवोवित वी संसते वसु ॥ १८३८ ॥
 सच्छेदवाशिना गुण देवा विवन्ममववना य ।
 म वरति इतिमि संक्षया सुवमणा वि ॥ १८३७ ॥
 सं मण्यसि भादेया परतेना इकखसंप्रकाश ४ य ।
 वेतपदात्त य अथ म यण्यसि वेसिमो अथ ॥ १८३६ ॥
 * कि मणे अथि देवा उदाहृ मथि वि संसयो वुज्जं ।
 मण्यो य योत्तु य संवण्ण संवदरेसि म ॥ १८३५ ॥
 * आगच्छे य विवण्ण जादे-वरा-मरणविण्यसुकेण ।
 वच्यमि म वंदमि वदिता पञ्चवयसिमि ॥ १८३४ ॥
 * वे पञ्चदेवे सीवु मथिओ आगच्छेती विण्यसामे ।

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सी संमणे पञ्चदेवो ३ अक्षुद्धि सहे खलियसवेहि ॥ १८३३ ॥
 * विण्यमि संसयसि विवण्ण अ-मरणविण्यसुकेण ।
 सयरीरेतरेयरावो मणु वी सी वयमोक्खो वि ॥ १८३२ ॥
 इह वंये मोक्खमि य मी य म कज्जा वती कुवो चव ।
 वेतपदात्त च पुंस म सदेय मण्यसि वी संका ॥ १८३१ ॥
 म हे वदे सयरीरेसस पि २ यस्तिप्यावहृतिरेवमातीण ।
 १ ययसि व मण्ये विद्धिसो वेणवमि ॥ १८३० ॥
 परिसियदेवेऽपरा विषय मता सुविचिरहिबवती ।
 काजण्णवितण्णती पडमसरीरे व तदजुत्तं ॥ १८२९ ॥
 भवती सिद्धी वि मती वेणविसिद्धसंभवा जती ।
 अथ म मरणोती अण्णोतीऽवसपवणं वि ॥ १८२८ ॥
 विवण्णण्णोती वा चोमातीणं पडणं पण्णवेऽजा ।
 तव कम्मण्णण्णोती पुण्णिकयमावती वा वि ॥ १८२७ ॥
 मण्णवण्णोती वा अण्णवण्णण्णवणं म ज्जे सं ।

वा गुण अतिरिच्यो विचय जीवो सव्व 4 विषयाविषयान्तो ।
 देवियसिम्भो भावो 11 वा 11 १८४ ॥
 तद्वदस्य वि सयान्तो सव्वान्तं वि भावस्यान्तो ।
 उवलस्येयसिम्भो वा 3 वादे तद्वदलस्य ॥ १८३ ॥
 सुवाविषयवतो भावलिङ्गितिरियादे ऊच्यो व 1
 उपयारधेवततो तं पञ्चकखमिणितियं तच्च 2 ॥ १८२ ॥
 अथवा जीमितियत् पञ्चकखं किं तदेव पञ्चकखं ।
 अथ सीदितिरिचयसिम्भं वा य सव्वपञ्चकखं ॥ १८१ ॥
 च कासति पञ्चकखं पञ्चकखं तं वि सयान्तं लोप ।
 किं च सयपञ्चकखं तं पञ्चकखं तं पञ्चकखं पञ्चकखं ॥ १८० ॥
 सह पञ्चकखस्यान्तो जीवादेय व 1 भावपुं १०६ ।
 सव्वकखस्यभावातो वाऽनुवलयो विभावातो वा ॥ १८९ ॥
 वे गुण सुविशेषकला भवेय वि किं वे महैतव 1
 विजासतोवापयणफलदेविसिद्धीपुं वाऽसति ॥ १८८ ॥
 तं सयान्तं पञ्चकखं देवा च्छेदोवायो तयान्तं वि ।
 वेवतणपुं य अरुं वा यान्तो वेविसो अरुं ॥ १८७ ॥
 * किं सयान्तं भवेय अतिथि अतिथि वि संसयो वुच्चं ।
 वासोपुं य वासोपुं य सव्वकखं सव्वकखं वा ॥ १८६ ॥
 * अथवा य विषयो वादे-वरा-भावाविषयस्यकखं ।
 च्छेदोवापुं वा च्छेदोवापुं पञ्चकखं वा ॥ १८५ ॥
 * वे पञ्चकखं सयान्तं अकथितो अकथितो विषयान्तं ।

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* विषयान्तं संसयान्तं विषयान्तं वर-भावाविषयस्यकखं ।
 वा सयान्तं पञ्चकखं अकथितं सव्व संसयान्तं ॥ १८४ ॥

¹ संस्कृत-तः । ² Repetition of gāthā 1578. ³ गतिवत् च-तः । ⁴ In this gāthā comes before the previous one. ⁵ मयरा-सुं । ⁶ तिह् ओ सह खं-सुं । तिह् च सह खं-को ।

- * ति मणो गुण-गव अस्थि व णस्थि चि संसयो वृद्धं ।
वृषवण य अस्थ ण यणयो वेसियो अस्थो ॥ १९०७ ॥
- * आसिद् य तिणो जाद-अर-मरणवियुक्तं ।
णसुण य योत्तण य सवणु सवदरिसो ण ॥ १९०६ ॥
- * वे पवदरे सोढु अयलयाता आगच्छती तिणयाता ।
वयसि ण वदसि वदिसा पञ्चवयसि ॥ १९०५ ॥

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- * तिणसि संसयसि तिणो अर-मरणवियुक्तं ।
सो संसयो पवदरेती तीह् ⁶ सस खडियसवेहि ॥ १९०४ ॥
- ⁴ ति सवणु चि मती पञ्चकख सवसंसयच्छेता ।
⁵ मयरागदोसरहिरो तिणियागवतो सोत्स ॥ १९०३ ॥
- ² मयरागदोसोसोहागवतो सञ्चमणविवदं ³ च ।
सव चि म वयण जाणयसञ्चयवयण वा ॥ १९०२ ॥
- सञ्च चेतमकथिप । सह वयणातोऽवसेवयण व ।
सवणुत्तणती वा अणुमतसवणुत्तणु व ॥ १९०१ ॥
- अञ्चयदुविषता वे तिण्य-गरी णरग चि वेऽभिमत ।
ते ण वती सुसोवखणपरिसससिस ण ते देकख ॥ १९०० ॥
- पावकसस पकिटस सोढो कसतोऽवसेस व ।
सोति सुव वेसिमता णरदया अथ मती हेत्ता ॥ १८९९ ॥
- कवमणुविरहिरेस सवमणुमणोसोत्तं अरु ।
णारागसञ्चोवसि य वदसि चं वेण वे सोति ॥ १८९८ ॥
- गुवोवखसंभव 'सरुतो वणुलो व यमोती ।
अथ तिणोत्तरेती तिणितमकखस करणदं ॥ १८९७ ॥
- कतकतरो व सिद्धी कुमणोच्चवतोसस ॥ १८९६ ॥
- ण हि पञ्चकख यमोत्तरेण वदममोत्तरेणोत्तरे ।

1° कर्त्तृत्वे-सु० । 2° पण्डित-तान् । 3° अण्ड-तान् । 4° निम्न-तान् । 5° Repetition of gāthā 1786. 6° सुता तौ-तान् । 7° काम ति-सु०, को० । 8° लोकार्णव-तान् । 9° स कामजीवण-सु०, को० । 10° वाण-तान् ।

गण्डिषु पूर्णं पठं साधारणमापव दो वि विण्णदं ।
 द्वेज न वा काम विद्य साधारणी भवपुण्योऽपि ॥ १९०८ ॥
 पुण्यकर्त्तृः सुभवा तदवमज्जीवककर्त्तृषो द्वेषा ।
 तस्यैव खद्यु सोकरो 2° पण्डितोऽपि ॥ १९०९ ॥
 पाण्डित्येऽपि तदवमज्जीवककर्त्तृषो सुभवा ।
 तस्यैव खद्यु सोकरो 3° अण्डधर्मात्तौ ॥ १९१० ॥
 साधारणपठण्णद्वि व अथ साधारणमापवतान् ।
 उक्तकर्त्तृषोऽपि तस्यैव य पुण्यपठकः ॥ १९११ ॥
 एवं विद्य दो विण्णदं द्वेज व साधारणी च व ।
 भवपुण्योऽपि भवपुण्योऽपि तदवमज्जीवककर्त्तृषो 4° ॥ १९१२ ॥
 5° द्वेज साधारणी वर्यु लोकार्णवता व वर्युधर्मा वा ।
 जति वर्यु धर्मा तदवमज्जीवककर्त्तृषो खद्युक् व ॥ १९१३ ॥
 अन्वयवमपुण्यवल्की वि अथ तद्वि अन्वय वि काम ।
 द्वेष व तदवमज्जीवककर्त्तृषो वि स एव ॥ १९१४ ॥
 कामस्य वासाधो द्वेज साधारणी वि द्वेष को दोषो ।
 पतिविपत्तिकाकारो न य सो कता भवस्यैव ॥ १९१५ ॥
 सुतोऽपि व तयो जति सुतो 6° तदवमज्जीवककर्त्तृषो ।
 7° काम वि सहावो वि य जति वाऽपि न कता तौ ॥ १९१६ ॥
 द्वेज वास वि व जति कज्जातिवो व सुविभवा ।
 अथ सो लोकार्णवः 8° तौ खरस्यैव द्वेष ॥ १९१७ ॥
 अथ वर्युणो स धर्मा परिणामो तौ स 9° जीवककर्त्तृषो ।
 पुण्योऽपि विण्णदो 10° कार्णवकज्जातिवो सो ॥ १९१८ ॥
 कर्त्तृषो कार्णवो द्वेजो न कज्जातिवो ।
 काम साधारणी वि य पठिष्यति च ॥ १९१९ ॥
 न विद्य द्वेजोऽपि कर्त्तृषो वि य सुसाधुभवतो ।
 पठिष्यत पुण्यपठं साधारणी विण्णदो ॥ १९२० ॥

5 काम्यो-तो-1 ० ७-को-1

1 ०-को-1 2 पत्र-तो-1 3 ०-को-1 4 ०-को-1

७ य पापारण्येव कामं तपकारणमावा ॥ १९३४ ॥
 एवं चिद्य विद्यते जीवन्मया यत्तपयन्नेव च ।
 हेतव ० य स हीनतरती कर्मसुसुभरती महत्तो य ॥ १९३३ ॥
 देहे पावत्यकती पुण्यकारिसे व मुक्तिमावाती ।
 विद्यतेतवव्यापण्यवलयपकारिसे अवेकवेतव ॥ १९३२ ॥
 तव वदस्यपापण्यपारिप्रायमावादिहेतुव्याव ७ तय ।
 सोकषप्यारिभती अथ पुण्यपारिप्रायमावा ॥ १९३१ ॥
 काम्यपकारिसमाहितं तदवस्यं पारिप्रायमावाती ।
 पुण्यवकारिसमाहितं देवदेवहेतुतपण्यमावा ॥ १९३० ॥
 इय क्वचित् सुहेतुव्यकारणत्वं य 5 काम्यो सिद्धे ।
 हेतुं समवायिकारणमावातं कामं चि को वेयो ॥ १९२९ ॥
 ७ सुहेतुं हेतुं कामं चिद्य किञ्च तप जीवो चि ।
 अथ सुख-दुःखतीतं कारणमावादेकं चि ॥ १९२८ ॥
 ती किं देहादीनां सुतत्पणती तय देवदे 4 मुत् ।
 देहाविकरुतसुचिचित्ती य 3 मणिते पुणो मणिते ॥ १९२७ ॥
 एतौ चिद्य तं मुत् सुतवलापणती अथ कुंयो ।
 फलमेती सोऽवस्यं सकारणो कारणं कामं ॥ १९२६ ॥
 हेतु तय चिद्य किं काम्यो ७ च हेतुव्यपण्यो चि ।
 सिद्धे सुहेतुविकारणपण्योति अवेह तय कामं ॥ १९२५ ॥
 किं अथ सुतमसुतस्य कारणं तय सुहेतुव्य कामं ।
 च सोऽयं सपञ्चजयो कर्तव्य 2 परपञ्चजो सेयो ॥ १९२४ ॥
 सत्वं तुल्यवृत्तं जति ती कर्तव्यपण्यवता केय ।
 किं कर्तव्य-कारणपण्यवता वदुत्तुणो तस्य ॥ १९२३ ॥
 ७ हि सत्त्वपण्येव सिद्धो वा कारणं अथ मत् वे ।
 पण्यमेव 1 तं चि हे अथ क्वचित् पाण्येव ती ॥ १९२२ ॥
 सुहे-दुःखकारणं जति कामं कर्तव्यं तदपण्येव य ।
 परमाणवी वदस्य व कारणमिह पुण्यमावादे ॥ १९२१ ॥
 सुहे-दुःखण्य कारणपण्येव कर्तव्यमावातीऽवस्यं ।

- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-१ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-२ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-३ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-४ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-५ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-६ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-७ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-८ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-१० ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-११ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-१२ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-१३ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-१४ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-१५ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-१६ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-१७ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-१८ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-१९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची
- ॥ १९९९ ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची-२० ॥ अतिथि-भाषण-सूची

* आसि य विण जति-जरा-मरणविपुसकेण ।
 गणानु य शक्तिण य संवत् १०१३ ॥ १९०३ ॥

* ते पवडते सति पमसो आनच्छे विणसामि ।
 वत्तसि ण वदसि वदितो पउजवसामि ॥ १९०२ ॥

[११]

* छिण्णिम संसयसि विण जरा-मरणविपुसकेण ।
 सो सण्ण पवडतो तिहि तु सह खडियसतोहि ॥ १९०१ ॥

असति व परसि जेण जमिणाहेत्तिति सणकाससि ।
 तदेसंखे संवत् १९०० ॥ परलेण ॥ १९०० ॥

तेऽवत्थिजसस केण विजयो धम्मो मणुसण्णो ।
 2 वत्थेच्छेते ण मतो 3 संवत् १०१३-सू० १ ॥ १९६९ ॥

असतो णसि पसति होउव व जति होहि खरविषण्णससि ।
 ण य संवत् १९६८ ॥ १९६८ ॥

मणुपुहेलणणसो सुत्तितपरलेणससतो समथ ।
 जीवत्थेऽवत्थण्णो णहेमतो णव 1 परलेणो ॥ १९६७ ॥

संवाण्णवत्थो तथेहे-परलेणजीवाण्ण ॥ १९६६ ॥

वत्तवत्थो णसो पत्तवत्थो समुत्तवो समथ ।
 एव उण्णत-वत्थ-पुवत्थससहेव मत्त संवत् ॥ १९६५ ॥

कण्णितेदवत्थेण ण जति ण य वति णो सो जिउतो ।
 उवत्तति कुंमाणारससिपत्तवत्थकत्थेण ॥ १९६४ ॥

हेव पत्तु विउत्तणार-ससिपत्तवत्थविजयसमपत्त ।
 कुंयो ति जतो वत्थो पत्तु-विउत्तिति-पुवत्थण्णो ॥ १९६३ ॥

कव-र-स-वा-वा-फासा संवत् १०१३-सू० १ ।
 उण्णितवत्तिते कवत्तवत्थो वत्त वत्त ॥ १९६२ ॥

अथो वत्थवत्तो विणसि वतो ण होति कुंयो वत्त ।

* किं मण्णे णेव्वाणं अत्थि णत्थि त्ति संसयो तुज्झं ।
 वेतपताण य अत्थं ण याणसी तेसिमो अत्थो ॥ १९७४ ॥

मण्णसि किं दीवस्स व णासो णेव्वाणमस्स जीवस्स ।
 दुवखक्खयादिरूवा किं होज्ज व से सतोऽवत्था ॥ १९७५ ॥

अध्वाऽणात्तित्तणतो खस्स व किं कम्म-जीवजोगस्स ।
 अविजोगातो ण भवे संसाराभाव एव त्ति ॥ १९७६ ॥

पडिवज्ज मंडिओ इव विजोगमिह ¹जीवकम्मजोगस्स ।
 तमणातिणो वि कंचण-धातूण व णाणकिरियाहिं ॥ १९७७ ॥

जं णारगातिभावो संसारो णारगातिभिण्णो य ।
 को ²जीवो ³तो मण्णासि तण्णासे जीवणासो त्ति ॥ १९७८ ॥

ण हि णारगातिपज्जायमेत्तणासम्मि सव्वधा णासो ।
 जीवइव्वस्स मतो मुद्दाणासे व हेमस्स ॥ १९७९ ॥

कम्मकतो संसारो तण्णासे तस्स जुज्जते णासो ।
 जीवत्तमकम्मकतं तण्णासे तस्स को णासो ॥ १९८० ॥

ण विकाराणुवलंभादागासं पिव विणासधम्मो सो ।
 इव णासिणो विकारो दीसति कुंभस्स वाऽवयवा ॥ १९८१ ॥

कालंतरणासी वा घडो व्व कतकादितो मती होज्जा ।
 णो पद्वंसाभावो भुवि तद्धम्मा वि जं णिच्चो ॥ १९८२ ॥

अणुदाहरणमभावो खरसंगं पिव मती ण तं जम्हा ।
 कुंभविणासविसिट्ठो भावो च्चिय पोग्गलमयो सो ॥ १९८३ ॥

⁴किं वेगतेण कतं पोग्गलमेत्तविलयम्मि जीवस्स ।
 किं णिव्वत्तित्तमधियं णभसो घडमेत्तविलयम्मि ॥ १९८४ ॥

दव्वामुत्तत्तणतो मुत्तो णिच्चो णभं व दव्वतया ।
 णणु विभुतात्तिपसंगो एवं सति णाणुमाणातो ॥ १९८५ ॥

⁵को वा णिच्चग्गाहो सव्वं चिय विभव-भंग-ठित्तिमइयं ।
 पज्जायंतरमेत्तण्णादणिच्चातिववदेसो ॥ १९८६ ॥

ण य सव्वधा विणासोऽणलस्स परिणामतो पयस्सेव ।
 कुंभस्स क्वालान व त्थाविकारोवलंभातो ॥ १९८७ ॥

¹ कम्मजीवजोगस्स-मु०, को० । ² जीवा-ता० । ³ तं-मु०, को० । ⁴ Repetition of gāthā 1839 । ⁵ Repetition of gāthā 1843 ।

१ वे-वा० । २ वाण तस्य-वा० । ३ वसंत संत तमाह-मु०, वसंत संत तथाह-को० ।
 ४ तिस्रो-वा० । ५ वखा-वा० । ६ वा० ।

१ वाण तस्य-वा० ।

* त्रिणिश संवयतिं त्रिण वर-परणिवृत्तुहेण ।
 सो समणो पवडतो तिहिं व सहे वंठियवतेहिं ॥ २०२४ ॥

णणसवणत्ततो व पुसंति वीतरणोदीससण ।
 तस्यणियमणियं वा सुतसुहे को पसंणोऽथ ॥ २०२३ ॥

पुं व पि होउव सुतो तिससुहेउकखणं व तदेवथ ।
 तं वो पिणिय्याहे वरुहा पुणोपरक्याहे ॥ २०२२ ॥

ण वसंत अवसंतं ति वा सुतो णणसरीरणाहणतो ।
 कुसणोविसेसाण पि य वतो सतं संवविसं ति ॥ २०२१ ॥

५ वुखाऽवति व संतं णणणिविंविंसुसववाहे ॥ २०२० ॥
 वावति वा त्रिवातो वासहेथो ववतोमिहे संतं ।

ण पुसोउव वीतरणं वीणिणमिहेवरविसेसा ४ ॥ २०१९ ॥
 व व ३ वसंतं तं संतमाहे वासहेतो सहेहे पि ।

तेणसरीरणाहो सुतो वीवो व खरसिंण ॥ २०१८ ॥
 णणिसेवतो य अण्णिसं वडिहे च व पन्वओ वेण ।

असरीरववहेसो अण्णो व वतो तिसेवातो ॥ २०१७ ॥
 वेणवण २ य अथं व सुहे वण्णिसिं वण्णं तं सुण्णु ।

वाहे व पुसंति वाहे कुसससरीरं ति को दोसो ॥ २०१६ ॥
 ण्णो असरीरो त्रिवथ सुहे-वुक्खाहे पिणिय्याहे च ।

तदसोखो णणसिंण व सोक्खोणावणिसिंण व व सुव ॥ २०१५ ॥
 व हे वडे १ ससरीरसिंण पिणिय्यावहेतिरेवणाहे च व ।

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