Parārthānumāna

parārthānumāna (T. gzhan don rjes dpag; C. tabi liang 他比量) is translated as "inference for others," etc. It is a type of inference (anumāna) that is contrasted with "inference for oneself" (svārthānumāna).

John Dunne states:

Pramāṇa Theorists generally speak of two forms of inference: “inference-for-oneself (svārthānumāna) and “inference-for-others” (parārthānumāna). The former is simply an inferential cognition: one looks at a smokey room, for example, and (with other conditions in place), one infers that fire is present. In contrast, an inference-for-others is one that is stated verbally so as to induce an inferential cognition in another person. In other words, this latter “inference” (which is actually a series of statements and not an inference) is meant to result in another person having his own inference-for-oneself with regard to the question at hand. In this sense, inference-for-oneself lies at the core of these thinkers’ inferential theory. But ironically, the structural elements that are necessary for one to have an inference-for-oneself are primarily explored in discussions of inference-for-others.

Sources

• Dunne, John D. (2004), Foundations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy, Wisdom Publications 

External links

• gzhan don rjes dpag, Christian-Steinert Dictionary